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THE JAKHONTOV PAPERS: RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS (1914-1916) - - - - - - *Kazimierz Grzybowski*

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THE JAKHONTOV PAPERS: RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS (1914-1916)

by Kazimierz Grzybowski

A SET of documents of exceptional interest has recently been added to the collections of the Library of Congress. They are the Jakhontov Papers,[1] consisting of reports on the meetings of the Council of Ministers of Russia during the period preceding the revolution of February 1917, with various documents and notes. All of these reports and documents were classified as secret and bear notations assigning them to three respective categories: "secret," "very secret," and "top secret." The largest part of this collection deals with the reform of the government in Poland in connection with the Manifesto To The Poles issued on August 14, 1914, by Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the reigning tsar and, at the beginning of World War I, Commander in Chief of the Russian Armies.

I.

The Jakhontov Papers are a primary source for two questions: the history of the reconstitution of Poland after World War I, and the functioning of the highest echelons of the Russian tsarist government in the last two years before the revolution.

The issues dealt within the Jakhontov Papers acquired a new poignancy for the history of the reconstitution of Poland, owing to the changes in the morphology of Europe after World War II. The renascence of Poland in 1918 was a development independent of the policies of the Russian government. At the time when Poland's fate was being decided Russia was involved in revolution and civil wars. Poland, as she emerged in 1918 and shaped her frontiers in the course of the next two years, carried no stamp of political ideas and decisions made in St. Petersburg. At present the situation has fundamentally changed. In many respects the Poland of today has been formed by the decisions of Moscow. Her frontiers, demography, social structure, régime, and leadership have been dictated by the Soviet government. In the political set-up which emerged after World War II Russo-Polish relations assumed anew that degree of importance and intimacy which characterized them before the downfall of monarchy in Russia.

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[1] The documents acquired by the Library of Congress were assembled by Arkadi Nikolaievitch Jakhontov, former chief secretary of the chancellery of the Council of Ministers.

In addition the debates on the Polish question held in the highest government centers in Russia, involving the tsar, the council of ministers, and Russian parliamentary institutions (the Duma and the State Council) provide an insight into the operation of the Russian government and mutual relations between various centers of authority. At this point the Council of Ministers is of crucial importance.[2] To what extent its position, role, and relationship to the throne were changed by the creation of the Russian parliament, which in addition to its legislative and controlling powers (budget and conscription) was also the instrument of public opinion, is central to the study of the Russian constitutional régime of that period, and reveals the veritable meaning of the reform of 1906.

A Soviet collection containing documents on Russo-Polish relations during the first two years of World War I, published by the Archival Service of Soviet Russia (*Tsentr-Arkhiv*) in 1926, must be used as a complementary source to the Jakhontov Papers.[3] It was designed to show that the independence of Poland was solely due to the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty, and that neither the Imperial government of Russia nor its western allies ever seriously considered the reconstitution of Poland as an independent state. The secondary purpose of the Soviet collection was to prove that certain Polish leaders, active during the war, supported Russian domination of Poland.[4] These two theses have since become axiomatic to the ethos of Soviet-Polish relations.[5]

The Soviet collection, which appeared as one of the many publications denouncing the policies of Imperial Russia and her allies, passed almost unnoticed. Political bias, so obvious from the selection of the documents, placed their reliability in doubt. Even in Poland, where the explosive material which it contained might have been useful to internal politics, the *Tsentr-Arkhiv* publication received little attention. In the political climate of Poland after World War I, Russo-Polish collaboration was of little interest and had little influence on the political careers of Polish leaders, a fact noted with surprise by the compilers of the Soviet publication.[6] Now, with the release of the Jakhontov Papers, it is possible to confirm the authenticity of individual documents and to gauge the extent of the omissions. Also, the Soviet collection contains a larger number of documents and systematically covers the entire period.

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[2] The Council of Ministers of Russia was created in 1857, and its organization was established by the imperial decree in 1861. It consisted of ministers and other members appointed by the tsar. Prior to 1905 it was a consultative body without special jurisdiction. The decree of October 19, 1905 reorganized the Council to form the new constitutional regime.

[3] N. M. Lapinski, ed., *Russko-Polskie otnoshenia v period mirovoi voiny, Tsentr-Arkhiv* (Moskva, 1926).

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[5] E.g. The Preamble to the Polish Six-Year Plan, Law of April 19, 1950, *D.U.* 21/179.

II.

The Grand Duke's Manifesto of August 14, 1914, gave an entirely new perspective to the question of the future of Poland. It recognized Polish national aspirations, promised to unite the partitioned country, stated, somewhat vaguely, the principle of Polish self-government. Its promises were modest indeed, but its political implications were quite unfathomable. For the first time since the reign of Alexander I, the Russian government addressed itself to the Polish nation, openly acknowledged the identity of Polish and Russian interests, and called for the cooperation of the two nations.[7]

The ideas of the Manifesto were not of Russian invention. They represented various points of the political platforms of the two political parties in Poland, the National Democracy and the Conservative, which, in the years immediately preceding World War I, chose to cooperate with Russia in the hope that governmental reforms already initiated in other parts of Russia would bring an end to the problem of Russification of Poland and would decentralize the administration, leading to a large degree of autonomy and self-government in the Kingdom of Poland.[8] The Poles understood the August 1914 Manifesto as vindication of their point of view and an invitation to join in the planning of immediate political and social concessions, as well as in the drawing of plans for the future of Poland.

In the two decades prior to World War I the three most important political trends in Poland, the nationalist, socialist, and conservative, at one time or another viewed the future of Poland in terms of unity with the Russian empire. The radical wing of Polish socialism (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and of Lithuania) desired Russian assimilation of Poland. Rosa Luxemburg, who was the principal exponent of the views of that fraction of Polish socialism, thought that structural changes in the economies of both countries would favor closer ties between Russian and Polish capitalists and proletarians. The downfall of monarchy would be followed by a socialist revolution, and by the brotherhood of the Russian and Polish workers. This atmosphere, in Rosa Luxemburg's opinion, would prevail over the nationalistic opposition of the nobility.[9]

None of Rosa Luxemburg's predictions have come true. Neither capitalists nor the workers of Poland have acquired the internationalist outlook. The bloody suppression of the May 1892 strike in Łódż by Russian police and troops persuaded the leaders of the Polish socialist movement

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[6] Lapinski, *op. cit.,* pp. 6-7.

[7] The text of the Manifesto is included in the *Jakhontov Papers,* and in Lapinski, *op. cit.,* p. 155. On August 8, 1914, Archduke Joseph, the commander in chief of the Austrian armed forces, issued a proclamation to the Poles promising them liberation from the "Russian yoke." Stanisaw Filasiewicz, *La question polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1920), No. 2.

[8] Roman Dmowski, *Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa,* 3rd ed. (Hannover, 1947), I, 56 ff. Cf. Wilhelm Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilungen (1795-1914)* (Berlin, 1917), pp. 276-278.

[9] Rosa Luksemburg, *Industrielle Entwicklung Polens* (Leipzig, 1898). Cf. Edward Rose, *Wielki Przemys Królestwa Polskiego przed wojną,* (Poznań, 1918), pp. 7, 16, 17.

that their conflict was not only with the Polish capitalist class, but with the St. Petersburg government, which was the real obstacle to the betterment of the Polish worker's lot. Consequently the conflict of opinion between the National Democracy Party and the Polish Socialist Party, which by the end of the nineteenth century had become the mass party in Poland, was not whether the independence of Poland should be the ultimate goal of their activity, but as to what tactics should be employed in the struggle.[10]

In this conflict of opinion the attractions of economic cooperation with Russia were not overlooked. A number of Polish economists and industrialists, however, had become aware of the great dangers present in the economic integration of Poland with Russia, particularly in view of Witte's program of industrialization. The latter program had forced Polish industries to compete with Russian industries, which were closer to the markets and raw materials. Poland was in consequence more and more reduced to the role of a commercial agent for Russian importers from abroad. As a result, economic cooperation with Russia in the years preceding World War I gave way to an endeavor to create an integrated Polish economy serving primarily Polish markets.[11]

Economic reasons, therefore, were not those which persuaded the leaders of National Democracy to cooperate with Russia. Until the beginning of the twentieth century Polish National Democracy had in its program the struggle for independence, including armed movement.[12] Three developments, however, persuaded them to adopt new tactics. Firstly, the constitution of 1906 gave Russia the Duma, and National Democrats, almost exclusively, were elected to it from the Kingdom. Secondly, the German government again resorted to the policy of the forcible Germanization of the province of Poznań, including the expropriation of Polish property and the total prohibition of the use of the Polish language in public.[13] Thirdly, Russia broke her alliance with Germany and became the ally of France.

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[10] The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was formed in Paris (November 1892). The conflict between the PPS and Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) came into the open during the international socialist congress in Zurich in 1893. SDKPiL (Rosa Luksemburg and Marchlewski) opposed the fight for the independence of Poland. During the Bolshevik advance on Warsaw in 1920 Marchlewski was the head of the bolshevik government for Poland. Another member of the same group, Feliks Dzierzyński, was the head of Cheka and the executioner of Russia. The present United Workers Party in Poland is the outcome of the merger of the Worker's Party and the PPS and represents a continuation of the traditions of the SDKPiL and of the later Communist Party of Poland which was dissolved in 1937-1938.

[11] Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 17. Cf. Wladyslaw Żukowski, *Bilans handlowy gubernii Królestwa Polskiego* (Warszawa, 1901-1904), Henryk Tenenbaum, *Znaczenie przemyslu wlóknistego w bilansie handlowym Królestwa Polskiego* (Warszawa, 1913), L. Janowicz, *Zarys rozwoju przemyslu w Królestwie Polskiem* (Warszawa, 1907), and H. Tenenbaum, "Rynki rosyjskie," *Z Rosją czy przeciw Rosji* (Warszawa, 1916).

[12] *Przegląd Wszechpolski,* the chief organ of National Democracy, advocated, until 1902, armed action as the chief means of liberating Poland. See also Feldman, *op. cit,* pp. 328 ff.

[13] Cf. Prince Bernard v. Bulow, *Imperial Germany,* t. Marie A. Lewenz (New York, 1924), pp. 290-326. Ludwig Bernhard, *Die Polenfrage, Der Nationalitätenkampf der Polen in Preussen* (Munich und Leipzig, 1920), Manifred Laubert, *Die preussische Polen Politik v. 1772-1914* (Berlin, 1920).

And again, contrary to the predictions of Rosa Luxemburg, the only consistent supporters of union with Russia were the party of the nobility, the conservatives. After the convention in Vienna in 1904, called because of the alarming growth of revolutionary sentiment in Russia, Polish conservatives adopted the name of the Party of Realists, with the general aim of reaching an agreement with Russia, and winning concessions which would curb the growth of the radical movement in Poland, thriving on both national and social oppression. The Realists stood for the monarchy, union with Russia, autonomy for the Kingdom, with local control of economic and cultural matters, and removal of those restrictions which prevented the development of conservative forces in the country. They were keenly aware of the revolutionary effects of the Russian rule in Poland. The restoration of the pre-eminent position of the Catholic Church in Poland was to play an important role in their plan.[14]

Hopes for Russo-Polish reconciliation were revived with the coronation of Nicholas II. Hurko, a narrow-minded polonophobe, was replaced as Governor of Warsaw by Count Shuvalov, and later by Prince Imeretynski, who abandoned the position of implacable hostility to everything Polish. In 1897 the Russian imperial couple visited Warsaw and Nicholas was made a gift of one million rubles from the Polish nation, which he used to establish the Warsaw Polytechnic. Permission to erect a monument to Mickiewicz in Warsaw (1899) further improved the atmosphere of rapprochement.

The 1914-1916 episode of Russo-Polish collaboration is the last historical occasion in which the Polish high nobility assumed the role of national leadership. Easy access to the throne and government circles, personal ties with many members of the Russian high bureaucracy, basic identity of views on political and social issues fitted them superbly for negotiations with the imperial government. Alexander Lednicki, in his depositions before the Special Commission of Investigation established by the Provisional Government after the February 1917 revolution, described how fruitless his efforts were to widen the platform of contacts between the representatives of the imperial government and the Polish nation.[15] Also, wherever we look at that time we find a member of a Polish aristocratic family placed in a strategic position. Count Adam Zamojski was attached to the Russian GHQ and was an aide to the Commander in Chief.[16] Count Zygmunt Wielopolski, Master of the Hunt, and his brother Władysław, Imperial Lieutenant in the Principality of Lowicz, as members of the court had easy access to the tsar and acted as liaison deputies to the throne.[17] In Warsaw Governor-General Prince Engalitchev paid social calls on Polish aristocratic families, visited the Warsaw Hunting Club, and circulated in Polish high society much to the consternation of his Russian collaborators.[18]

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[14] Feldman, *op. cit.*, pp. 278 ff. Cf. Kazimierz Smogorzewski, *Le jeu complexe des parties en Pologne* (Paris, 1928).

[15] *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima po materialam chrezvichainoi komissii vremiennogo pravitelstva* (Moskva, 1926), in seven volumes, VII, 237ff.

[16] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 137, depositions of General Janushkievitch.

[17] Cf. *Padenie* . . . VI, 28-44.

[18] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 148 ff.

After the resurrection of Poland the apologists of the Russophile policies of the National Democrats saw in the 1914-1916 collaboration with the Russians only a first step toward the final emancipation of Poland. Cooperation with Russia was to be a phase until the liquidation of the German danger. On the other hand, Dmowski, one of the most important leaders among the National Democrats, speaking during the opening meeting of Polish representatives with members of the Russian government on May 21, 1915, pointed out the necessity for Russo-Polish cooperation even after the war. He maintained that victory would not destroy the German nation, but that it would be a threat to both Poland and Russia, and that only the collaboration of the two nations could create an effective barrier to German aggression.[19]

Although there was no easily discernible difference of views between the Realists and the National Democrats, there was a difference in emphasis as to the loyalty which bound them to Russia. Realists viewed the reconstruction of Poland as the realization of the Russian historical mission, while National Democrats viewed Russo-Polish cooperation as a matter between two natural allies. Realists and National Democrats saw common enemies in radical movements which jeopardized their control of Polish public opinion. While National Democrats saw the solution of Polish social problems in the growth of an integrated society, to which Russian domination was an obstacle and statehood was one of the forms of the organic growth of a nation, Realists relied more upon the conservative character of the ruling classes of Russia and the form of her government, which by its very nature would oppose the tendency toward the radicalization of life in Poland.[20]

An interesting account of the views of National Democrats regarding Polish relations with Russia was recorded by Witte, who discussed Polish affairs with Dmowski during the revolutionary days of 1905. As he recorded Dmowski's views, Russia was dangerous to Poland because of the disruptive tendencies rampant of her life:

> Our schools are infested with socialist propaganda, the product of Russian nihilism . . . The only result of your attempt to russify us was to debauch our children and to deprive them of those sacred traditions which alone form a strong nation. You have taken our dearest possessions and, in exchange, you have given us nothing but your nihilism in its various aspects.[21]

After half a century of silence the Polish question reappeared as one of the problems of Europe, and Poles and Russians became aware that the policy of Russification had ended in failure. The endeavor to create a vast foundation for Russian rule in Poland with the rural commune and peasant self-government, in opposition to the other classes of Polish society, had failed. The unveiling of the monument to Mickiewicz in Warsaw (1899) meant a demonstration of national unity in which the Polish peasantry participated with the rest of the nation. In the course of years after this event, peasant communes in the Kingdom, almost without exception, passed resolutions changing the official language of rural self-government from Russian to Polish, thus coming into open conflict with the St. Petersburg government. In 1905 the régime relaxed its strictures concerning education in Polish and the peasants began to contribute in ever increasing proportion to the cost of maintenance of the network of private primary schools in Poland. Moreover, the resistance of the peasants (1902) had frustrated the attempt to introduce the instruction of the Catholic religion in Russian in parts of the Kingdom with a Uniate minority.

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 67 ff.

[20] Memorandum of Zygmunt Wielopolski of April 27, 1915, Jakhontov Papers, Lapinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-53. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 53-60, memorandum of Władysław Wielopolski.

[21] *The Memoirs of Count Witte, translated from the original Russian Manuscript*, A. Jarmolinski ed. (New York and Toronto, 1921), pp. 261-262.

The unity of Polish society was also visible in the fact that since the times of the Duchy of Warsaw (1807) Poles had lived under the Code Napoleon with uniform rules for all social strata, while class law prevailed in the Russian part of the empire until the abolishment of the monarchy. The uniformity of legal structure throughout the Kingdom prompted demands for a separate system of Polish courts and judges.[22]

The August 1914 Manifesto again placed the question of the reform of administration in Poland on the agenda of the imperial government. It was being considered in the last years before the war, but no solution was possible owing to the Duma's opposition to the use of the Polish language in the municipal and county government in the Kingdom of Poland. Until 1914 the reform of administration for Poland was one of the issues of a broad process of increasing participation of the people in the government of Russia. This was slowly gaining momentum and, introduced piecemeal in the Russian provinces, was nearing the point of expanding into the non-Russian provinces. With the outbreak of World War I the specific problem of a new government for Poland gradually acquired an international character. This caused great controversy within the Russian government and set all its centers in motion, providing an almost clinical example of its operation and disclosing its constitutional and non-constitutional ramifications.

III.

Decisions in Polish affairs were made at three levels: the throne, the government, and the high command of the armed forces. Russian parliamentary chambers had not taken an active part in the deliberations of the reform of government in Poland since 1914. For various reasons Polish leaders and Russian sympathizers with the Polish cause distrusted the Duma's ability and willingness to cooperate in the reshaping of the foundations for Russo-Polish cooperation. Poles who sat in the three Dumas had to endure the bitter experience of witnessing the opposition of the vast majority of Russian deputies to any governmental reforms which would allow the Kingdom of Poland the right to participate in the imperial government, insofar as the administration of Poland was concerned, or give Poles the right to use the Polish language in relations with official authorities.[23] Even the outbreak of the war and the predominantly favorable impression the Grand Duke's Manifesto made on the Russian public produced negligible change in the general attitude of the Duma to the Polish problem. As a contemporary and astute observer of the Russian political scene, French Ambassador Paléologue observed (March 1916):

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[22] Lapinski, *op. cit.,* pp. 56-57.

> Public opinion in Russia, on the whole, simply will not hear of Poland ceasing to be included in a united empire. The opposition does not come merely from nationalist circles and the bureaucracy; it is seen in the Duma and all the parties. The result is that the proclamation of Polish autonomy by legislative act is impossible . . .[24]

As matters stood during the two years preceding the downfall of the monarchy, Russian parliamentary institutions were not an instrument of change and reform. Accordingly the proponents of the reform in Russo-Polish relations reposed no confidence in these institutions, but in other centers of the government, just as opponents of the reshaping of the position of Poland in her relations with the imperial government were in favor of the Russian Parliament being entrusted with the final authority in this matter.[25]

Consequently the role of the Duma was limited to providing a platform for public statements of the tsar's decisions concerning the future of Poland. One of the vulnerable points in Dmowski's defense of his policy during the war was his reliance on the development of parliamentary institutions in Russia, which would have finally guaranteed the independence of Poland. He seems to have understood the temper of Russian society in a different light, and was probably guided more by hope than by reality.[26]

The protagonists of Polish autonomy within the structure of the Russian empire were working toward a solution through a coup d'état, the latter to be effected by an emergency legislation enacted under article 87 of the Constitution of 1906. At the time the Polish question began to be actively debated by the Russian government, Russian constitutional practice had reshaped the powers and enlarged the scope of emergency legislation through imperial ukase. The Constitution of 1906 permitted the enactment of emergency legislation while legislative bodies were in recess through imperial ukase alone, with the exception of acts pertaining to constitutional matters, affecting legislative chambers, or electoral laws for those bodies. However, after the dissolution of the second Duma, which had been elected by a general, equal, direct, and secret ballot, the new electoral law (ukase of June 3, 1907) prepared by Stolypin was enacted under article 87. It substantially restricted the right of representation of national minorities and of the lower classes of Russian society, assuring predominance to the upper strata whose interests made them faithful servants of the throne. The preamble to the ukase reaffirmed the fundamental principle of autocracy in these words:

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[23] *Jakhontov Papers.* Cf. Lapinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-77.

[24] Maurice Paleologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs,* tr. E. A. Holt (London, 1923) II, 199.

[25] Cf. Wielopolski's depositions in *Padenie . . .*, Vi, 28 ff. and *Ibid.*, V, 441-442, depositions of Kryzhanovskii, Cf. Lapinski, *op. cit.*, depositions of Lubomirski, pp. 126-128.

[26] Dmowski, *Polityka . . .*, I, 25 ff.

> All these changes could not be effected in a normal legislative manner through this State Duma, the composition of which is recognized by US as unsatisfactory, owing to the inadequate method of election of its members. Only the Authority which granted the first electoral law, the Historical Authority of the Russian Tsar, has the inherent right to change it and replace it with a new one. The Lord Himself gave US Royal power over OUR nation. And before His Throne WE shall answer for the destiny of the Russian Empire.[27]

When in 1912 Stolypin suspended the Duma for three days (March 12-15) and during the recess enacted according to article 87 the Law on the Zemstvos (local elective government) for the six western governments, which did not gain passage in the chambers, the system of parallel legislation including constitutional matters was complete.[28] One could argue that with this concept of the powers of the throne, it might have been more appropriate to introduce the reform in Poland as a grant from the throne. Under the Constitution of 1906 the monarchy, not the nation was the source of Russian sovereignty, and the judgment as to the wisdom of reforms of government and regime rested exclusively with the tsar, for which prerogative even the text of the Constitution could provide a foundation.[29]

The supremacy of the throne was also visible in the executive part of the government. Phraseology used by the Constitution of 1906 suggested that tsar-government relations were modeled after the pattern of the constitutional monarchies of the West. Article 24 of the Constitution provided that imperial edicts and orders required ministerial counter-signature, which indicated that decisions hinged upon where responsibility lay. It was the responsibility of the Council of Ministers under its chairman to formulate and direct governmental policies.

However, under the Constitution of 1906 the primary element for the successful operation of the council was absent. Ministers were appointed and dismissed by the tsar, who was under no obligation to receive advice concerning the selection of his ministers. Still, even under this arrangement the council could enforce its point of view in case of disagreement with the throne, provided the council possessed enough cohesion to assure the loyalty of individual members to its leader and program, and a mechanism existed permitting an appeal to public opinion. Such a mechanism could be provided by the Duma. But as a rule the ministers were not of its body and the tradition of conflict between the executive, i.e., primarily the Council of

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[27] *Sobranie Razporiazhenii i Uzakonenii Pravitelstva* (1907) (January-June), pp. 844-45.

[28] *Ibid.*, March 15, No. 48, p. 419.

[29] Cf. Article 16, Ukase of October 19, 1905. B. E. Nolde, *Ocherki Ruskogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava* (St. Petersburg, 1911), pp. 5, 17, 33-46, 54, 58-83.

Ministers and the Duma, was perhaps the only tradition which took a strong root in the little measure of constitutionalism that could be established in the brief period before the war.

In addition the internal rules of the council (October 19, 1905) were a compromise of two principles: that the council acts as a unit, and that all of its powers come from the throne. Rule 19 provided that the official *rapporteur* of the council to the tsar was the chairman, and that individual ministers could report to the tsar only with the chairman's approval. Simultaneously, rule 18 provided that in case of disagreement in the council the issue must be carried to the tsar who would in turn decide it, but who would have total freedom of decision. While these rules were being drafted, Witte, later the first chairman of the council under the Constitution of 1906, insisted that rule 18 provide that individual reports to the tsar be made in the presence of the chairman, and that they must be previously reviewed and approved by him, which would have provided a surrogate of the principle of the unity of government, visibly manifested by the subordination of individual ministers to the chairman of the council.[30]

In addition Article 12 of the Constitution left the conduct of foreign affairs to the tsar, the minister of foreign affairs advising the tsar directly. The council would deal with foreign affairs when ordered by the tsar, or when the foreign minister thought it prudent to ascertain the opinion of his colleagues, or if the matter dealt with by him touched upon the jurisdiction of other ministers (Sec. 16 of the Ukase of October 19, 1905). In its final stage the Polish question was raised by the Russian foreign minister Sazonov, and the council was called into action by order of the tsar, which assured him of the role of arbiter should the council disagree with Sazonov's proposed measure.

In practice the council was a technical and advisory body. Informed by the tsar of his resolution to settle a political problem, it discussed the matter to provide him with the elements of the future decision. Later, when the decision was made, the council could be charged with the preparation of the draft. Nevertheless, there was no specific reason why the tsar should abide by the advice of his ministers, and not that of private sources. Similarly there was no obligation that the council be entrusted with the preparation of the draft. In final analysis the council was a body of experts in charge of normal governmental routine, but quite unable to make political decisions and assume responsibility. All ministerial posts, including that of the chairman of the council, remained bureaucratic positions as of old. Of several chairmen prior to the revolution of 1917, only two (Stolypin and Witte) could qualify as statesmen. However, even they were not political leaders. Obviously the bureaucrats were unable to lay foundations under the institution of the council of ministers as an independent body in the governmental system of Russia. Seeking a political basis for their functioning, the council had, perforce, to identify itself wholly with the imperial throne.[31]

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[30] Kokovtsov, *Out of my Past,* ed. by H. H. Fisher (Stanford University Press, 1933), p. 66, Nolde, *op. cit.,* pp. 204-207.

[31] See for instance the depositions of Shturmer before the Special Commission appointed by the Provisional Government. Asked what his political program was Shturmer was unable to formulate it in even the most general manner. Cf. *Padenie* . . ., I, 292 ff., also V, 181 ff.

In moments of political crisis, a government thus composed could not be equal to the occasion. It had little contact with the nation, and its information about the public attitude came for the most part from the reports of the police. When in May 1915 members of the government met with the representatives of Poland, they acted not on their own initiative but under pressure, in view of the criticism of their plans.[32] At the time of war, when Russia faced the greatest danger in her history, the majority of ministers saw no need to cooperate with the national representative body, or with local self-government, specifically in matters connected with the war. In the prosecution of the war they saw an opportunity to strengthen the power of centralized government, administration, and bureaucracy.[33]

It is not an oversimplification of the problem to say that the question of the Kingdom of Poland figured in the minds of the imperial ministers primarily as the problem of the restriction of opportunities for members of the Russian bureaucracy, which identified itself with the state.[34] Poland was one of the areas of the empire in which bureaucracy reigned supreme, without the participation or control of the local population; the latter was totally excluded from its ranks.[35] Traditionally the highest posts in the Kingdom of Poland were given to Russians of Germanic origin. These appointees perpetuated their rule by inflaming national conflict. Polish and Russian sources provide instances of desperate attempts of Russian officialdom in Poland to prevent amelioration of Russo-Polish relations, so dangerous to their *raison d'être.*[36]

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[32] Dmowski, *Polityka . . .*, I, 123-24.

[33] See depositions of Ignatiev in *Padenie . . .*, VI, 6-8. See also Sergiei D. Sazonov, *Fateful Years 1909-1916* (London, 1928), p. 280. Cf. Michael T. Florinsky, *The End of the Russian Empire* (New Haven, 1931), pp. 5-6.

[34] P. N. Miliukov, *Istoria Vtoroi Russkoi Revolutsii*, I. *Protivorechia Revolutsii* (Sofia, 1921), pp. 11-12. See also Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Troshchynski, minister of justice and secretary of state during the reign of Alexander I, wrote in a memorandum submitted to the emperor in 1815:

"In Western European states the government has always been and still is only a part of the state, while in Russia it is the whole state. In France, England and even in Spain government action is the result of the will of the nation or of convictions current in the society which the government must always respect. In Russia the government acts on its own and does not need any initiative emanating from society. For many years to come the government will have no opposition in Russia, except such as it may create of its own volition." Nolde, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[35] As long as Polish reform was debated as a measure of local self-government the question of language in the relations between administration and population, and in the activities of the local self-government, was one of the thorny problems, because, as Article 3 of the Constitution provided, the only official language of the empire was Russian. Before the war the government of Stolypin introduced a bill in the Duma to extend to the Kingdom of Poland the force of 1892 law on elective municipal government. It provided that city councils would be permitted to deliberate in Polish, while records would be used in relations with imperial authorities. The Duma passed this law, but it could not obtain its passage in the State Council which, under the elective and appointive system then in force, was representative of the Russian ruling circles and was largely composed of former high bureaucrats. (Cf. *Stenographic Reports of the State Council* 1912-1913, pp. 1373 ff. and *Ibid.*, 1913-1914, pp. 96 ff.) See also *Osobyj Zhurnal Sovieta Ministrov*, February 18, 1915, *Jakhontov Papers.*

Not cohesive enough to evolve a policy, the government by and for the bureaucracy demonstrated high ability to rule in violation of the principle of the law and counter to the line of policy adopted by the highest centers of imperial authority.

IV.

To the outside world the author of the Manifesto was the Grand Duke Nicholas, and for a while Poles saw in him one of the chief architects of the Russo-Polish rapprochement.[37] Actually its author was Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The official story is that the Grand Duke signed the Manifesto on the Emperor's orders and did not participate in drafting the text.[38]

The debate over the Manifesto disclosed a basic difference of opinion in the council. The minority (Sazonov, Krivoschein, Charitonov and Ignatiev) favored a new approach to the Poles, and with the tsar's support, won the day.[39] Yet it was not a complete victory. Dmowski was shown the text of the Manifesto two days before its publication. According to his statement it was penned by Prince Trubeckoi, one of Sazonov's assistants, with leading liberals seated in the Duma, Kotlarevski, Struve, and Nicholas Lvov, lending their talents. The text shown to Dmowski spoke of autonomy for a united Poland, indicating that the plan was to give the Poles (as in Austrian Galicia) national representative institutions. However, the published text spoke only of local self-government.[40] It is known that the Grand Duke intervened at the last moment, determined to remove certain ambiguities, and the published version may be the result of his wishes.[41]

In the subsequent period Polish affairs were almost daily business at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the Russian Armies, as the security of Russian troops depended largely on the attitude of the population. As General Janushkievitch, the Chief of Staff, explained, the Grand Duke understood his role in Polish affairs to be set by the Manifesto and, within its limits, attempted to satisfy Polish ambitions. However, there is little evidence of the Grand Duke's initiative in this respect.[42] Regardless of the fact that his Russian armies had to fight in territories chiefly inhabited by Poles, the Grand Duke took little interest in arousing the latter's sympathy. He opposed quick action leading toward a program of political emancipation of Poland. Moreover, he voiced the opinion that even the introduction of local and municipal government in Poland, as well as enactments through legislative channels, which would in all probability have killed any extensive concessions for the Poles, should wait for the end of the war.[43] Although endowed as commander in chief with large powers in the field of public administration, including the removal and appointment of the highest governmental officers, the Grand Duke demonstrated remarkable restraint in using them to pacify Polish demands. For instance, an extremely urgent decision involving the discharge of two assistants of the Warsaw Governor General, Uthoff and Essen, who, rabidly hostile to the Poles, had not demurred at public criticism of the Manifesto, had to await the arrival of the tsar at GHQ.[44] Polish attempts to create a Polish volunteer corps were also largely frustrated.[45]

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[36] Dmowski, *Polityka . . .*, I, 110, 122, 124 ff. See also the depositions of Wielopolski in *Padenie . . .*, VI, 28 and of Lednicki, Ibid., VII, 238-39. According to Lednicki, after the August 1914 Manifesto, Malakov, the minister of the interior, issued a directive to the Warsaw Censorship Office to stop all articles in the Polish press concerning autonomy for Poland. See also Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 304. Rodzianko, the president of the Duma, told the Commission of Inquiry that the highest Russian authorities in Poland had taken the stand that the Manifesto and its promises were premature and had no practical significance. *Ibid.*, VII, 119-121.

[37] Cf. Dmowski, *Polityka . . .*, I, 121 ff.

[38] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 140 ff.

[39] *Padenie . . .*, VI, 6-7.

[40] Dmowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

[41] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

If the Grand Duke's relations with the Poles were cordial, his correspondence with the imperial government revealed infinitesimal sympathy with Polish ambitions. He offered little support for more liberal measures in the proposed concessions. Sometimes his opinions demonstrated bureaucratic pedantry and sometimes either hostility or a total lack of comprehension of the essentials of the Russo-Polish conflict. When early in 1915 a declaration on the future of Poland was debated, the Grand Duke suggested a text so replete with terminology similar to previous anti-Polish legislation that its effect would have been nil. He also opposed any concessions to the Catholic Church in Poland, wishing to reserve the dominant position for Orthodoxy, a policy which made little sense in a Catholic country.[46] Still, General Janushkiewicz indicated that his commander in chief was aware of the dissipation of pro-Russian feelings in Poland as a result of the continuation of the old régime, and of the necessity to win Polish good will in Galicia, while Russian armies stood at the gates of Cracow.[47]

In the summer of 1915 the Russian armies suffered defeat on the German front and retreated from the Kingdom of Poland and parts of Lithuania. At that moment the high command of the imperial armies took two steps which dealt a mortal blow to the program of reconciliation. Just before the withdrawal, some 3,000 Polish boy scouts were arrested and deported to Siberia. Some 1,300 were released on Kerensky's interpellation in the Duma, some few hundred were freed after the revolution, but about half of them disappeared without a trace. Then came the disastrous plan imitating in essence the tactics of Kutuzov in 1812, described by the picturesque but untranslatable term *omiertvlenia oblastei,* which entailed the destruction of Warsaw's public utilities, sewers, gas and power plants, the deportation of the population, and the destruction of various localities and crops. Warsaw was saved, but in the northeastern part of the Kingdom the plan was put into effect and nearly three million inhabitants from the rural areas were evacuated, reducing the total population of the Kingdom by one fourth.[48]

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[43] Letter of General Janushkievitch, November 22, 1914, *Jakhontov Papers,* also Lapinski, *op. cit.,* p. 24. See ibid., p. 40 (*Osobyi Zhurnal* of February 18, 1915).

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 24.

[45] See depositions of Janushkievitch, Lapinski, *op. cit.,* pp. 138-139.

[46] *Ibid.,* pp. 40ff, and 47-48. Also letter of Janushkievitch of March 14, 1915, in *Jakhontov Papers.*

[47] Lapinski, *op. cit.,* pp. 24 and 140.

Responsibility for these actions lay between the Grand Duke and his chief of staff, General Januskhievich, but it is difficult to determine who originated the action. Rodzianko, President of the Duma, who knew the commander in chief intimately, had a relatively low opinion of the Grand Duke's acumen, but it does not necessarily provide a clue to the question of which of the two was the moving spirit in Polish policies.[49]

The climate at GHQ and in the highest army circles changed radically after the Grand Duke and Janushkiewicz were relieved of their commands. Aleksieiev, as chief of staff, and Brusilov, commander of the southern front, became the protagonists of a solution favorable for the Poles. A memorandum prepared by the Warsaw Bureau of the *Okhrana* (secret police), which described the shift of Polish sympathies to the Central Powers, caused General Brusilov to write impatiently (June 16, 1916): "Austria gave the Poles definite rights in the field of government, while we do not go beyond vague promises. Obviously—and there is nothing surprising in it—the Poles chose that which is the most advantageous for them."[50] At the same time General Aleksieiev urged that the government issue, at last, a proclamation to the Poles.[51] Also, the command of the armed forces permited Aleksander Lednicki and Zygmunt Wielopolski to circulate in the army an answer to *Okhrana's* anti-Polish memorandum.[52] It was the army which finally provided the means for breaking silence on the future of Poland. The tsar's order of the day (December 12, 1916), penned by General Gourko, assistant chief of staff, proclaimed the establishment of a free Poland as one of the war aims, on the territory composed of all three partitioned parts.[53]

V.

Although on many occasions opponents of the Polish reform in the council of ministers have openly declared against it, the main points of the controversy involving the rationale of the Russian mission and Russian place in the future European system remain buried under the secondary issues of the Russo-Polish dispute. To some extent opposition was dictated by a sense of frustration in the realization that the reform would obliterate all the achievements of the Russian cultural mission in Poland. The minister of justice feared that the reform of the government would undo the "great" achievements of Russian administration, and that land records, introduced in the Kingdom of Poland under Polish rule (1818) and recorded in Russian since the judicial reform, would again be converted into Polish. Sometimes the Russian statesmen were overcome by their emotions. Shturmer, writing in a moment of crisis in regard to international developments, appealed to the tsar not to trust the Poles: "A great deal has been granted to the Poles by Your Majesty and Your Majesty's ancestors, but as experience shows, the magnanimity of tsars and the good faith of Russian monarchs never could satisfy the Polish political leaders. Their demands are limitless and in their efforts to separate from Russia they are incorrigible."[54]

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[48] Marcel Handelsman, *La Pologne, sa vie économique et sociale pendant la guerre* (Publications de la Dotation Carnegie, Les Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, Yale University Press: New Haven, U.S.A., 1932), pp. 50-61. Cf. Florinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-215. Professor Florinsky failed to mention that the deportations affected the Polish population almost exclusively See also *Padenie* . . ., VII, 245.

[49] Rodzianko in *Padenie* . . ., VII, 119-121.

[50] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[52] *Padenie* . . ., VI, 35 and VII, 248-49.

[53] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

The critical issue was that the decision on the future of Poland meant a decision on the future course of the Russian ship of state on international seas. Russia had to choose between an alliance with Germany and cooperation with the West, acts fraught with dangers hardly to be gauged at the time.[55] Sazonov (report of April 17, 1916) argued that Russia had no choice but to embark on the new course. The era of Russo-German alliance had come to an end. The Polish question, the keystone of peace between the partitioning powers, now would be a weapon in their struggle; consequently Poland must be resurrected by Russian hands and united with Russia.[56]

Sazonov's opponents were less sure that Russo-German alliance was a dead issue, and were perhaps sounder judges of future potentialities of the policy of cooperation with Germany—the Rapallo Treaty and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact have palpably demonstrated its possibilities. But paramount in their minds was the question as to whether Polish autonomy was compatible with the continuation of the old rule in other non-Russian provinces.[57] Opponents of the renascence of Poland claimed that such a program must be preceded by a fundamental change in the balance of power in Eastern Europe, effected by the weakening in Germany and territorial acquisitions for Russia. The reunification of Poland was to be recompensed by the annexation of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bucovina, Subcarpathian Ruthenia, parts of East Prussia and Asiatic Turkey, and control of the Turkish Straits, while the hegemony of Prussia in Germany must end.[58]

Between the tsar, committed to the war to the bitter end (a course which favored the Poles), and the opposition of the majority of his government to any reform in Poland, the result was a stalemate. The only visible result of the new approach to the Polish question was the law of March 17, 1915, on municipal government, which finally allowed the use of Polish in the internal administration of city government. However, this concession dealt a bitter blow to Polish feelings as it was linked with the final separation of the two governments, Chelm and Suwalki, from the Kingdom.

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[54] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[55] Cf. the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of November 15, 1914, Lapinski, *op. cit.* See also the depositions of Prince Lubomirski, *ibid.*, p. 128. Cf. Paleologue, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-69.

[56] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 85 ff.

[57] Paleologue, *op. cit.*, I, 268-69.

[58] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 19 ff.

In the meantime the council of ministers, charged with the drafting of the reform bill, conducted endless correspondence with the Grand Duke's chief of staff, General Janushkievich. Finally, on the order of the tsar, who planned a solemn announcement of the régime for Poland during his visit in Warsaw, a draft was prepared, and was forwarded to Wielopolski and other Polish leaders.[59] It was found to fall far short of Polish expectations. Wielopolski went to the tsar and it was decided to call a special Polish-Russian Commission to examine Polish views on the matter and to prepare the draft.[60] On May 21, 1915, several ministers, Polish deputies and former deputies of the Duma, and members of the State Council from Poland met, and the Poles outlined in general terms the scope of Polish needs. Another commission charged with the preparation of the bill proceeded to hold a series of meetings but no agreement upon proposals was reached. The Russians insisted on the administrative unity of the empire. The Poles insisted on autonomy with Polish national institutions. In the end each side produced a separate draft, the Poles demanding separate statehood, linked with Russia only by the person of the monarch, and the Russians agreeing only to local elective government for Poland. Secretary of State Kryzhanovskii, who deputized for Goremykin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, admitted that the composition of the commission was unfortunate, since none of its Russian members was familiar with conditions in Poland.[61] The only positive step taken during this period was Goremykin's declaration in the Duma (July 19, 1915) announcing the tsar's decision to grant autonomy to Poland.[62]

Goremykin's speech in the Duma marked the highest point in Russo-Polish understanding. A few weeks later Warsaw fell, and all work connected with the Polish question came to a standstill. Wielopolski continued his action in the Duma and endeavored to influence Russian public opinion. But Polish efforts alone were insufficient to advance the cause of Poland. In February 1916 Goremykin fell and his place was taken by Shturmer. This brought a change in the political climate. Hopes for victory were at the vanishing point. If Goremykin was hostile to early concessions to Poland, he could appreciate the Russian interest in uniting all of Poland under Russian rule. Shturmer's opposition to the plan of governmental reform was the result of his belief that it would make it more difficult to come to terms with Germany. He was convinced that a negotiated peace with Germany was the only way to avoid catastrophe. By mid-August of 1916 there seemed to be definite possibilities for an understanding with Germany, and it seemed apparent that involvement with the Poles would have obviously been an obstacle.[63]

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[59] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[60] *Jakhontov Papers,* report of the Council of Ministers of May 21, 1915. Dmowski, *op. cit.*, I, 123.

[61] *Padenie . . .*, V, 441-42. Depositions of Kryzhanovskii.

[62] Fourth State Duma, Fourth Session, *Stenographic Reports,* meeting of July 19, 1915, p. 10.

[63] Handelsman, *op. cit.*, p. 37, Paleologue, *op. cit.*, II, 317.

The time however pressed for action. The Germans had announced in the Reichstag their intention to resurrect Poland under the aegis of the Central Powers, and at the price of a Polish army half a million strong, which could dangerously strengthen the arms of the Central Powers. Moreover, the Germans hoped that the resurrection of Poland would improve the moral position of Germany in an eventual negotiated peace by removing the stigma of the unprovoked attack on Belgium.[64] French concern was reported by Isvolski, the Russian ambassador in Paris,[65] and Sazonov could quote the authority of the German chancellor when describing the international significance of the Polish question.[66] Radical groups in France were agitating for concessions from St. Petersburg to justify the continuation of the war. French pressure on the Russian government for a decision on the Polish question had passed the stage of discreet prodding and threatened to erupt in an open discussion of war aims. Briand's advice, transmitted through Paleologue to the Russians,[67] Viviani's and Thomas' visit to the Russian capital in May 1916 and their entreaties to settle the Polish question[68] as well as Izvolski's report with copies of confiscated articles[69] convinced Sazonov that this was the last chance to settle the Polish question with a semblance of Russian initiative and thus influence the future orientation in Poland.[70] But to accomplish that he had to force the hand of Nicholas II and to overcome the objections of the advocates of a negotiated peace with Germany, as well as the objections of the opponents to concessions to the Poles in the interest of Russian nationalism, Orthodoxy, and of the régime.[71]

The tsar was convinced of the necessity of making concessions to the Poles. But his feeling for and understanding of the problem was shallow, and two questions were unsettled in his mind: the scope, and the timing of the Russian action. To provide an answer, Sazonov submitted to the tsar three documents: a memorandum authored by himself (April 17, 1916),[72] a report by Isvolski (April 25, 1916),[73] and a note by Prince Stanislaw Lubomirski, who had seen German rule in the occupied Kingdom of Poland.[74]

The three documents set the governmental machinery in motion, resulting in a flow of advice to the tsar, which culminated in a series of decisions from the throne. In a sense the picture of government revolutions was stereotype. However, in this instance, owing to the peculiar condition of the government in Russia a much wider circle of persons was activated; there were those constitutional elements of the imperial government, which finally carried the day. The government in Russia was at that time administered from two centers of authority, one with the tsar in the GHQ, the other with the empress in St. Petersburg, and the Polish problem suffered all the buffeting of the cross currents flowing from the two centers of authority.

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[64] Bernard Fürst von Bulow, *Denkwürdigkeiten* (Berlin, 1931), III, 249.
[65] *Lapinski, op. cit.,* p. 94-97.
[66] *Ibid.,* p. 85.
[67] Cf. Isvolski's report in Lapinski, *op. cit.,* pp. 94-97.
[68] Paleologue, *op. cit.,* II, 261.
[69] Lapinski, *op. cit.,* p. 95.
[70] Sazonov, *op. cit.,* pp. 298, 303.
[71] Paleologue, *op. cit.,* II, 54, Fiedotov, *Novyi Grad* (New York, 1953), pp. 189. 190.
[72] Lapinski, *op. cit.,* p. 85.
[73] *Ibid.,* p. 94.
[74] Ibid., p. 101.

The first round belonged to Sazonov. After two violent denunciations of his plans by Shturmer (June 28, 1916),[75] Secretary of State Kryzhanovskii was instructed to prepare a draft of the Manifesto to the Poles.[76] A few days later Sazonov was dismissed[77] and Shturmer, who opposed the new orientation in foreign affairs, was appointed in his place.

Shortly thereafter (July 11, 1916) Władysław Wielopolski was summoned to GHQ and having discussed with the tsar all aspects of the new regime in Poland was advised by him to visit the empress and to discuss the reform with her, the tsar admitting that he considered her to be a sagacious person and that he consulted with her on all questions.[78] Wielopolski duly saw the empress a few days later and found her fundamentally opposed to the Polish plans for two reasons: a new régime in Poland would create additional difficulties for her son, the tsarevitch, when he succeeded to the throne, and the same rights would have to be ultimately granted to the other provinces of the empire, including the Baltic nations, and such a gesture was something which Russian autocracy could not afford to make.[79] The situation was anomalous in terms of the 1906 Constitution, but normal in terms of the personal rule of Nicholas II. The government was stalemated because the crown was unable to choose among conflicting counsels.

Gradually active consideration of the Polish question ceased.[80] Nevertheless, passive resistance on the part of Russian bureaucracy could not halt the march of events. On November 5, 1916, the manifesto of the German and Austrian emperors, re-establishing Poland under the wing of Austria and Germany, was announced.[81] It was followed by the American note to the warring states with proposals of peace. The French reply mentioned higher war aims, including the rebirth of Poland. Shturmer was dismissed and on December 2, 1916, the new chairman of the council spoke again in the Duma on the reconstitution of Poland. On December 12, 1916, the tsar issued his proclamation to the army and navy. A few days later Zygmunt Wielopolski was called to GHQ and was informed by the tsar that Poland was to be re-established, with her own legislative institutions and a separate army.[82]

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[75] Ibid., pp. 98, 104.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 106 and *Jakhontov Papers*, communication of the deputy minister of foreign affairs to Shturmer of July 9, 1916.

[77] In all probability Sazonov was dismissed under pressure from the tsaritsa. Paleologue, *op. cit.*, II, 305. See Neratov in *Padenie . . .*, VI, 206-07.

[78] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 128, depositions of Lubomirski.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 128. Cf. *Padenie . . .*, I, 292. Following Wielopolski's visit the tsaritsa sent a telegram through Shturmer (July 22, 1916), requesting the tsar to withold the decision on the Polish question until her arrival at Army Headquarters (Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 126, Padenie . . ., VII, 250). After that time the subject of Poland was frequently referred to in the tsaritsa's letters to the tsar. The basic tenor of her advice is the opinion of Shturmer that the settlement of Polish affairs should await the reconquest of Poland (*Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar 1914-1916*, London, 1923). See *Ibid.*, letter of July 25, 1916, No. 319, p. 377, and No. 340, September 4, 1916, p. 390). To add weight to her opinions she invoked the authority of Rasputin who apparently was opposed to Polish reform (letter of October 29, 1916, No. 375, *ibid.*, p. 426). After the proclamation of the two emperors of Austria and Germany, the tsaritsa was of the opinion that the renascence of Poland under the German aegis would create a source of unending hostility between Germany and Russia. See also Shturmer in *Padenie . . .*, V, 181-82.

[80] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 126-29, *Padenie . . .*, VI, 39-40.

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In 1914 the process of the administrative unification of the Polish provinces with the rest of the Russian empire was nearly complete. Polish institutions had been abolished. The difference between the administration of Poland and Russian areas consisted in the absence of those modern institutions which insidiously had made their appearance in Russia: local elective government, courts with jury, and modern laws enacted for the Russian provinces of the empire. The Kingdom of Poland was ruled centrally, and by Russian bureaucracy, and Poles were legally prohibited from serving the government in Poland. One of the Polish participants in the Russo-Polish conference of May 21, 1915, complained as follows:

> The misfortunes of Poland flow from . . . the centralization of the administration of the country. Russian statesmen are unable to devote special attention to the special needs of Poland—the experience in the State Duma has demonstrated that even the friends of Poland are unable to grasp the specific needs of Polish life, and members of the administration coming from the interior of Russia, or from remote borderlands of the empire, brought up in the concepts of extensive economy, consider the vital needs of Polish life unfounded, and not meriting attention, and instead of assisting the efforts of the Polish community put in their way insuperable obstacles.[83]

Indeed, in many of the Polish provinces Russian officialdom perceived its role to be that of creating difficulties in the development of the economic potentialities of the country, and as a general rule all sorts of social activities were subject to stifling restrictions. Still, the inability to understand Polish conditions was not the main cause of the extravagances of Russian rule in Poland. They were secondary manifestations of deeply buried inhibitions, the result of the mutual influences of the two most important Slavic nations, which through the centuries have attracted and repelled each other, and have suffered real and imaginary injuries at the hands of each other, perhaps in a manner unparalleled in relations between any two European nations. Russo-Polish relations were full of paradoxes, and the Russian bureaucrat's inability to understand Polish conditions may be balanced by the great sympathy, understanding, and almost instinctive feeling for the Polish problem which many Russians, both friends and antagon-

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[81] Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, No. 38, pp. 57-58.

[82] *Padenie . . .*, VI, 44.

[83] *Jakhontov Papers,* cf. also Lapinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-9.

ists of the Poles, have displayed. From Adam Czartoryski to Włodzimierz Spasowicz and Aleksander Lednicki, a number of Polish patriots and important figures in Russian public life have worked for understanding between the two nations under conditions which have been elsewhere impossible. A legion of other Poles active in economic, social, and intellectual fields were the architects of Russian greatness and progress, and were given opportunities which were not open to them anywhere else. But there was a concurrent and almost morbid feeling and fear of the Polish threat to Russian ambitions, coupled with an attraction to Polish ways and culture. Also, the Polish question had a revolutionary significance of an almost unfathomable quality for Russian public life, and between the requirements of justice and the interests of the Russian empire it presented an insoluble problem.

A comprehensive analysis of these issues would indeed exceed the scope of this study, and could not be undertaken exclusively in the terms of reference of events so recent. At the same time, the analysis of the events which the Jakhontov Papers and the Soviet documents illustrate would hardly be complete if one of the chief causes of Russian exasperations was not discussed.

The program of the Polish reform was only a link in a long process of concessions which were being won by the populations of the empire, permitting the participation of the people in the affairs of government. The beginnings of local elective government (*zemstvos*) date back to 1851, when a surrogate of local government was created by tsar Nicholas I; simultaneously Polish institutions in the Kingdom were being destroyed. In 1864 the abolition of serfdom was followed by the reform of the *zemstvos,* which assured a voice in local government to the emancipated peasantry. In 1890 another reform set the clock back, assuring a preponderant representation to the nobility and cutting down the peasant representation in the *zemstvos.*[84] However, only a part of Russia, that part comprising the national territory of Great Russians—34 out of 96 provinces (gubernias)—was granted this measure of self-government. In addition Finland had autonomy.

The expansion of *zemstvos* into other areas of Russia as well as into provinces acquired from Poland was repeatedly considered. But in this case the imperial government faced enormous difficulties. *Zemstvos* in central Russia were controlled by the Russian nobility. In the nine Western governments the nobility was predominantly Polish, and in the three Lithuanian provinces not only the nobility, but the lower strata of the population were either Polish or Lithuanian. The strength of the Polish element in these areas was strikingly revealed during the upheaval of 1905-1906 and after the proclamation of the ukase of tolerance. The events of those days had persuaded the governing circles that any measure of self-government in the provinces of Wilno, Grodno, and Kowno would corrode the laboriously built up veneer of Russification.

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[84] Polner Tikhon I. *Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of Zemstvos* (New Haven, London, 1930), pp. 15, 25.

[85] After the accession of Alexander II the assemblies of the nobility were again permitted to function in the governments of Wilno, Grodno and Kowno, and to take

In September 1905, representatives of the nobility of Lithuania were summoned to express their views regarding the future of *zemstvos* in the three governments and proposed that local elective bodies at all levels be elected by equal, universal, and proportional suffrage.[85] Thus the public was apprised of the myth that the Russian régime was a defender of the rights of the peasantry against the arrogance of the Poles.

Next came the apostolic visitation of the Bishop of Wilno—the first in many years—made possible by the ukase of tolerance. Stolypin, a government-appointed marshal of the nobility for this area, summed up his impressions of those turbulent days by saying that the bishop traveled in Polish territory. As the authority of the government shrunk to the vanishing point and anarchy threatened to envelop the country, the bishop dared to counsel Stolypin that the sole remedy was to replace the centralized administration with government by the local people, and Russian regiments with troops recruited from the local people. This was dangerously reminiscent of the days of Alexander I, who entertained the idea of the return of the nine western governments to Poland, an aspiration finally repudiated by Nicholas I. As Stolypin recounted these events during the debate of the local government reform for Lithuania, he had no doubt that it would signify the end of Russian influence in that part of the empire:

> Everything would be transferred into Polish hands, the personnel of the *zemstvos* would be replaced by Polish personnel, and Polish speech would be heard everywhere. The overall result of such an act would be that the local population would be convinced that these three provinces had been joined to the Kingdom of Poland.[86]

In other words, the events of 1905-1906 had demonstrated that the struggle for the heritage of the Polish Commonwealth was far from over. Although artificially retarded, the inexorable process of social change and the slow growth of the elements of the rule of law, which threatened the very founda-

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up the question of the improvement of the peasants' lot. Landowners in these three provinces unanimously passed resolutions advocating the abolition of serfdom. Later, when Tsar Alexander II convened the representatives of the nobility of Russia to examine the project of reform, he began his address by "thanking the representatives of the Lithuanian governments for the example they had given to the whole of Russia."

[86] Stenographic Reports, Third State Duma, Third Session, Part IV, meeting of May 7, 1910, pp. 784-811. See also *Sobr. Uzak. i Razp. Prav.*, March 14, 1911, Part I, p. 411.

[87] The Polish character of certain parts of Lithuania, which had been camouflaged by the Russian population census of 1898, was first discovered by the German population census in the occupied portions of Lithuania. It was revealed that in the area which included the city of Wilno and the counties of Wilno, Troki, Lida, Oszmiana, and Swienciany, Poles constituted the largest national group. In the administrative area of Wilno, including the city and the counties of Wilno and Troki, Poles had an absolute majority. See Hans Praesent, "Kriegsmässige Volkszahlungen im General-gouvernement Warschau und die Bevölkerungszahl," *Jahrbücher für National Oekonomie und Statistik*, XIII (1919), 52-64. A. Wilenski, *Nationalitätenfrage in Litauen und Weissruthenien*, *Polnische Blätter* (Berlin, 1917), VI, 160-161. See Hoetsch O., *Russland* (Berlin, 1917) 2nd ed., p. 387. See also Jan Czekanowski, *Stosunki narodowościowe-wyznaniowe na Litwie i Rusi w świetle zródel oficjalnych* (Lwów, 1918), pp. 2, 29, 40-41.

Another feature of the conflict of the two cultures particularly humiliating to Russian pride became clearer: Polish cultural influence was independent of the political control of the disputed area, while Russification tions of the bureaucratic administration, placed a question mark over the Russian character of those territories.[87]
was the achievement of the administrative action.

It was a bitter blow to the ruling circles of Russia. Discussion in the Duma, preceding World War I and concerned with the various aspects of the reform of the government in Poland, reflected the pronounced feeling of frustration that so much effort had been expended in vain. A certain myth lay in ruins: the myth that, until the Congress of Vienna when the Polish crown was placed on the brow of the Russian tsar, Russia had reclaimed only that which was rightly her own. The problem of supreme importance for future relations with Poland, a land rising again and able to demand her rights, was the question of an effective barrier to the penetration of Polish influence beyond what Russia was prepared to recognize as Polish territory. Needless to say there was constant concern about the retention of some control over the fate of Poland. Still another question concerned what policies to follow with regard to Poles living outside the Kingdom of Poland, Poles who in certain areas would decidedly constitute the most numerous national group.

A full program to deal with such difficulties was outlined in the report of the Warsaw Bureau of the Secret Police (May 16, 1916), the foremost suggestion of which was that Poland's western frontiers be pushed as far west as possible:

> The larger the Polish territory reclaimed from Austria and Germany, the greater would be the abyss created between those countries and the Polish people. Dealing with the question as to what territory should be included in a united Poland, it is necessary to recognize that in principle, in the event of a propitious result of the war, it ought to include lands ethnographically Polish; some exception ought to be admitted as regards the Polish population in general, and, as an axiom, it should be accepted that the farther west the Polish frontier is pushed, the larger the Polish population that will be included, and the easier it will be [to reach] an agreement regarding the eastern frontier.[88]

However, in the eastern provinces of Russia, anti-Polish measures should be continued.

Thirty years have passed, and in the solutions forced on Poland after World War II the old plans were re-instituted. The Polish frontiers were shifted westward, the Polish population and culture in eastern Poland were uprooted, and the nation—politically and economically dependent on Russia—was isolated from the West.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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[88] Lapinski, *op. cit.*, p. 78 ff.

STRESEMANN AND POLAND BEFORE LOCARNO

*by Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski**

SINCE the Stresemann papers were opened to research in the spring of 1953,[1] the person, the policies and the methods of that great statesman of the Weimar republic have become the object of an intensive reappraisal. True, the interest in Stresemann, the lionized hero of Locarno, all but forgotten in the age of Hitler, had revived in Germany on the morrow of World War II: was not a policy similar to that he had pursued in the twenties the only one which offered that prostrated nation any possibility of rising again from the abyss of defeat and ruin?[2] But only when his papers became available for research was it possible to raise the curtain of myth and legend enveloping that controversial statesman. Soon there appeared studies, in which his policy of revisionism,[3] his attitude toward the rearmament of Germany,[4] and his policy of balance between the West and East,[5] were submitted to a searching analysis. This analysis can now be deepened and broadened since some of the files of the German Foreign Office for the Weimar period were opened to research in the fall of 1956.[6]

One of the unexpected results of the First World War was that the two biggest—and at the same time also the most dynamic—nations of Europe went down to defeat. The defeat, however, did not smother their dynamism—in Russia the revolution actually invested it with a new impetus—and both the Russians and the Germans were resolved from the outset, each in their

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[1] A microfilm of these papers: Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv, "Nachlass des Reichministers Dr. Gustav Stresemann," (hereafter cited as "Nachlass") was made available by the Department of State at the National Archives, Washington. A carefully screened selection of the "Nachlass" had been published soon after Stresemann's death: Gustav Stresemann, *Vermächtnis, Der Nachlass in drei Bänden,* ed. by Henry Bernhard (Berlin, 1932-33) (hereafter cited as *Vermächtnis*); *the slightly condensed* English edition, *Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters, and Papers,* ed. and trans. by Eric Sutton (3 vols., London, 1935-40), is not always reliable. For an analysis of these papers, see Hans W. Gatzke, "The Stresemann Papers," *Journal of Modern History,* XXVI, No. 1 (March 1954), 49-59.

[2] For instance, Walter Görlitz, *Gustav Stresemann* (Heidelberg, 1947); Hubertus Prinz zu Löwenstein, *Stresemann, Das deutsche Schicksal im Spiegel seines Lebens* (Frankfurt a. M., 1952). See also Felix E. Hirsch, "Stresemann in Historical Perspective," *The Review of Politics,* XV, No. 3 (July, 1953), 360-377. There is a valuable bibliography of Stresemann's writings and speeches and of works on Stresemann: Gerhard Zwoch, *Gustav-Stresemann-Bibliographie* (Bibliographien zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, H. 1) (Düsseldorf, 1953).

[3] Henry L. Bretton, *Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles* (Stanford, 1953).

[4] Hans W. Gatzke, *Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany* (Baltimore, 1954).

[5] Karl D. Erdman, "Das Problem der Ost-oder Westorientierung in der Locarno-Politik Stresemanns," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht,* VI, No. 3 (March 1955), 133-162; Hans W. Gatzke, "Von Rapallo nach Berlin: Stresemann und die deutsche Russland-politik," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* IV, No. 1 (January 1956), 1-29; Eric Eyck, "Neues Licht auf Stresemanns Politik," *Deutsche Rundschau,* LXXXI, No. 2 (February 1955), 111-119.

[6] A microfilm of these documents from the German *Auswärtiges Amt* (hereafter cited as *AA*)—the files of the Reichsminister and the *Staatssekretär*—are to be found in the National Archives, Washington, D. C.

own different way, to reverse the verdict of the war. The Germans were possessed by the all-pervading urge to break the fetters of the hated *Diktat* of Versailles, and regain the lost territories and the former rank of a Great Power. Stresemann, leader of the German People's Party, the party of the great industrialists, fully shared this craving of his compatriots, perhaps even to a higher degree than many of them, being a child of Berlin, imbued with the glory of Prussia. Yet, in contrast to the most vociferous nationalists, he knew that only by a gradual revision of the treaty of Versailles by "undermining" (*aushöhlen*) could this be achieved.[7] He was convinced that Germany was in no position to pursue any other policy; that by insisting on getting back everything at once, she would end up in getting nothing. Only by writing off for the time being some of her losses—those impossible to recover in the existing circumstances—might she regain the others.

Like all his compatriots, Stresemann felt particularly aggrieved and affronted by the loss of the Eastern territories. "Like all German nationalists, he bore toward the Poles an aversion composed of hatred and contempt. That Germans should rule over Poles appeared to him just and normal, but that Poles should rule over Germans—perversive. Putting an end to this state of perversion appeared to him most fervently desirable . . ."[8] Hence he considered the revision of the German-Polish frontier as the paramount objective of German foreign policy. No wonder, therefore, that in the opinion of a German historian the Polish question provides "the key which opens the way to the complicated alleys" of Stresemann's policy.[9]

Yet Stresemann was never so carried away by this question or so blinded by the hatred of the Poles as to lose his keen sense of reality. When in the summer of 1920 the Bolshevik armies advanced into Poland and that hated enemy was in mortal danger, "a wave of popular enthusiasm for Soviet Russia swept over Germany."[10] German volunteers flocked to join the Red Army,[11] and some Germans even wanted Germany to attack Poland from the rear.[12] The head of the Reichswehr, Seeckt, had anticipated that Poland might be "swallowed up," and if Germany could not "help Russia to re-establish her former imperial frontiers," she "certainly should not hinder her."[13] Apparently he expected that the Bolsheviks would not only leave Germany in peace but also return her former Polish territories. Stresemann did not entertain any such illusions, even though he too had thought of using Russia as a lever against the West.[14] "Do you really think," he wrote to the powerful industrialist Albert Vögler, "that Lenin, who had been constantly preaching world revolution, will stop at this [German] frontier? But what then?"[15] He must have been relieved when the Bolshevik armies were turned back from Warsaw, even though he certainly did not rejoice at the Polish victory.

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[7] Gatzke, *Stresemann*, 12.

[8] Eyck, 118. The German-Polish problem," writes the former chief of the Eastern Department of the German Foreign Office, "is extremely complicated and obscured by life-long mutual antipathy, the more deep-seated as without doubt a feeling of superiority over the Pole is inherent in the German and keenly resented by the Pole." Herbert von Dirksen, *Moscow-Tokyo-London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy* (Norman, Okla., 1952), 24. The British Ambassador in Berlin noted in 1924 that the Germans "despised" the Poles, and that in Berlin "the very wind is anti-Polish." Viscount D'Abernon, *The Diary of an Ambassador*, III: *Dawes to Locarno, 1924-1926* (New York, 1931), 45.

[9] Erdmann, 137.

[10] Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923* (3 vols., New York, 1951-53), III, 326. See also Lionel Kochan, *Russia and the Weimar Republic* (Cambridge, 1954), 30.

[11] Carr, 326.

[12] Kochan, 30.

[13] Friedrich von Rabenau, *Seeckt: Aus seinem Leben, 1918-1936* (Leipzig, 1940), 252.

But there were many indications that the Bolsheviks would renew the attack. Faced with this threat, the Polish chief of state, Józef Piłsudski, and the political quarters close to him wished for an improvement of relations between Poland and Germany. Wih this in view, the Archbishop of Warsaw, (who had been the head of the Regency established by the Central Powers in Russian Poland in 1917), visited Germany in November, 1920, in order to sound out Chancellor Fehrenbach, a leader of the Catholic Center Party. Appraised by the Chancellor of the Archbishop's proposal, Stresemann stated categorically that "any discussions about the improvement of the present relations would have to be preceded by a declaration of a complete Polish *désintéressement* in Upper Silesia [where a plebiscite was pending] as well as by a settlement of the Polish Corridor question."[16] He was to maintain this position to the end.

But whatever were Piłsudski's ideas, the Poles would give up neither Upper Silesia nor the Corridor. In 1821 the struggle for Upper Silesia entered the final phase, culminating in blood encounters in the contested area, and bringing the tension between Germany and Poland to a boiling point. The decision of the allies on the division of Upper Silesia following the plebiscite brought forth a loud cry of indignation all over Germany, and strengthened the desire for a closer tie with Russia.[17] On April 16, 1922, the world was startled by the Rapallo agreement.[18] Just as in the past, the new German-Russian friendship was based on a common desire to despoil their common neighbor, Poland. This was stated bluntly by the most powerful man in Germany at the time, Seekt, in a memorandum to President Ebert and Chancellor Wirth (September 1922): "Poland's existence is intolerable, and incompatible with the vital needs of Germany. She must disappear, and disappear she will through her own inner weakness and through Russia's action—with our help . . ."[19] Stresemann would not go so far, but he accorded the Rapallo policy his full approval.[20]

The first political dividend from the Rapallo treaty accrued to Germany when, in reprisal for her default on coal deliveries, France occupied the Ruhr in January, 1923, and Germany retaliated with a policy of passive resistance. Foreign Commissar Chicherin branded this occupation a crime, and Moscow set out to neutralize France's eastern ally, Poland, by threatening her with an attack and bringing strong diplomatic pressure to bear on Warsaw.[21] However, Germany could not carry on for long the ruinous policy of passive resistance. To end it and to save Germany from complete economic collapse, Stresemann took over the reins of power on August 12, 1923. His policy of coming to terms with the West was abhorrent to Moscow, as it tended to arrest Germany's drift toward revolution.[22] The Comintern decided to act, but Stresemann's energetic measures soon put an end to the Communist attempt to seize power in Thuringia and Saxony. Stresemann never forgot this experience.[23]

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[14] Bretton, 170, n. 55.

[15] "Nachlass," container 3090, serial 6930, frame 139314 (cited hereafter as 3090/6930/139314).

[16] *Ibid.*, 3171/7351/165810.

[17] Carr, 364-365.

[18] For a description to the road to Rapallo, see *ibid.*, 305-382; Wipert von Blücher, *Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo* (Wiesbaden, 1951), 144-165.

[19] Julius Epstein, "Der Seeckt Plan," *Der Monat*, I, No. 2 (November 1948), 48; Rabenau, 317.

[20] "Nachlass," 3110/7009/14331-2, 143336.

Stresemann's government fell on November 23, 1923, but he continued to hold the portfolio of foreign affairs in the succeeding cabinets until his death on October 3, 1929. He was convinced that the Rapallo policy which he inherited was not enough: the Russian card should by no means be discarded, for it could be useful in playing with the West, but only through arriving at an understanding with the West could a way out of the existing impasse be found. This meant coming to an agreement with France. In essence, the question of French security was the key to the whole situation, French fears had first to be assuaged by adequate guarantees, if France was to make concessions in the most pressing questions of reparations and the evacuation of the Ruhr.

Stresemann was enough of a realist to know that any security guarantees that did not include Poland would not be considered adequate by the French and that this issue was bound to be raised immediately in any discussion of security. Instead of waiting for the Frence to raise it and to be then confronted with a hard dilemma, he decided to see whether a way out of this difficulty might not be found, before making any offer to the West. He was, of course, once again not prepared to recognize expressly the eastern borders of Germany in the way he proposed to recognize the western ones. That was "impossible." But he would offer to Poland—he telegraphed the German Minister in Warsaw, Ulrich Rauscher, on March 8, 1924—a general arbitration treaty, patterned after the treaties which Secretary of State Bryan had concluded with a number of powers in 1913 and 1914. Germany had already signed such a treaty with Switzerland. However, the trouble with that treaty was that in the first sentence of its preamble the two parties avowed the inviolability of each other's territory. For this reason Stresemann thought it advisable not to mention that treaty at all to the Poles. If the proposed treaty entailed giving up recourse to force during its duration this was not really a sacrifice since Germany would be unable to wage war for a foreseeable time anyway.[24]

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[21] *AA,* 1405/2860/D552713, D552746; 1425/2945H/D570836-7. See also E. H. Carr, *The Interregnum, 1923-1924* (London, 1954), 165ff., 215-219, 223 f.; Kochan, 67; Theodore H. von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930," in G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* (Princeton, 1953), 269-271.

[22] Also the German Ambassador reported on October 19, 1923, that Moscow was overtaken by the "cauchemar" of the great coalition when Germany reaches an agreement with France and finds herself ready to join in a common military action with the Entente against the Soviets. *AA,* 1013/1692H/397633.

[23] *Vermächtnis,* II, 94; Gatzke, "Von Rapallo," 5, 12, 13.

Stresemann's idea was to be implemented later in a different form. However, in March 1924 Stresemann deferred to Rauscher's opinion that the time was not suitable psychologically for making such an offer to Poland. Rauscher believed that the notion of obtaining a guarantee of the western frontiers through French influence had become so much a subject of discussion in Poland that the proposed German offer would be received as a "diversion maneuver." The Poles would not reject it outright but would answer that a general guarantee pact with the participation of their French ally would provide the best guarantee of security. Or they would point to the preamble of the German-Swiss treaty and ask for a similar recognition of their frontier, placing the Germans in an awkward situation.[25]

As it turned out the Germans did not have to cross that bridge. Good luck soon came to Stresemann's succor: in May 1924 the French voters rejected Poincaré and the policy he incarnated. The accession to power in France of the Cartel of the Left undoubtedly marked the opening of a new era in the diplomatic history of Europe. The new rulers of France were far more amenable to the British insistence on a reconciliation with Germany, at the price of certain concessions. Stresemann could now approach the West without any previous gesture of reconciliation towards Poland.

If Poincaré's fall was greeted with relief in Germany, it distressed the Poles. In a long memorandum to Stresemann, dated July 25, 1924, Rauscher wrote that Poland "owed her liberation not to her own efforts," but to "the political requirements of the victorious powers, particularly France." Hence a Poland had been formed that was and had to remain "a standing enemy of Germany as well as of Russia on account of the Corridor and Upper Silesia and the annexation of large eastern territories." This made Poland "an unconditional adherent to the Versailles treaty, to the anti-German tone affixed to it, and to that carrier of the 'Versailles methods'—the Poincaréan France." Polish foreign policy was "dominated by a genuine and enduring fear" that silenced "all rational arguments" pointing to "the advantages of a complete or partial change of course; hence the repudiation and rejection of the new procedures for which MacDonald and Herriot strive; hence the fear of an eventual German-French settlement (*Ausgleich*) that would eliminate any forcible measures against Germany; hence the hope expressed these days in the Rightist papers that Herriot would be soon overthrown in favor of Poincaré; hence the demand expressed generally and impetuously by the Polish press to obtain now, perhaps in the last moment before the threatening settlement, a material guarantee from the Entente Powers of the postwar territorial status quo in Europe." As all Polish parties shared this attitude, there was no prospect of any change in Polish foreign policy:

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[24] *AA,* 2299/4556H/E148361-68.

[25] *Ibid,* 2299/4556H/E148354-57. (March 11, 1924).

"Poland will always be found on the side of France." Any Polish declarations that appeared to contradict this "fundamental proposition" must be considered "a figure of speech or an attempt to deceive." Poland hoped for the preservation of the Franco-British entente, so as to "avoid having one day to opt for one or the other power." The Polish Left had no program of foreign policy: "The Right had one, perhaps false, but firmly formulated."[26]

The Social Democrat Rauscher's disparaging opinion of the Polish Left was not quite deserved. At the time of his dispatch, the campaign of the Left for a modification of Polish foreign policy in view of the change of political climate in Europe led to the replacement of the National Democratic Foreign Minister Count M. Zamoyski by the Left's candidate, Count A. Skrzyński, an enthusiastic partisan of the New Diplomacy based on the League of Nations.[27] The Poles watched with unfeigned anxiety the progress of the negotiations for the Dawes Plan, which had begun in April and were successfully concluded in August 1924, and they were alarmed by the growth of a friendly atmosphere between Germany and the West. As London and Paris, yearning for a reconciliation with Berlin, did not pay any attention to Polish apprehensions, Warsaw came to the conclusion that a change of method had become necessary.

Polish reaction to Stresemann's policy could only fortify his conviction that he was on the right track. If he needed any encouragement, it was provided by the changing mood of not only British but also French public opinion, particularly when Germany expressed her readiness, under certain conditions, to join the League of Nations. When in August the French Ambassador in Berlin reiterated to the British Ambassador, Lord d'Abernon, that French public opinion "would not agree to a pact of Security which only ensured the French frontier and did not give protection to the Polish frontier against German aggression," the Englishman noticed that "he was somewhat less vehement on this point than on previous occasions, and he quite recognized what an enormous gain it would be for Europe if the danger of a direct war between France and Germany were averted." The Frenchman also confided that German officials had repeatedly offered to him "complete guarantees against military aggression as regards France," and were "prepared to engage not to make any military attack on Poland," yet no German government would accept "the Danzig corridor as a permanent solution." The Secretary of State Maltzan had said to him: "Why not be satisfied with the pact of guarantee for the French frontier? The Polish question is really a part of the Russian question."[28] One month later Stresemann told d'Abernon that it "was foolish for France to trust to the Polish alliance. Supporting Poland meant the inevitable hostility of Russia, and Russia was bound to come back some day or another. This love for Poland had been the real cause of Napoleon's downfall . . . The same thing would happen again." "Stresemann considered that it was essential for the Rhineland to be frankly part of Germany, also for Danzig to be reincorporated. Without this there could be no permanent peace."[29]

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[26] "Nachlass," 3111/7125/147628-35.

[27] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej,* No. 131 (June 17, 1924), 14-22; Władysław Grabski, *Dwa lata pracy u podstaw państwowości naszej (1924-1925)* (Warsaw, 1927), 90-92.

[28] D'Abernon, 87-88.

France's "love for Poland" might have been a roadblock to a future Franco-Russian rapprochement, but Stresemann might also have disclosed to Lord d'Abernon even though the latter hardly needed to be told this—that Germany's gravitation toward the West threatened to jeopardize Russo-German friendship. Chicherin minced no words calling the prospect of Germany's entering the League "capitulation, a journey to Canossa, a resignation from the future," which collided with the Rapallo policy and could lead to possible conflicts with Russia.[30] In an endeavor to reassure the Russians, Stresemann pointed out to the Counsellor at the Russian Embassy, Bratman-Brodowski, on September 26, 1924, "that we did not, as Mr. Litvinov had imputed to us, thereby [by joining the League] recognize once again the frontier imposed on us in Upper Silesia." Germany could make use of Article 19 of the League Covenant which provided for the revision of treaties. He referred to an article in the *Temps* which had suggested that the decision to join the League did not involve any alteration of policy on the part of Germany, and that she was "apparently merely concerned with bringing up the question of the revision of the Versailles treaty in the international *milieu* of the League. . . ." From this the Russian government might see "how wrong they were in assuming that we were changing our policy."[31] Five days later Stresemann firmly denied Brodowski's allegation that Germany had begun to support a union of the states bordering on Russia, "a policy that favored Poland and was to the disadvantage of Russia." "We had little occasion," he observed sarcastically, "to offer special support to Polish policy or to pursue an anti-Russian border-states policy."[32] Moscow, however, was not one to be easily assuaged by such professions. In his report to the Central Executive Committee (October 18), Chicherin continued to insist that Germany's entry into the League would mean "the surrender of its independent policy and subjection to the policy of the Entente-Powers."[33]

Seeing that reproofs and ill temper made no impression on Stresemann, Moscow switched to the "carrot" approach. This also might have been motivated by a desire to avert the impending changes at the Wilhelmstrasse by strengthening the hand of the "Easterners" in Berlin. On December 4 Victor Kopp, a member of the collegium of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs,[34] intimated to the German Ambassador, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, an ardent advocate of a close Russo-German collaboration, that an understanding between Russia and Germany concerning Poland was "urgently desired," and, if "Germany does not waive her claims either to Upper Silesia or to the Polish corridor, a common German-Russian pressure could be brought to bear on Poland."[35]

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[29] *Ibid.*, 100-101.

[30] Gatzke, "Von Rapallo," 7-8.

[31] *Vermächtnis*, I, 587.

[32] *Ibid.*, 589.

[33] Jane Degras (ed.,) *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, I (Oxford, 1951), 464. October 18, 1924.

[34] Concerning Kopp's position and previous activities, see von Laue, 251 f., 270 f.; Carr, *passim*.

Rantzau, who since the recognition of the Soviet government by France on October 28 had been hunted by the spectre of a Franco-Russian rapprochement at the expense of German interests, considered it "absolutely desirable" to enter into a confidential exchange of views with the Soviet government over the Polish question "*before* the arrival of the French ambassador" who was expected in Moscow in about a week.[36] However, Berlin was not in too great a hurry. It was preoccupied with the Reichstag elections and the negotiations for the formation of a new government, while at the Wilhelmstrasse the final draft of a note to the members of the Council of the League of Nations concerning Germany's entry into the League was being prepared. This note was dispatched on December 12 and the next day a telegram with instructions signed by the Secretary of State Maltzan was sent to Rantzau, authorizing him to enter into an exchange of views with the Soviet government over the Polish question and to communicate to Chicherin that Germany wished to keep permanently in confidential touch with Russia over Polish affairs. The eventual entry of Germany into the League would not signify a guarantee of the Polish frontiers, and Germany was determined to maintain her neutrality. It was left to Rantzau's discretion whether to state also at that time that for Germany and Russia the solution of the Polish question lay "in pushing Poland back to her ethnographic frontiers."[37]

This telegram was one of the last acts of Maltzan as Secretary of State. It had been announced three days earlier that the willful German co-architect of Rapallo was being sent to the distant Washingtonian "Siberia" or, as Radek put it, "Washingtonian Canossa."[38] Significantly, Maltzan was succeeded by the head of the Anglo-American department in the ministry, Karl von Schubert, "a vulgar anglophile," to use another expression of the editor of *Pravda*. This change revealed, wrote Radek in the same editorial, that German capital, begging "on its knees" for credits, was prepared to surrender to Anglo-American capital. Germany was selling "its future for lentil." But Berlin denied at once that any change of policy should be read into these "routine" personnel transfers. Moscow was told that Schubert had long cooperated with Maltzan, and that the Wilhelmstrasse makes neither a western nor eastern policy, only German policy.[39]

On December 20 Rantzau saw Chicherin who welcomed the readiness of Germany to discuss the Polish question but submitted that the exchange of views ought to range over the general political situation.[40] After consulting the "personalities in authority" Chicherin made on December 26 an official proposal that before taking up the Polish question the German and Russian governments first bind themselves "not to enter into any political or economic alliances or agreements with third parties directed against the other." This meant, he explained, that the two governments would be obliged to coordinate their actions with regard to the League of Nations and declared that Russia was ready to assume an obligation to conclude no agreement with France that might be directed against Germany, provided that the latter, on her part, would pledge herself to observe the same attitude toward England. "We shall do nothing with Herbette" [the new French ambassador], he told Rantzau, "if you do nothing with Chamberlain."[41]

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[35] AA, 2313/4562/E154862.

[36] *Ibid.* E154865.

[37] *Ibid.*, 2300/4556H/E148613-15; 1418/2860/D554636-38.

[38] Karl Radek "Puteshestvie v Vashington," *Pravda*, December 17, 1924.

[39] *AA*, 2300/4556H/E148612. Zechlin to Rantzau, December 19, 1924.

[40] *Ibid.*, 1408/2860/D554659-61.

The Russian proposal placed Berlin in the most awkward situation. It was obvious that Moscow's purpose in making it was to avert the impending agreement between Germany and the West. To respond to the Russian overture and begin negotiations threatened to compromise the Stresemann policy, while, on the other hand, to decline it might jeopardize the valuable Russo-German connection and drive the Russians into the arms of the French. Not that the Germans had any illusions as to the ability of Russia to give them effective support in the foreseeable time. Even so convinced an advocate of Russo-German cooperation as Maltzan asserted to d'Abernon on December 27 that the Russian army had "deteriorated considerably," and he doubted if it would have been "much good even against Poland," although it was "strong enough to maintain the present régime in Moscow . . ." As the Germans were "no longer isolated," he said, they needed the Russians "much less." He disclosed further that to calm French fears of a military alliance between Germany and Russia, he had discussed the matter with the French ambassador and told him that "both France and Germany must keep their heads and not allow the Russians to jockey either of them into an alliance with Russia through fear of the other."[42]

Stresemann decided to open negotiations with the West while playing a dilatory game with the Russians, pleading repeatedly that the political crisis in Germany was responsible for the delay in obtaining the presidential and cabinet decision with regard to the Russian offer.[43] From this path he would be swerved neither by Russian ire, and threats, nor temptations nor the violent opposition of the German Nationals[44] and Count Rantzau's insistent promptings.[45] In great secrecy he proposed on January 20, 1925, to the British, and on February 9 to the French government the conclusion of a Western security pact, offering at the same time to sign innocuous arbitration treaties with other powers. A "top secret" memorandum among his papers discloses that he was prompted to take this step by the desire to liberate Germany's western provinces from the "stranglehold" of allied occupation and to calm French fears in respect to German rearmament. "The presently acute questions of disarmament and evacuation," it states, "are often judged in France from the point of view of security against possible German plans for aggression. They could thus probably be solved more easily if they were tied in with a general agreement securing the peace between Germany and France."[46]

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[41] *Ibid.*, 2313/4562H/E154921-30.

[42] D'Abernon, 120.

[43] *AA*, 2313/4562H/E154933-4, E154966-69, E154979-81.

[44] Annelise Thimme, "Gustav Stresemann: Legende und Wirklichkeit," *Historische Zeitschrift* CLXXXI, No. 2 (April 1956), 315.

[45] *AA*, 2313/4562H/E154919-20, E154924, E154932, E154991-92. E155020-23, E155048, E155052-53.

The German proposal was prepared in cooperation with Lord d'Abernon—"almost a collaborator" of the German Foreign Office[47] and sometimes referred to as the lord-protector of Germany—and, as was to be expected, received the warmest reception in England. For the goal of detaching Germany from Russia on which he set his heart,[48] d'Abernon was perfectly willing to pay the price of the Polish corridor. At the beginning of 1925, he had told Countess von Seherr-Thoss that "Poland does not need any port, and, as Czechoslovakia, could carry on its trade through the ports of other nations. She would only have to be accorded suitable facilities for that."[49] On February 16, Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain wrote to the British ambassador in Paris that for the Polish corridor "no British government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier."[50] True, there was a suspicion in London that the German proposal for security in the West was made only with a view to rendering the position more favorable for war in the East.[51] And this view was widely held in France. Yet British opinion concurred with a *Times* editorial which advised Poland to make concessions to Germany in an effort to gain the friendship of that powerful neighbor.[52] Chamberlain thought that "in obtaining additional security in the West . . . the danger of war in the East" would be lessened. If Germany came into the League and played "her part there in a friendly and conciliatory spirit," he believed "that within a reasonable number of years" she would find herself "in a position where her economic and commercial support [was] so necessary and her political friendship so desirable to Poland that, without having recourse to the League machinery, she [would] be able to make a friendly arrangement on her own account directly with the Poles. This is what Briand said to me and what other members of the Council [of the League] repeated.[53] For the success of such a policy, goodwill, patience, and tact are necessary. If the German public and press could be restrained from talking so much about the Eastern frontiers, they might get more quickly to a solution."[54]

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[46] "Nachlass," 3166/7309/158121; also 3165/7415/175571-72. February 9, 1925.

[47] Dirksen, 44.

[48] D'Abernon, 163, 184.

[49] "Nachlass," 3166/7312/158666. Philip Kerr expressed an identical opinion to d'Abernon on March 18. d'Abernon, 150-151.

[50] Sir Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain* (2 vols., London, 1939-40) II, 259.

[51] D'Abernon, 156-157.

[52] *Vermächtnis,* II, 91-92.

[53] Briand envisaged such a development in a conversation with the German ambassador on August 6, and said that this view was shared by Chamberlain and Beneš. France would "certainly not stand in the way of its realization," he assured the ambassador. *AA* 1426/2945H/571873-74.

As could be expected, the German initiative caused consternation in Poland, where it was regarded as a clever move to detach the French ally from Poland, so as to press more effectively the revisionist campaign against her.[55] Stresemann at once explained to the press that it was "equally an error for the Polish press to say that the German proposal involved the fourth partition of Poland, as for the *Rote Fahne* to maintain that the German government regarded the frontier in the East as fixed, and was abandoning any attempt to amend it. It was extremely difficult to foresee how matters would develop." His advice was that "the discussion about a possible threat to Poland be left to the Polish and the English press." If the *Times* considered the frontier untenable, it could be quoted, but the Germans should always stress that they would seek to settle any differences with Poland by purely peaceful means. For it was no secret that "even in a defensive war we could not hold our frontier against Poland. An offensive war was not to be thought of with the resources at our disposal."[56] He was to repeat over and over again that Germany had neither "the power to force through an alteration of her frontiers nor the desire to do so." After all, Article 19 of the League Covenant stated expressly that treaties which had become inapplicable could be altered, and Germany had every right to take advantage of this principle and "to reopen the question at some future date."[57] On March 16 he confirmed "emphatically" to the French ambassador what he had said to him in their first conversation in the fall of 1923, that Germany had no "intention of proceeding against Poland by force," but hoped for a peaceful solution when the world would realize "that the Eastern frontier could not endure." He added that the danger of war did not come from Russia, since "a consolidated Russia would hardly be satisfied with the existing frontiers," and in distress "would perhaps seek solution in war." "Was the whole world to take up arms?" Was it not "much more sensible to come into conference and consider whether the obvious blunders in the demarcation of the frontiers" could not be corrected?[58]

Meanwhile the Russians pressed the Germans for an answer to their December proposal and intimated their willingness to go beyond the neutrality pact and to conclude an alliance. At the end of February the chairman of the council of commissars Rykov hinted at the possibility of a Russo-German military alliance in a conversation with Rantzau. And the

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[54] Petrie, II, 267-268; also 273-74. Chamberlain was however not so accommodating when British interests were involved, as an entry in Stresemann's diary on the London visit at the beginning of December 1925 attests: "Chamberlain's wholly negative attitude on the Colonial question, in reference to an alleged utterance by Luther on the subject, was very unpleasant and painful. England could not, he said, dispose of these colonies, which are actually in the possession of the Dominions; nor could she give up any of her own colonies." *Vermächtnis,* II, 251.

[55] *Sprawozdania stenograficzne sejmu* No. 183 (March 6, 1925), 47-48; No. 193 (April 3, 1925), 89-90; No. 195 (April 24, 1925); No. 198 (April 28, 1925), 75-99; No. 199 (April 29, 1925), 31 ff.

[56] *Vermächtnis,* II, 65, 70, 72. See also Stresemann's articles in the *Kölnische Zeitung* (March 13), *ibid.,* 74 ff.; and in *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* (April 10), *ibid.,* 90-93.

[57] Bretton, 117.

[58] *Vermächtnis,* II, 84; also 91-93.

more cautious Chicherin told the latter that "one should not forget that Russia needs Germany for rebuilding her military power and that Germany needs Russia as an arsenal."[59] Stresemann was placed in a most delicate situation. He kept secret from the Russians as long as possible his Western pact proposal. When he finally disclosed it to them on the eve of making it public (March 9-10), he endeavored to allay their fears by pointing to the reaction in Poland, by vigorously denying the allegation of the German Communist Party that the Eastern frontier had been recognized.[60] He insisted that the proposal was meant as a defensive measure against "the French expansionist policy on the Rhine." The newspaper reports that Germany had declared her readiness to assume an obligation "not to bring about a change of the geographic frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia by military actions, were completely false."[61]

Stresemann was ready at long last to reply to the Russian December proposal on March 19, after having received a note from the Secretary General of the League of Nations in answer to his note of December 12. He instructed Rantzau to transmit to the Russians a long communication explaining German foreign policy. The German initiative for a western pact stemmed from the necessity to free German territory from the French occupation. It was Germany's first step on the road to recovering its strength. The arbitration treaties, which Germany also proposed to sign, did not constitute any real obstacle for "maintaining the political aims which we must pursue with regard to our eastern frontiers." England and France insisted that the entry of Germany into the League was necessary. But as this question affected directly the relationship of Germany to Russia, he, Stresemann, made it perfectly clear to London and Paris that the Germans "are not in the position and do not want to sacrifice this relationship to the League." However, if Germany became a member of the League, she would be in a position, owing to her right of veto in the League's Council, "to hinder any action of the League directed against Russia," and would not lose "the possibility of preserving neutrality toward Russia" in so far as the obligations under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant (sanctions) were concerned. Admittedly, her freedom of action could be restricted. For instance, in a case when "events take place that would bring within the sphere of immediate possibility pushing Poland back (*Zurückdrängung*) to her ethnographic frontiers, then, it would be very conceivable, that an active intervention on the part of Germany would be greatly hampered by her membership in the League of Nations." Yet the undoubtedly great importance of this consideration was reduced by the fact that "in such a case Germany, even as a non-member of the League, would have to reckon with the certain antagonism of the Entente Powers, at least that of France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia." It would be different "if Germany and Russia were strong enough and determined to meet every coalition with an armed hand." Stresemann agreed with Rantzau that an open or secret German-Russian military alliance in the foreseeable future would be "most dangerous." But this was not to say that a "deepening or concretion of German-Russian relations" should not be considered. Consequently, he proposed that the two countries begin a thorough discussion of the implications of Germany's eventual entry into the League, so that it would be made clear that this step "would not in the least imply a change in principle of our policy."[62]

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[59] *AA,* 2313/4562H/E155006-09, E155024-28. Rantzau to Stresemann. Feb. 24 & 28, 1925.

[60] *Ibid,* E155014-16; a shorter version in *Vermächtnis,* II, 512.

On March 25 Schubert told the Russian ambassador that Berlin would be also pleased to enter into candid conversations with Moscow on the Polish question, since they knew that in this question the Russians also had a great interest. The Germans held fast to two proposiitons: first, under no circumstances would they guarantee their frontiers with Poland, and, secondly, they did not think of opening "in a practical way the frontier question at this time."[63] However, Litvinov declared to Rantzau on April 7 that in the event of the entry of Germany into the League he did not see the possibility "of arriving at a positive result in the most important questions, such as the question of the ethnographic frontiers of Poland."[64] A week later (April 15) Stresemann reassured the Soviet ambassador that "Germany maintained her freedom of action with regard to the Eastern frontier," that she was anxious not to endanger her relations with Russia and would not let herself "be forced onto the side of Poland against Russia." But she could not base her policy "solely on an alignment with Russia." She aimed at creating "a stable situation in the West, while keeping a close watch on developments in the East and preserving her freedom of action. From this point of view Russia must surely understand the step" Germany had taken.[65]

It was not only with the Russians that Stresemann had to contend but also with their German allies: the Communist Left and the German National Right. The latter did not believe that the hated Versailles *Diktat* could be overthrown by way of a rapprochement with its principal guardian, France, and by joining its odious creation, the League of Nations. Such a policy would only alienate Russia and thus end all hopes for the destruction of Poland. On April 2, Stresemann conferred with the German National leaders trying to prove that their fears were unfounded and that his policy was being vindicated by its results. For instance, Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons indicated, he asserted, "at least indirectly, a recognition of the German standpoint toward the revision of the Eastern frontier." Also, "the attitude of the world at large toward Poland" had changed. By joining the League, Germany would "take part in all important decisions," concerning among others "the questions of Danzig and the Eastern frontiers."[66] Five days later he wrote to Ambassador von Maltzan in Washington

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[61] *AA*, 2313/4562H/E155012-13; E155076.

[62] *Ibid.*, E155068-90. Rantzau delivered this message only on April 7, *ibid.*, E155178-81; "Nachlass," 3165/7415/175570 ff.; Gatzke, "Von Rappallo," 9-10.

[63] *AA*, 2313/4562H/E155123.

[64] *Ibid.*, E155179.

[65] *Vermächtnis*, II, 513-514.

that his policy in making the security pact offer "was undoubtedly right" as it would "protect the Rhineland from the consequences of the French policy of persecution, split the Entente, and open new possibilities in the East."[67] Yet all these arguments failed to make an impression, and the opposition to his policy was growing.

In the last analysis, Stresemann aimed at a complete isolation of Poland. Yet at first his policy seemed to produce an opposite effect insofar as Polish-Czech relations were concerned. Czech public opinion, too, was disturbed by the German offer to France.[68] The Czechs sensed the danger in the same way as the Poles, and this made both of them anxious to compose their quarrels and to forget their animosities. On April 20, Foreign Minister E. Beneš paid a visit to Warsaw and signed a number of agreements settling various points at issue between the two countries. However, his appraisal of the situation differed greatly from that of Skrzyński. He had confided earlier to the American Chargé d'Affaires that he "approved of the German offer," even though he interpreted it "as an intelligent effort" on Germany's part "to recover her strength." It "represented the best," he said, "that could be obtained in place of the rejected [Geneva] Protocol," and he "would be satisfied to conclude an arbitration treaty" with Germany. But he "was resolutely averse to concluding a military convention with Poland."[69] Two weeks later, on the eve of his Warsaw visit, he told the American minister that "Germany had taken measures to inform him that any rectifications of frontier toward Czechoslovakia did not enter into their calculations, and that they were ready to furnish any guarantee and to sign a treaty of arbitration." This made him believe that Czechoslovakia had not been specifically mentioned in the original proposal so as not to make it too pointedly directed against Poland.[70]

Commenting on the Warsaw visit, the German minister in Prague wrote that Beneš had sought for years a rapprochement with Poland, but could not overcome Polish bitterness "over the robbery of the Teschen region and Javorina." His offers to visit Warsaw had been peremptorily declined. "Only after the German guarantee proposal had become known, did the attitude of Poland change." Actually it was not the German move that alarmed the Poles but the realization that the Western Powers were not fully committed to the unconditional finality of the German-Polish frontier; hence their fear of isolation and the desire for a rapprochement with Czechoslovakia. Beneš, on the other hand, had also his good reasons to reciprocate

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[66] *Ibid.*, 88. Stresemann also stated this frankly to the French ambassador on June 18, *ibid.*, 104.

[67] *Ibid.*, 281.

[68] National Archives, Washington, 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno) /32. The American Chargé d'Affaires to Kellogg, March 18, 1925.

[69] *Ibid.*, /34. Pearson to Kellogg, April 3, 1925. A week before Beneš said as much to the German minister, *AA*, 1425/2945/571595-6, 571647-8. On March 31 Stresemann thanked him in the name of the German government. "They have noted with satisfaction that he shows understanding for the meaning and aim (Sinn und Zweck) of our security action." *Ibid.*, 1488/D617768.

[70] National Archives, 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee /42. Einstein to Kellogg. April 18, 1925. Stresemann made this very clear in his telegram of March 31. *AA*, 1488 /D617768.

this desire. The question of the German-Austrian *Anschluss,* vital for Czechoslovakia, had again reappeared, and was not mentioned in the German guarantee proposal. For the Czechs, surrounded as they were on three sides by the Germans, an open frontier with Poland was a necessity. Moreover, the Poles might agree to *Anschluss* as a compensation to Germany for the lost Eastern territories. Nevertheless the Czechs were resolved to avoid a far-reaching commitment. The representatives of foreign powers in Prague also did not believe, the minister concluded, that "the cautious Beneš has committed himself politically to any considerable degree, especially knowing that he himself perceives the necessity of revision (*Revisionsbedürftigkeit*) of the Polish western frontier."[71]

This information must have pleased Stresemann, but it did not suit his purpose at all that the discussion on his proposal should revolve around the Eastern and Austrian questions. He insisted that these questions should not be tied in any way with the proposed Western pact, and complained to Lord D'Abernon that "the whole affair had become confused, as the Eastern frontier question, and now the German-Austrian question, had been introduced into the debate, though they had nothing to do with the subject. But the Poles and the Czechs thought that we intended an annexation policy on a large scale, and that as soon as we had secured a stable situation on the West, we should swallow up Austria, recover the Polish corridor, and so forth. It went without saying that we should never publicly state that we would renounce either, but we had neither the purpose nor the power to make any move against Poland, and, for the rest, the German-Austrian question was not for the time being in the sphere of reality."[72] He had already declared in the Reichstag that no one in Germany could accept the Eastern frontier as unalterable, and therefore Germany could not even consider a settlement of the security question that included recognition of this frontier.[73] The German position was thus made unmistakably clear to the Western Powers, who were then engaged in drafting the text of the French reply to the German offer.

While awaiting the French note, Stresemann had a visit from Litvinov, who, on June 13, stopped in Berlin on his way to Karlsbad. The Russian "was very greatly disturbed by the state of Russo-German relations." He feared particularly that Germany would be entangled in the anti-Russian policy of England, and warned that Poland might "try to get in touch with Russia." Of course, he would "deplore" any such development, but after all, with Germany driven into an anti-Russian position, surely Russia could not be expected to draw no consequences from the new situation and not to react against it, and he hinted that France also might seek a rapprochement with Russia. In reply Stresemann reiterated to his visitor that "Germany had *no intention* of allowing herself to be used as an auxiliary in any action directed against Russia."[74]

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[71] "Nachlass," 3114/7133/148731-34; *AA,* 1425/2945/571647. See also a note on Stresemann's conversation with the Italian Ambassador Bosdari on May 8, *Vermächtnis,* II, 97.
[72] *Ibid.,* 100. June 4, 1925.
[73] *Ibid.,* 99. May 18, 1925.

This conversation, and the Russian reply to the German memorandum which had come on June 2,[75] clearly revealed that Russo-German relations had reached a point where something had to be done if the Russian connection was to be preserved. To put Russian fears to rest, Stresemann decided to propose that the German and Russian governments conclude an agreement to the effect that they would "in the spirit of Rapallo" maintain "a lasting friendly contact with each other in all common political and economic questions." Russia could not on the basis of Rapallo prevent Germany from joining the League, but Russia had "the right to require that Germany would not pursue there an anti-Russian policy and Germany was ready to assume such an obligation." "Germany would not only refuse participation in any action of the League against Russia but she would make impossible any such action."[76] Stresemann persuaded Rantzau, who since April 13 had been conducting in Berlin a vigorous campaign against Stresemann's policy, to return to his post and communicate the offer to Chicherin.[77] To accentuate the importance of the offer and the value which Germany placed on continued cooperation with Russia, Rantzau was accompanied by the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, Dirksen, who also was entrusted with the mission of reviving Russo-German trade negotiations.[78]

Ten days before the departure of Rantzau and Dirksen, Stresemann received the French reply to his February memorandum, and found it to be "a distortion" of that memorandum. The French, he thought, attempted to work their Eastern alliances into the proposed Western pact, France thus becoming the guarantor of the peace treaties in Eastern Europe, with "the right to come immediately to the help of any nation attacked." Not only was this "wholly unacceptable" to Germany, but he also regarded it as being in complete conflict with the observations made by Chamberlain in the House of Commons."[79]

Nonetheless, he insisted that "the negotiations must be pushed forward."[80] But before this could be done, the powerful nationalist opposition had to be overcome. The Cabinet meeting on June 24 became the scene of an acrimonious altercation. Some ministers thought it inconceivable that treaties could be revised by negotiation. General von Seeckt stated bluntly: "We must regain our power, and as soon as we do, we naturally will take back everything we lost."[81] There was no doubt in his mind that that power could only be regained in close military collaboration with Russia, which he had already established.[82] He must have been therefore alarmed by the

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[74] "Nachlass," 3113/7129/147856-59. Litvinov's references to Poland are omitted in *Vermächtnis,* I, 516-518.

[75] *AA,* 2313/4562H/E155328-42.

[76] *Ibid.,* 2314/4562H/E155428, E155449-56. June 25, 1925.

[77] *Ibid.,* E155427-32. June 21. See also "Nachlass," 3113/7129/147876-81; for an abbreviated version, see *Vermächtnis,* II, 518-19.

[78] Dirksen, 55-56.

[79] *Vermächtnis,* II, 109, 116.

[80] *Ibid.,* 123.

[81] "Nachlass," 3113/7129/147890.

deterioration of Russo-German relations, which threatened to put an end to the undercover German military activities in Russia. But Stresemann's arguments once more gained the day. After all, it was difficult not to agree with him when, on another occasion, he said that a long time would elapse before Germany "could pound the table with her fist,"[83] and that in the meantime any kind of "bragging and saber-rattling without a saber"[84] made hardly any sense. Chancellor Luther voiced the opinion of the majority in expressing his preference for Stresemann's policy as against "the policy of those who merely wait until we again have a great army available some time in the future, and until then fold their hands in their laps and trust that the Good Lord will send us one day some miraculous means of defence against our enemies . . ."[85] However, the struggle was far from over, and the anti-Stresemann campaign continued unabated.

Heart and soul in this struggle, Stresemann evinced little inclination for an additional effort required to end the tariff war, which in the meantime had broken out between Germany and Poland and was further aggravating the already strained relations between the two countries. Apparently, he was neither responsible for nor in favor of it, as the June 15 entry in his diary attests: "We do not want a tariff war [with Poland], as we export 400 million worth of goods to Poland. But on the other hand, we cannot let in Polish coal freely, as at present we have an acute coal crisis in Germany, and as a result distress prevails in Waldenburg. It will certainly be extremely difficult to find a way out of this situation, especially as the press is predominantly on the side of the German coal industry (Hugenberg), and one plays with an idea of an economic break with Poland. As if we could do without such exports in the present state of affairs!"[86] If Stresemann thought that Germany could hardly afford such a tariff war at that time, then what could be said about Poland, nearly half of whose foreign trade had been with Germany. No wonder that the Poles, pressed by an economic crisis, made strenuous efforts to reach some kind of agreement. One of their most important political and industrial leaders, Korfanty, made several trips to Germany and conferred three times with Stresemann, but failed to make any headway:[87] the forces opposed to a trade agreement with Poland proved too powerful. From the outset economic questions became tangled up with such explosive political issues as the liquidation of German property in Poland and the expulsion of German optants. Agitation reached such dimensions that Stresemann felt constrained to upbraid Poland in the Reichstag on August 6 for being animated by a *"spirit of*

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[82] Erdmann, 140. For an account of Russo-German military cooperation, see Helm Speidel, "Reichswehr und Rote Armee," with H. Rothfels' introduction, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* I, No. 1 (January 1953), 9-45; Georges Castellan, "Reichswehr et Armée Rouge, 1920-1939," *Les relations germano-soviétiques de 1933 à 1939,* ed. by J.-B. Duroselle (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, vol. 58) (Paris, 154), 137 ff.

[83] Erdmann, 152.

[84] "Nachlass," 3099 /7118/145903.

[85] *Vermächtnis,* II, 110.

[86] *Ibid.,* 308.

[87] *Ibid.,* 543-544, 546-547.

hatred and egotism."[88] This was precisely the spirit which the Poles had all along imputed to the Germans.

Under these circumstances the frontier issue was fast becoming ever more acute. Stresemann saw clearly that this issue, if not handled with utmost care, could cause irreparable damage to his policy. Consequently, he sent on June 30 a "strictly confidential" directive with several long memoranda on various aspects of German-Polish dispute to all German diplomatic missions abroad, setting forth the official position in this matter. Even though one of the most important tasks of German policy consisted in convincing world public opinion that in the long run the eastern German frontier was untenable and hence its revision was necessary "in the interest of universal peace," nevertheless a revisionist campaign "on a large scale" could not be launched at the time. On the contrary, one ought to emphasize "most categorically that the German initiative for a security pact in no way aimed at opening the question of the modification of the German eastern frontiers.' "We would only render a political service to our opponents, if an impression is created in the world that Germany now propagandizes a speedy modification" of these frontiers. This did not mean that the German standpoint should not be presented in a subtle way in private conversations whenever the subject of the Corridor was brought up. Owing to the intensive Polish propaganda trying "to convince the world of the necessity of the Corridor," there was no need to take the initiative in bringing this subject up for discussion. In return for the Corridor Germany was prepared to provide a free port for Poland in Danzig, and even in Stettin and Königsberg. The question of an exchange of the Corridor for Lithuania had to be handled with "the greatest prudence.' In any case, Poland would only accept such an exchange under strong pressure. This pressure could be applied in the first place by Russia. Hence the solution of the Corridor question was "hardly conceivable without the cooperation of Russia and Germany." Certain economic pressure could also be brought to bear by the Anglo-Saxon powers, if the idea gained ground that Poland should as well make a sacrifice in the interest of universal peace. Germany had only "an interest in the economic collapse of Poland in so far as it would make Poland more inclined to territorial sacrifices." "A new partition of Poland such as in 1793 or 1795 could not be an objective of German policy." German claims were limited to the Corridor with the Netze region, Upper Silesia and frontier corrections in other parts. In its own well-understood interest Germany must give up any claim to Posen. Once these claims were satisfied no obstacle stood in the way, as far as Germany was concerned, to good German-Polish relations.[89]

For the time being, however, it was not the contest with Poland that posed the greatest difficulty for the Wilhelmstrasse. The thorny problem of fitting Poland in the proposed Western security pact was for the French to resolve. All that Stresemann had to do was to hold fast to his original position on this question. Far more difficult was the problem of how to maintain unchanged the old relationship with Russia while at the same time drawing closer to and wooing England and France. The Russians remained unimpressed by reiterated German explanations and assurances. Chicherin ridiculed the German offer of June 25 as "vague suggestions and pretty phrases, tuned to the melody 'und wenn Europe Ruhe hat dann hat Europe Ruh'." He could not consider these as *"concrete proposals"* and proffered a "positive counterproposal," a repetition of his December overture.[90]

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[88] *Ibid.*, 546.

[89] *AA*, 2301/4556H/E149414-34.

In contrast to the disturbing telegrams from Rantzau in Moscow, those from the Paris and London embassies sounded more and more comforting. On August 6 Briand dwelt upon the possibilities of a peaceful modification of the German eastern frontiers in a conversation with Ambassador Hoesch. Even though at the moment Poland, suffering "from a psychosis not always expressed in an agreeable form," was not inclined to any concessions, he was "convinced (*überzeugt*)" that such possibilities would come to pass once Germany sat in the Council of the League of Nations and could speak on equal terms with other powers, and her economic power and other factors made their impact. "France certainly will not stand in the way of the realization of such possibilities in case they show themselves."[91] The next day Sir William Tyrrell, the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, told the Counsellor of the German Embassy, Feronce-Dufour, that Briand wished to liquidate French obligations toward Poland and hoped to achieve this through a German-Polish arbitration treaty of which France would become a guarantor. In answer to Dufour's observation that Germany could not accept such a solution, Tyrrell explained that this was just a question of form, since the League of Nations would become the real guarantor or arbitrator; it would save French prestige and would help to rescue the French government from the difficult situation in which it found itself in relation to Poland.[92]

Britain and France continued to press this solution on Germany when the Western and German legal experts met in London at the beginning of September to prepare the draft of the Western security treaty. The British representative Sir Cecil Hurst declared at the conference that "one of he most important tasks of European policy was to eliminate, as far as possible," the Franco-Polish alliance, fraught with "great dangers in view of the whole Polish attitude" and the fact that France could hardly evade her obligations, even in the event of an aggressive action on the part of Poland; then he joined his French colleague Fromageot in a renewed effort to induce the German representative Gaus to accept Eastern arbitration agreements guaranteed by France, whereby Germany also would bind herself not to wage war in the East. As Stresemann had already done before, Gaus declined to consider "explicit obligations of this kind, as they went beyond the arbitration agreements and the stipulations of the League of Nations." Neither could Germany assent to France's becoming the guarantor of the Eastern agreements, as that would give her "a pretext to interfere diplomatically at every stage of the current German-Polish discussions."[93]

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[90] *Ibid.*, 2314/4562H/E155610. Rantzau to Stresemann, July 20, 1925. Also *ibid.*, E155599. July 18.

[71] *Ibid.*, 1426/2945H/571873-74.

[92] *Ibid.*, 571884-5. Dufour to Schubert, August 7, 1925.

The eastern question was left to the foreign ministers meeting, but it was obvious that on this point Stresemann would not go beyond his original offer. On September 7 he penned a clear and succinct exposition of his foreign policy in the now famous letter to the former Crown Prince. As he saw it, German foreign policy "in the more immediate future" was confronted by three great tasks: the reparations question, the protection of Germans abroad, and "the readjustment of our Eastern frontiers—the recovery of Danzig, the Polish corridor and a correction of the frontier of Upper Silesia." "If we want to secure these aims," he wrote, "we must concentrate on these tasks; Hence the security pact, which guarantees us peace, and . . . our Western frontiers." Germany could best protect Germans abroad by joining the League, thus gaining a platform from which she would speak "on behalf of German civilization as a whole." "Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania, who are all bound by international treaties to take care of their minorities, i.e. especially the German minorities, would not ignore so reprehensibly their obligations if they knew that Germany could bring all these derelictions before the League. Moreover, all the questions that lie so close to German hearts, as for instance war guilt, general disarmament, Danzig, the Saar, etc., are matters for the League of Nations, and a skillful speaker at a plenary session of the League may make them very disagreeable for the Entente. . . ." Stresemann did not think that the decision to join the League involved the question of a choice between East and West. "Such a choice," he wrote, "can be made when backed by military force, which, alas, we do not possess. We can neither become a continental spearhead for England, as some believe, nor can we involve ourselves in an alliance with Russia. I warn against any Utopia of coquetting with Bolshevism." He concluded by saying that "the most important thing" was to "free German soil from any occupying force." "We must get the stranglehold off our neck." To do so, German foreign policy must "finassieren" and "avoid big decisions"; that is, to achieve by finesse what it could not gain by force, as Metternich had done after 1809.[94]

A week after this letter had been written, Germany was invited by the Western powers to a conference—the famous Locarno conference—at the beginning of October. In the last-minute effort to thwart the impending rapprochement of Germany with the West, the Russians began to exercise "the highest pressure imaginable."[95] They started by playing the Polish card for all it was worth. Chicherin paid a friendly visit to Warsaw[96]—an "extortionist gesture"[97]—and renewed an offer for a non-aggression pact to the Poles. He was received with much solicitude but Skrzyński was not prepared to accept his offer unless both the Baltic states and Rumania were also included.[98]

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[93] Erdmann, 146-147.

[94] *Vermächtnis,* II 553-555. For a complete version of the letter, see "Nachlass," 3168/7318/159871 ff. For a discussion of the meaning of "finassieren," see Thimme, 332-334.

[95] Dirksen, 59.

[96] Degras, II, 55-57; Kochan, 108.

From Warsaw Chicherin proceeded to Berlin, reaching it on September 30 and engaging at once in a four hour-long evening conversation with Stresemann. He professed to his host to be at a loss to understand Germany's security policy. Last December Rantzau had proposed to him a Russo-German cooperation with a view to "pushing Poland back to her ethnographic frontiers." By this, nothing else could be understood than "a military cooperation" for the purpose of "crushing (*zertrümmern*) today's Poland." Whereupon Russia had proposed as a first step the conclusion of a neutrality pact. Stresemann was "amazed" (*erstaunt*), "dismayed" (*bestürzt*) and "surprised" (*befremdet*) by Chicherin's communication since he had "no knowledge of this German step for an alliance with Russia for the purpose of partitioning Poland." He telephoned at once to von Schubert and was assured that such a suggestion had never been made, but it was possible that when Kopp had sounded Rantzau on the Polish question, the latter "might have said that Poland would be entitled only to existence within her ethnographic[99] frontiers." This disputed point was pursued at the second interview on October 2, after Stresemann had checked the documents. He repeated that it was Kopp who had on December 4, 1924, broached the subject of Poland suggesting joint action. While not denying this, Chicherin held his ground insisting that Rantzau had read to him from his instruction the expression about "pushing Poland back to her ethnographic frontiers." Stresemann conceded that this phrase was indeed to be found in the Foreign Office instruction to Rantzau, "but not as the central point . . . not as an offer of alliance," and that it was "left entirely to Count Rantzau's discretion as to whether he should make this statement at all."[100]

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[97] Dirksen, 59.

[98] Jan Starzewski, *Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 1914-1939* (Szkoła nauk politycznych i społecznych, mimeograph, London, 1950), 93; J. Grzymała-Grabowiecki, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w roku 1926* (Warsaw, 1928), 146.

[99] In the text by an obvious mistake "territorial."

[100] "Nachlass," 3113/7129/147979ff. The complete text of the minutes of the two conversations is printed in Erdmann, p. 153 ff. Schubert told President Hindenburg several weeks later that Chicherin had ventured to tell Stresemann "wholly incredible things," that in December 1924 Germany had offered Russia an alliance "for the purpose of crushing Poland." Stresemann was so "surprised" that he telephoned Schubert in the night, and was told that Chicherin's assertions were "downright grotesque nonsense." Chicherin "then smiling calmly dropped the point." *AA*, 2314/4562H/E155786. Dirksen writes in his memoirs (p. 59) that Chicherin "frightened Stresemann by allegedly secret pledges agreed upon by former German governments—a contention which was proved to be utterly unfounded when files and statements by the officials concerned were scrutinized." This statement does not make sense since Stresemann had been resposible for German foreign policy continuously since August 1923.

It is difficult to explain Stresemann's reticence to acknowledge that Rantzau had indeed used the phrase about "pushing Poland back." Stresemann himself used that phrase, for instance in his March 19, 1925, instruction for Rantzau (see n. 62). Hilger, who was the foremost German expert on Russia at the Moscow embassy, writes that "a

Turning to the forthcoming negotiations at Locarno Stresemann assured his visitor that "no indirect guarantee of the Polish frontier" by way of unconditional arbitration treaties "would come into question," that Germany "could not of course regard Poland as at present constituted as a fair settlement," and that she would never of her "own free will recognize the Polish frontiers." Chicherin accepted this declaration with "satisfaction." Stresemann then said that he "had never received a clear answer as to what constituted the menace to Russia" in Germany's joining the League. Litvinov's contention that the Germans would "fling themselves into the arms of England" out of gratitude for England's support on the Danzig, Saar and the minorities questions was "pure hypothesis," for no one in Germany thought of waging war on behalf of others. He reiterated that Germany might be of much service by throwing her voice "into the scale when the League had to decide whether Russia ought to be declared the aggressor and a world coalition" formed against her. While "upholding her own interests," Germany would also see to it that "the League was not turned into an instrument that had 'War against Russia' inscribed on its standard."[101]

Stresemann remained true to this promise when at Locarno the question of Germany's behavior in the eventuality of a Russian aggression against Poland became "the pivot of the whole debate over the security pact and the League of Nations." He made Germany's joining the League conditional upon her being released from the obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant. Germany refused to be involved in anything that could embroil her in war, be it "military cooperation, permitting the transit of troops, or economic blockade." Stresemann forcefully represented that Russia would undoubtedly answer the German economic boycott with a declaration of war, and in such a case "it would be possible that the Russian army would overflow all of Germany and Bolshevism would surge forward to the Elbe. In such a moment Germany would have nobody who would come to her assistance." Consequently, so long as she was disarmed, "she would have to decide herself to what extent she could participate in the actions of the League of Nations under Article 16."

From this position Stresemann was not to be moved either by Briand's impassioned appeals or by Chamberlain's assurances. Having asked whether Germany's resistance to assuming all obligations arising out of membership in the League would not indicate that she was not considering remaining neutral, but would actually aid the Russian aggressor, Briand professed that he could not bring himself to think that "Germany would give economic assistance to a Russia who assailed civilization." For it might occur that "while Germany looked on with arms crossed, its neighbors (i.e. Poland) would be overpowered. Then Germany would experience a war with

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common sharp hostility to the new Polish state was one of the most potent bonds between Berlin and Moscow, and another partition of Poland the silent maximal aim of both governments throughout the interwar period. (The phrase that was used was, 'To push Poland back to her ethnographic frontiers.')" Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies* (New York, 1953), 154.

[101] Erdmann, 157, *Vermächtnis,* II, 525-526, also 523.

double terror." She could not "look on inactive while a civil war broke out in her own land." But if she exposed herself to a danger of war on account of her cooperation with the League, then her friends would come to her side. Chamberlain confirmed this by declaring that England would be obliged to support Germany with all her power if the latter, as a member of the League got into conflict with Russia, adding that those who had disarmed Germany would be the first to put arms in her hands again.[102] But in the end Stresemann won a great diplomatic success: Germany was to be accepted into the League on her own terms.[103]

However, "the hardest struggle" was fought over the question of the French guarantee of the arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Here again, Stresemann largely had his own way. Although the French, conscious that "it would be in some measure dishonorable for them to conclude a security pact on their own leaving their allies in the East out in the cold," signed special treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, these treaties were not incorporated into the Western security pact.[104] Stresemann even claimed, while explaining on October 19 the Locarno agreements to the Cabinet, presided over by President Hindenburg, that the French guarantee had been completely eliminated, and that France could come to the help of Poland only if the League had "unanimously indicated" Germany as an aggressor. Thus the hitherto existing Franco-Polish alliance had lost its force as it was worked into the Covenant of the League. Should France come to Poland's help without Germany being declared an aggressor by the League, England the guarantor of the Western pact, "would be obliged to come to Germany's assistance." The Locarno agreements, he insisted, were not concluded to "stabilize the status quo," but "to assure peace;" and they did not involve any "relinquishment of former German territory."[105]

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[102] "Nachlass," 3169/7319/160067 ff. Dirksen's minutes; an English translation: "An Unpublished Document of the Locarno Conference," *International Affairs*, No. 7 (Moscow, 1956), 155-162; Erdmann, 143 ff. See also *Vermächtnis*, II, 199-200, for Stresemann's speech in Dresden on October 31.

[103] However, Gaus anticipated in a confidential memorandum that Germany "could not disavow a manifestly flagrant aggression on the part of Russia." For, otherwise, "Germany would make herself guilty, or at least suspect, of conniving in the eyes of the world." But before Russia could be branded as an aggressor by the League, she would first have to be summoned "to submit to the stipulations of the League's Covenant on the arbitration procedure, under the conditions, of course, which again would be determined unanimously by the Council." This, Gaus argued, would give Germany an opportunity "to look after her particular political interests." Erdmann, 145.

[104] *Vermächtnis* II, 213.

[105] "Nachlass," 3169/7319/160161 f.

ON THE EVE OF A REVOLUTION*

by János Mészáros

"IMPERIAL Highness, Hungary is lying at your feet,"—these were the famous words of Prince Paskievitch to Czar Nicholas I, reporting that his army of 200,000 men had defeated the Hungarian fight for freedom of 1848-49. One hundred and seven years later, another Russian Commander-in-Chief could have reported the same sentence to his masters in the Kremlin.

History proved that Paskievitch's report had been false: the Hungarian nation had not been defeated. Neither did the Hungarian people surrender after November 4, 1956, when the armed forces of the Revolution were crushed by thousands of Russian tanks.

The roots of the Hungarian Revolution of last October lie very deep. They can be traced back directly to the Berlin upheaval of June 1953, and to the changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies following Stalin's death; they are linked to Hungarian national feeling, longing for independence, for human rights, and for improvement in the conditions of life.

The spontaneity and popular outburst of the Hungarian Revolution has been a shock both to the West and to the leaders of the Soviet Empire. The sober endurance of the revolutionary forces, the bitter resistance and national unity of the whole people, without example in Hungarian history for more than a hundred years, might have been a surprise even to the Hungarians themselves, whose moral forces had been tried alternately by fascist and communist oppressions in the decades following World War I.

Nevertheless, it seems to be of the utmost importance to reconstitute the story of events in Hungary preceding the Revolution. The repeated efforts of the Soviet Union and her puppets in Hungary and other satellite countries to prove to the world and particularly to their own population, that the Revolution of October 1956 had been instigated by a small group of

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*Facts of this account are based on personal evidence or first hand information. The exact date of some events, however, could not have been given with complete accuracy on account of the lack of good Hungarian documentation. The author of these lines would like to emphasize that his recollection of events cannot be regarded as *the* prehistory of the Revolution.

Neither would he dare answer the question whether the causes and tendencies, results and consequences of a revolution could be understood by a contemporary observer at all. All he had in mind was to sketch certain aspects of the story not too often referred to. Besides, he intended to give an idea of the complexity and atmosphere of the months preceding the Revolution.

Reconstruction of the most essential events and facts of the last eight to nine months preceding the Revolution is not an easy task. Documentary evidence of many of these events—with rare exceptions—is not available from behind the Iron Curtain. It is hard to determine to what degree the human mind, the recollection of events can be trusted, particularly in those cases when information has been given by persons still in Hungary. Therefore all such articles can be considered only as fragments of a testimony which has to be completed with, crosschecked against, and compared to the evidence of other more or less fragmentary testimonies. The author of these lines would be only too happy if his testimony would promote to a small degree this comprehensive work of the future historian.

counterrevolutionaries with the help of western "imperialists," have been rejected by the investigation of the UN Special Committee.[1] But this outstanding historical document, as well as many other evidences, cover mostly the period after October 23, 1956: further efforts should be made to show the genuine forces and impulses that resulted in the Revolution, in destroying *from inside* the core of the communist régime in Hungary. This would show the hollowness of Soviet arguments, and would help to approach the historical truth concerning the processes behind the Iron Curtain.

Referring to the "historical truth," it is not enough to come back to such general statements as "Soviet oppression," "national feeling" etc. There is no less Soviet oppression in other satellite countries, and there is a strong nationalism in the Soviet orbit among other peoples as well. With the exception of Poland, they did not lead, however, to a popular uprising since 1953. Hence, in addition to the common facts of Soviet imperialism and natural resentment of the peoples affected by it, we have to take into account other factors too which might be decisive under certain historical circumstances in the life of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain.

Approaching the problem, *how* the Revolution had been "prepared," and *why* it received literally the support of the entire Hungarian people, three factors seem to be of outstanding importance:

1. The revival of Western ideas and the strengthening of the contact with foreign countries.
2. The moral crisis within the communist party, particularly acute after the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.
3. The pressure of the worsening economic situation and social conditions of the country.

It would be futile to try to show which one of these factors was more important. As a matter of fact, they were deeply interwoven, and as referred to above, related strongly to international events. And all these factors together seem to have created the critical re-evaluation in the thinking and attitude of the whole of Hungarian society, especially of the youth, workers and intelligentsia. This critical re-evaluation of past and present, tied up to the traditions of national culture and history, not inferior to any other nation's, gave the revolutionary trend of this deeply and literally democratic transformation of society, which eventuated on October 23.

Impact of Western Ideas

The policy of "peaceful coexistence," inaugurated by the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, had a peculiar impact on Hungarian cultural and intellectual life. From 1954 on, cautious but serious efforts were made to reestablish some of Hungary's traditional cultural ties with the west. In this respect, the activity of the Academy of Sciences was remarkable.[2] In addition to scientific sessions organized in the countries of the Soviet orbit and the underdeveloped countries, more and more scientists took part in congresses, anniversaries, etc. held in the west: by 1956, dozens of Hungarian scientists had visited Austria, France, England, West Germany, two or three attending even sessions which took place in the United States.

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[1] United Nations' General Assembly, Official Records: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592), *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (New York, 1957).—Quoted hereafter as: *UN Report.*

Other contacts were developing too. More artists and journalists were allowed to visit western countries. An exhibition of English cartoons was organized by the Institute of Cultural Relations in Budapest, and in spring 1956, Yehudi Menuhin gave two concerts with tremendous success. He was the first American artist who visited Hungary since 1947; but about the same time, authorities put out feelers to negotiate the reopening of Hungary for a limited number of American movies too. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some considerations were given to the possibility of resuscitating under certain circumstances even Hungary's only official cultural treaty with the west, the former Hungaro-French Cultural Convention.

The significance of these measures and preparations was only emphasized by the fact that under the given circumstances, almost all these contacts had to be made through official channels, and put a serious drain on Hungary's reserve of hard currency at a time when the financial situation of the country imposed rigorous measures of economy on the nation's foreign trade. It is obvious that the communist régime expected political and propaganda advantages by making these concessions in the cultural field, and tried to counterbalance also financially these "investments."

One of these counterbalancing measures was the considerable increase of the number of western tourists in Hungary. By late summer 1956, several tens of thousands of western visitors were in Hungary: most of them came from Austria, West Germany, France, Holland, but there were many Englishmen, Italians, Swiss and Scandinavians too. After many years, their cars changed the sight of Hungarian cities, introducing the element of highly developed western communication.

Also other steps of far-reaching consequence were taken. In May the "Iron Curtain" was demolished along the southern and western borders of Hungary, as a demonstration of goodwill toward Yugoslavia and Austria. The abolition of the barbed wire and minefields on the frontier was something unheard of in the recent history of the Soviet Union and her satellites: psychologically, it might have been understood even as a symbol of the abandonment of Soviet mental self-isolation; practically, it made it possible for 200,000 Hungarians to find their way to the west after the Revolution was put down by the Russians.

Another interesting aspect of strengthening the personal contacts with abroad could be observed within the Soviet orbit itself. Imitating the Soviet Union, all people's democracies practically had stopped issuing passports for private persons as early as 1947-48: with rare exceptions, only citizens who had something to do "officially" in another country were allowed to travel abroad.[3]

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[2] In Hungary, the Academy of Sciences has been the organizer of all essential scientific activity in the country. The old Academy had been "reorganized" according to Soviet patterns in 1949.

Many thousand Hungarian families who had close relatives in Czechoslovakia, Roumania, or Yugoslavia, had been forbidden to see them for almost a decade. By 1956, the picture unexpectedly changed. Official circles seemed to begin to grasp that the old situation was "inhuman," and incompatible with the sincere friendship existing among the peoples of the "democratic camp." Within a few months, passport obligations were abolished between Hungary on one side, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Roumania on the other. Negotiations for similar agreements with Poland and Yugoslavia were started with the same purpose. By simple permits, available through the travel agency "IBUSZ" within two to three weeks, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians got the opportunity to visit Czechoslovakia and Roumania in the summer of 1956; as a matter of fact, "travel-fever" became a mass-epidemic.

Was it a "calculated risk" of the new trend in Soviet policy, to give a trial to "socialist democracy" by loosening the reins, and by making less unbearable the atmosphere of mistrust and prison-camps? Or was it a particular weakness and feeling of insecurity of the Hungarian communists which caused them to forget about the rule that it is always dangerous for the régime in totalitarian states to restore a dose of lost freedom to the people? Maybe it was a chaotic combination of both.

In any event, the interchange of persons and ideas was put forward by the Hungarian government as a new outlook for the possibilities of peaceful coexistence. Personalities who left the country immediately after World War II were approached through official and semi-official channels, and were offered a return under favorable conditions.[4] Thus e.g. Antal Páger, outstanding actor and former member of the fascist "Arrow Cross" Party, came home at government expense and was promised that he would get back his own house. At Whitsuntide, a group of several hundred former Hungarian citizens, who left the country illegally or were expelled on account of their "Volksdeutsch" origin, was allowed to visit in Hungary and see for themselves, how "favorably" conditions had changed.

On the other hand, under the pressure of domestic "travel fever," and also perhaps in order to meet at least partially the demand for reciprocity of western tourist agencies, the problem of letting Hungarian tourists go to the west has been discussed by the authorities, and sometimes in the press too. In late summer, the ship "Deák Ferenc" left for Vienna with a group of more than a hundred artists, painters, sculptors, critics. After their return there came a large group of actors and actresses; then one of journalists, writers, members of the trade union for publishers and printers was allowed to go to Vienna.

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[3] Delegations of workers or peasants, including the exchange of trips for vacation, organized by the trades unions were also considered as "official" visits. The exchange of artists belonged to the same category.

[4] "The Communist régime also tried to strengthen its hitherto unsuccessful repatriation campaign among the Hungarians abroad, by extending an amnesty to Hungarians living abroad who might choose to return home." Assembly of Captive European Nations, *A Survey of Recent Developments in Nine Captive Countries, February 1956-Feb-*

A majority of those who visited recently in the west were professional people, scientists, artists, writers and journalists, i.e., people who themselves were often active in shaping public opinion by informing others. Many of them had their husband or wife with them; this never had happened in earlier years when, exceptionally, individual passports had been issued for a trip in western countries. There were, however, quite a few workers in these groups, especially on the trip organized by the union of printers. Particularly considerable was the number of workers among Hungarians travelling in Czechoslovakia and East Germany: some factories, e.g., Ganz Wagon, organized by themselves cheap trips for their workers.

Most of the Hungarians who took part on these trips had never left their country before. In the majority they were young men. But even those who had already been abroad, or were of the older generation which still had an idea of western civilization, now received the opportunity to compare and see with their own eyes.

Traditions of Hungarian cultural life, western broadcasts,[5] and, curiously enough, the lack of adequate information of the period between 1947-1956 had kept alive the Hungarians' interest in western development. Now this interest has been tremendously increased, and pushed forward with elementary force by personal experience and the impressions of many thousand Hungarians. However impossible it might be to measure exactly the effect of such contacts, the shock of personal impressions can be hardly overestimated. By realizing how other people lived, by comparing technical progress and standards of living in other countries to their own, Hungarians began to demand to be treated like a mature people, and desired to be adequately informed concerning the life of other nations. They now asked critical questions as to the failures of domestic economic development and technical progress. More and more critical articles appeared in the press; under the pressure of public opinion, neglected so steadily for a decade, even the government-supervised publishers planned to include in their plans the reprinting of the works of "forgotten" authors, as Aldous Huxley, Cocteau, Mauriac, etc., and of some younger contemporary western writers.

The shock caused by the re-establishment of the contact with the west-

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ruary 1957. (New York: 1957), p. 82. Subsequently referred to as: *A Survey of Recent Developments*.

[5] The question of Western radio propaganda has been raised several times in connection with the Hungarian events. It can be stated that Western broadcasts rendered an invaluable service both to the Free World and to the Hungarian people in maintaining practically the only contact between the Hungarian masses and the West in the years 1948-56. These broadcasts have been an extremely important source of information even with regard to announcing and explaining events behind the Iron Curtain, as for instance in the case of the Khrushchev-speech (see below) in February 1956. Despite the desperate efforts of Soviet propaganda to prove the contrary, there is, however, no evidence that Western radio broadcasts had a special role in exciting Hungarian sentiments in the critical months preceding the Revolution, or that they contributed substantially to the creation of that atmosphere which finally led to the outbreak of the Revolution. This, of course, does not mean at all that Western broadcasts were always good propaganda, nor that they did not commit regrettable mistakes and blunders which might have been misunderstood and misrepresented by many thousand Hungarians in an opaque and precarious situation. (e.g. Wrong information, attacks on Imre Nagy, tone of broadcasts.)

ern world has been shown in its complexity through a poem of Tamás Aczél whose novel was awarded the Stalin-prize in 1951. The poem, published in *Irodalmi Ujság,* (Literary Gazette) organ of the Hungarian Writers' Union, described the author's impressions of Vienna, and suggested some reflections about a banana, brought to his little daughter who started crying being frightened by the unknown fruit, never eaten before.

It has been intended that the new generation should be isolated. Perhaps the writers and artists were the first to realize the danger of this planned mental sterilization. At least writers, journalists and artists were the first to react since 1949, in an open and organized way, against the intellectual conformity imposed by the régime. Since the autumn of 1955, they led the campaign for the right for "free and creative" criticism, emphasizing that it has always been a duty of the creative mind to tell the truth about the most important problems of national life even if the government or party did not like it. This, of course, has been contested by the leaders of the party. In December 1955, a special Resolution of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party condemned the "deviation" of the communist writers Gyula Háy, Tibor Déry, Zoltán Zelk.[6] But the controversial issue finally was won by the writers. In spring 1956, József Darvas, Minister of National Culture, and Márton Horvát, Editor in Chief of the party organ *Szabad Nép* (Free People) and a member of the Politburo, admitted at the session of the Writers' Union and in different discussions that writers were right in their criticism of the régime, and recanted all their former statements concerning the "rightist deviation" of certain writers. This was the more important because Márton Horvát was known as the author of the party's December Resolution, condemning the writers, and József Darvas supported the resolution in several articles and interlocutions. By the middle of summer, the writers had their way: as Géza Képes, Secretary of the Writers' Union put it in a lecture, given to all Hungarian cultural attachés in the Foreign Ministry, "whether they believed it or not, the Hungarian writers publish their weekly, *Irodalmi Ujság,* in defiance of any direct or indirect censorship, and are responsible to nobody but to the people . . ."

Képes' statement, reiterated emphatically at the annual session of the Writers' Union in 1956, was true. As early as May-June 1956, *Irodalmi Ujság* became, with its two full pages of "discussions," with its editorials, letters and articles, referring to all important problems of national life, the leading organ of public opinion. Its circulation jumped from 5,000 to over

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[6] "The writers were the first who started openly to criticize the régime in Hungary and, thus, the intellectuals assumed the initiative of the active struggle for the rights of freedom. In 1955, when the Party, then ruled again by Rákosi, directed its main efforts to control and confine the liberalization which had begun in the Nagy period, many writers still continued to support Nagy's policy, demanding creative freedom in literature. The controversy came to a head at a November 10, 1955, meeting of the Writers' Union. At this point, the Party charged such Communist writers as Gyula Háy, Zoltán Zelk, Tamás Aczel, Tibor Méray and Tibor Déry with right-wing deviationism." *A Survey of Recent Developments,* p. 80. Also: *UN Report,* pp. 5, par. 49, and 66, paras. 379-380. Concerning the writers' role, see the recently published book of George Mikes, *The Hungarian Revolution,* (London: 1957) pp. 64-68.

30,000 and would have been even greater, had it received more paper from the government. As soon as it appeared on the street, people were fighting for a copy of it.[7]

True, intellectual unrest and the accumulation of more and more open criticism directed essentially against the leaders of the party and government, had some other very important reasons and aspects too, and we shall have to come back to this later. But the idea of having an indisputable right to an independent opinion, so inherent in western democracy, was being unquestionably strengthened and stimulated by the direct experience of the West. Moreover, the establishment of the personal contact with foreign countries taught the common people to consider the right of travelling and learning about other peoples as a basic right of personal freedom, the loss of which might even endanger the welfare and survival of the nation. Realizing the importance of human contacts, people started to grasp what they have lost during the past decade. In this way, one of the basic principles of tyranny has been questioned unconsciously by the masses. And one Sunday, the issue was even put openly by *Magyar Nemzet* (Hungarian Nation) in late summer 1956. In a long article, Sándor Novobáczky, former member of the Editorial Board of *Szabad Nép,* and expelled from the party on account of his support of Imre Nagy, declared flatly that all Hungarian citizens except delinquents, have a constitutional right to a passport which has to be given to them on their demand without further delay, whether they asked it for western or eastern countries.[8] At the same time, the article denied explicitly to the secret police the right to scrutinize the applications for passport according to unknown political considerations.

Novobáczky's article, as well as a few other articles, published in the weeklies, *Béke és Szabadság* (Peace and Freedom, organ of the Hungarian peace-movement) and *Irodalmi Ujság* (e.g. 2-3 articles by Tamás Aczél) attacked directly the secret police and the principal working methods of a police state.[9] Throughout the whole summer, Prime Minister András Hegedüs and Lajos Ács, member of the Politburo, came out with sharp criticism against these articles during closed press conferences, held alternately in the press department of the Council of Ministers and in the Central Committee of the party. But these attacks, as well as the attack on the writers made by István Kovács, Secretary of the Budapest Party Organization at a special session of the party active of the Budapest organization, resulted only in new polemics. The writers and journalists did not give in. They were backed by public opinion, which at that time was already strong and nervous enough to be feared by high governmental and party circles. The latter were clearly on the defensive, and felt that the use of police actually might wake up the "sleeping lion," the wrath of the people, in the name of which they claimed to rule.

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[7] See also: *UN Report,* p. 67, par. 385.

[8] In the middle of October, it was announced that all Hungarian citizens over forty five who had relatives abroad, could apply for passports and were free to leave the country. This has since been cancelled by the Kádár régime.

[9] See also: *UN Report,* p. 67, par. 385.

Moral Crisis Within the Communist Party

To be sure, the conscious revolt against the omnipotent authority of the leadership of Matthias Rákosi began within the inflated party membership itself as early as the middle of 1953. Shortly after the Berlin upheaval when all satellite leaderships were deeply embarrassed, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party[10] held a plenary session in the last days of June. On this session Imre Nagy, a Moscow trained communist himself, came out with an extremely sharp criticism against Rákosi, Gerö, Révai, the leading clique in the party. Nagy's opposition was not completely new: in 1949, he opposed adamantly the policy of the forced collectivization of the Hungarian village. At that time, and in 1953 too, he based his arguments on Leninist principles. But if one removed the marxist phraseology from his speech of June 1953, one found, as a matter of fact, all the essential data unveiled as far as the political blunders and the economic bluffs and mischiefs of Rákosi and Co. were concerned.

Nagy's attack was more personal, more merciless, and yet more difficult to reject than any of the sharpest western criticisms against the régime, precisely because it came from within the party leadership itself. Chaos in domestic policy and economy, plus the vagueness of the shifting political forces in Moscow might have been the determining factors of the Central Committee's June resolutions which appointed Imre Nagy as the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, elected him as the second member of the Politburo, but at the same time maintained Rákosi as First Secretary of the party. Thus the top leadership was split. This was something like a Hungarian anticipation of the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party; it was, however, as Rákosi's speech at the session of the Budapest party active on July 11, and many events to come indicated, only the beginning of the showdown.

Characteristically enough, neither the resolutions of June, referred to subsequently as "historical" by the party decisions and speeches in the following years, nor the speeches pronounced at this session have ever been made public before the party membership. This too helped Rákosi and his supporters to eliminate Nagy from power in March 1955.[11] A campaign was started against Nagy and his "rightist" followers who were purged out of the party organizations, of editorial boards, and of any positions of importance if they refused to recant.[12] Even students at the universities, particularly at the agricultural faculty of which Nagy had been a professor, were ejected on account of their "rightist" and "bourgeois" sympathies.

Nevertheless, Rákosi and his tools never again succeeded in regaining their control completely over the party machine. They had the support of a considerable part of the functionaries whose salary they increased when tens of thousands lost their jobs in consequence of governmental "rationalization." But Nagy had the sympathy of many party intellectuals; he was popular among the peasants, and his views were shared by the overwhelming majority of writers and journalists. His speech of inauguration as Chairman of the Council on July 4, 1953, contained most of his principal statements, albeit in a toned down form. But his speech at the June session of the Central Committee has been circulated in a typewritten form, too, among friends. His name became associated with the spirit of reconciliation and political amnesty, introduced during his chairmanship under the slogan of "a new governmental program" in the second half of 1953. There was a certain hopeful expectation in the economic field, especially among individual farmers and small artisans, and in the field of social welfare too. These hopes, however, were soon to vanish, for Rákosi and his men started almost immediately after their temporary defeat to block Nagy's measures and made every effort to discredit his policy.

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[10] The Communist Party's name in Hungary before the Revolution.

[11] See the "Foreword" of Hugh Seton-Watson to the recently published book *Imre Nagy on Communism* (New York: 1957), p. XIII. Imre Nagy's book also contains interesting revelations concerning the role of top Soviet party leaders in his appointment in 1953.

[12] Imre Nagy himself was expelled from the party in November 1955. His party membership was not restored until October 14, 1956.

But even after the elimination of Nagy in 1955, Hungarian stalinists did not dare to revert to their former ruthless methods, or to annihilate completely and openly the measures introduced by Nagy in the economic and social fields. They had to temporize and could not risk attacking directly the primary claims of the masses, as they had done between 1949 and 1953. They also made efforts to improve the supply in consumer goods, thus trying to appease the man in the street, whose interest has already been dangerously aroused by some leading political questions such as the truth about the Rajk-case, Titoist Yugoslavia, etc.

Both the rehabilitation of Rajk and Titoist Yugoslavia were, however, extremely touchy and hot problems for Rákosi and Gerö. They attempted to remain silent and ignore public opinion while the latter grew more and more indignant and insisted on some explanation. In addition to the changes in the international situation, there were some important domestic factors which kept alive and even accentuated steadily this indignation. One of these factors was the issue of rehabilitation.

As time went on, the problem of rehabilitation turned out to be one of nation-wide importance. From the second half of 1953 on, tens of thousands of people were released from jails and concentration camps on the basis of a political amnesty. Those "unreliable" and "bourgeois" elements who had been displaced by the thousands from the big cities into the countryside were now allowed to return to their former places of residence. Once returned they hastened to relate their experiences. Soon the whole country was horrified by the medieval cruelties, the survivors of which gave evidence of the sufferings of those who finally had been executed after the show trials, or had simply succumbed under torture. Almost every family had a relative or a friend whose personal experience was enough to convince even those who did not care much about politics, or who out of fear, simply did not wish to realize that working methods and final aims of communism did not differ too much from those of nazism. Bestial fantasy in inventing new ways of torturing the human body and soul, the devilish plan of making an entire nation share in the guilt, this was the common characteristic and aim of the two totalitarian systems which Hungary was forced to experience during the life span of a single generation.

Former communists and social democrats, supporters and enemies of the régime, fellow-travellers and people who had nothing to do with politics and whose only crime was that they possessed a bit more land and were branded "kulaks," or who happened to question the reason of some governmental measure on their working place, persons suspected because they had the "wrong" friends or influential enemies, in one word all those who in recent years suffered innocently and often were put together in jail testified now together to the rottenness and hollowness of the régime.

Often considerable indemnities, tens of thousands of forints, were paid for those who had spent several years in jail. Special party and governmental commissions were set up for the re-trial of cases, and in order to find adequate jobs for the rehabilitated persons. But for all this the people had to pay the bill, and by then, the people wanted to know the authors of the whole terrible drama. And the more reluctant and hesitant the leaders of party and government were in admitting their guilt,[13] the more efforts they made to temporize and minimize their political crimes, the more the outcry grew for an open trial of all the guilty persons.[14] People did not want to accept simply Gábor Péter, former chief of the secret police as a scapegoat; they kept on asking for the arrest and open trial of Mihály Farkas,[15] former minister of defense and that of his son, Vladimir, who had been one of the most cruel torturers of the prisoners. The demands for justice and complete rehabilitation of the supporters of Imre Nagy and the victims of the terror[16] were increasingly endorsed within the party by those who previously did not want to move for some reason but by now wanted to get rid forever of the blame and shame of tacit collaboration in a crime against a nation.

This psychological drive became irresistible after the "secret report" given by Khrushchev in February 1956 at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party had leaked out.[17] A few examples will be sufficient to give an idea of the tenseness of the atmosphere. At the second discussion of the problems of Hungarian history writing, organized by the Petöfi-Club, Aladár Mód, marxist historian and member of the Central Committee of the party, characterized the years of terror between 1949 and 1953 by admitting that although convinced of his own brother's innocence, he dared not ask and could not do anything when the latter had been arrested, for he knew he himself would follow him immediately. At a meeting of the writers' party organization, literary critic Sándor Lukácsi expressed his conviction that "as long as this murderer (i.e., Rákosi) remains the secretary general of the party" he doubted whether socialism could be built up in Hungary. This was the climax of a heated discussion, after which the meeting was interrupted but Lukácsi, reprimanded and attacked, of course, by high party officials, was not arrested. Neither was any action taken against that unknown teacher, George Litván, who happened to ask Rákosi at the meeting of the party active of the 13th district in Budapest "whether it would not be better for the Hungarian people if comrade Rákosi resigned his post of secretary general?"[18] Rákosi's irritated answer was that this type of slanderous provocation was only too well known to him from the broadcasts of the "Voice of America. . ."

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[13] Rákosi, for instance, mentioned "the innocence of comrade László Rajk and his associates" only at the end of March 1956 in a speech held at a party meeting in Eger, a small town in Northern Hungary. That was intended to be his self-criticism. As far as the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia were concerned only slow progress was made: even months after the common Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of Belgrade, soldiers used caricatures of Marshall Tito as targets in their rifle practice and marched with them openly in the streets of Budapest. With regard to the importance of the issue of rehabilitation, see also: *Imre Nagy on Communism,* pp. 295-297.

[14] The reluctance of the régime to admit its crimes is also indicated by the hesitation to release high ecclesiastical personalities, and former political leaders. Archbishop Joseph Grösz of Kalocsa was "pardoned" only in May 1956; the false indictment of the Lutheran bishop Ordass was repealed only in late summer; the innocence of Cardinal Mindszenty was not openly admitted at all before the Revolution. Ex-presidents Tildy and Szakasits, as well as Anna Kéthly and other former Social Democratic leaders were released in late spring partly under the pressure of domestic public opinion, partly with regard to the international situation, (e.g., the intervention of the British Labour Party during the Soviet leaders' visit in England.)

[15] Actually, Mihály Farkas was dismissed from the party only after the July session of the Central Committee. (See below.)

[16] E.g. the speech of Julia Rajk, widow of László Rajk, at the meeting of the old party members, held on June 18, 1956.

Actually, it was not the "Voice of America," but the voice of the Hungarian people that had to be reckoned with even at party meetings by the spring of 1956. For once it had been admitted that sympathizers and supporters of the régime were treated like traitors, jailed and executed innocently by the thousands, the question immediately arose: what kind of treatment could be expected from the same régime for those guiltless millions who rejected communism? Thus came up logically the problem of moral rehabilitation for a whole nation. This moral rehabilitation had to include all honest people, mistreated peasants, abused workers, despised intellectuals, and also Cardinal Mindszenty, still held in seclusion.[19]

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[17] The régime attempted to conceal the Khrushchev Report, which has been circulated in Poland and has been made public even in Bulgaria among the members of the party, from the overwhelming majority of the party membership in Hungary: it was read only in higher party echelons, to the party actives of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the editorial offices of *Szabad Nep*, etc., but in any case only after the report had been published by the western press.

[18] After Csepel, the 13th district is the greatest industrial district of the Hungarian capital. After his rehabilitation, János Kádár became the secretary of this district's party committee, and was sitting on the side of Rákosi at the meeting mentioned above. It is an irony of fate that Litván who was not arrested under Rákosi, has been put into jail by the Kádár régime after the Revolution.

[19] In this connection the role of the different churches, particularly that of the Catholic church, cannot be overlooked. Two thirds of Hungary's population are Catholics. It would be a challenging task to analyze, for instance, the impact of the Catholic Church on the strengthening of the moral resistance of the Hungarian people to communism. The spiritual forces and authority of the Church have not been broken even after its two prelates, Cardinal Mindszenty and Archbishop Grösz had been put into jail. Their isolation, intended to decapitate the Church, resulted only in complete alienation of the Catholic masses from the régime.

While not giving in on matters of principle the Catholic clergy exhibited extreme

These problems could not find their solution at party meetings. Neither could they wait for the conversion of Rákosi and his clique who were still in power, and prepared for counterattack. Nevertheless, people kept on asking. In addition to the party meetings, more and more disagreeable questions were asked at press conferences and at the meetings of the Petöfi Club, at discussions of journalists, writers, economists, historians, engineers and scientists, artists and students of philosophy.[20] Universities became the centers of the fermentation which, however, soon infected the youth in the factories and in the army too.

Yet this intellectual and moral fermentation was still spontaneous and unorganized. And this was, from a certain point of view, even more dangerous for those who stubbornly opposed any essential changes in the direction of the nation's life. When the Petöfi Club, created by the communist-dominated youth organization *DISZ* (Union of the Working Youth) started its discussion-evenings in March 1956, the number of participants was a few dozen. After the first discussions, the number of regular attendants grew by the hundreds; at the time of the discussion of the problems of the press, the discussion had to be held in the Central House of the Officers and the number of participants was estimated between 5,000 and 6,000.

At that meeting again, writers and journalists led the discussion. Almost without exception, they attacked Rákosi's policy. The efforts of Márton Horvát, Zoltán Vas and Sándor Nógrádi, three members of the Central Committee of the party, who were present and tried to tone down the effect of the sharp attacks and, to a certain degree, to divert the discussion, were several times interrupted and ridiculed. On the other hand, there was an open manifestation of sympathy, when Géza Losonczy, editor

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caution even after 1953. Under the leadership of Archbishop Gyula Czapik of Eger, the Council of Bishops succeeded in re-negotiating the issue of religious instruction in the public schools. The release of Archbishop Grösz and other ecclesiastical personalities at the end of 1955 and at the beginning of 1956, the improvement in the treatment of Cardinal Mindszenty about the same time were to a considerable extent due to the efforts of the Council of Bishops. On the other hand, Archbishop Czapik accepted a position in the leading board of the re-organized People's Patriotic Front. He consented to go to the congress of the Peace Movement held in Helsinki in June 1955. It may be assumed that this *rapprochement* of the régime and the Church was tied to certain conditions that have not yet been revealed, and, under the changed circumstances are not likely to be made public in the near future. It may also be assumed that there were several negotiations between the government and the Catholic high clergy in the months preceding the Revolution. But there is no evidence at all that members of the clergy would have taken any active part in the discussions and events leading directly to the Revolution. Again, Soviet propaganda efforts referring to the "clerical reaction" (in addition to the Western "agents") are not related to the facts.

[20] Actually, the discussion of philosophers, as well as many of the writers' discussions, were, among others, the re-opening of esthetic and philosophical debates of the years 1949-1952, when George Lukacs, outstanding marxist esthetic and literary critic had been attacked by József Révai then Minister of National culture, and Lászlo Rudas, marxist philosopher, on account of his alleged "anti-marxist" views. About the same time the writer Tibor Déry had been criticized because of the "bourgeois" and "decadent" tendencies of his writings. These were the so-called "Lukács-" and "Déry-" discussions. Concerning the exact dates of the most important discussions of the Petöfi Club see: Melvin F. Lasky, ed., *The Hungarian Revolution, A White Book* (New York, 1957), p. 29.

of *Magyar Nemzet,* summed up the political history of the years 1953-1956 and mentioned the role of Imre Nagy.[21]

This discussion, which began at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and was interrupted after 3 o'clock next morning, was to be continued a week later. But when, two days later the news of the Poznań uprising came, a special resolution was immediately issued on June 30 in the name of the party's Central Committee forbidding the further activity of the Petöfi Club. This kind of "interpretation" of the Poznań events, of course, resulted in a new wave of indignant protest. But by that time Rákosi had decided on action. At the beginning of July, he proposed to the Politburo a list of about four hundred persons who were to be arrested immediately.[22]

Rákosi's proposal for a new terror action appeared too risky even for some of his supporters. Members of the Politburo called on Soviet Ambassador Andropov and asked for his immediate help. It so happened that in the middle of July, the Soviet Vice Premier, Anastasi Mikoyan arrived in Budapest, and after a dramatic session of the Central Committee where Rákosi still had strong support, the latter was ordered to go.[23] The Politburo was completed with four members, two of which (János Kádár and George Marosan) were former victims of Rákosi. But Nagy himself was left out, and the post of first secretary was entrusted to Ernö Gerö, closest friend and collaborator of Rákosi (July 18).

Economic Chaos

Another important factor of domestic discontent was the precarious economic situation of the country, the importance of which has usually been underestimated in the analysis of the causes of the Revolution. This is not the place to discuss the basic effects of the gradual sovietization of Hungary's economic life. Neither can we go into such aspects of the problem whether the rapid industrialization of Hungary benefited the country in the long run, or not? We shall approach general questions of economic policy only as far as they seem to affect essentially the immediate causes of the Revolution, and shall confine ourselves consequently to problems which arose after 1953, and in particular during the months preceding the Revolution.

As referred to above in connection with the events of June 1953, at that time Hungary was on the verge of economic ruin, and it was mainly on account of this that Imre Nagy had his way. Although maintaining the basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism in the economic field too, he launched a much more modest economic policy for Hungary, defying thus the self-deception of the "country of iron and steel," slogan of former economic dictator Ernö Gerö. Instead of pushing forward the forced industrialization, Nagy pointed out that Hungary's raw material resources are very limited.

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[21] See *UN Report,* p. 67, par. 384; also: "The Story Behind Hungary's Revolt—by Rebel Leaders," *Life,* February 18, 1957, pp. 104 and *passim,* article of Tamás Aczél.

[22] *Ibid;* also: *Imre Nagy on Communism,* pp. 298-299.

[23] This Soviet move indicates a certain shift and instability in Soviet policy towards Hungary in those critical months: in May, Suslov, another member of the top Soviet party hierarchy, visited Budapest and at that time gave strong support to Rákosi.

In order to stimulate productivity in the mines and factories, he deemed necessary the immediate improvement in the quantity and quality of consumption goods. Putting the stress primarily on the production for the direct benefit of the population and slowing down the development of heavy industry, Nagy followed the same trend as Malenkov in the Soviet Union. Taking into consideration the desperate conditions of Hungarian agriculture, he reversed the policy of the years between 1949 and 1953, and denounced unequivocally the practice of forced collectivization which cost the nation billions of forints, even allowing the peasants to leave the collective farms in order to resume individual farming. In the field of education, Nagy emphasized the necessity of developing the system of elementary schools and professional education, calling particular attention to the problem of national traditions. To help the socially weak, pensions were to be raised; in small trade and handicraft individual initiative had to be encouraged.[24]

It was not an easy task to put into practice these and other measures, but Nagy tried to do his best. Soon he was to feel, however, the counteracting of Rákosi and the party hierarchy which gave at most only halfhearted support to his program. The latter, to be sure, had serious drawbacks that could be and were exploited to block and discredit Imre Nagy who certainly has been too naive and well-meaning to break down energetically the sabotage of the opposing forces. One of the results of the behind-the-scene fighting was a complete economic chaos. Enterprises of heavy industry, appointed to help out with the production of consumer goods as stoves, bathtubs, boilers, horseshoes, nails, pots and pans, etc. often were not prepared at all for this; investments of many millions were stopped, or slowed down considerably, as in Sztálinváros (Dunapentele) and Diósgyör, causing a certain amount of technical unemployment. Imre Nagy intended to reduce bureaucracy in the party and central administration, and desired to strengthen local administration, giving the latter more independence. But the measures of "rationalization," exerted in several steps, put tens of thousands on the street, causing panic and insecurity, chiefly in the cities.

As far as the village was concerned, circumstances were no better. By 1953, the régime had to admit the fiasco of the kolkhoz-like cooperatives; but after Imre Nagy had been eliminated from power at the beginning of 1955, the campaign for developing the cooperatives started again. The consequence was that neither the collective nor the individual farm had any security, production was in agony, for the peasant did not trust anybody, least of all the government. In 1955 and 1956 Hungary, once an exporter of grain, had to import large quantities of wheat and fodder.

These and other alarming economic problems were deeply rooted in the communist economic policy, and were the result of the critical years 1949-1953. Actually, however, efforts were made to lay all the consequences of the previous years on the shoulders of Imre Nagy, blaming him for the economic chaos.

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[24] See also: *A Survey of Recent Developments*, p. 78.

In addition to the basic controversies of communist economy there were also others of minor importance, yet disturbing because of their complexity in an already unbalanced situation. There was, e.g. the problem of indemnity and reintegration of the rehabilitated persons. The "overproduction" of young but not always well trained specialists who began to pour from the universities in consequence of an exaggerated planning at a time when the five-year plan had to be reduced considerably, was another uneasy aspect of the picture. Then in July 1956, the army was to be reduced partly as an indication of goodwill of Soviet peaceful intentions, partly because of economic considerations. Most of the rank and file were expected to go back into agriculture, but the release of many officers, resented by the army, caused other troubles in the factories and enterprises from which they had mostly been taken several years previously, and where they could not always be given adequate jobs immediately under the changed circumstances.[25]

Even a strong government with sound economic policy would have had a hard job to overcome such difficulties. But the government of András Hegedüs, himself a creature of Rákosi, was not strong nor did it take sound measures to prevent imminent disaster. Besides the gods might not have liked it either. The extraordinary damages caused by the flooding of the Danube in summer 1954 and in March 1956, meant economic ruin to tens of thousands of families; it was generally known that at least one part of the damage could have been prevented, had not the government neglected for many years the work of flood-control and the repairing of dams. Also the hesitation to accept western aid for the plagued population had stirred up much irritation, and indicated the complete dependence of the government on Moscow. True, the two earthquakes which occurred in January and March 1956, did not cause much harm, but were quite unusual in Hungary: those who knew the human soul were well aware of the fact that sometimes even a drop can be dangerous if the glass is already full.

And yet, more and more unexpected cloudbursts were swelling the troubled waters of Hungarian economy. In late spring, the government had to admit that the oil wells of Zalaegerszeg had suffered from water seepage and production declined sharply. This meant heavy losses both for industry and for the foreign trade balance; besides, there were rumors that those old specialists convicted in the MAORT show-process as "agents and spies of the Anglo-American oil companies and imperialists" in earlier years, might not have been completely wrong in predicting the fatal consequences of the exaggerated exploiting of Hungary's oil reserves.

It was under these circumstances that the government had to make all efforts to maintain the purchasing power of the working classes in order to avoid further troubles.[26] To show some "results," the draft-project of the second five-year plan was made public for "discussion" in the last days of April 1956. As a matter of fact, the directives of the plan were supposed to go before Parliament at its autumn session in 1955; this had to be changed, however, since Moscow delayed its approval for several months, demanding new "corrections" of the draft submitted by the Hungarian State Planning Commission. Hence "public discussion" of the plan was only a propaganda maneuver.

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[25] Much alarm was caused also by the plans of "re-organization" of the country's administrative system instigated by Rákosi shortly before his dismissal: his plan affected the living of tens of thousands of employees, and threatened the population of several traditional administrative districts with economic disaster. After Rákosi had left, the government tried to carry out his plan, but had to drop it under the pressure of public opinion in late summer.

[26] A price cut was announced for May 1. In July the annual "voluntary" state loan

As things turned out, it happened to be one of the greatest political blunders of the Hegedüs government. The draft of the plan was a boomerang against the government: at the officially instigated discussions held in all factories, enterprises, institutions and communities of the country, the "directives" were torn to pieces, and often ridiculed in public. One of the first "sensational" discussions of the Petöfi Club was that of the economists: the best marxist economists, like Tamás Nagy, former rector of the Karl Marx University, Professor George Markos, and others rejected unanimously the basic goals of the plan and proposed its complete transformation. Attacks on the plan appeared in a more or less unveiled form in the press too: here again, *Irodalmi Ujság* opened the series with an editorial signed by George Markos who flatly proposed to come back to the "line" of Imre Nagy.

The ridiculous chapters of "cultural and social goals" of the plan harvested no less objections either from the public. At the press conferences, held in the different ministries, ministers and their deputies tried to justify themselves by referring to the precarious economic situation of the country, by transferring the responsibility of the final text of the plan to the Council of Ministers or the Central Committee of the party. Thus e.g. Gyula Kiss, Deputy Minister of Public Education, had to admit when pressed too hard that the Ministry's original propositions were not taken into consideration at all in shaping the final plan; for indicating some of the difficulties of Hungarian public education, he revealed at the same time facts cautiously concealed up to then from the public. Some of his facts and figures were shocking. They showed, for instance, that in the county of Szabolcs, which is in North-Eastern Hungary and has a mainly agricultural population, over several years an average of more than 30 per cent of the matriculated pupils failed to complete the obligatory public eight-class elementary school for social and economic reasons; that in the big cities, like Miskolc, second city of the country, most schools had to be run in three shifts in consequence of the lack of classrooms.

After several weeks of debate, however, it was announced "after having carefully examined all proposals," that no basic changes could be made in the plan without endangering seriously the economic stability of the country.[27] This was the situation in late summer when it became clear that

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was abolished for the year 1957. There were wage-adjustments for several categories of workers, and the salaries of teachers and scientific personnel were raised by September 1, 1956.

[27] It was only in the middle of October that Andor Berei, President of the State Planning Commission, admitted the necessity of "modifying" the plan.

the harvest of 1956 turned out to be much worse than expected on the basis of previous predictions. In many places, peasants refused the fulfillment of compulsory crop deliveries for the state. The government had to back down, and promised a "revision" of the whole system of compulsory delivery of agricultural produce.[28] In the first days of September, Polish coal deliveries, vital for industry, were cut drastically without any previous warnings: as industry worked with a reserve of only two-three days, production had to be slowed down. Miners were summoned to work through Sundays with overtime-payment; measures of economy were taken into consideration, but the winter-supplies of the population were supposedly secured; the central problem of the plan for 1957 was, as stated officially, "the problem of the supply in raw materials."

Toward National Unity

After the political crisis of July which resulted in the removal of Rákosi, further steps were expected from the government. The latter, however, seemed to assume that, having sacrificed Rákosi, public opinion was going to calm down. This might have been, eventually, the opinion of Moscow too which underestimated the political maturity of the Hungarian masses and did not realize how precarious the situation was.

Once again, Hegedüs and Gerö tried to temporize, minimizing the strength of the domestic storm then brewing. Negotiations with Imre Nagy were renewed and continued throughout the whole summer; at its session of August, parliament was encouraged to criticize "freely" the government, and was given the task to become the "real" center of political life as it is proper to the supreme organ of state power. Purged journalists and writers were repeatedly contacted and asked for opinion; they were even promised concessions in turn for a "compromise" of admitting that also Nagy and his followers had committed "mistakes." But on the whole, there was a delaying tactic in the field of domestic policy.

The deeply interwoven threads of intellectual fermentation, moral shock, economic pressure and national consciousness shaped the contexture of the crisis which approached a new height. In September the Writers' Union held its annual convention, and elected with a sweeping majority a new board of direction. The new leadership reflected the spirit of national unity: with the exception of a handful of stalinists, who were left out of the leadership, all shades of political and literary convictions were duly represented.[28a]

After the crisis of July, the demand for national unity gained new strength. By September, the activity of the Petöfi Club revived. The youth at the universities of Budapest, Szeged, Miskolc, Sopron joined in and debated essential political, economic and cultural reform plans. They started to send their representatives to the meetings held by the youth organization in the factories; the latter, in turn, were invited to attend the discussions of the students.

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[28] The abolishment of the compulsory delivery of agricultural products occurred only two months later, during the Revolution under the government of Imre Nagy on October 30.

[28a] See Faludy, György, Maria Tatár, and György Páloczi Horvath, *Tragödie eines Volkes* (Vienna, 1957), p. 109.

Much emotion was stirred up by the re-burial of Lászlo Rajk, George Pálffy, and other victims of judicial murder on October 6, 1956.[29] As it has been pointed out by the foreign press, this "mea culpa" of the régime was meant as a gesture toward Yugoslavia before the anounced visit of an official Hungarian party and government delegation in that country.[30]

There were many speculations and conjectures in connection with this visit. True, Hungarians were deeply impressed by Austrian neutrality and economic prosperity. All honest people had to admit that for a small country like Hungary with her western and Christian traditions, it would be the most profitable to follow the example of Austria, and abstain from the possible conflicts of East and West.[31] Nevertheless it was a hard political reality that without the co-operation of the Soviet Union this goal could not have been achieved. Therefore it was only natural that much consideration was given to the problem of "national communism," which seemed to some people as a possibility of solution on the pattern of titoist Yugoslavia.

Much attention was paid to the reports of different professional, cultural, and trade union delegations, which visited Yugoslavia in an increasing number from the spring of 1956.[32] Most members of these delegations came home with mixed impressions. They saw the economic difficulties of the country, and were told of many social problems too. But at the same time they reported some remarkable signs of development: even in the field of industry, where Hungary used to be ahead of Yugoslavia, the latter seemed to make greater progress in many respects. In this connection, Yugoslavia's free contacts with the west were given high consideration. The spirit of discussing freely all kinds of topics in all walks of society made an impression too. Also, the Hungarian public was especially interested in how the Yugoslavs approached the problems of agriculture and the peasants, and how they managed to run enterprises and factories with the help of elected and independent workers' councils. The growing prestige of Marshall Tito too in Hungary should be mentioned: in the eyes of many, he seemed to be a national hero and a great statesman, maybe the only one in Europe who succeeded in opposing both Hitler and Stalin.

In addition to all this, the changes in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations seemed to give a slight hope for the re-negotiation of Soviet-Hungarian relations too. The re-examination of these relations was considered necessary and demanded with increasing force by public opinion. When at the already mentioned discussion of the Petöfi Club about the Hungarian press and information of public opinion Professor Lajos Jánossy rose to speak and told his audience that he, the vice-president of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission had not the faintest idea of the Soviet-Hungarian uranium agreement, and was not even allowed to ascertain the uranium content of the ore found in Southern Hungary, this was only a characteristic symptom of Soviet-Hungarian relations, the real essence of which has always been concealed and kept a dark secret under the propaganda curtain.

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[29] In this connection the short stories of Tibor Déry ("Love," "Nicky") published in the summer and autumn of 1956 by *Irodalmi Ujság* and *Csillag* (Star, monthly review of the Writers' Union) deserve to be mentioned, both describing masterfully the atmosphere of the previous years of terror and insecurity.

[30] The one week visit took place in the second half of October: the delegation, led by Ernö Gerö, arrived back to Budapest on the morning of October 23.

[31] See also: *Imre Nagy on Communism,* p. 299.

[32] On May 29, the Hungarian government concluded several economic agreements with Yugoslavia, after the negotiations had been interrupted for several months. There was a settlement of Hungary's financial debts, arising out of the economic blockade of Yugoslavia by the Soviet orbit after the Cominform dispute; another agreement concerned Hungarian-Yugoslav technical and scientific co-operation. Finally, a trade-agreement had been signed too. *A Survey of Recent Development,* p. 81.

By now, however, more and more questions were asked at press conferences and public discussions concerning not only the Hungarian uranium ore, but concerning the conditions of Soviet-Hungarian political, economic and military co-operation as well. The question was raised repeatedly, why the exact terms of Soviet-Hungarian trade relations could not be made public if Hungary was an independent nation?

Intellectual fermentation, political, economic and moral considerations as well have to be taken into account if we try to analyze the causes of the Revolution. It was in the best tradition of Hungarian history when writers and artists, scholars and students, the spiritual *élite* of the country raised the vital problems of the nation. This was the revival of the ideas and practice of Hungary's glorious Revolution of 1848-49; this was the inspiration of the great revolutionary poet Sándor Petöfi whose name has become the symbol of a youthful and democratic national renaissance.

It seems to be important to emphasize the democratic character of the whole movement which was popular in the strictest sense of the word. For writers and intellectuals could push forward their ideas and demands only when and because they were strongly backed by the masses. It is enough to read in the letters of workers, published in *Irodalmi Ujság,* or to recall the words uttered by simple peasants who happened to attend some meetings of the Petöfi Club, or of the students, to establish the obvious truth that this time the intelligentsia really understood and reflected the feelings and claims of the people. Besides, as has been correctly emphasized by western observers on different occasions, the overwhelming majority of students were children of workers and peasants,[33] and this new intelligentsia, which got its education under the communist régime, still had very strong ties with the working classes.

Hence the new intelligentsia was, in some respects, in a better psychological position than the old: it felt more conscious and had no complexes of inferiority. Taught by the régime to be "internationalists," young people became really interested in international events, and, as youth always does, supported ardently the idea of truth. It was therefore very natural that when the news of Polish events came on the 19th of October, the

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[33] This was also true with regard to the officers in the army.

Hungarian youth reacted immediately, and without any hesitation expressed its sympathy toward Poland.

The shake-up in Poland worked like a catalyst in Hungary. On the 21st and 22nd, there were student meetings in Budapest at the Building Industry Technological University and at the University of Szeged. At these meetings, political, economic and ideological demands were put forward in the resolutions, and a new student organization (MEFESZ-League of Hungarian University and College Student Associations) was created.[34] In the industrial city Györ (North-West Hungary), the writer Gyula Háy demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops of Hungary on an open meeting. These demands and resolutions were already the basic demands of the Revolution.

On October 23 there were student demonstrations in front of the Polish Embassy in Budapest and the Petöfi statue. Then, carrying Polish and Hungarian flags, the demonstrators went to the statue of General Józef Bem, Polish patriot and friend of Petöfi, who fought also for Hungarian independence in 1848-49.

As on that heroic March 15 in 1848, now again, students and writers put forward the demands of the nation.[35] Before the statue of Bem, the manifestation of the youth was already joined by many officers of the army.[36] From the statue of the Polish hero of Hungarian freedom, one part of the demonstrators marched to the symbol of tyranny and demolished the Stalin statue; others went to the building of Radio Budapest in order to make public the students' demands. Huge crowds were demonstrating before the Parliament building too.[37]

About the same time, however, the provocative speech of Ernö Gerö was broadcast[38] and the secret police committed a new grave crime, opening fire on the demonstrators before the radio.

Thus the time of empty promises has passed; speeches and demands had to yield to revolutionary deeds. Time will show whether they were in vain or not: there can be no doubt that they were aimed at the better future of the Hungarian nation.

New York City

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[34] See the Resolutions of the Building Industry Technological University, *UN Report*, p. 69.

[35] See the Proclamation of the Writers' Union read by Peter Veres before the Bem-statue, *UN Report*, pp. 69-70.

[36] Concerning the demands, see: *UN Report*, "The Declared Aims of the Uprising," pp. 68 and *passim*. Also: Free Europe Committee, *The Revolt in Hungary, A Documentary Chronology of Events*, (New York: 1957) pp. 4-6.

[37] See the description of the meeting before the Parliament in Tamás Aczél, *op. cit.* See also George Mikes, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-87, and George Urban, *The Nineteen Days* (London, 1957), pp. 1-54.

[38] Excerpts from Gerö's speech were published in *The Revolt in Hungary, A Documentary Chronology of Events*, p. 5.

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NOTES

An invitational letter to attend an organizational meeting of historians and social scientists interested in Central European History was sent to a selected list of scholars in advance of the meeting of the American Historical Association in New York, December 28-30, 1957. Approximately sixty scholars attended the organizational meeting at which by-laws were adopted and officers elected. The purposes of the Conference Group for Central European History were stated as follows: "To express a common professional interest in Central European History, to encourage scholarship and interest therein, to represent such scholarly interest in relation to other organizations, and to further collaboration with scholars and institutions abroad having similar interests."

The elected officers are Professor Hans Kohn, City College of New York, Chairman; William O. Shanahan, Notre Dame, Vice-Chairman; Hajo Holborn, Yale, aon Arthur May, Rochester, Board members; and Oron J. Hale, Virginia, Secretary-Treasurer. All interested persons are cordially invited to become members by writing to the Secretary-Treasurer—Oron J. Hale, Department of History, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. The annual dues are one dollar.

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The Jozef Pilsudskí Institute in America held a meeting in The Kosciuszko Foundation (15 East 65th Street, New York City), February 3, 1958 at which Professor Bogdan Zaborski presented a paper on the subject: "The Geographical Bases of a Federation of Central-Eastern European Countries."

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The 1956 American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies in Language, Literature, Folklore and Pedagogy has appeared as volume 9 in the Slavic and East European series of Indiana University Publications. It is a collaborative enterprise, edited by Professor Joseph T. Shaw. The title is rather modest, as a very considerable number of titles which are not literary or linguistic are included, particularly under the rubric "General". Where convenient, responsible reviews of selected books are listed, which is a boon. The bibliography represents a great amount of laborious combing of journals and bibliographies. A total of 807 titles, books and articles, are listed. No attempt has been made to compile a complete list of Slavic publication or reviews in western periodicals.

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The *Sudeten Bulletin* of January 1958 notes the recent foundation of three new institutes in the German Federal Republic: The Eastern College at Köln, the Institute for Eastern Law at Munich, and the Institute for Eastern Churches in Münster. It is not clear, from data in hand, whether these Institutes are related to the recent foundation of several publications which have recently been announced: *Osteuropa Recht* (1955), *Osteuropa Naturwissenschaft* (1957), *Osteuropa Wirtschaft* (1956), all published by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde (Stuttgart).

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The University of Colorado, with the aid of a grant from the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, is sponsoring a regional Conference on Central and Eastern European Affairs at Boulder, Colorado, May 9 and 10. The general theme of the Conference is a reassessment of the relations between Moscow and the satellite states since Budapest and Gomulka's ascent to power, and their impact on American foreign policy. Leading papers will be given by Shepard Stone of the Ford Foundation, John C. Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, and Harry Schwartz of the *New York Times.*

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The Polish Academy of Sciences announces the resumption of publication of the monumental *Polski Słownik Biograficzny.* This dictionary begun in 1935 by the Cracow Academy, had completed Volume VII under the editorship of the late Professor Władysław Konopczyński when publication was stopped in 1949 in the letter G. Most of the biographies for the rest of the alphabet were already in hand at the time of suspension of publication. Some of these will doubtless be revised, and some others added. Revision of the earlier volumes is planned.

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Documentary materials from captured German records microfilmed by the American Historical Association (AHA).

Since the beginning of its operations in September 1956 the American Historical Association's Committee for the study of War Documents has filmed at the Military Records Branch, Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Virginia, more than 1,300,000 frames of captured German records. Included in the filmed materials are the following:

1. Extensive records of the NSDAP dealing with the early history of the party as well as the organization and activities of both the party and its affiliated organizations on all levels during the years of Hitler's rule;
2. records of the Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums pertaining to German resettlement activities in World War II and of the Reichskommissar für die *Wieder*vereinigung [sic] Oesterreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich;
3. files of the Organization Todt;
4. in the economic field extensive files of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, the Statistische Reichsamt and the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft;
5. in the cultural field records of party-dominated research and educational institutions such as the "Sven Hedin"-Reichsinstitut für Innerasienforschung, the Deutsche Akademie, Munich, the Akademie für deutsches Recht and the Deutsch-japanische Gesellschaft;
6. several small, but valuable groups of documents of leading personalities, incl. Hitler, Göring, Himmler and Ritter von Epp;
7. records of various provenance pertaining to German interests in the Far East covering the pre-war and World War II periods; certain high level German military records and correspondence of the Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin are included;
8. records of the Communist Party organization in the Smolensk Oblast.

Most of the microfilms prepared by the AHA Committee are already deposited in the National Archives and available for private research. Data sheets identifying the documents and containing information necessary for locating the materials on film are availble in the National Archives in original and on a special film. Scholars who wish to use this material should direct inquiries to the Exhibits and Publications Branch, National Archives, Washington 25, D. C.

BOOK REVIEWS

Weise, Erich, *Die Staatverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen im 15. Jhdt.* Bd. II (1438-1468). Marburg: Hist. Kommission für Ost- und Westpreussischen Landesforschung, 1955. Pp. 296.

Sixteen years ago the first volume of Weise's work appeared. Now at last we have the second volume of this impressive and voluminous study. The destruction wrought by the war to many archives and libraries has greatly slowed the production of collections of sources. There is, therefore, all the more cause to welcome the present publication. Weise has drawn his material from the Archives of the Teutonic Order, presently at Göttingen, and a few from Polish archives.

Weise construes the term "Staatsverträge" broadly, including treaties, as well as protocols of negotiations even if they were not carried to completion. The number of these *acta* for the years 1438-1466 is very limited. There have been added all the *acta* which, in the judgment of the editor could have had any bearing on the Treaty of Toruń of 1466. He has added furthermore the *actum* of the Order (1440) giving the submission of the Order of Poland, municipal *privilegia*, papal bulls of excommunication, the King's purchase of Marienburg from mercenaries of the Order, in all a most interesting cross-section of documents. Of 232 documents, three-fourths are from registers; of 66 reproduced in their entirety, 14 have hitherto not been published. The bases for selection are not clearly stated. There are some superfluous *acta* (e.g. Nos. 189, 295). Obviously one must allow for some divergence of opinion as to what an editor should or should not provide the reader. Yet it would certainly have been better to print the *acta* of the Skolim Trial in Vienna (1445-56) from the Joachim-Hubatsch *registrum*, the negotiations with the Emperor in the same year, the pourparlers concerning the alliance with Eric XIII of Denmark (1453) with the Dutch and Lithuanians during the war, the papal agreement on the lifting of the anathema on the King (May 15, 1467), and the three documents deciding the peace of Toruń in 1466. (See my study, *Związek pruski i poddanie się Prus Polsce,* Poznań, 1949, pp. xcii, 185)

Weise has arranged his documents by groups rather than in chronological order. Unfortunately as there is neither index nor a list of documents, ready use of the collection is somewhat difficult. Each text is preceded by an indication of earlier editions, reaching back to the sixteenth century. But he has missed many such earlier prints, both in the sixteenth and in later centuries, some of which (e.g. Karnowski, 1574) appeared with valuable critical notes, as well as the text of the unknown confirmation of privileges issued by King Casimir on June 2, 1454, of Januszowski (1600), the *Jura Municipalia Silesiacarum,* Vol. IX and the work of Jan Frieberg. "Spór Polski z Rzymem w czasie wojny 13-1., *Kwart. Historyczny* 1910, were missing, and for No. 315—the declaration of war by the king of Denmark—there is no mention that the document was published *in extenso* in *Codex Epistolaris* s. XV, vol. III (Cracow 1894), and under No. 68, the book of G. A. Lögdberg *De Nordiska Konaungarna och Tyska Orden 1441-1457* (Uppsala 1935) is omitted. In No. 290 Weise disputes the authenticity of the donation of Duke Conrad of Masovia for the Teutonic Knights, dated at Kruszwica in 1230, but he omitted to quote the classic work of Max Perbach, *Preussisch-polnische Studien,* Vol. I (Halle 1886), who proved that the document is a forgery. For No. 302 the book of M. Biskup, *Stosunek Gdańska do Kazimierza Jagiellończyka,* (Toruń 1952); for No. 360 the study of H. Oesterreich, "Die Handelsbeziehungen d. Stadt Thorn zu Polen," in *Zeitschr. d. Westpreuss. Geschichtsverein* 28/33, (1890-1894), are omitted.

Forgeries are generally designated with an asterisk, but it is not clear why the certainly false bull of the Pope Nicholas V of 1453 (1452), excommunicating the Confederation of the Estates, is not so marked (No. 273). The editor does not defend the authenticity of the bull, but he implies that if Rome had taken an official position toward the Confederation, she would surely have issued the excommunication. But in any case Rome took no stand, and the bull is a forgery.

Weise, in a model way, analyzes the formal side of the documents, their script, authenticity, the use of concepts prepared by the order for foreign princes (e.g. No. 271). It is only regrettable that the editor did not abstain from polemics concerning the value of the printed documents. In Vol. I there is only one such polemic (No. 181). In Vol. II he has inserted in the introductions to the documents his personal ideas, e.g. on the illegality of the submission of the Confederation of the Estates to the King of Poland without permission of the Order (No. 288). He asserts that in 1454 there was no incorporation of Prussia into Poland, but only a personal union. Former German scholars, whose editions of sources are quite properly admired, scrupulously refrained from pronouncing on the value of the documents, limiting themselves to the discussion on the authenticity of the sources and their reliability. They feared to fall under the reproach of "hineininterpretieren," of trying to influence the reader. Weise has abandoned these principles. Even when quoting the literature, he gives his opinions on the Polish scholars: e.g. p. 115 "Górski . . . tendenziös und fehlerhaft. Vetulani . . . desgleichen . . . W. Hejnosz . . . versucht überholte Irrtumer zu verteidigen." Weise would appear to mean that their ideas differ from his own. Such remarks are hardly appropriate for an edition of sources.

Weise is obviously desirous of reproducing the best text, but there a few exceptions. The speech of Jan Bażyński (Johann von Baysen), delivered before the King of Poland in February 1454, is known in two versions: one is quoted by the contemporary Polish historian Jan Długosz. the other is known from the Chronicle of Caspar Schütz, the secretary of Danzig (1592 and 1599). Schütz used the Danzig Archives and quoted some documents of value, now unfortunately missing. Thus the German version of the speech, published by him, deserves more confidence than Długosz'. Weise quotes both versions, but instead of printing the original German text of Schütz (editions of 1592 and 1599), he accepts the Latin translation of the edition of 1769, which is not generally used by scholars, because the text is shortened and altered. Weise is not only taking the worse text of Schütz, but in both texts of Schütz and Długosz he makes omissions without any indication in a note. In the places where the text of Długosz is printed in long lines it does not accord with Schütz. Thus, it would seem, scholars would not be able to use No. 290. The same error appears in No. 299: the editor, having in hand the original text of the oath to the King of Poland in the *Metrica Regni* of 1454 preferred to print the Latin version of Schütz in the edition of 1769.

There are some other corrections to make: in No. 300 Weise asserts the privilege of the King of Poland of December 14, 1454 in Radzyn concerns the *Terra Culmensis,* whereas in reality it is speaking of *Terra Chelmensis* (east of Lublin), just as the supposed privilege for the *Ecclesia Culmensis* concerns the *Episcopatus Chelmensis* (No. 298). When publishing the treaty of peace of 1466 Weise gives erroneously the call-number of the original: it is No. 1140 of the Central Archives of Warsaw (and not 1143), which he could have found in my edition (*Związek Pruski,* p. 84), where it is published on the basis of the original. It is probably the document which the Grand-Master issued as the "Landesherr," while three other documents of the Teutonic Order and two of the Polish side have not yet been analyzed, either by German or by Polish scholars. They differ by their eschatocols and the number of seals, and some of them are probably preliminaries.

Some minor mistakes may be corrected: the death of King Władysław III of Poland (1444, p. 21), the day of the capture of Constantinople (p. 177). Slavonic names of persons and localities are written in the modern version or in the contaminated reading of the sources (e.g. Nos. 310, 311, 342, 345, 346). It would have been better to choose a single principle. Notwithstanding some errors and deficiencies the work of Weise can be of some use to scholars. Vol. I was better than Vol. II. We can hope that in Vol. III Weise will go back to the sound traditions of earlier German editors.

University of Toruń Karol Górski

Eckert, Georg, *Von Valmy bis Leipzig; Quellen und Dokumente zur Geschichte der preussischen Heeresreform.* Hannover & Frankfurt a. M.: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt O. Goedel, 1955. Pp. 300. DM 12.50.

Mr. Eckert's book is a welcome addition to the literature concerning the impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon upon Prussia, although it does not contribute anything wholly new in the way of materials or approach. It does, however, assemble and make readily available to the reader materials from scattered printed sources, many of which can only with difficulty be secured in this country. These materials are organized in such a manner as to present a picture of the struggle for military reform in Prussia as it appeared to contemporaries. This work is therefore well suited to its avowed purpose: to provide a brief introduction into the sources for the serious student. It is equally useful to bring the more casual reader the authentic flavor of the period and an understanding of its military-political problems. It is particularly well adapted to provide readings for graduate students in courses concentrating upon the period of the Revolution and Napoleon.

Starting with Goethe's famous account of the Battle of Valmy, the editor leads the way through the twenty years that follow by means of quotations from contemporary works by major figures, with an occasional insertion of later material. Although he includes the description of a battle here and there, the editor is more interested in the basic and disconcerting changes which were forced upon Prussia's leaders by the need to meet the French on their own terms. He therefore concentrates upon theory more than upon events and as much upon the social, economic and political implications of the military reforms as upon the reforms themselves, and this is perfectly justifiable, since the military reforms—as is so often the case—reached far beyond the battlefield and the army in their effect upon the total fabric of Prussian life and institutions. Mr. Eckert further points out that at least some of these implications were recognized by both the reformers and by their opponents and that some important Prussian leaders preferred defeat and subjection to Napoleon to reform and the violent reorganization of their way of life, with its threat to the continued control of the state by the landed nobiliy.

While this book is certainly valuable, there are some grounds for criticism of the criteria of selection and presentation, as is always the case with an anthology. There should have been more material representing the views of the foes of the reformers. There was a long and impassioned controversy over reforms, but here only Friedrich von der Marwitz and Herr von der Decken are permitted to present their arguments against a host of the palladins of the new order, while King Frederick William balances carefully between the two camps. This scant reflection of the ideas of the champions of the old order could well give the reader a false impression regarding the relative strengths and activity of the opposing factions. Besides this substantive criticism, some of the selections seem to be too short to permit proper presentation of the author's arguments or proper evaluation by the reader. This is particularly true in the introductory sections.

Beyond these broad criticisms of what is, after all, a matter of taste, there are only two very minor problems. Where battles are discussed, the absence of charts or sketches is regrettable; it is difficult to follow a detailed discussion of a military action without some form of topographical guide. The military historian is as dependent upon his maps as is an infantry officer. The reader who is only casually competent in German may also find the use of antiquated spellings and words a minor stumbling block, even though it adds to the contemporary flavor of the various selections.

The editor himself very neatly places his book in its proper position with regard to the literature of the subject, although his bibliography is suggestive rather than inclusive. It nicely supplements the pertinent portions of General Fuller's *Decisive Battles of the Western World* as well as the numerous accounts of this period and subject from the French point of view.

Von Valmy bis Leipzig is intended for the general student of the period and for the interested but relatively casual reader. It stands between the work of the popularizers and the detailed studies prepared by the scholar who writes primarily for his fellow scholars. It should be welcomed and valued for what it is and what it can contribute rather than be criticized for not being a definitive treatment of the subject.

University of Pittsburgh HAROLD J. GORDON, JR.

DITTRICH, Z. R., *De opkomst van het moderne Duitsland.* Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1956. 2 vols. Pp. 393, 351. fl 22.50 ea.

This is a study of German history from the Prussian defeat in 1806 until the proclamation of the Empire in 1871, preceded by a brief sketch of the early modern period. Well acquainted with the extensive German literature on this subject, Dr. Dittrich gives the reader an interestingly written and in most respects reliable account of the dramatic events of these years.

A shortcoming is the inadequate discussion of the nationalistic movement, particularly its ideology, during the first half of the century. The author is also often poorly informed on questions indirectly related to his major topic. For example, he accepts without questioning the traditional view on the amount of destruction caused by the Thirty Years' War and greatly overestimates the manpower which France could draw from her colonial empire in the 1860's. It is also incorrect to say that in 1870 every Frenchman was firmly convinced that Prussia would be smashed to pieces. (Prévost-Paradol, Renan, and Taine, among others, evaluated the situation more realistically.)

The author's interpretation of Bismarck's prime ministry, which takes up the entire second volume, is largely an attempt to justify every step taken by the Prussian statesman. Dr. Dittrich considers the German situation prior to the unification as "untenable" and disregards the possibility of any alternative solution. It is symptomatic in this respect that Metternich appears only as a minor figure and that no justice is done to the ideas of a German conservative like Gerlach. The author is undoubtedly right in refuting the legendary views of Bismarck as a man of blood and iron, but he is not convincing when he tries to explain Bismarck's political realism by his religious faith, or when he calls the Prussian leader a more authentic Christian than any other statesman of his period (including Gladstone).

His comments are frequently little more than moralistic judgments insufficiently supported by evidence. There is ample reason for admiring Bismarck's diplomacy, but superlatives such as "giant" are as ineffective in characterizing him as the invectives which have been used by Bismarck's enemies in the historical world.

Dr. Dittrich should be praised for his detailed bibliographical notes, which make the work a valuable tool for further study. His point of view has also some value as a reaction against the revisionist school represented by some German and English historians during and after the last war (A. J. P. Taylor and L. B. Namier are the author's *bêtes noires*). Yet, this study is too dependent on German historiography and too impressionistic in its comments to be considered an important contribution to the history of the rise of modern Germany.

Agnes Scott College KOENRAAD W. SWART

RICH, NORMAN and M. H. FISHER, edd., *Die geheimen Papiere Friedrich von Holsteins.* Deutsche Ausgabe von Werner Frauendienst. Band II: *Tagebuchblätter.* Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956. Pp. xx, 442. DM 32.

In contrast with the recollections in the first volume, the notes here published represent Holstein's contemporary impressions. When he began his career at St. Petersburg in 1860, Bismarck warned him that keeping a diary was incompatible with diplomatic discretion. In 1881, however, he began to record in a notebook some Bismarck anecdotes and, in the following year, a few other items. There are no entries from April to November 1882 nor after March 1883. The more substantial notes begin in January 1884 and end on November 11, 1888.

When Holstein came to the conclusion that his papers were not secure in his office or in his home, he wrote to his cousin, Ida von Stülpnagel, that he would send the notes to her for safekeeping and for her personal information as soon as they were written. In September, 1906, he asked for their return; but he died before they could be shipped to him. In the beginning, he omitted reference to current political and diplomatic issues but, as he became more doubtful about Bismarck's policies, in 1886 he began to include comments about his objections and about his moves towards a personal diplomacy of his own.

As Holstein was one of Bismarck's most intimate associates, his opinions and comments on the chancellor are of major interest. In the course of the 1880's, they were progressively unfavorable though he continued to feel that Bismarck's prestige value for Germany was enormous and that some of his ideas were great.

A host of other figures in German public life appear and reappear in the notes. As in the recollections, Holstein's comments are usually depreciatory, stressing the poor judgment and petty motives of almost everyone but himself. In the end, it is hard to avoid the question: how could the government of a great empire be carried on by people like that? Many of Holstein's judgments, for example, of William II, are paralleled in the memoirs of Waldersee and other well-informed contemporaries. It is a relief to turn from these notes to the collections of state papers and to recall that a diary is a place in which a person can give vent to his vexations and partially considered views.

These notes are less important for the revelations of diplomacy and policy than for the bickerings and rivalries, the behind-the-scenes portrayal of the people and the friction which were an aspect of life and politics in the highest circles of Germany.

University of Minnesota LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL

Čiževskij, Dmitrij, *Aus zwei Welten: Beiträge zur Geschichte der slavisch-westlichen literarischen Beziehungen.* Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, ed. by Cornelis H. van Schooneveld. No. X. The Hague: Mouton, 1956. Pp. viii, 352.

The two worlds mentioned in the title of this book are the Slavic on the one side and the non-Slavic (primarily Western Europe, especially Germany, but also Greek and Roman antiquity and the Latin Middle Ages) on the other. The book is a collection of twenty-one essays, each well documented, nineteen of them written in German and two in English. Fifteen are either reprints of earlier magazine articles (in some cases translated from Russian or Czech into German) or expansions of briefer notes published mainly in the *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie.* Eight full-page plates with black and white photographs enhance the beauty and value of the volume. Different though the subject matter of the various essays may be, all are permeated by the thought of cultural interrelation and exchange within the Slavic world as well as between Slavs and non-Slavs. Literary and religious interests predominate, but there is also some folklore material. On the whole, the volume impresses the reviewer very favorably by the soundness of method and clarity of presentation. A few grammatical mistakes in the German language are a minor flaw which in no way obstruct the understanding. There are also misprints, e.g., p. 290, 1.16, *Jung-Stillung* for *Jung-Stilling.*

Of the two English articles, the first, "Ivan Vyšenśkyj" (pp. 129-141), reprinted from the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy in the U. S.,* I (1951), 2, 113-126, characterizes the main features of the basic philosophy (to some extent also the style) of this Ukrainian mystic and prose writer, who spent the greater part of his life on Mount Athos (he died before 1630) and is called a Ukrainian Savonarola. The other English essay, "John Owen an Ivan Velyčkovśkyj" (172-178), is a stylistic analysis of some poems of a Ukrainian Baroque poet of around 1700 (there were two men with the same name and it is not clear which of them is the author) who transplanted a number of epigrams written (in Latin) by the Welsh writer John Owen (1560-1622).

Religious problems and German-Russian literary relations are involved in the following studies: "German Mysticism in Russia" (179-196), "Jacob Boehme in Russia" (197-219), "Arndt's *True Christianity* in Russia" (220-230), "Two Heretics in Moscow" (231-268). The last title in this group refers to the Silesian Quirinus Kuhlmann (died in Moscow in 1689) and the Russian Dmitrij Evdokimovič Tveritinov (who was tried in 1714), and consists of archival materials and their interpretation. "Swedenborg Among the Slavs" (269-290), published here for the first time, shows up the existence of (positive or negative) interest in or knowledge of the Swedish mystic (1688-1772) among the Russians (as early as 1780), the Poles, Ukrainians, and Czechs. We learn that the well-known Russian lexicographer Vladimir Dal' (from the Danish *Dahl*) was a Swedenborgian, likewise Count Aleksej Tolstoj, and that the Polish romanticists Adam Mickůwicz and Juliusz Słowacki show traces of Swedenborg's influence.

"The Baroque Book Title" (142-154), expanded from a note in *ZfslPh.,* XVIII (1943), 358-366, discusses the book titles used by Comenius (1592-1670) in his Czech and Latin publications. Comenius is also the topic of two other essays, both originally written in Czech and first published in the collective volume *Co daly naše země Evropě a lidstvu* (Prague, 1940), pp. 181-188, namely, "Comenius and Occidental Philosophy" (155-164) and "Comenius and the German Pietists" (165-171). "Plato in Old Russia" (45-65) is a revised edition of an article originally written in Russian (in collaboration with M. M. Šachmatov) and published in *Zapiski Russkago Istoričeskago Obščestva v Prage,* II (1931), 49-81. In the study

"Two Czech Ecclesiastical Songs" (66-88), an expansion of a Czech article published in *Slovo a slovesnost,* II (1936), 98-105 and 251-252, two poems of the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, respectively, both symbolic and religious in character, are analyzed as to structure, interpreted, and compared with later parallels. "The Utopia of the Painter A. A. Ivanov" (291-307), first published in Russian in *Put',* XXIV (1930), 41-57, deals with Aleksandr Andreevič Ivanov (1806-1858).

"The Exiled Truth-Justice" (115-128), expanded from a note in *ZfslPh,* XVIII (1942), 44-49, deals with a topic used in sermons by Saint Dimitrij Tuptalo in Moscow on September 20, 1705, and by Bishop Stefan Javorśkyj also in Moscow on November 13, 1790. The author follows the theme from the eighteenth backward to the fifteenth century in various Slavic literatures, mainly Ukrainian, Czech, and Polish. He finds two original sources for the motif of the Exiled Truth (or Justice), namely, the New Testament and Classical (Greek and Roman) literature, and points out its extreme popularity in medieval literature.

The following six essays are new: I. "Some Problems of Comparative History of the Slavic Literatures" (1-16); III. "The *Social Problem* in the Old Slavic Literatures" (29-44); VI. "The Book as a Symbol of the Cosmos" (85-114); XIX. "Majakovskij and Calderon" (308-318); XX. "Esenin's Song *About the Bread*" (319-336); XXI. "Polyphemus and Stenka Razin" (337-348). No. VI was prompted by Ernst Robert Curtius' book on European Literature and Latin Middle Ages (German edition: Bern, 1948; English translation: 1953) and represents a Slavic supplement to that standard work. No. XX is a motif analysis. One of the motifs is the popular "Martyrdom of the Bread Grain," which appears also in the ballad *John Barleycorn* of Robert Burns. A first Russian translation of Burns' poem, by M. I. Michajlov, was published in *Sovremennik* in 1856. However, Čiževskij quotes earlier Slavic occurrences of similar character, e.g., "The Martyrdom of Hemp" and "The Martyrdom of the Grape." The "Martyrdom of Hemp" appears in a poem of V. A. Žukovskij in 1831 as an introduction to the "Martyrdom of a Handkerchief," and Čiževskij expresses astonishment that a "linen" handkerchief should be made of hemp. Whatever the situation in this respect may be, it is interesting to note that in Lithuanian folklore the "Martyrdom of Flax" (*lino mūka*) is well known, apparently borrowed from Russian or Polish.

In the article "Some Problems of Comparative History of the Slavic Literatures," the author takes issue with Roman Jakobson on the basic belief of the latter in a common Slavic heritage.

Of Čiževskij's own folklore studies included in this volume, only the abovementioned treatment of "Esenin's Song *About the Bread*" meets fully the requirements set up by him in the theoretical introduction (essay No. I). He is not consistent in his treatment of the Polyphemus legend, when he refuses to recognize its origin in the corresponding Odyssey episode. The combination of the Polyphemus legend with the seventeenth-century Stenka Razin is clearly the work of some individual story teller. It has a parallel in Lithuanian literature where Vincent Krévé introduced Prince Sharunas (a creation of his own imagination) in the rôle of the innocent stranger, who in the Lithuanian tradition of the international motif "Late Revenge" is mostly a priest.

The article "The Magic Throw of the Spear" (17-28), expanded from a note in *ZfslPh.,* XXII (1954), 339-343, explains satisfactorily the expression *izlomi kopie* 'he broke the spear,' occurring frequently in the Russian chronicles, as a petrified formula signifying the start of hostilities or of the battle or a challenge. However, the attempt to prove that it goes back into primitive Indo-European antiquity is less convincing. A similar gesture, the throwing down of the gauntlet, is not mentioned. In medieval Switzerland a glove turned inside out was thrown at the feet of an adversary to declare war on him.

University of Pennsylvania ALFRED SENN

RITTER, EMIL, *Die Katholisch-Soziale Bewegung Deutschlands im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert und der Volksverein.* Köln: J. P. Bachem, 1954. Pp. 525. DM 19.50.

Emil Ritter is known as the author or editor of a number of works dealing with Catholic statesmen and political Catholicism in Germany. The volume under review profits from this fact, in so far as it relates the history of the *Volksverein* and its relationship to wider and earlier Catholic social thought. The author, moreover, has made a thorough study of the sources which have any bearing on the more immediate fortunes of this popular Catholic society.

The work, nevertheless, has some of the shortcomings of a pioneer study undertaken by a dedicated scholar. Ritter has not mastered fully the difficulties inherent in any attempt to trace the evolution and accomplishments of a popular society whose success inevitably reflects the daily efforts of many relatively nameless persons.

By way of introduction, the first book (128 pages) of this volume gives a good historical survey of earlier Catholic social movements in Germany. Through this maze, Ritter traces a line of thought and Catholic endeavor which had its fruition in the creation of the *Volksverein* (1890). Since this history is a labor of love, the author feels under obligation to give credit whenever and wherever credit is due and to cite statistics as often as statistics are impressive. Extensive quotations from the statements of diverse Catholics and various church assemblies become somewhat repetitious. The main thread of the story gets shredded in the hands of so many witnesses. The reader gets the impression that the *Volksverein* performed herculean labors, with no very clear image of the work accomplished.

The *Volksverein* was founded in 1890, ultimately with the blessing of Windthorst, Centre Party leader, who served as an honorary president. It announced a program whose substance received Papal encouragement through the Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum,* a year later. Throughout a lifetime which ended with the rise of Hitler, the headquarters of the movement were located in M. Gladbach in the Rhineland, a city which became almost synonymous with the organization. The *Volksverein* provided the framework for a genuine popular movement with membership open to every adult and male Catholic who contributed one *Mark* per year. When the Social Democrats, some years before World War I, began to gain recruits from the women in the industrial cities, the *Volksverein* met the challenge by creating an auxiliary society for women, in "defense against Social Democratic agitation among women."

The aims of the *Volksverein* were both negative and positive. On the one hand, it erected barriers against "false doctrines" and any revolutionary attempts along social lines. The growth of Social Democracy, with its program of social, economic, and religious subversion, was to be inhibited through the propagation of a Christian concept of society. In a more positive sense, members of the society advocated and put into practice suitable Christian social principles aimed at reconciling worker and employer. This was accomplished through personal example as well as through lectures and various schemes aimed at popular education. The society published and distributed millions of pamphlets, especially the *Roten Hefte,* to instruct its membership and any others that could be reached.

The *Volksverein* had its greatest success in the period before World War I. Domestic and foreign testimonials, a number of which are cited, demonstrated its effectiveness. The work of the society represented one of the forces which gradually weaned the German worker and radical away from the revolutionary approach to social and economic salvation. The Social Democratic party, adjusting itself to the changed circumstances, ultimately became largely revisionist in outlook, without completely disavowing past revolutionary slogans. Significantly enough, the *Volksverein* never showed the same vitality and popular following in the 1920's when Social Democracy had reconciled itself to the concepts of Western democracy and liberty; nevertheless, it still possessed enough influence to be worthy of becoming one of the earlier victims of Hitlerian *Gleichschaltung*. It was not revived in a Germany which after World War II showed little need for special defenses against utopian dreams—Marxian or otherwise.

Montana State University Oscar S. Hammen

Georg von Rauch, *Russland-Staatliche Einheit und Nationale Veilfalt.* Munich: Isar Verlag, 1954. Pp. 235. DM 15.00.

The topic of federalism and centralism in Russia, treated by Professor von Rauch, is of acute interest in a time when even Nikita Khrushchev has come out in favor of a partially decentralized administration of the Soviet Union. Contrary to widely held opinion, definite features of decentralized, autonomous administration and local self-government in Russia can be traced to the very first century of the existence of the Muscovite Tsardom. The Tatar Khanate of Kasimov, Bashkiria and many Siberian principalities enjoyed wide powers of self-government in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the activities of the local "voevodas" were in large part only supervisory. The vast territories of the Don, Dnieper, Terek and Ural Cossaks, as well as the Ukraine, preserved their autonomy in internal affairs almost until the second part of the eighteenth century. Among the reformers and would-be reformers of Alexander I's reign, decentralization became one of the most popular notions. Speransky, Novosiltsev, Denisov (who advocated introduction of the wide autonomy for the Don Cossaks), Oginski (author of a plan for an autonomous Western region) and Alexander I, himself, were deeply interested in reforming Russia as a federative or decentralized state. These federalistic schemes of the Russian government found practical application in the preservation of regional self-government in the Baltic provinces and in the granting of a constitution and limited independence to the Poles and Finns. The idea of a reconstruction of the Empire along federal lines was no less popular among the Decembrists. Pestel and Muraviev, the main ideologists for this group, strongly insisted on decentralization and broad freedoms of self-administration in their constitutional projects.

With the ascent of Nicholas I to the Romanovs' throne, the government reverted to centralism in its administration and its ideology, and the slogan "indivisible Russia" became an official motto. The supporters of decentralization were, however, still numerous among liberal intelligentsia, and such leading writers as Herzen and Bakunin radically opposed official centralism and gave influential support to the Poles in their fight for independence. Following the rise of nationalism among the peoples of Russia in the last century, G. von Rauch comes to the conclusion, however, that with the exception of Poles, the leaders and ideologists of the non-Russian intelligentsia of the Romanovs' empire were more inclined toward the concept of federalism than of secession. Thus for instance in the Ukraine, the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, Shevchenko, Kostomarov, Antonovich and Dragomanov along with many other Ukrainian leaders, supported the idea of an all Slavic federation, the nucleus of which was to be formed by the three branches of the Eastern Slavs.

The first four chapters of the book deal with the period ending in 1860, describing mainly the political structure of the Russian state and the government's attitude toward the problems of self-government and centralization as well as various projects of reforms of the local administration. In the latter four chapters the attention of the author is concentrated on the rise of nationalism among the non-Russian peoples of the Empire, and their struggle for cultural and national autonomy. It is a very correct study of national movements in imperial Russia, but the author deals mostly with the fate of the peoples of Russia's western borderland, and to a large extent neglects its Eastern regions, saying very little of Russia's Moslems and Caucasian minorities. The destinies and the rôle of the German nobility and their struggle against the Russian administration for domination over Latvians and Estonians are on the contrary over-detailed for the size of the book. Some minor errors can be found in his treatment of the Ukrainian and Belorussian national movement. For example, there was, contrary to his information, never a 60-member Ukrainian caucus in the Dumas. All deputies from the "Ukrainian" provinces were members of all-Russian political parties, and only one of them was officially classified as a representative of a Ukrainian party.

In his study of the time of Peter I's and his successors' administrative system, Professor von Rauch has ignored the work of such outstanding specialists on Russian regionalism as Gaunthier, Bogoslovsky and Yushkov, who studied the provincial administration and inner political life of northern Russia, where federalistic and democratic principals, preserved from ancient Novgorodian time, were alive even in the century of the blossoming of Russian absolutism. This disregard of the northern Russian tradition prevented the author from giving a complete picture of federalistic trends in Russian political thought and life, which were deeply rooted among the population of Northern and Eastern Russia, and which found their expression in organization of various autonomous administrations in 1917-1920. These minor errors and omissions do not however diminish the value of the book and since rather few scholars have dealt with the evolution of the centralist and federalist ideas through the centuries of Russian history, the work performed by Professor von Rauch is extremely useful, and well prepares the reader for the understanding of one of the key problems of the present Soviet Union.

Russian Research Center SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY
Harvard University

REITLINGER, GERALD, *Die Endlösung: Hitlers Versuch der Ausrottung der Juden Europas, 1939-1945*. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1956. Pp. xx, 698. DM 21.80.

This book was originally published in England in 1953 under the title *The Final Solution—The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945*. Since it aroused little attention in Germany, it was translated into Germany by O. H. Hess "as a moral duty."

The subject matter is plainly and simply horrifying. Here is an objective summary of what was probably the darkest chapter in the history of civilization. The evil deeds of the Roman Caligula, the Russian Ivan the Terrible, and the Spaniard Philip II fade into insignificance alongside the campaign of the peasant Nazi Caesar to wipe the Jews of Europe from the face of the earth. The author has accumulated a vast amount of documentary material—the stories of survivors, the testimony of eyewitnesses at the Nuremberg Trials, and reports from the secret archives of the Third Reich. "In a world of police states," says the author, "scarcely anyone allows his official correspondence to lie around. But here in Nazi Germany was a police state that left behind it hundreds of tons of documents and thousands of witnesses."

Mr. Reitlinger divides his book into two major sections. The first part treats the preparation and beginning of the "solution," with attention to the pogroms of September, 1939, the early deportations, the ghettoes, the Auschwitz plan, and the gas chambers. The second, and larger, part concerns the implementation of the plan throughout Europe, with special chapters devoted to the liquidation of the Jews in the Soviet Union, Poland, France, and other European states. A final chapter concerns the Jews in Germany at the time of the downfall of the Third Reich.

It is a depressing task to read page after page blackened by documentation concerning corpses piled like firewood and Jews sent unsuspectingly into gas ovens. It is a nauseating story of inhumanity and bestiality, terrible evidence of the human mind gone wild. Worst of all, this is a book of facts.

The question has been asked a thousand times: How was it possible for a people such as the Germans, renowned throughout the world as a cultured, civilized people, to permit this to happen? The author confesses that he is helpless in answering this key question or in drawing any conclusions. During the last two years of the war, he says, at least a hundred million people knew about the extent of the massacre. But they did nothing, perhaps because they were gripped in the terror of a police state. No one showed any curiosity, because curiosity was not healthy in the lunatic Third Reich.

For the conscientious historian of German affairs the subject matter of this book provides a dilemma. If he pays special attention to it, he runs the risk of being labeled "anti-German." If, on the other hand, he neglects it, he shirks his duty as historian. For here is the documented raw material out of which history is written.

Inside Germany some intellectuals have racked their brains to find an answer for their country's descent into barbarism during the Hitler Reich. A few have examined their consciences and admitted responsibility. Rudolf Pechel admits: "It remains a fact that Hitler and his régime unloosed the war, hurled the entire world into unspeakable misery, annihilated millions of lives, attempted to exterminate the Jews with the most gruesome means, and placed all who did not conform to his views under the axe and on the rack of the executioner. The fact remains that the German people are co-responsible for this crime." Joachim Leuschner describes Hitlerism as "the last step from nationality to bestiality," and adds: "Moreover, the gas chambers of Auschwitz belong to our national heritage; without recognition, atonement, and the surmounting of this national disgrace there can be no new dignity for our people."

There are, indeed, some hopeful signs that the Germans are seeking ways to integrate themselves into the West and thus provide a new opportunity for their creative contributions to a common civilization based on a common heritage. One does not expect continued groveling for the crimes of Hitler. But one does expect recognition of the enormity of the crimes. It would be most encouraging if the sales of Reitlinger's book in Germany approached that of Ernst von Salomon's *Fragebogen.*

The City College of New York LOUIS L. SNYDER

FREUND, MICHAEL, ed., *Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Dokumenten.* Vol. II, *An Der Schwelle des Krieges, 1939.* Vol. III. *Der Ausbruch des Krieges,* *1939.* Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten. Freiburg: Herder; Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber, 1955 and 1956. Pp. xvi, 503; ix, 440.

The first volume of this ambitious undertaking appeared in 1953 under the title *Der Weg Zum Kriege 1938/9.* (See review by S. H. Thomson in *JCEA, October* 1954, p. 305.) The second volume begins with Hitler's march into Prague in the middle of March 1939 and covers the period until the end of July. The third volume is devoted entirely to the crucial last month prior to the outbreak of the war. The first volume had been widely criticized because of the laxity of editorial standards. Volumes II and III, especially volume II, are much improved in this respect. Now the sources of the documents are always given, it is indicated whether a document is given in full or in abbreviated form, whether it is translated or not and by whom, and omissions in the texts of the documents are specifically pointed out. In general, the selection of the documents is fair, and the reader gets a coherent story and a stimulating, even if often depressing picture of those momentous months. The editor, Professor Michael Freund of the University of Kiel, shows much journalistic skill in the grouping of the material and in the "headlines" and titles of the documents and chapters. Many a reader will disagree, however, with some of the editorial comments, especially Professor Freund's atitude toward the Poles (see vol. II, 75, vol. III, 331, 408), specifically his treatment of the Danzig customs dispute (vol. III, 10 ff) and his ideas about the function of treaties (see particularly vol. II, 303 and 361 and the commentary on Roosevelt's message of April 14, 1939, on p. 171.)

One may also debate on principle the value of this mixture, neither fish nor fowl, of selected documents and selections from documents, connected by often elaborate editorial comments. While there is no doubt that such events as Hitler's march into Prague and the international reaction to it, or the parallel negotiations of the West and of Germany with the Soviet Union come out most vividly in Mr. Freund's collection, there is also the danger that compilations like his will give all but the most sophisticated reader an exaggerated sense of getting the evidence and the objective truth when actually he gets only some evidence and quite selected truths. With this *caveat* in mind, one will readily agree with the editor that it is better to have this compilation than to have nothing or to wait for an indefinite period of time until "all" the evidence will be in and a "final" diplomatic-military history of the Second World War can be written.

A word must be said about the front of the dust jacket which adorns these two volumes. It shows a gray map of Europe on which, like the claws of vultures, three red arrows from the East and two yellow ones from the South and West point to the center of Europe, Germany. Those who might question the congruity between the situation covered in the two volumes and the picture of the map will find on the inside front of the jacket to volume II (which covers March to July 1939) a note in small print which informs them, somewhat shamefacedly, it seems, that the map depicts the last phase of World War II. On the otherwise identical jacket of volume three (dealing with August 1939 this little note is omitted. A minor point, maybe. To the neutral observer, however, the very eye-catching map looks like another "encirclement of Germany" myth. It certainly does grave injustice to the critical atitude of the editor towards the disastrous adventure of Hitler's military and foreign policy.

Cornell College — Eric C. Kollman

Kalnins, Bruno, *Der sowjetische Propagandastaat: Das System und die Mittel der Massenbeeinflussung in der Sowjetunion.* Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1956. Pp. 278.

This book is undoubtedly one of the most important works on the contemporary Soviet system published in Western Europe since World War II. It was prepared as a doctoral dissertation for the Humanities Faculty of the University of Stockholm. Of Latvian birth, Dr. Kalnins studied at the University of Petrograd shortly before the Russian Revolution. Leaving Latvia after its incorporation in the USSR, he has lived as an émigré in Western Europe for a number of years, and has been a frequent writer on Soviet affairs.

Kalnins' aim is to describe and evaluate the entire range of Soviet domestic indoctrination. In entitling his book "the Soviet propaganda state," he emphasizes the extreme importance of this subject. He is careful to indicate, however, that indoctrination rests upon compulsion, and is inseparable from it:

> . . . V. Lenin and J. Stalin have often explained that the power of the Soviets is based on compulsion *and* conviction.
>
> Naturally, compulsion is the primary element in this formula, so important for the Communist dictatorship. The people are compelled to accept daily the flood of Soviet propaganda . . . (p. 9)

Seen in this light, Kalnins' emphasis is a highly useful complement to the numerous studies which have stressed the purely physical aspects of compulsion, such as the concentration camps, in the Soviet system.

The American reader will doubtless compare this book to Alex Inkeles' *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), which Kalnins rightly describes as the pioneering work in the field. Kalnins, however, undertakes to examine a considerably broader range of Soviet activity. After a careful study of oral indoctrination which he, like Inkeles, recognizes as the key element of Soviet propaganda, Kalnins, again following Inkeles, considers the entire range of mass communication media. In addition, Kalnins devotes chapters to the Party school system; indoctrination in the armed forces; the rôle of the "mass organizations" (Pioneers, Komsomols, trade unions, sport groups) in indoctrination; and the propaganda aspects of Soviet culture.

All of these seemingly varied elements are linked not only by organizational supervision through the agitation and propaganda sections of the Communist Party apparatus, but by frequent interchanges of directing personnel. Although Kalnins does not analyze these organizational relationships as thoroughly as one might wish, he makes it clear that in all its ramifications the indoctrination machinery constitutes a single system.

Inevitably, in treating so many topics in one book, the author occasionally becomes somewhat superficial and, more rarely, makes generalizations of dubious validity. His treatment of the press, second in importance only to oral indoctrination, adds little which is not widely known. At times, in discussing the press, he is misleading, though on relatively unimportant matters. For example, it is not true that the press as a whole uses photographs very sparingly (p. 188), though *Pravda* does. In general, however, Kalnins does correctly indicate that the regional press is more varied and somewhat more informative than the central papers. In discussing the Party schools, Kalnins fails to recognize that the practical importance of the provincial and Republic Party schools, which train key officials of the local apparatus, is probably much greater than that of the Evening Universities of Marxism-Leninism and the university courses in Marxism-Leninism, which are primarily designed for maintaining ideological conformity of the intellectuals.

Here Kalnins appears to have been misled by too close adherence to Soviet sources. In general, however, he has used an immense body of Soviet published sources with great skill. His analysis has the special advantage available only to the resident of a country like Sweden, close to the Soviet stations—of being based in part upon protracted and systematic listening to the Soviet radio. In addition, Kalnins has employed a considerable number of émigré publications, and has used nearly all the scholarly studies dealing with phases of his topic which have been published in the United States and Western Europe.

Like all studies which undertake to examine a broad segment of Soviet affairs, Kalnins' book indicates the need for many more detailed monographs. Until a far more exhaustive and systematic investigation of the Soviet indoctrination system is made, however, his work will scarcely be superseded, and will be a major resource for students of the contemporary Soviet régime.

University of Wisconsin JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

BAUER, RAYMOND A., ALEX INKELES and CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, *How the Soviet System Works.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. Pp. 274. $4.75.

American studies of the Soviet Union have been greatly affected in quantity and quality by the Cold War and by its impetus on government agencies, private foundations, and the public to support such studies. Within the academic world, exploration of the USSR has found its foremost arena in the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. The book under review is the first product of the Center's most important group project to date, its large Air Force-financed Project on the Soviet Social System. The project's importance derives not only from the central rôle originally assigned by the Russian Research Center to the areas emphasized—sociology, psychology, and anthropology—but also from the vastness of the areas covered and of the personnel and funds behind it.

The purpose of the book is "to assess the social and psychological strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system" (as against the previously emphasized political and economic aspects), and to do so "from the perspective of a unique body of data—interviews with hundreds and questionnaires administered to thousands of refugees from the Soviet Union, in Europe and the United States, in 1950 and 1951" (p. 3). The authors warn, however, that the present volume is not a summary of the Harvard project's findings as a whole; these are to appear in a series of subsequent monographs. Meanwhile the present work concentrates on general analysis and conclusions.

The introductory Part I of the book discusses the Harvard project itself, the data gathered, and the problems involved—notably the precise representatives and biases of the émigré sample, and how to deal with them. This reviewer, after having first initiated and then observed from the outside the project's contacts with Soviet émigrés in Germany, Austria, and the United States, found this book's formulation rather convincing. Part II, on "Operating Characteristics of the Soviet System," attempts to summarize the available material on the formal aspects of Soviet life, e.g. propaganda, planning, police, foreign policy.

The meat of the book, the portion drawing most heavily and explicitly on the Harvard project, is contained in the two parts which follow. Both deal with the *informal* aspects of the social system. Part III takes up "The Individual in Soviet Society" while Part IV turns to "Social and Psychological Characteristics of Specific Groups" ("The Ruling Elite;" intelligentsia, workers, and peasants; generational differences; nationality groups). A concluding Part V contains a summary, together with "Some Evaluations by the Authors" and "Some Forecasts by the Authors." Among the most revealing conclusions are the following:

(1) The individual's nationality appears to play a lesser rôle in determining his attitude toward the régime than has often been supposed. Indeed,

> people of the same occupation or social group hold essentially the same attitudes and values regardless of nationality. (pp. 217-218)
>
> (2) The Project findings yield strong evidence as to the importance of informal mechanisms in the operation of a society that, on the surface, appears and pretends to be highly centralized, controlled, and rationalized. The rank-and-file citizens learn to apply complicated techniques of accommodations and evasion. . . . In addition, "localism" or "familism," the tendency for local loyalties and informal mutual protective associations to develop on the local level as defense against the pressures of the center, plays a major rôle. (p. 218)
>
> (3) Most Soviet citizens appear to accept and approve the basic structure of the Soviet welfare state and do not seem profoundly troubled by the gross fact of extreme concentration of power in the USSR; indeed they seem to regard it is inevitable if not downright proper. The régime, therefore, has a tremendous potential source of strength here. The strength is, however, more latent than activated, full activation being forestalled by the resentment against the terror, the collective-farm system, the low level of material rewards, and the régime's past history of arbitrary and harsh treatment of the population and its constant intervention in and disregard for the citizen's personal life. (p. 223)

In the West's debate on the future evolution of the Soviet system, Professors Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn favor a skeptical, or at least conservative, interpretation:

> In brief, our best prediction for the short run is that at "worst" the present régime may revert to Stalinism and at "best" it may become a more popular, or at least less resented, but no less totalitarian government. (p. 251)

The authorship, scope, and new data of this work make it one of the most ambitious analyses of the USSR yet ventured in the West. And in this case the Social Science emphasis—stressing psychological and sociological factors as well as methods of analysis—only enhance its value. One cannot object either to the Social Science terminology or to an overabundance of statistics. If anything, one almost regrets the ever unobtrusive use of the statistical data obtained so imaginatively from so unique (and problematical) a source.

In conclusion, two caveats only. Here and there the book's laudable combination of brevity and simplicity with comprehensiveness tends to obscure the difference between novel or focal points and other matter. On several occasions in Part I, for instance, suggestive notions crop up on the rôle of ideology in Soviet society, and on American misconceptions of it. Yet they are not spelled out or given a clear priority over other more familiar and less interesting notions. Again, in Part III, a tantalizing one-page section on "Interpersonal Relations" leaves the reader unsatisfied, and a fascinating later chapter on "Some Aspects of the Russian National Character" only partially satisfies. A second caveat concerns the Cold War approach to the USSR. While such an approach is understandable and on certain levels essential, this reviewer was surprised by its prominent rôle in this academic work. Thus the stated fulcrum itself—the strengths and weaknesses dichotomy—appears to be rooted in the functional utilitarianism of the Cold War approach.

These caveats notwithstanding, this is a general survey of importance and originality.

Brandeis University GEORGE FISCHER

UHLIG, HEINRICH, *Die Warenhäuser im Dritten Reich.* Köln Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956, Pp. viii, 230. DM 9.75.

Even though the focus of this study is in the field of distribution economics and business administration it has much wider political and social connotations. One of the most effective appeals the Nazis had for the German middle class was the fight against all types of modern mass distribution: department stores, chain stores and variety stores of the "5 and 10" kind. Especially during the depression, when retail trade was badly affected, anti-department store campaigns represented one of the main propagandistic levers of Hitler's rabble rousers.

The book deals systematically and in a documentary fashion with the successive stages of this manifestation of "middle class socialism": the growth of department and chain stores and the beginnings of opposition, coinciding with the rise of anti-Semitism before 1914, the crisis of the small retail store during the depression, repressive taxation after 1930, the slogans and techniques of Nazi propaganda, organized boycott, breaking of show windows and use of tear gas, beatings of customers and terrorization of store owners—all of this was used even before the Nazis came to power in January 1933. Soon after, the National-Socialist Party started organizing boycotts on a large scale. The S.A., and later the S.S. were mobilized and any person entering a department store was apt to be stopped, identified and frequently mistreated. Nazi legislation limited the creation of new stores, restricted the lines of merchandise they could sell, but hesitated about closing them entirely. Jewish stores were "aryanized," but on the whole nothing decisive was done until the infamous 9th of November, 1938 when hundreds if not thousands of stores were destroyed, including no less than 29 department stores.

A radical change occurred with the outbreak of the war in 1939. Suddenly, the government discovered that department stores and other means of mass distribution were ideal instruments of wartime rationing, rationalization and planning. At the beginning of 1940 the discriminatory taxes were abolished and when it was later decided to close a large number of stores in order to mobilize labor for war industries, it was the small stores and not the large organizations that bore the brunt of the measure. It is a moot question whether propaganda would have started again had the Nazi party survived the war.

Anti-department store movements were widespread in Central Europe before 1939. Almost every country passed legislation limiting large scale retail distribution for the benefit of its traditional middle classes, the shop keepers and handicrafts. Everything fascist parties fanned the discontent and found willing support among the dispossessed and discontented store owners and their families. Nowhere was the movement more violent and more destructive than in Germany.

This book will provide useful documentation to students of German national socialism, but it may serve a more general purpose by disclosing the sources of middle class *malaise* and incipient fascism in similar situations in other political systems. In a still broader context it illustrates the conflict of the capitalist mode of business organization with the traditional and frequently anachronistic remnants of pre-capitalist enterprise. At any rate it was one of the chief reasons for the failure of democracy in many, indeed most, parts of Central Europe.

Reed College **Frank Munk**

Markus, Vasyl, *L'Incorporation de L'Ukraine Subcarpathique à L'Ukraine Soviétique, 1944-1945.* Louvain: Centre Ukrainien d'études en Belgique, 1956. Pp. 144.

The purpose of this study, as stated by the author, is to gather and examine new evidence relating to the political events that brought about the annexation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union on June 29, 1945 (p. 7). This is indeed a worthwhile undertaking and the writer must be commended for adding another valuable treatise to the literature on Eastern European politics.

The book begins with an historical sketch of the political vicissitudes of Ruthenia from 1918 to 1944 (13-22) and ends with a progress report summarizing the ten-year existence of the Subcarpathian Ukraine (88-95). The nucleus of the volume consists of a description and analysis of the Soviet techniques and strategies in Ruthenia from about April, 1944, when the Red Army reached the Carpathian foothills, until June, 1945, when Subcarpathian Ruthenia was incorporated into the U.S.S.R. (23-87). Most of this material describing the progress of Soviet *Gleichschaltung* has already been presented in this country by Ivo Ducháček, J. W. Brügel, E. D. Carman, F. Němec, and others. Although Mr. Markus proposes to analyze and evaluate these events as objectively and impartially as possible, he presents a one-sided Ukrainian political point of view (7).

He believes that on June 29, 1945 the dream of many of his compatriots came true. By the incorporation of Ruthenia into the Soviet Ukraine, all Ukrainian provinces had been reunified into a single state. He does not approve of the Sovietization of the land. However, as far as the interests of the population are concerned, he thinks they are better assured now within the Soviet Ukraine than they are in a Sovietized Czechoslovakia or Hungary (p. 89f). Yet he is discontented with the methods employed to transform Ruthenia into the Subcarpathian Ukraine. Markus alleges that Dr. Beneš used Ruthenia as a bargaining device for bettering Czechoslovak-Soviet relations after World War II (101, 103, 105). This, of course, is oversimplification. If Mr. Markus had studied Compton Mackenzie's interview with Beneš in the spring and summer of 1944, he would have discovered that Beneš was one of many Czechoslovaks who wished the Subcarpathian Ukrainian dream to come true:

> BENEŠ: We took Ruthenia on trust after the last war. We consider it necessary that Ruthenia should be formally restored to us because it was included in our pre-Munich frontiers, but, at the same time, if the Subcarpathian Ruthenians decide to unite with the Soviet Ruthenians (Ukrainians) we shall not oppose it. We merely demand the moral satisfaction of being consulted first. We never did consider that Subcarpathian Ruthenia was our concern, but if, after the First World War, they had been given to Poland or remained under Hungary they would have lost their nationality and their national culture. This we preserved for them. We feel we have finished our duty towards them, and we are content that they should join the present Ukraine. (Mackenzie, *Dr. Beneš* (London: 1946), p. 290.)

Besides, the effective government to engage in political bargaining at that time was not President Beneš, but the central committee of the National Front, a caucus of party leaders, which shaped policy and made executive decisions which the cabinet endorsed and the Provisional Assembly enacted. The real power was in the hands of six party leaders.

In conclusion, Mr. Markus lists four positive results derived from the incorporation of Ruthenia into the Soviet Ukraine. (1) It rendered impossible the attempt of the dominating nations to create a Ruthenian or Subcarpathian Ruthenian nationality. (2) It was instrumental in creating a pan-Ukrainian mentality, a real sentiment of unity among the whole Ukrainian people, and a political determination to share the fate of the whole Ukrainian nation under all circumstances. (3) It brought progress in education, culture and art. (4) It extended industrialization, distribution of land, and economic progress in general (90-91). The author's expressed hope that the Ukrainian people, divided during many centuries, will once again enjoy the fruits of unity is followed by his desire to achieve a free and independent Ukrainian state.

University of Southern California Peter A. Toma

Schultz, Joachim, *Der Funktionaer in der Einheitspartei—Kaderpolitik und Bürokratisierung in der SED;* Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft, Berlin, No. 8; Stuttgart: Ring Verlag, 1956. Pp. 285. DM 22.50.

It is an astonishing fact that in the voluminous outpouring of books on the Soviet Union there is not a single one that attempts a thorough presentation of the organizational structure of the Communist party, more specifically, of the organizational core of that party, the *cadres.* This is partly due to a lack of vital sources of information with regard to the innermost workings of the C.P.S.U. and the techniques of party rule. The present study of the Soviet zone party goes a long way in making up for this deficiency, since the S.E.D. is after all deliberately modelled on the structure of the C.P.S.U. Moreover, the author relied not only on the most painstaking analysis of printed sources, but on the wealth of information gathered from reliable unofficial sources at the Berlin Institute for Political Science.

Schultz is specifically concerned with the rôle of "political" *cadres,* and, in differentiating them from the broader élite structure, succeeds in clarifying numerous terms of the communist jargon that are still too frequently confused. *Élite* and *cadre* development, far from being identical, are seen to be interwoven processes, often working at cross-purposes, especially since many members of the Communist *cadres* are not at all to be counted among the ruling political and administrative groups. And the most important power struggles take place outside the narrower *cadre* framework, within the small group forming the top of the ruling pyramid. Schultz enters in detail into the process of *cadre* selection, training and utilization and the expectations of the party with regard to the performance of the party bureaucrats. If any major insight can be derived from this study, it is that party organization and the execution of party policy through the organizational network hold the key to both the successes and failures of communist policy. This apparent paradox is very tellingly revealed in the foremost principle of Communist party organization: "democratic centralism," which means that the party "line" is absolutely binding upon all members and especially the *cadres;* infractions of party orders (and the activity of the *cadres* of all walks of life is identical with a party order) are tantamount to breaches of the law or even political sabotage. The only course open to dissenters, and one that has been used to a surprising degree in the Soviet Zone, is to leave the party, in spite of the material and moral hold the party has upon its bureaucrats.

Schultz isolates several weak points of *cadre* policy; the gap between leaders and masses enlarged by a deliberate policy, but contrary to ideology and the constant exhortations for greater "contact with the masses"; the complex system of "parallel jurisdictions" between party and administrative bureaucracies; the development of a sterile bureaucracy in which even the control organs designed to check this phenomenon are becoming bureaucratized; and the excessive *cadre* fluctuation, due to the fact that the party has usurped more positions in the state than it has so far been able to fill with competent and at the same time loyal functionaries. Thus the party, far from being the monolith it is made out to be, suffers—even to the point of severe crisis, as the events in June 1953 showed—from built-in "dialectical" contradictions.

Perhaps it was wise, as Professor Stammer remarks in the preface, that the author did not engage in any hypotheses about future developments, the situation in eastern Germany being even more in flux and less stabilized than in the Soviet Union. Still it is to be regretted that on the basis of such excellent empirical data the author did not have the courage of his own convictions and did not attempt to indicate the trends which by an almost imminent logic seem to suggest themselves.

This book offers rather heavy reading and the abundant documentation (following the excellent system used in the earlier volumes of this series) might have to be passed over by the more general reader. But it will greatly facilitate further research in contemporary communism and should be consulted by every student of party organization. There are probably only a few leading Communist party organizers who possess as much comprehension of the party's machinery as does the author.

University of California (Berkeley) HORST DUHNKE

NEUBACHER, HERMANN, *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1945*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1956. Pp. 215. DM 12.80.

Following a brief introductory statement about the Balkans, Hermann Neubacher describes his duties and experiences as a highly placed official of the German Reich in South-Eastern Europe, and tells how, arrested by the Americans, he was forced eventually to serve a seven and a half year sentence as a war criminal in American and Yugoslav prisons. It is, however, what Neubacher has to say about wartime Yugoslavia, about Tito and Mihailovich, that is of special interest.

Neubacher describes the chaotic situation in Yugoslavia, about Tito and Mihailovich, that is of special interest.

Neubacher describes the chaotic situation in Yugoslavia after the Axis occupation and says that, according to information which reached him, the Croat Ustashi murdered about 750,000 Serbs, a figure smaller than that quoted by Yugoslav sources. He says that the Ustashi leader, Ante Pavelich, officially proclaimed that "One third (of the Serbs) must be converted to Catholicism, one third expelled from the land, and one third killed" (31).

From Neubacher we also learn that the administration of the Banat was entrusted to the local *Volksdeutsch*, because General Antonescu threatened to fight if the Hungarians were to get the Banat (126). Neubacher tells us that he was an intransigent opponent of the principle of "collective responsibility," according to which fifty or more Yugoslav hostages were killed for one murdered German, although he admits that Police General Meissner resorted to this practice on instructions from the "highest leadership" (136-142).

After the Italian collapse in September 1943, Neubacher favored the creation of a "Greater Serbia" federation—comprising Serbia, Sanjak and Montenegro—under the presidency of Nedich (149-155). In such a federation, he saw a guarantee against the "Bolshevization" of the Balkans, a counterpoise to Tito's movement, and he solicited the cooperation of Nedich, Mihailovich and Ljotich (143). But Hitler, who suffered from "an anti-Serbian complex," opposed any concessions to the Serbs (146-147).

Neubacher writes that even prior to his coming to Belgrade, in August 1943, the Chetniks "occasionally participated with Italian and German troops in operations against the Partisans." The Italians made particularly extensive use of this cooperation, but it was disapproved of by Hitler and actually forbidden by the German Headquarters (147). In November 1943, after the Italian surrender, three of the Chetnik *vojvode* (Kalabich, Keserovich, Lukachevich) reached an understanding with the Germans (166). The contracting parties agreed not to attack each other, and to cooperate against Tito's forces. According to Neubacher, the Germans were sparing in supplying arms to the Chetniks for they feared that they might eventually be used against themselves (166-167).

We are told that Mihailovich publicly condemned subordinates who had concluded agreements with the Germans, and that he was never personally present at negotiations with the Germans. Yet, Neubacher does not doubt that Mihailovich hoped to get weapons from the *Wehrmacht* by means of agreements concluded by his subordinates. Neubacher says that he never met Mihailovich in person, but that he was in constant contact with him through D. Achimovich, the Chetnik political representative in Belgrade. He also adds that a personal meeting with Mihailovich would have been of little value for this would have served "to expose Mihailovich as a collaborationist" (168).

After England abandoned him as a result of his refusal to ally himself with Tito and to wage war against the Germans, which he believed would have invited new German reprisals against the civilian population, Mihailovich—in the opinion of Neubacher—had no choice but to rely on the Germans for his military supplies. Thus, even though he "hated the Germans," Mihailovich was forced into ever closer cooperation with them (165-167).

By May 1944 Nedich began to suspect Neubacher's relations with Mihailovich and feared that the Germans might throw their weight behind the latter. Yet, as the Red Army neared the frontiers of Yugoslavia, the two nationalist leaders—Mihailovich and Nedich—found it expedient to meet in August, 1944 and agree on a course of common action. Mihailovich asked Nedich for financial assistance and to intercede with the Germans to supply arms for 50,000 Chetniks. What happened from this point on is now common knowledge.

Despite his imprisonment, six and a half years of which were spent in Yugoslavia, Neubacher writes without rancor, and betrays no apparent psychological after-effects of the war. As if no war had ever taken place, the author is serving today as an adviser to the Ethiopian government. Though a specialist may find little in the book that is new, it nevertheless corroborates from an authority on the German side what has already been rather well established from other sources.

Stanford University WAYNE VUCINICH

NEUMANN, RUDOLF, *Ostpreussen, 1945-1955* (Ostdeutschland unter fremder Verwaltung, Bd. 1). Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner, 195. Pp. 112. DM 7.80.

This outwardly unassuming 112 page book, the first in a series on East Germany under foreign administration, and containing chiefly facts and figures, will be attentively read not only by scholars but also by everyone interested in East European questions, since it gives the best information at present obtainable on one of the most obscure and least penetrated areas behind the iron curtain, hotly contested in world history: East Prussia. A former stronghold of Hohenzollern and Junker might, East Prussia, in her present condition, has become not only a symbol of the downfall of these powers but also a proof of the fact that their bogus "savior," Hitler, by his neurotic anti-Russian drive, has brought down vengeance even upon the elements who were closer to him than noblemen and counts: the broad masses of the German population. In a preface, the *Vorstand* of the Herder Institute of Merburg, under whose auspices this series is issued, enumerates the kind of source material on which this type of publications on practically unaccessible territory must necessarily be based: interviews of refugees; the Polish press which— it is stated—in spite of its totalitarian character furnished valuable information; Polish literature on those territories, comprising the publications of agencies such as the *West Institut* in Poznan—the editors here and everywhere still use the German form of the name Posen—the former Schlesische Institute in Breslau, now taken over by the Polish Academy of Sciences, the Institut der Polnischen Gesellschaft (Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne) in Allenstein ("Olsztyn," as an excellent overlay containing the Polish forms of places given on an attached map of East Prussia permits us to read), etc. Much information, the editors say, was gained from photographs of all kinds which permitted them to check the Polish data.

In evaluating these sources, the expert responsible for this volume, Rudolf Neumann, has shown prudence and scholarship, though the forcibly conjectural character of many of the data gives room for a comparatively free play of his political sympathies, reflected in an especially strong emphasis on all indications that the former German population maintained its nationality and in an especially skeptical treatment of factors in Polish and Russian state planning proving the total absorption of the German element through industrialization. But on the whole, he succeeds in drawing a fair and well-founded picture, proving that in spite of emigration and political evacuation, still a rather considerable number of Germans survived the storm of 1945, especially in Southern East Prussia, where cities such as Osterode, Allenstein, Mohrungen, Bartenstein, Loetzen, and others still retained about one half of their former inhabitants.

Forced by the catastrophic desolation of the area, a result of the events of 1945 which gave East Prussia and her population a shape calling into mind Grimmelshausen's description of Germany after the Thirty Years War (even the packs of wolves were not lacking), the foreign administrations, both the Poles in the South and the Russians in the North, indulged in a frantic search for workers. This forced the Poles to mitigate the sharply anti-German policy that had prevailed at the beginning, and to replace it by systematic endeavors to let the Germans live there and make them work, but at the same time to Polonize them thoroughly. An analagous trend seems to have been followed by the Russians, though the especially tight curtain they have drawn around their particular area prevents Mr. Neumann from spreading the same light on the situation prevailing there.

The presentation ends in 1955, when the book was published, and thus does not comprise the latest phase in which Gomulka, the former Minister of the Regained (Polish) Territories, who was held responsible for the efforts to eradicate the Germans (p. 34), emerged from disgrace and assumed Poland's leadership. We do not know whether Gomulka, after having regained power, renewed his former policy in East Prussia. but we do not believe so, for the simple reason that it was no longer necessary: Even Mr. Neumann, a German, states (p. 41) that in the opinion of both Poles and former Germans the young generation in that area is becoming reconciled to the Polish régime. East Prussia, it appears, is rapidly becoming a country filled with Polish *Kleinbauern*, (the Poles would rather use their ferein for *Mittelbauern*) i.e. peasants owning 5-15 ha.

Washington, D. C. GEORGE W. F. HALLGARTEN

TOBIAS, ROBERT, *Communist-Christian Encounter in East Europe.* Indianapolis: School of Religion Press, 1956. Pp. 567. $8.00.

This study by Dr. Robert Tobias, of the Butler School of Religion, is a very timely contribution to a better understanding of the vast and complex problem of Church and Religion under the Communist régime. The author's endeavor was to present unbiased and objective information on the religious situation in Communist countries, the lack of which is the cause of many distorted views in the West and in the United States in particular. "To many East Europeans the Roman

Catholic Church is the voice of churches in the West. So far as they can see," says Dr. Tobias, "the several committees for 'Free Europe' in the West are controlled by a predominantly Catholic point of view. It is probably true that in the United States much of the information concerning East Europe, and the propaganda about East Europe, on which public opinion and to a considerable extent State policy are formulated, has been introduced through Roman Catholic channels" (p. 180).

This book has two parts: "Interpretation" and "A Chronicle of Events." In the first part in three main chapters; Communist Purposes, Inner Struggles of the Church, and The Church Universal, the author examines thoroughly various methods of the Communist campaign against Church and religion from the beginning of the Soviet régime in Russia in 1917 to 1951 in Communist countries of East Europe according to specific local, national, social, cultural and political conditions. One of the recent Communist methods seeks to divide the Christian churches by treating some of them better than others.

In several remarks concerning the rôle of exiles the author expresses little confidence in their wisdom or in their right to return to any predominance in their "liberated" countries. Or, to be more precise, he has serious doubts about some activities on behalf of exiles and their captive nations. Everybody who is familiar with the political plight of exiles in the USA and other countries and with the more and more evident failure of these enterprises, will sympathize with the author. Yet it has to be said that the following judgment does not do justice either to the author and his book nor to thousands of exiles: "The Church in the pre-Communism situation must prepare for the time when it can be rejoined more closely to fellow-Christians in the Communist orbit. This means the practice of trust, patience, charity and prayer. The last thing it means, if ever, is that the West should prepare leaders, political or ecclesiastical, who might one day return to the East to set things right. The practical possibilities of such an arrangement (assuming that the West would do the "liberating") are about as unthinkable as the possibility of Americans accepting the Communist American G.I.'s in Korea as their leaders if America were some day liberated by Soviet forces" (p. 201). This could only be a slip of the tongue in the heat of the author's disapproval of the "liberation policy" which did nothing but raise false hopes behind the Iron Curtain. To this we can only say that if an exile named Lenin had not returned to Russia, Dr. Tobias probably would not have written his book.

The second part, "A Chronicle of Events" (pp. 221-567), contains historical background material, summaries of the religious situation and official documents pertaining to Church-State relations in Soviet Russia, the Baltic states, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, followed by an epilogue and bibliography. Misprints in foreign languages are rather frequent in this section.

The writer summarizes only very briefly the developments in 1950-1953 in a short epilogue of six pages without mentioning any events in 1954-1955. A more detailed study of this relatively short but important period would have added even more weight to this well documented study.

One cannot escape the impression after reading this book that many aspects of life behind the Iron Curtain have been described in the West in recent years rather by slogans than by facts. This, perhaps, was due mostly to the mythological era of Stalin when possibilities of finding out the truth were so few. Knowing more about the real life behind the Iron Curtain, the West will be able, perhaps, to help bring about even more profound changes through other approaches to the West-East problem than through a "liberation policy" which, so far, has remained in the realm of big empty words. For the West-East problem in the last analysis is whether we shall be able to live without sacrificing human liberties or whether we shall all perish in an atomic holocaust.

New York City **Blahoslav S. Hrubý**

Crankshaw, Edward, *Gestapo. Instrument of Tyranny.* N. Y.: The Viking Press, 1956. Pp. 275. $3.75.

Mr. Crankshaw, whose earlier books on the Soviet Union have been widely read, has writen on the Nazi Secret Police with a view of "establishing what the Gestapo did and what it did not do" in order that "we shall have a much clearer view of what was done by other organizations. . . . which sought not always unsuccessfully, to saddle the Gestapo with their crimes."

In my judgment it would have been much clearer to state unambiguously that after 1939, the Gestapo was organizationally Division IV (*Gegner-Erforschung*) of the Reichs Security Main Office (RSHA), itself one of twelve SS "Main Offices" under the direction of their chief, Himmler. Crankshaw's organizational breakdown (p. 92 f) is not without error. Not everything he lists under Section IV A was lodged here. For example, "Political Churches, Sects and Jews" was the title of IV B, while the personnel card index, dossiers etc. were under IV C. Nor is the author correct in suggesting that IV B was "added to cover the occupied territories," for this became IV D. Another correction: IV G dealt with prisoner transports, *not* "custom and frontier protection," which came under IV F. RSHA Division VII was *not* concerned with scientific exploitation, especially the rocket research at Peenemünde (91); this Division, headed by SS General Dr. Franz Six, specialized in ideological research, especially the evaluation of academic materials in foreign libraries, archives and institutes. Nor is it entirely correct to write that "after Canaris's execution, the SD took the whole outfit [i.e. *Abwehr*] over, so that the German Army was unique in the world in having no Intelligence of its own" (217). In actual fact, in 1944 the important elements of the former *Abwehr* which were absorbed by the RSHA went to both IV E and to the *Militärisches Amt,* under Division VI, headed by Walter Schellenberg.

Crankshaw's statement that "the leadership of the police and the rank-and-file membership of the Gestapo and Kripo were restricted to the SS" (92) should also not go uncorrected. Prior to 1938 there had been pressure upon members of the Criminal Police to join the SS, but such membership was not obligatory. The decree of June 23, 1938 facilitated the acquisition of SS membership for Kripo members, but it was not automatic. The voluntary basis was essential, if the myth of the "élite" character of the SS was not to be impaired. Later, in a letter dated March 24, 1943, Himmler again impressed this fact on RSHA Chief Kaltenbrunner, ordering him to annul any SS membership of Security Police officials who had not applied "without duress and voluntarily" and who did not correspond to the racial and ideological criteria which the SS had established before the war.

Inaccurate dates suggest that Mr. Crankshaw should have written with less haste. He writes that the Nazis came to power on January 30, 1935 (66) and that the Enabling Act was passed on March 21, 1933 (71). He cites a legal decree of November 11, 1937 (90) which he suggests "was a logical outcome of a decree of June 23rd 1938" (91), already mentioned above. One might have wished that the author, instead of simply condensing previous writings, might have attempted more independent verification. For example, he follows Wheeler-Bennett's account of the contract between Hitler and his military chiefs on the battleship *Deutschland,* prior to the Roehm purge, without regard to the important questions which Hildegard Boeninger has raised in the JCEA (April 1954) on this matter. Some of the author's over-simplifications, it must be admitted, have contributed to a high degree of readability, yet must this really be purchased at such a price?

The author also poses the question whether the crimes could happen again perhaps outside Germany, because "otherwise the verdict oscillates senselessly between the two extremes of untruth: on the one hand, that all Germans were directly responsible; on the other, that they were due solely to Hitler and a hard core of Nazi brutes" (12). "In certain circumstances," Mr. Crankshaw concludes, "other peoples than the Germans would find themselves well on the way to producing a fair imitation of the Gestapo," yet "it is only in Germany that they have deliberately delegated their power without reserve to psychopaths and the criminal riff-raff of their country, absolving them from all restraint" (243). In his final words, "until they learn to accept a reality which includes people, the Germans, in their restless and insane striving for something better, will remain dangerous to those who content themselves with trying to make the best of the world as we know it to be" (247).

Perhaps it is appropriate to recall the observations of Andrew G. Whiteside in JCEA (April 1957) that the controversy among scholars about the nature of National Socialism is closely linked to the emotional and other predictions of various historians. By avoiding any overt analysis of totalitarianism (such writers as Hannah Arendt and Carl J. Friedrich are never cited by him—or by Reitlinger), Crankshaw has presented simplifications that are neither very novel nor very helpful.

University of California, Berkeley MANFRED WOLFSON

NEUSS-HUNKEL, ERMENHILD, *Die SS.* Schriftenreihe des Institutes für wissenschaftliche Politik in Marburg/Lahn. Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Abendroth, No. 2. Hannover und Frankfurt/Main: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt O. Goedel, 1956. Pp. 143. DM 7.50.

In highly concentrated form, this short, well documented study of Heinrich Himmler's elitist empire offers scholars the most thorough coverage of the sources to date. Although a great deal of research remains to be done on the voluminous records which the ramified SS empire left behind, Dr. Neussüs-Hunkel has performed a remarkable evaluation and analysis of this deceptive organization. While superficial observers have described one facet or another of the *Schutzstaffel der NSDAP* (Guard Squadron of the National Socialist Party) like the proverbial blind men with the elephant, this author has the superior insight to emphasize the facet which unites all the others: conspiracy. In Himmler's 1936 pamphlet, *Die SS als antibolshewistische Kampforganisation* she finds a key not only to the Leninist model from which Himmler worked, but the real enemy which Himmler and the SS sought to combat: the rightist counter-revolution. Replying to the spokesmen for the theory that National Socialism is an "irrationalist breakthrough," the author marshals abundant evidence of an unremitting effort to rationalize the power-wielding potentialities of the SS against any and every internal enemy of the Nazi revolution. Dr. Neusüss-Hunkel is amply aware, however, that no ideological goals are to be found behind the revolutionary ethos. Even the talk of a new Military Order, a new aristocracy of race, was mere advertising. The SS' goal was "permanent revolution," a perversion of Trotsky's ideal. The SS represented the fantastic synthesis of a revolutionary ethos without fixed goals and a police-totalitarianism in which the secret police (*Sicherheitsdienst*) were the conspirators.

The organization of the book emphasizes the functional character of the SS.

The first quarter of the work shows how historical necessities of the rising characteristic dictatorship contributed to many of the features of the SS. The second and third quarters deal with the techniques of social control which the SS perfected and put at the service of the dictatorship, and eventually turned to its own advantage in the internal rivalries which National Socialism included as part of its dynamism. The last part describes the rôle of the SS in the imperialist dénouement of 1939-1945. The author admits to an increasing centrifugal force in the later years which pushed Himmler and the SS into ever sharper conflicts with other Nazi figures and institutions. Throughout the work, however, the emphasis placed on the sociological and economic setting of the dictatorship (power of German big business; the Party and SS people as outsiders ambitious to become insiders) helps to tie the SS back into the whole phenomenon of National Socialism.

Aside from the careful use of nearly all the published literature about the SS, and a considerable though not exhaustive use of the Nuremberg documents, the study makes very effective use of Nazi publications, e.g. Nazi yearbooks, and of one source particularly, only identified as *Dienstaltersliste der SS von 1938* (SS Rank-List for 1938). The book includes sets of membership statistics for the different branches of the SS at different times and very handy charts of organization in the appendix. There is no index, but the table of contents is quite detailed. Unfortunately, the author's German style is somewhat complex.

University of Nebraska **Robert Koehl**

SHORTER NOTICES

Stoltenberg, Gerhard, *Der deutsche Reichstag 1871-1873.* Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1955. Pp. 216. DM 12.00.

Stoltenberg's study of the first German Reichstag of the Bismarckian Reich is one of a series of volumes published by the German Commission for the History of Parliamentary Government and Political Parties. This series of studies is intended to heighten the understanding of and respect for parliamentary government in the German Federal Republic of today. After a chapter dealing with an analysis of the political parties represented in the Reichstag the author presents the record of each of the four sessions of the Reichstag and attempts to show how the original proposals introduced in the Reichstag were improved and amended by the debates in the Reichstag and the general legislation process. "Painstakingly," the author claims, "the deputies infused the spirit of a free constitution with greater clarity into the texts and paragraphs of the law. The result was the stabilization of the national as well as parliamentary institutions and at the same time the refinement of the legal protection of the citizen against the organs of the state, the strengthening of the power and independence of the judiciary and the strengthening also of the public officials and civil servants" (p. 193). One may question this as too roseate a picture of the workings of the democratic legislative process in that period; but one is also led to the sorrowful reflection that the much more democratically oriented Bundestag of present day German is woefully weak in political talent when compared with the Reichstag that numbered among its members such figures as Ludwig Bamberger, Rudolph von Bennigsen, Hoverbeck, Ketteler, Eduard Lasker, Miguel, Richer, the brothers Reichensperger, Treitschke, Windthorst and others.

The volume adds nothing significant to our knowledge of the period and it is written in a pedestrian style which will hardly engender enthusiasm for parliamentary institutions among the German youth of today. Its value is chiefly for the technical political scientist.

Queens College, N. Y. **Koppel S. Pinson**

Grindrod, Muriel, *The Rebuilding of Italy: Politics and Economics, 1945-1955.* London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. Pp. vii, 269. $4.00.

This is a good book, indeed, a very good book, well up to the usual high level of Chatham House studies. Muriel Grindrod, editor of the monthly review, *The World Today,* combines painstaking research, acute criticism, and careful observation to produce the best account in English of recent Italian developments.

Writing in felicitous style, Miss Grindrod studies the prostrate condition of Italy in 1945, the collapse of the monarchy, and the ratification of the peace treaty. She considers 1947 the pivotal year in Italy's recovery, as she deals first with home politics, second with external affairs (with especial attention to Trieste), and finally with socio-economic matters such as industry, agriculture, trade, education, emigration, and the *Mezzogiorno.*

The Rebuilding of Italy stresses the importance of the Resistance, 1943-1945, in determining postwar political thought and behavior. Mention should have been made of an American scholar, Professor Charles F. Delzell of Vanderbilt University, who has studied the *maquis* in German-occupied Italy, and is likewise aware of its profound influence. Future historians will have a toothsome problem when they seek to estimate the exact impact of the Resistance on the Italian generation that came of age in 1945.

Miss Grindrod states in her summing up that for governments of the past decade, "the greatest of their achievements may be found to lie in their efforts towards improving the lot of the South . . ."; Italy "is a country still uncertain after wars and political adventures, as to its basic direction" (p. 252), given parliamentary rhetoric on the one hand, and philosophical hair-splitting and intense individualism on the other. The author asserts with optimism, "Yet Italy's history goes to show that it is under free institutions that her finest qualities emerge; . . ." (ibid.)

An appendix of Italian governments since 1943, a suitable critical bibliography, and a competent index, all recommended the Grindrod book. It supplements most usefully H. Stuart Hughes' helpful manual, *The United States and Italy* (Cambridge, 1953).

University of Miami, Florida **Duane Koenig**

Muir, Nadejda, *Dimitri Stancioff: Patriot and Cosmopolitan, 1864-1940,* London: John Murray, 1957. Pp. 287. 25 s.

This life of her father by the late Lady Muir is one of the very few authoritative biographies of Bulgarian statesmen available to English-speaking readers. Dimitri Stancioff was a gentleman, diplomat, and statesman of the nineteenth-century school who was international in his education and tastes and yet a staunch patriot in his personal beliefs. Two world wars have destroyed the traditions in which he was bred, and most public men today are narrower in their cultural outlook.

Stancioff was the scion of a Bulgarian commercial family from the Danube region, and had the good fortune to be educated at the Theresianum Academy and at the University of Vienna. In 1887, at the age of twenty-three, he entered the service of Prince Ferdinand, and thenceforth remained a government official and close to the Bulgarian court. In 1894 he was appointed diplomatic agent in Bucharest, and two years later, at the tender age of thirty-two, he was transferred to the critical post of St. Petersburg. In 1906 he returned to Sofia as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and later represented his country in Paris (1908-15) and Rome (1915).

Stancioff's pre-war diplomatic career was thus spent largely in what turned out to be the Allied capitals, and he was closely concerned with Bulgaria's re-establishment of relations with Russia in 1896, the development of the Macedonian question, and the crisis of the Balkan wars. His attitude on these questions was both patriotic and cosmopolitan, as the title of this biography suggests, and it was his very moderation which led to his break with King Ferdinand in 1915. Stancioff felt that his country's interests lay with the Allied powers, and he was therefore forced to spend the war in a secondary military post out of touch with affairs of state. Bulgaria's defeat brought him back into prominence, however, and he served on his country's delegation to the peace conference, as minister in London (1920-24), and as delegate to the Genoa and Lausanne conferences. He thus participated in the main events of Bulgaria's foreign policy, and this biography provides a useful narrative of these developments. If it does not give as intimate an account as one would have liked of Stancioff's mind and philosophy, it nevertheless portrays with skill the spirit and drama of a lost era.

Princeton University C. E. Black

Busek, Vratislav, and Nicholas Spulber, Edd., *Czechoslovakia*. Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee. New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp. xiii, 520. $10.

This book is a symposium, prepared by a team of scholars under the auspices of the Free Europe Committee. The contributors are partly pre-war citizens of Czechoslovakia, partly American experts in mid-European problems. The authors have assembled data about almost all component parts of contemporary Czechoslovakia and her public life. The only gap in this book seems to be a missing chapter on scientific efforts in that nation. The reader may admire the assiduity of the authors in collecting the statistical data, but the authors themselves are well aware of the problematic value of the Communist statistics. As to the data of economic conditions, Mr. Spulber writes (p. 222): "In the opinion of the researchers, these data are deficient in many respects, due to the faulty system of collecting and processing of basic data, the uncertainty regarding certain continuously shifting statistical definitions, the official method of withholding indispensable "linking" figures, the abusive utilization of percentage comparisons, and the impossibility, thus far, for independent observers to check many of the officially claimed performances . . ." About one half of the book is devoted to economic conditions and policy, but there is also good information about literature,. education, tactics against the churches, against political exile, about Communist propaganda in foreign countries. There are valuable sketches of history, preceding individual chapters, and, in the appendix, biographies and characteristics of leading Communists.

University of Pittsburgh Josef Macek

Weinlick, John R., *Count Zinzendorf*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1956. Pp. 240. $4.75.

Count Zinzendorf, founder of what was later called the Renewed Church of Moravian Brethren, was a highly unusual figure. A member of Germany's upper nobility, he was determined to follow his deep, mystical, inner convictions and become a minister of the faith. He was opposed in this by many of his fellow nobles, even those holding similar pietistic views, because they considered it degrading for one of their members to become a humble pastor.

His class did not raise the only opposition to Zinzendorf's ministry. Lutheran theologians entertained grave doubts as to his religious orthodoxy. Nor did his attitude of tolerance towards other religions, especially towards Catholicism, endear him to Lutheran churchmen. Nevertheless, he staunchly insisted throughout his life that his creed did not conflict with Lutheran teachings and that the Moravian Brotherhood remain within the church. After his death, however, the Brotherhood established itself as an independent church.

During his rather remarkable life, Zinzendorf came into contact with a wide range of people, including not only his fellow aristocrats and learned theologians but also kings, North American Indians, and simple peasants. Some of his closest collaborators were artisans. The first bishop of the Brotherhood was trained as a carpenter. Within Zinzendorf, the aristocrat and the democrat led a life-long struggle. This was not a problem facing many other European aristocrats of the time and it makes the life of Zinzendorf therefore still more interesting. It could well have been more strongly developed in Weinlick's work.

Weinlick's *Count Zinzendorf* tells, mostly in chronological order, of the significant occurrences in the reformer's life. It is an honest and sincere account, albeit uncritical. Zinzendorf's errors in judgment, his arbitrariness, and his brusqueness are not entirely ignored; but, in this study, his saintly qualities stand out above all else.

The chief merit of this book is that it is the first full length biography of Zinzendorf in English within recent years. It does not pretend to contribute new material to, nor new insights into, the study of the German reformer's life. As a matter of fact, this biography seems to be based mainly on the English translations of Spangenberg's *Life of Zinzendorf,* which are, incidentally, inexplicably cited in their German forms. The author makes very sparing use of footnotes and, moreover, completely omits a bibliography.

All in all, the romance of the great figure of Zinzendorf more than manages to project itself through to the reader.

Brooklyn College HERMAN FREUDENBERGER

MANNING, CLARENCE A., *History of Slavic Studies in the United States.* Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 117. Paper, $3.00.

The growth of Slavic studies in the United States has been, of late years, considerable enough to justify a study of the beginnings. Starting from the arrival in America of noticeable numbers of immigrants of Slavic origin, from Russia, the Habsburg Empire and Germany, Professor Manning traces the evolution of this ethnic core into a cultural body with an impact upon American education. At the beginning, both because of inherited interest and language controls, the protagonists of these studies were mostly of Slavic origin. The first World War gave a further impetus to these studies, and, during the Inter-bellum period some Americans of non-Slavic origin joined the race; the second World War has ingested the gains and given rise to new institutes and a whole new field which is now irrevocably a part of our educational curricula and of our national nexus of curiosities.

Professor Manning has written a most useful summary of this salutary development. There are details on which some clarification or emendation might profitably be offered. Vassar College under President McCracken is not given sufficient credit for establishing exchange scholarships for students from Czechoslovakia and Poland. The scholarships offered by the Institute of International Education (p. 50) for study in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 30's were open to applicants of non-Slavic origin, as well as to those of Slavic origin. Professor Noyes (p. 51) at California experienced rather more difficulty in getting his Slavic courses established than is indicated here. Nothing is said about Americans of non-Slavic origin who studied or got their doctorates in Slavic—Eastern or Western—universities. The reviewer is not acquainted with "the *Journal of East European History* (edited by the University of Chicago)" (p. 69) nor with the person of "Francis Joseph II" (p. 85). The last chapter, concerned with summary and conclusions, thoughtfully poses the consideration of the present and foreseeable status of Slavic studies. It is of course immediately valid to object to the term 'Slavic', in view of the many non-Slavic peoples in the area outside our conventional "Western European" cultural orbit. On p. 10 Professor Manning sees "signs which indicate that this marked increase [in students of Slavic subjects] is coming to an end." This is contrary to what the reviewer sees. We are grateful for this useful survey, and value the author's analysis.

S. H. Thomson

Schmid-Egger, Hans, *Zukunft in Böhmen*. Munich: Pressverein Volksbote, 1957. Pp. 123.

The problem of the return of the Sudeten Germans to Bohemia appears to be a fixture in German political conjecture. The present study is, as the author professes, a *Diskussionsgrundlage*. The historical aspects of the multinational European state are presented with particular emphasis on the Swiss model. The reader who takes the time to study Swiss history and the peculiarly Swiss character of the Swiss Germans and their relations to the French and the Italian Swiss will find the application to the Czech situation somewhat forced. References to Palacký's suggestions of 1848 would, furthermore, appear out of place in twentieth century Danubia, given the disappearance of the Hapsburg Empire. The author assumes that Bohemia is the *Heimat* of the Sudeten Germans, who want to live there *nach ihrem eigenen Gesetz* (p 81), without noticeable emphasis on their past performance. It is perhaps asking a good deal to expect the Czechs to forget what the Sudeten Germans did to the state when they had the chance. This may or may not be forward-looking international relations; it certainly is international realism. The Czechs are assumed to be "ein immer suspekter Nachbar" (p. 98) because they lean today on France, tomorrow on Russia. What should a people of nine or ten million do when forced to face the unconcealed absorptive policies of a people of eighty million? This bland approach of German publicists, accusing the Czechs of unreasonable belligerency when they wish to keep their small state intact and viable, while fashionable in 1938, would appear to be outdated in 1957.

S. H. Thomson

CORRIGENDA

Owing to late return of proof, a few errors appeared in the article of F. Gunther Eyck in the January issue of the JOURNAL:

p. 356, footnote 1: F. Donaver, *Vita di Giuseppe Mazzini* was published at Florence, 1903. . . . For *Freiden* read *Frieden*.
p. 357, footnote 2: For 1936 read 1836.
p. 362, footnote 25: For p. 187 read P-187.
p. 370, footnote 55: After "italics are" insert "in."
p. 376, footnote 77: The title of Bolton King's work is *Mazzini*.
Last line, for born fruit, read belatedly borne fruit.
p. 377, footnote 81: For Lapper read Lepper.

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MONTENEGRO: RUSSIA'S TROUBLESOME ALLY, 1910-1912

by Edward C. Thaden

THE great powers have long had an interest in enticing smaller powers to follow their leadership in world affairs. A small nation ally which occupies a strategically important geographical position obviously offers many advantages to a great power intent on improving its own diplomatic and military position. At the same time, a small nation friend can often cause considerable embarrassment, and even anxiety, for its great power protector. This is especially the case when the small power ally lacks internal stability and has hopes to strengthen itself through some sort of external expansion. Such an ally was Montenegro for Russia between 1910 and 1912.

After Russia failed to prevent Austria-Hungary from annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and 1909, she did everything possible to avoid any repetition of this humiliating episode elsewhere in the Balkans. The St. Petersburg government resorted to two tactics in order to hinder further Austro-Hungarian expansion into the peninsula: (1) Serbia and Bulgaria were encouraged to form an alliance and (2) Bulgaria and Montenegro were urged to sign military conventions with Russia. The major obstacle in the way of the successful implementation of Russian Balkan policy was Bulgaria. The Bulgarians obviously preferred to keep two irons in the fire and therefore were reluctant to commit themselves definitely to either the Entente or to the Austro-German group of powers in Europe. Thus St. Petersburg labored in vain until the fall of 1911, when the Bulgarians finally decided to commence the negotiations with Serbia that culminated in the formation of a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance in March, 1912.[1]

In Montenegro, on the other hand, Russian policy was eminently successful from the very beginning. Indeed, this success is not very surprising, inasmuch as Russian military and monetary aid to Montenegro was a long established custom that dated back to the time of Peter the Great. Until 1910, however, this aid was of a rather informal nature and was not regulated according to a military convention between Russia and Montenegro. Russian military leaders in St. Petersburg had discussed the advisability of such a convention as early as 1907. The crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina doubtless made this matter seem much more urgent than before. On December 15, 1910, after prolonged discussion between military and political figures in St. Petersburg, a Russo-Montenegrin military convention was signed. In the convention, Russia promised to give Montenegro a yearly military subsidy of 600,000 rubles[2] and to send Russian military instructors, equipment, and arms for the Montenegrin army. Montenegro, for her part, committed herself to place all of her armed forces at the disposal of Russia whenever requested to do so by the Russian government. In Article VII of the convention, she agreed not to undertake any offensive military operations or to contract a military alliance with any third power without Russian consent. Article X of the convention authorized the Russian government to suspend payment of the subsidy and the sending of military supplies upon any infraction of the agreement whatsoever on the part of Montenegro.[3]

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[1] A. L. Popov, "Diplomaticheskaia podgotovka Balkanskoi Voiny," *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, VIII (1925), 6-14.

I

The Russo-Montenegrin Military Convention of December 15, 1910, it would seem at first glance, gave Russia effective control over Montenegrin foreign policy. Actually, this control was not as effective as some Russian diplomats might have wished, above all because the Montenegrins (like many other Balkan Slavs) realized that a combination of unofficial sympathy in Russia for the "brother Slavs" and unmistakable Russian strategic interests in the Balkans were likely to make official Russia's disapproval of any Montenegrin move relatively unimportant. Moreover, the threat of suspending Montenegro's subsidy payments was not one that the Russians could use with impunity, because it was always possible that the Montenegrins would turn to Austria-Hungary for financial aid. This the Russians wanted to avoid at all cost, for such financial aid was likely to lead to a *rapprochement* between Montenegro and the Dual Monarchy.

If the Russian policy makers in St. Petersburg understood this situation in 1910 (there is little doubt that they did later), they could hardly have been reassured by the ambitions of King Nicholas of Montenegro. From the very beginning of his rule in 1860 he had dreamed of reconstructing the ancient Serbian Empire of Stevan Dušan, the medieval tsar of the Serbs who ruled at Prizren.[4] When Nicholas was still young, his chances for doing this seemed fairly good. His family, the Petrović line, had ruled over the free Serbs of the Black Mountain for more than two hundred years, a time span which certainly overshadowed the few generations the Karadjordjevici and Obrenovici had ruled in Serbia. Moreover, before 1900 Nicholas was certainly a more impressive ruler than the weak and dissolute Obrenović kings of Serbia. He was a soldier who had led his victorious troops against the Turks in the 1870's; and he was an outstanding poet in the Serbian tongue whose lines "Onward, onward, let me see Prizren—For it is mine, I shall come to my home" became, in the words of British reporter Mary Edith Durham, "a national song for all the Serbian race."[5]

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[2] Report on the question of renewing the military convention with Montenegro, February 3, 1914, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma, 1878-1917*, edited by A. P. Bolshemennikov, A. A. Ierusalimskii, A. A. Mogilevich, and F. A. Rotshtein (Moscow, 1930-) (hereafter cited as *MO*), 3d Series, I, 165. References are to the volume and the number of each document (unless otherwise indicated). The hyphenated Arabic numeral following the volume number refers to the part number. Dates are given in the western calendar.

[3] Report of Sukhomlinov and Zhilinskii, October 2, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-2, 518.

[4] See Wadham Peacock, "Nicholas of Montenegro and the Czardom of the Serbs," *Nineteenth Century and After*, LXXII (1912), 881-82; M. E. Durham, "King Nikola of

With the restoration of the Karadjordjević family to the throne of Serbia, Nicholas of Montenegro found himself increasingly eclipsed by Serbian King Peter I. Serbia, though still a relatively backward nation, was large and wealthy in comparison with Montenegro. Serbia's economic, political, and social progress around and after 1900 transformed her internal structure sufficiently to attract the sympathies of a large percentage of the Serbs outside of Serbia's frontiers—including many of Nicholas' own subjects. The Montenegrin ruler was quite aware of this turn of events, and he did make considerable effort, given the limitations of his own horizons, to strengthen his country by increasing its productivity and improving its laws and institutions. But Montenegro remained, as the English Montenegrin sympathizer Peacock wrote, "cramped and confined":

> . . . it has no proper port; its territory is still largely barren rock, its products insignificant, and its warriors are not keen to devote themselves to labour or trade. All these defects would be remedied by an extension of its borders which would give the Kingdom richer land, inhabitants more adapted to the pursuits of peace, and harbours which would secure fuller and easier communications with Europe.[6]

In 1910 King Nicholas of Montenegro looked especially in the direction of northern Albania for the extension of his kingdom's borders. At the time, there was considerable dissatisfaction with Turkish rule in all parts of Albania. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century an Albanian nationalist movement gradually came into existence. A handful of intellectuals formed committees inside and outside of Albania and demanded more autonomy for the Albanians in the Ottoman Empire. The news of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was at first received with enthusiasm by Albanian nationalists, who hoped that the new government in Constantinople would grant Albania more autonomy. However, this enthusiasm was soon cooled by the centralizing and chauvinistic policies of the Young Turks. Their non-recognition of Albanian nationality, their efforts to replace the Latin alphabet with the Arabic, their use of Albanian tax revenue

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Montenegro," *Contemporary Review*, CXIX (April, 1921), 473; Spiridion Gopčević, *Geschichte von Montenegro und Albanien* (Gotha, 1914), p. 544; J. Jovanović, *Stvaranje Cronogorske Države i razvoj crnogorske nacionalnosti* (Cetinje, 1948), pp. 391-394.

[5] Durham, "King Nikola of Montenegro," p. 473.

[6] Peacock, "Nicholas of Montenegro. . . . ," p. 886. See Jovanović, *Stvaranje Crnogorske Države*, pp. 327-99.

and troops outside of Albania, their disarming of the Albanians without paying a promised indemnity—all were actions which tended to alienate and antagonize the Albanians. This was especially the case in northern Albania, where a large part of the population was Catholic and where King Nicholas of Montenegro did his utmost to persuade the Malissori of this region that they should turn to him for protection against Turkish abuses.[7]

Before the Malissori revolted in the early part of 1911, according to the accounts of both the Austro-Hungarian minister in Cetinje, Baron Giesl, and the British reporter Mary Edith Durham, King Nicholas promised to them refuge for their families and arms to aid them in their struggle for independence against Turkey.[8] Thus when the Ottoman troops took the heights of Mount Dečin near the Montenegrin border on May 16, 1911, the defeated Malissori were freely admitted into Montenegro. When the Turkish government notified Montenegro that Turkish troops might cross the Montenegrin frontier in pursuit of the Malissori and assured the Montenegrin foreign office that this should not be construed as a hostile act against Montenegro, the Montenegrin government warned that such military activities would very likely lead to armed conflict because of the bellicose frame of mind of the average Montenegrin at that particular moment.[9] King Nicholas, it would seem, had no great desire to avoid such an armed conflict. Indeed, the Serbian minister in Cetinje reported to his Russian colleague a few days later that General Martinović, a confidential adviser of King Nicholas, had confided to him that the king was determined to provoke a war with Turkey in the belief that Russia, in the final analysis, would be obliged to support him.[10]

King Nicholas did not, however, rush blindly into a war with Turkey and felt his way forward with deliberate care and calculation. He attempted to divert any suspicions that the powers might have had concerning his complicity in the northern Albanian revolt by requesting them to guarantee the security of his country against a possible Turkish attack.[11] Competent foreign observers at Cetinje like Baron Giesl, the Austrian minister to Montenegro, Arseniev, the Russian minister, and Colonel Potapov, the Russian military attaché, were convinced that there was little reason for such a guarantee because they considered Nicholas, and not the Turks, to be the party likely to start trouble on the Turko-Montenegrin border.[12] Their estimate of the situation was borne out by Turkish actions during May and June, 1911, for the Turks followed a generally conciliatory policy in northern Albania during these months.[13] The king's tactic of pointing an accusing finger at Turkey was therefore no longer too effective and he was obliged to resort to other tactics. On June 19, 1911, he sent a special Montenegrin mission, headed by former Montenegrin Foreign Minister Mjušković, to St. Petersburg in order to assure the Russian foreign office that Montenegro would observe strict neutrality in regard to the Malissori rebellion.[14] A few days later the king invited the representatives of the powers in Cetinje to discuss with him possible ways and means to bring about a pacification of the rebellion on the Turko-Montenegrin border.[15]

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[7] J. Swire, *Albania, the Rise of a Kingdom* (London, 1929), pp. 91-100; E. C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 91-2; "Albaniia," *Bol'shaia Sovietskaia Entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 1926), II, 132-33; Stavro Skendi, "Beginnings of Albanian Nationalist Trends in Culture and Education (1878-1912)," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XII (1953), 356-67.

[8] M. E. Durham, *Struggle for Scutari* (London, 1914), pp. 18-19, 28-29, and 41; W. Giesl, *Zwei Jahrzehnte im Nahen Osten* (Berlin, 1927), p. 223.

[9] Arseniev to Neratov, May 17, 1911, *MO,* 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 13.

[10] Arseniev to Neratov, May 20, 1911, *ibid.,* p. 10, note 3.

[11] Arseniev to Neratov, May 22, 1911, *ibid.,* 24.

[12] Arseniev to Neratov, May 17, 20, and June 16, 1911, *ibid.,* 13, p. 10, note 3, and p. 117, note 1; Potapov to Zhilinskii, June 16, 1911, *ibid.,* 108; Giesl, *Zwei Jahrzehnte,* p. 223.

Although the powers understandably had no desire to discuss such a pacification and to enter into serious negotiations with the ruler of a country as small and insignificant as Montenegro was, the maneuvers of King Nicholas were nonetheless at least partially successful. His professions of peaceful intentions had moved the Russians by the end of May to attempt to reassure the Ottoman government concerning the intentions of Montenegro and to suggest that the Porte should make an unequivocal statement of its peaceful sentiments toward Montenegro.[16] In June, while the Mjušković mission was in St. Petersburg, the nationalistic Russian newspaper *Novoe Vremia* praised King Nicholas for his efforts to find an acceptable solution to the Albanian question.[17] On June 30 Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Neratov wrote to Emperor Nicholas II that, judging by Mjušković's comments, it was unlikely Montenegro would undertake provocative action on the Turko-Montenegrin border.[18]

In the other European capitals, there also was not too much alarm about the possibility of a Turko-Montenegrin war. When the British and Russian governments proposed during May and June that the powers should consider some sort of common action at Cetinje and Constantinople, the other powers showed relatively little interest in such action.[19] Moreover, Russia and England, the two powers which then seemed to be most interested in possible action at Cetinje or Constantinople, could not agree what the nature of this action should be. Thus when the British government suggested toward the end of June that the powers should recommend to the Porte the advisability of granting social, economic, and national reforms to the Malissori, the Russian foreign office found this proposal unacceptable because it would, in the opinion of St. Petersburg, encourage Malissori resistance to Turkey.[20]

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[13] Cf. E. C. Thaden, "Charykov and Russian Foreign Policy at Constantinople in 1911," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XVI (1956), 28.

[14] Arseniev to Neratov, June 19, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, p. 118, note 1; Neratov to Nicholas II, June 30, 1911, *ibid.*, 142.

[15] Akers-Douglas to Grey, June 24, 1911, *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914* (London, 1933), IX-1, 495.

[16] Neratov to Charykov, May 23, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 27. Cf. Thaden, "Charykov . . . ," pp. 29-30.

[17] *Novoe Vremia*, June 27, 1911.

[18] *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 142.

[19] Osten-Sacken to Neratov, May 24- 1911, *ibid.,* 40; Giers to Neratov, May 24, 1911, *ibid.*, 41; Dolgorukii to Neratov, May 25, 1911, *ibid.*, 49; Izvolskii to Neratov, June 6, 1911, *ibid.*, 87; Thurn to foreign office, June 9, 1911, *Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914* (Vienna, 1930) (hereafter cited as *OUA*), III, 2542; *Documents diplomatiques français* (Paris, 1929-), 2nd Series, XIII, p. 591, note 1; Cartwright to Nicholson, June 7, 1911, *British Documents*, IX-1, 475.

The rather optimistic views prevalent in many European capitals concerning the situation on the Turko-Montenegrin frontier were never shared by Russia's representative in Cetinje. On June 16 Russian Military Attaché Potapov communicated to St. Petersburg his fears that King Nicholas was bound to attempt to incite a war with Turkey in order to "save face" before the Albanians.[21] The Russian minister to Montenegro, Arseniev, reported his impressions concerning the intentions of Nicholas that same day after having had an interview with the king. Arseniev concluded from a statement Nicholas made on the inevitability of war that the latter was only waiting for a convenient incident to start a war with Turkey. The Russian minister felt that Nicholas was counting on the aid of Bulgaria if such a war should come to pass. In the meantime, Arseniev suggested, the king was moving cautiously until he received the payment of Montenegro's military subsidy from Russia that was due in the latter part of June; for until then he would lack the necessary funds to begin hostilities.[22]

When the Russian subsidy was deposited in the account of the Russian mission to Montenegro in the Bank of Montenegro, Arseniev and Potapov requested that St. Petersburg allow them to allocate to the Montenegrin government only 500,000 crowns of the 1,014,000 that had been sent by the Russian government. The balance, they argued, should remain in the account of the Russian mission until "relative calm" had been established in the country. On June 28 Arseniev and Potapov received permission from Neratov to do this. But Neratov apparently still was not convinced that the situation on the Montenegrin-Turkish border was as grave as Potapov and Arseniev claimed. The Mjušković mission had obviously reassured him concerning Montenegrin intentions. Although he permitted Arseniev and Potapov to suspend one-half of Montenegro's subsidy and continued to warn Montenegro as to the possible harmful effects of any precipitate action on the Turko-Montenegrin border,[23] it would seem that he considered these measures to be merely added inducements to keep Montenegro at peace and that he did not alter his belief that Montenegro had no intention to go to war at that moment. In any case, he was soon to learn that resolute Russian action was urgently needed at Cetinje in order to prevent the Montenegrins from threatening the peace of the Balkans through provocation of Turkey in northern Albania.

On July 2 Nicholas ordered that the Montenegrin recruits should be armed and prepared to move to Podgorica, in the vicinity of the Turkish frontier. When Potapov learned of the king's act from Montenegrin Minister of War Djurović, he warned the latter that any troop concentration near Podgorica was contrary to the objectives of the Russo-Montenegrin Military Convention. Potapov added that it was not possible, for fear of alarming the Turks, to have a Russian colonel in the vicinity of the Turkish frontier at that moment, so he would not be able to continue his supervision of the training of the Montenegrin army. Djurović was therefore asked to point out to his majesty that there was no guarantee that the Russian government would permit the use of Montenegro's subsidy to pay for the expenses incurred by a concentration of troops at Podgorica.[24]

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[20] Grey to Russell, June 24, 1911, *British Documents*, IX-1, 497; Grey to de Salis, June 26, 1911, *ibid.*, 498; O'Beirne to Grey, June 28, 1911, *ibid.*, 502; Neratov to O'Beirne, June 27, 1911, *ibid.*, enclosure 2 in No. 502; Neratov to Benckendorff, June 29, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 139.

[21] Potapov to Zhilinskii, June 16, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 108.

[22] Arseniev to Neratov, June 16, 1911, *ibid.*, p. 117, note 1.

King Nicholas was furious about Potapov's attempt to influence his actions. He announced that he had no need of pecuniary aid from the Russian government; that Russia had no right to interfere with his sending troops wherever he pleased; and that he would send his troops to Podgorica the next day.[25] On July 4, two days later, King Nicholas ordered that Montenegrin troops should be mobilized at Podgorica, affirming at the same time that he wanted no war with Turkey and the concentration of troops along the Turko-Montenegrin frontier was necessary in order to protect the security of his country.[26] The Russian foreign office was not assured by these affirmations. Indeed, Neratov found the king's action to be contrary to Mjušković's promise that Montenegro would do everything to avoid a war with Turkey.[27] In so thinking, Neratov clearly had abandoned his previous inclination to underestimate the gravity of the situation reported by Arseniev and Potapov. He did not, however, immediately take measures to restrain King Nicholas. Neratov apparently hoped that the king would soon abandon his provocations on the Turkish border because of financial difficulties caused by the presence of Albanian refugees on Montenegrin soil and by the withholding of one-half of the military subsidy from Russia.

There was, however, little indication of such a change of mind on the part of the Montenegrins during the following several weeks. King Nicholas continued to advise the Malissori not to accept any offers of the Turks that were not guaranteed by the great powers—a guarantee that Nicholas promised to obtain for the Malissori.[28] On July 14 St. Petersburg learned that the Montenegrin foreign minister had sounded the Serbian minister in Cetinje as to the attitude of the Serbian government in the event of a war between Montenegro and Turkey.[29] About the same time, the Austro-Hungarian government became sufficiently alarmed about the situation in nothern Albania and on the Turko-Montenegrin border to suggest that Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia should act in concert in order to

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[23] Arseniev to Neratov, June 26, 1911, *ibid.*, 131; Neratov to Arseniev, June 29, 1911, *ibid.*, p. 143, note 1; Neratov to Arseniev, June 29, 1911, *ibid.*, pp. 156-57, note 1.

[24] Potapov to Zhilinskii, July 2, 1911, *ibid.*, 150.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Arseniev to Neratov, July 4, 1911, *ibid.*, p. 179, note 2.

[27] Neratov to Arseniev, July 5, 1911, *ibid.*, 164.

[28] Durham, *Struggle for Scutari*, p. 73; London *Times*, July 14, 1911.

[29] Arseniev to Neratov, July 14, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, p. 213, note 4.

put an end to the crisis in this area. Neratov recommended to Emperor Nicholas II that Russia should accept the Austro-Hungarian proposal;[30] but before there was time to arrange for such concerted action, the Russian foreign office made use of a Turkish request for Russian intervention in Cetinje. The Porte had asked the Russian government to transmit to Cetinje the Turkish demand that Montenegro cease all interference with the return of the insurgents to Turkish Albania. The Russian government not only forwarded this demand but also, on July 26, 1911, threatened King Nicholas that *all* Russian *moral* and *material* support would be withheld from Montenegro unless he agreed to the Turkish terms. Upon hearing this, the king replied that he had no need of a Russian subsidy and that he was glad that he was then able to conduct the foreign policy of his country without the control of Article VII of the military convention of December 15, 1910. Several hours later, however, he returned and declared himself ready to do as Russia wished.[31]

King Nicholas could hardly back down on his promise because Austria-Hungary and Italy were also putting pressure on him to abandon his support of the Malissori, and Turkey was threatening to open military operations against the Malissori on the Turko-Montenegrin border.[32] For a number of months after the beginning of August, he therefore urged the Malissori to come to terms with the Turks and even threatened to disarm them and cut off all food supplies unless they accepted the Turkish offer of amnesty, educational and economic reforms, the right to carry arms, military service limited to Albania, and reduced taxes. The Malissori were reluctant to accept any offer from the Turks without a guarantee of the powers, but finally the British journalist Mary Edith Durham who was a highly respected and trusted person among the Albanians, persuaded them that they had no other alternative. On August 3 they accepted the Turkish terms, and by August 14 there remained in Montenegro only fifty Malissori who absolutely refused to return to Albania.[33]

This marked the end of the Malissori affair of 1911. By the middle of August Russian military experts apparently considered that "relative calm" had returned to Montenegro, for on August 14 Polivanov, the assistant to the Russian minister of war, requested that the Russian government resume regular payments of Montenegro's military subsidy.[34]

The Malissori and other Albanian tribes were still dissatisfied with conditions in Turkey. The dilatory tactics and reluctance of the Young Turks to fulfill their promises with dispatch made it most likely that new revolts would break out at any time in Albania. Montenegro (and the other Balkan states) was eager to make use of such revolts to extend her own frontiers at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the Albanians. However, as long as the powers were actively engaged in pacifying northern Albania, it was hardly possible for Montenegro to act openly in pursuit of her ambitions in this region.

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[30] Neratov to Nicholas II, July 18, 1911, *ibid.*, 206; Aehrenthal to Conrad von Hötzendorff, July 21, 1911, *OUA*, III, 2568.

[31] Arseniev to Neratov, July 26, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 251.

[32] Giesl, *Zwei Jahrzehnte*, p. 223; Swire, *Albania*, p. 109.

[33] Swire, pp. 109-110; *Nove Vremia*, August 4 and 15, 1911; Durham, *Struggle for Scutari*, pp. 76-83.

[34] Polivanov, August 14, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 318.

II

Since opposition to the wishes of the powers had proved to be futile in the first part of 1911, Nicholas attempted during the second part of that year to persuade one of the two powers most directly interested in Balkan affairs (*i.e.* Austria-Hungary and Russia) that it was to its interest to adopt a more friendly and considerate attitude toward the needs and wishes of Montengero. It was particularly Article VII of the military convention of 1910 (which forbade Montenegro to sign military conventions and to undertake offensive military operations without Russian consent) that irritated the king. During the following months he therefore attempted to persuade the Russians to revise Article VII,[35] at the same time negotiating to establish more intimate relations with Austria-Hungary. In so doing, he undoubtedly hoped to demonstrate to Russia the urgency of a more considerate treatment of Montenegro as well as to gain valuable concessions from Austria-Hungary by dangling tantalizing suggestions before the eyes of Austro-Hungarian diplomats of Montenegro's willingness to become the faithful ally of the Dual Monarchy.

Already at the beginning of August 1911 King Nicholas openly expressed his dissatisfaction with Russian attempts to restrain his freedom of action to the Italian and Austro-Hungarian ministers in Cetinje. When he spoke to Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian minister, alone, he boasted that he could get along without Russian aid by cutting expenses and collecting more taxes. When Giesl cautioned Nicholas that higher taxes were hardly wise in impoverished Montenegro, the king suggested that Austria-Hungary could perhaps make him a loan so that he could deal more effectively with his financial problems.[36]

Although Giesl distrusted Nicholas and did not believe that the king was really prepared to break with Russia, the Austrian minister nevertheless felt that it was to the interest of Austria-Hungary to make money available for Montenegro. "In this way," he wrote to Austrian Foreign Minister Aehrenthal, "the country will be attached to us economically in a most natural way and will become a politically friendly neighbor. This will prepare the way for the transition to a later and more intimate association (*Anschluss*)."[37] Aehrenthal was in agreement with Giesl concerning the advisability of Austro-Hungarian economic aid to Montenegro. Indeed, the Austrian foreign minister even hoped to bring about a customs union between Austria-Hungary and Montenegro,[38] which clearly could have brought

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[35] Report of Sukhomlinov and Zhilinskii, October 2, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-2, Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, February 3, 1912, *MO*, 2nd Series, XIX-2, 420.

[36] Giesl to foreign office, August 4, 1911, *OUA*, III, 2580.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] Aehrenthal to Giesl, November 11, 1911, *ibid.*, 2903.

Montenegro irrevocably into the economic and political sphere of influence of the Dual Monarchy.

Russian diplomats were quite aware of the possibility that Montenegro might turn to other powers for financial and moral assistance. At the end of the summer of 1911, Obnorskii, Russian chargé d'affaires in Cetinje, described how the prolonged stay of the Albanian refugees on Montenegrin soil had taxed the meager financial resources of the country and produced a veritable financial crisis. He suggested that Russia should extend financial assistance to Montenegro because such assistance from another power would be a threat to Montenegrin independence.[39] The Russian government, however, made no effort to proffer such aid to the small kingdom and even made little attempt to persuade King Nicholas that Russia was especially solicitous of his wishes at a time when he was openly dissatisfied with the constraint the Russian government had recently exercised on his freedom of action in regard to the Malissori crisis. Thus the tsarist government refused to consider his expressed desire to have Article VII of the Russo-Montenegrin Military Convention revised. And when Russia was informed at the beginning of the Tripolitan War that Montenegro had approached both the other Balkan powers and Italy concerning the possibility of common action against the Turks, King Nicholas was warned by the Russian chargé d'affaires in Cetinje that the very existence of Montenegro as a state depended on avoiding any intereference in the Italo-Turkish war.[40] The Russian government, it seems clear, was then convinced that Russia's generous yearly subsidy of between one and two million crowns was sufficient guarantee that Montenegro, in the final analysis, would almost always be obliged to comply with Russian wishes. Russia's principal concern with the small power at the time seemed to be to prevent it from causing unnecessary complications in the Balkans through any attempt to extend its borders to the south by taking advantage of the plight of a Turkey at war with one of the European powers.[41]

The rumored intention of the Dual Monarchy to reoccupy the Sanjak of Novibazar must have made the maintenance of the *status quo* seem all the more imperative to the Russian foreign office in the fall of 1911.[42] King Nicholas of Montenegro, on the contrary, apparently saw in an Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Sanjak the opportunity to advance the interests of his own little country. Accordingly, a rumor circulated in Montenegrin political circles in mid-October about an Austro-Montenegrin agreement allegedly reached in Vienna, according to which Montenegro was to receive Scutari and Berane to the south and southeast of Montenegro in the event that Austria-Hungary would occupy the Sanjak.[43]

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[39] Obnorskii to Neratov, September 2, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-1, 385; Obnorskii to Neratov, August 27, 1911, *ibid.*, pp. 399-400, note 3.

[40] Neratov to Obnorskii, October 2, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XVIII-2, 508; Obnorskii to Neratov, October 4, 1911, *ibid.*, 528.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] See Hartwig to Neratov, October 8 and 22, 1911, *ibid.*, 562 and 697.

[43] Giesl to foreign office, October 17, 1911, *OUA*, III, 2774.

Giesl was instructed by Aehrenthal to keep the Montenegrin king in the dark as to the true intentions of the Dual Monarchy in the Sanjak. Actually, Aehrenthal was determined to avoid all moves that might upset the *status quo* in the Balkans; but, at the same time, he considered it to the advantage of Austria-Hungary to convince the Balkan states that the monarchy would use any disturbance of the peace of the Balkans by a Slav nation as a pretext for another Austro-Hungarian military advance into the heart of the peninsula. He reasoned that the fear of such an alternative would cause these nations to work harder to maintain peace, in this way furthering what Aehrenthal then considered the primary goal of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans, *i.e.* the maintenance of the *status quo*.[44]

Such reasoning was probably correct as far as Serbia was concerned but certainly did not apply to Montenegro. Any change of the *status quo* that might benefit Montenegro was welcome. Therefore, if the king believed that Austria-Hungary planned to march into the Sanjak, his natural reaction was to bargain with the Ballhausplatz ahead of time in order that Montenegro would have her share of the booty. At the beginning of November, Nicholas even went so far as to offer to arrange a secret treaty or convention with Austria-Hungary. He promised to heed without exception the advice and instructions of the Dual Monarchy. All that he asked in return was that Austria-Hungary recognize Montenegro's claim to northern Albania (without which he claimed Montenegro could not survive) in the event that circumstances, "perhaps against the will of Montenegro and Austria-Hungary," would bring about the "liquidation of Turkey."[45]

Giesl and the Austro-Hungarian foreign office were not convinced by the king's words that Montenegro really intended to become the Dual Monarchy's faithful friend and ally and continued to believe that Nicholas was primarily interested in keeping two irons in the fire by playing off Russia against Austria Hungary.[46] Despite this belief, the Ballhausplatz came to the conclusion that it was time to show Montenegro special favor. First of all, it was decided to make a loan of three and one-half million crowns available for Montenegro through the Boden Credit Anstalt in Vienna. This loan was ratified by the Montenegrin Skupština on December 17, 1911. One million crowns of the loan were to be used to cover the deficit in Montenegro's budget for 1911; one and one-half million crowns, to make land loans available for the population of Montenegro; and one million, to construct highways.[47]

About the same time a second decision was made in Vienna: to send two experienced Austro-Serbian jurists from Dalmatia to Montenegro in order to assist her in raising the standards of the Montenegrin judicial system. There was however disagreement between Austria-Hungary and Montenegro as to who should pay these jurists. Montenegro did not want to have these legal experts paid by the Austro-Hungarian government, for she wanted to exercise full control over their activities while they were serving in the capacity of legal advisers to the Montenegrin government. When the Vienna government finally (in April, 1912) named two Dalmatian jurists to be sent to Montenegro as an Austro-Hungarian delegation, Montenegro informed Vienna that the sending of a delegation representing the Austro-Hungarian government had not been requested and therefore asked that the jurists should not be sent to Cetinje.[48]

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[44] Aehrenthal to Giesl, October 25, 1911, *ibid.*, 2823.

[45] Giesl to foreign office, November 1, 1911, 1911, *ibid.*, 2857.

[46] Giesl to foreign office, August 4, November 1, 1911, and January 25, 1912, *ibid.*, 2587, and 3247; Aehrenthal to Giesl, November 11, 1911, *ibid.*, 2903; Giesl, *Zwei Jahrzehnte*, pp. 224-25.

[47] *OUA*, 903; Arseniev to Sazonov, December 18, 1911, *MO*, 2nd Series, XIX-1, p. 220, note 2; Sazonov to Nicholas II, February 6, 1912, *MO*, XIX-2, 425.

The initiative taken by Austria-Hungary in Montenegro in the fall and winter of 1911-1912 naturally somewhat alarmed Russia. When the Russian minister and the Russian military attaché in Cetinje learned that the Montenegrin Skupština would ratify the three and one-half million crown loan from the Boden Credit Anstalt, they suggested to the Russian foreign office that Montenegro should be warned that ratification could easily result in Russia's cutting of Montenegro's military subsidy. This, they thought, might be effective as a means to influence the decision of the members of the Skupština.[49] The Russian foreign minister, Sazonov, did not follow this advice, but he was nonetheless concerned about the Austro-Hungarian economic and political campaign in Montenegro. In a report to Emperor Nicholas II, he pointed out that the customs, salt monopoly, and cigaret paper monopoly revenues of the kingdom served as a guarantee of the regularity of Montenegro's interest payments to the Dual Monarchy; and he emphasized that a mortgage bank like the Boden Credit Anstalt could readily gain control of the Montenegrin economy.[50] In regard to the planned Austrian assistance for Montenegro's court system, Sazonov considered this as an attempt on the part of Vienna to gain control over an important branch of the internal administration of the small Balkan power. Such control, he instructed the Russian chargé d'affaires in Cetinje to inform the Montenegrin government, ". . . will paralyze the true development of the kingdom, which Russia has always sincerely encouraged."[51] Such words were calculated to have influence in Cetinje, where there were influential, pro-Russian governmental figures like the head of the Montenegrin cabinet, Tomanović, who profoundly distrusted Austria-Hungary. It was especially the accusations of Tomanović against Austria-Hungary, as Giesl has admitted, that persuaded King Nicholas to terminate his negotiations concerning the sending of Dalmatian jurists to Montenegro.[52]

Russian concern about the possibility of an Austro-Montenegrin *rapprochement* was of course exactly what King Nicholas wanted to encourage. It had obviously been his hope for some time to involve Austria-Hungary and Russia in a competition for Montenegrin favor. In November, 1911, for example, a little after Austria-Hungary had politely turned down his offer of a treaty of alliance, he sounded out Russia as to her attitude in the event of an Austro-Hungarian invasion of the Sanjak. If the Russians would menace the Dual Monarchy in Galicia, he declared himself ready, ". . . at the first signal from Russia, to bite Austria in the leg." However, if Russia did not oppose the annexation of the Sanjak, he threatened to reach an agreement with Austria-Hungary concerning compensation for Montenegro to the south and southeast in exchange for Montenegrin acceptance of the change of the *status quo* in the Sanjak.[53]

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[48] Miller to Sazonov, February 15 and 23, 1911, *MO*, XIX-2, 477 and 521; Arseniev to Sazonov, April 22, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 175, note 3; Giesl, *Zwei Jahrzehnte*, p. 24.

[49] Arseniev to Sazonov, December 12, 1911, *MO*, XIX-1, p. 180, note 1.

[50] Sazonov to Nicholas II, February 6, 1912, *MO*, XIX-2, 425.

[51] Sazonov to Miller, February 20, 1912, *ibid.*, 500.

[52] Giesl, *Zwei Jahrzehnte*, p. 224. See Miller to Sazonov, February 14, 1912, *MO*, XIX-2, p. 138, note 4.

King Nicholas had named his price, but the foreign office in St. Petersburg was not particularly interested in paying it. For one thing, the Russian foreign office did not believe at the end of 1911 that an Austro-Hungarian move into the Sanjak was imminent. Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Austrian chief of staff, did, it is true, consider the moment a favorable one for a military decision in the Balkans. However, when Conrad attempted to influence the conduct of Austrian foreign policy through his troop concentrations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Foreign Minister Aehrenthal, who then sought to follow a pacific policy based on the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, protested to Emperor Franz Josef. As a result, Conrad was dismissed as chief of staff, which was clearly a victory for the peace policy of Aehrenthal.[54]

Aehrenthal's peace policy, it should be emphasized, really made it superfluous for Russia to make any important concessions to Montenegrin wishes. Once it became apparent that Austria-Hungary was primarily interested in maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans, the possibility of Montenegro's obtaining coveted territory to the south through common action with Vienna was ruled out. Then it became a relatively painless and easy matter for Russia to remind the Montenegrins of their fears of Austria-Hungary's acquiring a strangle hold over their small country and to flatter King Nicholas by allowing him to visit Emperor Nicholas II in St. Petersburg—after first cautioning him that the Russian government would be offended if he passed through Vienna en route to the Russian capital.[55]

In general, Russian policy in Montenegro was handled with considerable skill around the beginning of 1912. Without using the threat of suspension of Montenegro's subsidy, the Russian foreign office not only contributed to the failure of the Austro-Montenegrin negotiations concerning the reform of the kingdom's court system but also managed to strengthen the ties of friendship existing between Cetinje and St. Petersburg. Moreover, what was very important from the Russian standpoint at the time, King Nicholas even kept the promise he had made to Emperor Nicholas II while at St. Petersburg in February, 1912, to do everything in his power to maintain peace in northern Albania.[56] Accordingly, he consistently advised the Albanian tribes under his influence during the early part of 1912 not to cause trouble and threatened, if his advice was not heeded, to close the frontier and not permit the entry of a single Albanian refugee into Montenegro.[57]

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[53] Arseniev to Neratov, November 9, 1911, *MO*, XVIII-2, 847.

[54] Denkschrift Hietzing, October 22, 1911, *OUA*, III, 2809; Giers to Neratov, December 7, 1911, *MO*, XIX-1, 171.

[55] Arseniev to Sazonov, December 21, 1911, *MO*, XIX-1, 246.

III

While Russia exercised a restraining hand on Montenegro, she pursued a policy elsewhere in the Balkans that was almost calculated to give the Montenegrins new opportunities to attempt to annex territory to the south and southeast. Since 1908, when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia had sought to encourage the formation of a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. Russian diplomats, however, were apparently aware of some of the dangers of such an alliance from the very beginning,[58] and they therefore did not favor the inclusion of the most unstable and undependable of the Balkan powers in the alliance. Accordingly, shortly after the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance was finally formed in mid-March, 1912, Russia advised the Bulgarians not to permit Montenegro to join their alliance with Serbia.[59]

It was not too likely that the Bulgarians would heed such advice for very long, for they were most anxious to enlist the aid of other Balkan powers for the eventuality of a war with Turkey. Thus serious negotiations with Greece were begun a month before the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was signed. A treaty of alliance between Greece and Bulgaria had been prepared by the end of April, and was signed on May 29, 1912.[60] The Bulgarian political leaders approached King Nicholas toward the end of spring 1912 with the object of negotiating a Bulgaro-Montenegrin treaty of alliance. These negotiations took place in the Vienna Hofburg between June 8 and 19, 1912, right under the noses, so to speak, of Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold and Franz Josef, who had invited King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and King Nicholas of Montenegro to pay their respects to the Austro-Hungarian Emperor.[61] This Bulgarian initiative undoubtedly greatly heartened King Nicholas, who up to this point in 1912 had followed pretty much a hands off policy concerning northern Albania, despite the existence of a general insurrection in Albania.[62]

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[56] *Ibid.;* Miller to Sazonov, March 4, 1912, *MO*, XIX-2, 583; Nicholas I (Montenegro) to Nicholas II, March 17, 1912, *ibid.*, 651; *ibid.*, p. 229, note 3.

[57] *Ibid.*, 651; Potapov to Zhilinskii, May 3, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 293, note 2; Potapov to Danilov, May 17, 1912, *MO*, XX-1, 19.

[58] See Urusov to Neratov, May 15, 1911, *MO*, XVIII-1, 6.

[59] Memorandum of Sazonov, May 10, 1912, *MO*, XIX-2, 878.

[60] Nekliudov to Sazonov, February 24, 1912, *ibid.*, 534; Urusov to Sazonov, March 30, 1912, *ibid.*, 712; Nekliudov to Sazonov, May 1, 1912, ibid., 844; *MO*, XX-1, p. 207, note 2; Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 75.

[61] *MO*, XX-1, p. 205, note 4; Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, p. 86; I. Geshov, *The Balkan League* (London, 1915), p. 41; M., "The Balkan League, History and its Formation," *Fortnightly Review*, XCIX (March, 1913), 430-40.

[62] Swire, *Albania, the Rise of a Kingdom*, p. 119; Potapov to Danilov, May 17, 1912, *MO*, XX-1, 19.

Nicholas, however, avoided border incidents almost until the middle of July, apparently because he hoped the Turks would make certain rectifications of the Turko-Montenegrin frontier in favor of Montenegro. On June 11, 1912, a joint commission signed a Turko-Montenegrin protocol which provided for such rectifications.[63] The Turkish government, however, delayed ratification, allegedly in order not to antagonize the tribes of northern Albania with the prospect of incorporation into Montenegro at a time when there was general unrest in this area. King Nicholas' reaction was to prepare an appeal to the powers and to announce to the Russian representative in Cetinje that he would have to resort to drastic measures, perhaps even being obliged to seize one of the Turkish border posts.[64]

In the actual practice of King Nicholas' policy, the drastic measures seemed to precede any formal appeal to the powers, for around mid-July and early August, 1912 a series of border incidents occurred on the Turko-Montenegrin frontier.[65] It was only on August 10, after having attacked Turkish positions on several occasions, that the Montenegrin government appealed officially to the powers to take into their hands without delay the correction and drawing of a new boundary line between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire.[66] In order to persuade the powers of the urgency of action on this request, King Nicholas, according to the Russian military attaché in Cetinje, planned to raze to the ground the whole line of Turkish blockhouses on his eastern frontier. A prelude to such action was apparently the armed support that Montenegro was then giving to Slav insurrectionists near Berane in the Sanjak of Novibazar.[67]

These incidents alarmed the Russian foreign office. Attempts were therefore made once again to pacify the Turko-Montenegrin frontier through diplomatic action at Cetinje, Constantinople, and the major European capitals.[68] These efforts were, however, to a large extent frustrated because the Montenegrin situation was then developing in close connection with growing unrest in Albania and with the increasing inclination of the nations of the Balkan Alliance (Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia) to risk a war with Turkey. In regard to Albanian unrest, the success of the Albanians in opposing Constantinople during 1912 greatly disturbed all of the Balkan states, because they feared that the Albanians might eventually establish their control over large parts of Macedonia and Old Serbia. The Bulgarians, Greeks, Montenegrins, and Serbs already had enough difficulty dividing these areas among themselves without allowing the entry of a fifth contender into the match. It was especially feared that the Turks would attempt to encourage the settlement of Albanians throughout Macedonia and Old Serbia at the expense of the Slavic element.[69] In all the Balkan states there were many people and groups who were prepared to make the most of such fears. This was particularly the case for the Bulgarian-oriented Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. During August, 1912, this organization held a number of mass meetings in Bulgaria as a means of protesting against Turkish reprisals in Macedonia for provocative activities of Macedonian terrorists. At the time the Russian representatives in Sofia feared that public opinion might push Bulgaria into war at any moment over some minor border incident or Turkish reprisals in Macedonia.[70] Geshov, the Bulgarian minister president in 1912, wrote several years later concerning these meetings and a congress of Macedonian revolutionists held on August 24, 1912:

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[63] Giers to Sazonov, July 6, 1912, *MO,* XX-1, 272.

[64] *Ibid.;* Potapov to Quartermaster branch of General Staff, July 12, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 265, note 1.

[65] Obnorskii to Neratov, July 13 and 18 and August 3, 1912, *ibid.*, 291, 328, and 406; Neratov to Obnorkii, August 3, 1912, *ibid.*, 405; Potapov to Quartermaster branch of General Staff, August 3, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 408, note 1.

[66] Giers (Constantinople) to Neratov, August 10, 1912, *ibid.*, 446; A. Giers (Cetinje) to Neratov, August 10, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 437, note 1.

[67] Potapov to Quartermaster branch of General Staff, August 19, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 508; A. Giers to Neratov, August 19, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 49, note 2.

[68] Neratov to the chargés d'affaires in Paris and London, August 20, 1912, *ibid.*, 513; Sazonov to the chargés d'affaires in Paris, London, Berlin, and Vienna, August 27, 1912, *ibid.*, 565; Neratov to A. Giers, August 23, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 65, note 2.

> Both the meeting[s] and the congress voted resolutions to the same effect: Bulgaria must immediately mobilize her army and demand autonomy in favour of Macedonia and Thrace, failing which, she must declare war on Turkey. Otherwise the country was threatened with troubles bringing in their wake incalculable consequences.[71]

The powers, being fully aware of the excited state of mind of the Balkan peoples toward the end of the summer of 1912, were in agreement that some form of collective action was needed to avoid complications in the Balkans. There was, however, little likelihood of effective action because the powers had conflicting viewpoints on the nature of their task in the peninsula. England, for example, opposed any concerted pressure on Turkey to make reforms in the Balkans, apparently because of her position as a colonial power in Moslem areas,[72] while Russia tended to favor such pressure in order to aid the Slavic cause in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, clearly favored the Albanians as opposed to the Slavs.[73]

As was so often the case in the past, the powers were only able to iron out their differences of viewpoint and find a common denominator between themselves by piously agreeing that there should be reforms made within the Ottoman Empire and that the *status quo* in the Balkans should be maintained.[74] Russia attempted to give support to the planned common action of the powers along these lines by categorically stating to the Balkan states that they could not count on Russian support in the event of war and that war with Turkey could not benefit them in any way.[75] On October 7 the Russian foreign minister had a proposal of French Foreign Minister Poincaré communicated to the Balkan capitals that stated unequivocally that the powers would permit no change of the *status quo* in the Balkans at the end of a war between Turkey and the Balkan allies.[76]

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[69] Urusov to Neratov, August 8, 1912, *MO*, XX-1, 435; Hartwig to Neratov, August 13, 1912, *ibid.*, 464; Romanovskii to Danilov, August 20, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 517.

[70] Nekliudov to Neratov, August 12, 1912, *MO*, XX-1, 455; Nekliudov to Neratov, August 18, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 499; Romanovskii to Danilov, August 20, 1912, *ibid.*, 517.

[71] Geshov, *The Balkan League*, pp. 49-50.

[72] Sazonov to Nicholas II, October 15, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 1034; minute of A. Parker of the British Foreign Office, August 30, 1912, *British Documents*, IX-1, p. 654; Grey to Buchanan, October 21, 1912, *ibid.*, 813; report of Grey on conversation with Sazonov, September 24, 1912, *ibid.*, 803; Grey to Bertie, October 6, 1912, *ibid.*, 780.

[73] Doulcet to Poincaré, October 11, 1912, *Documents diplomatiques français*, 3d Series, IV, 123; note of Russian government to French government, October 12, 1912, *ibid.*, 135; Buchanan to Grey, October 9, 1912, British Documents, IX-1, 811; Sazonov to Izvolskii, October 16, 1921, *MO*, XX-2, 1053; Sazonov to Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and the Balkan capitals, October 31, 1912 *MO*, XXI-1 (Only the German translation of Volume XXI-1 seems to be available outside of the Soviet Union. In the German edition, *Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, this is Volume IV, Part I in the 3d Series, hereafter cited as *IB*, IV-1), 100; memorandum on conference in the Austro-Hungarian foreign office, October 16, 1912, *OUA*, IV, 4118.

Montenegro's reaction to the attempts of Russia to limit the freedom of movement of the Balkan states was to reopen negotiations with Bulgaria for the drafting of a military convention. By mid-September a final draft for a Bulgaro-Montenegrin military convention had been drawn up. Both powers, according to this draft, were committed to engage all of their military forces in a war against Turkey. Montenegro was to begin hostilities not later than September 28, and Bulgaria within a month thereafter. Bulgaria agreed to pay to Montenegro, if the agreement were ratified, 700,000 francs during the war. And, finally, Serbia was to be informed of the agreement and decision to begin war as a *fait accompli*.[77] The Bulgaro-Montenegrin military convention, it seems, was never ratified because Geshov has categorically stated that ". . . no written treaty was signed by us with Montenegro."[78]

Early in September the Montenegrins began similar negotiations with the Serbs. On October 3, 1912, a military convention was signed by Serbian and Montenegrin delegates in Lucerne, Switzerland. The convention specified the operational areas for the Montenegrin and Serbian armies and provided that the armies of both powers should attack Turkey simultaneously five days after the ratification of the convention by the Montenegrin and Serbian governments, subsequently amended to read that hostilities were to commence no earlier than October 14, 1912. Both countries were also, according to the convention, obligated to deploy all of their armed forces against Austria-Hungary in the event of an Austro-Hungarian invasion of the Sanjak.[79] In all probability, this convention was ratified by the two governments, because on October 8, two days after Montenegro had broken off diplomatic relations with the Porte and the same day that she declared war against Turkey, Pašić, the Serbian premier, told the Russian ministers in Belgrade that Montenegro had been obligated not to begin hostilities earlier than October 14.[80]

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[74] *MO*, XX-2, 1034; memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in St. Petersburg to Neratov, September 23, 1912, *ibid.*, 737; Sazonov to Neratov, Balmoral, September 25, 1912, *ibid.*, 771; Nekliudov to Sazonov, August 29, 1912, *ibid.*, 591.

[75] Neratov to Nekliudov, Strandtman, and Urusov, August 22, 1912, *ibid.*, 532; Sazonov to Hartwig, Urusov, and Obnorskii, September 17, 1912, *ibid.*, 690; Neratov to Nekliudov, Hartwig, Giers, and Urusov, October 4, 1912, *ibid.*, 889.

[76] Sazonov to Neratov, Paris, October 6 and 7, 1912, *ibid.*, 916 and 927.

[77] Potapov to Quartermaster branch of General Staff, September 11, 1912, *ibid.*, 668 and 669; Sazonov to Obnorskii, September 18, 1912, *ibid.*, 699; Potapov to General Staff, September 16, 1912, *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, XV (1926), p. 22, No. 12.

[78] Geshov, *The Balkan League*, p. 41.

[79] *MO*, XX-2, 669, Potapov to General Staff, September 28, 1912, *ibid.*, 802; Hartwig to Neratov, October 6, 1912, *ibid.*, p. 364, note 1.

While these negotiations went on, King Nicholas became increasingly intransigent in his dealings with the Porte. When the Turkish chargé d'affaires in Cetinje requested on September 21 that Montenegro should discontinue her material and moral aid to the Malissori uprising, King Nicholas peremptorily refused to enter into any negotiations with the Porte.[81] Shortly thereafter, he announced to the Russian minister in Cetinje that it had become necessary for Montenegro ". . . to engage in a duel with Turkey, even though she was perfectly aware that Russia will not come to her aid in the impending struggle."[82]

King Nicholas was spared the trouble of provoking further difficulties with the Porte by a new move on the part of the other Balkan powers. Toward the end of September they began to prepare a collective note that was to be presented to the Porte and the powers, demanding that Turkey should adopt and implement far-reaching reforms for the Christians in the European part of the Turkish Empire.[83] It seems unlikely that Balkan political leaders seriously thought that the Turks would comply with such a demand. In all the Balkan states, diplomats and politicians were under the pressure of public opinion to act energetically in defense of the alleged interests of the brother Christians still under Turkish sovereignty. This was especially the case in Bulgaria, where the prime minister, in the opinion of the Russian minister in Sofia, was soon likely to be faced with the choice of war or dismissal, in which case he would doubtless choose war and remain in power.[84]

The armies of the three Balkan allies and Montenegro were mobilized on September 30 and October 1, 1912. King Nicholas not only mobilized the Montenegrin army but also heaped reproaches on the representatives of the powers at Cetinje for their lack of action on the Turko-Montenegrin border question. He declared that because of this inaction of the powers it had become necessary for Montenegro to take over several Turkish border points as a sort of collateral for the final and favorable settlement of this question.[85]

King Nicholas was in close contact with the Balkan allies during these days and was consulted concerning the drafting of the note on reforms in European Turkey that the allies intended to present to the Porte and the great powers. But Nicholas was even more impatient than the other Balkan political leaders, apparently because of the pressure of the strong war party in Montenegro and his own ardent desire to gain acceptance as a greater king and military leader than King Peter I of Serbia.[86] His impatience soon led him to break with the other Balkan states as to the timing of the attack against Turkey. Both Greece and Serbia advised King Nicholas to wait at least a week before beginning hostilities, but this advice was disregarded. On October 6 Montenegro broke off diplomatic relations with the Porte. Two days later Montenegro[87] declared war on Turkey.

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[80] Hartwig to Neratov, October 8, 1912, *ibid.*, 947.

[81] Giers to Neratov, September 22, 1912, *ibid.*, 736.

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] Nekliudov to Neratov, September 22, 1912, *ibid.*, 735.

[84] *Ibid.* Cf. Paget to Grey, September 24, 1912, *British Documents*, IX-1, 743; Grey to Paget, September 30, 1912, *ibid.*, 761.

[85] Nekliudov, Urusov, Hartwig to Neratov, September 30, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 829, 830, and 831; Giers to Neratov, October 1, 1912, *ibid.*, 849 and 850.

The differences of opinion between Serbia and Greece on the one hand and Montenegro on the other were not serious ones. The leaders of all of the Balkan states obviously considered the fall of 1912 an opportune time to commence a war against Turkey; and in the negotiations between the allies and Montenegro, the latter power had been clearly designated as the power that was to trigger the war. However, the three Balkan allies apparently felt that they should first draw up their collective note, present it to the powers and Turkey, and then commence hostilities against Turkey. By the end of the second week in October, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia had reached an agreement as to the text of the note. On October 13 the three powers presented identical notes to the powers and the Porte, demanding that Turkey accept and implement the comprehensive program of reforms for the Ottoman Empire that had been worked out jointly by the Balkan allies. The Porte refused to answer these notes and, on October 15, recalled its representatives in the Balkan capitals. On October 17 Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia declared war against Turkey.[88]

It is highly doubtful that the Russian foreign office seriously believed after October 1, 1912, that this war was avoidable. Russia did, it is true, join the other powers in common action to maintain peace in the Balkans. It seems, however, that Russian leaders did this because they deemed it necessary to pacify Russia's friends (England and France), who were most irritated by St. Petersburg's role in precipitating events in the Balkans through Russian sponsorship of the Balkan Alliance,[89] and not because they had any particular faith in the efficacy of such action. On October 3, 1912, Sazonov, who was then in Paris enroute to Russia after having conferred with Sir Edward Grey at Balmoral during the latter part of September, was informed by his assistant in St. Petersburg, Neratov, that the beginning of hostilities between Turkey and the four Balkan powers was awaited in "the near future."[90] Sazonov, himself, told the French ambassador in St. Petersburg on October 12 that there could no longer be any doubt that the Balkan allies would begin hostilities against the Turks within several days. Two weeks after the war had begun, he categorically stated that it had been clear from the beginning that a Balkan war was almost unavoidable.[91]

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[86] See Giesl to Berchtold, October 3 and December 1, 1912, *OUA*, IV, 3934 and V, 4734.

[87] Kholmsen to General Staff, October 8, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 954; Demidov to Neratov, October 9, 1912, *ibid.*, 961 and 962; Hartwig to Neratov, October 8, 1912, *ibid.*, 947; Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 138-45.

[88] Notes of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian governments to the Turkish government, October 13, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 1012; Giers to Sazonov, October 15, 1912, *ibid.*, 1043; *ibid.*, 1047, 1075, and 1080; Pallavicini to foreign office, October 15, 1912, *OUA*, IV, 4098.

[89] O'Beirne to Nicolson, May 16, 1912, *British Documents*, IX-1, 569; Nicholson to O'Beirne, May 21, 1912, *ibid.*, 570; Grey to Buchanan, October 21, 1912, *ibid.*, 813; Poincaré to foreign office, St. Petersburg, August 13, 1912, *Documents diplomatiques français*, 3d Series, III, 264-I; Cambon to Poincaré, October 9, 1912, *ibid.*, IV, 107; Poincaré to Cambon, October 15, 1912, *ibid.*, 170.

[90] Neratov to Sazonov, October 3, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 867.

IV

After Montenegro's declaration of war on Turkey of October 8, 1912, the small kingdom lost any status it might have possessed previously as Russia's ally, for the Russian government expressed its disapproval of Montenegro's act by cutting off all Russian financial and military aid.[92] This was done because Montenegro had gone to war without consulting Russia, which was clearly contrary to Article VII of the Russo-Montenegrin Military Convention.

Russia continued, however, to take considerable interest in Montenegro as one of the Slavic powers in the Balkans. Toward the end of 1912, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov was visibly worried about the agitation of opposition groups in Montenegro against King Nicholas and feared that they would be further strengthened if Nicholas continued to be unsuccessful in his efforts to obtain the northern Albanian town Scutari for Montenegro. Sazonov even went so far as to suggest to the Austro-Hungarian minister in St. Petersburg that any strengthening of anti-dynastic groups in Montenegro was certainly against the interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia. About the same time, he instructed the Russian ambassador to Great Britain, Count Benckendorff, to support Montenegro in regard to Scutari at the London Ambassadors' Conference, which met informally to discuss Balkan problems between December 17, 1912 and August 11, 1913.[93]

Benckendorff, however, encountered stiff resistance on the part of Austria-Hungary to any suggestion of handing over Scutari to Montenegro. He also found Sir Edward Grey and French Ambassador to Great Britain Cambon not to be overly sympathetic to Russia's standpoint on this question. Benckendorff nevertheless continued to support Montenegrin claims to Scutari for more than a month. Finally, on January 22, 1913, he suggested to Sazonov that further discussions concerning Scutari were futile because this was the one issue on which Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary were united. He therefore asked for new instructions that would permit him to yield on Scutari.[94] Sazonov sent such instructions on January 24, 1913, and commented:

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[91] Doulcet to Poincaré, October 12, 1912, *Documents diplomatiques français*, 3d Series, IV, 126; Sazonov to the Russian representatives in Berlin, London, Paris, and the Balkan capitals, October 31, 1912, *MO*, XXI-1 (*IB*, IV-1), 100; Sazonov to Izvolskii, October 12, 1912, *MO*, XX-2, 995.

[92] Report on conference on the question of the renewal of a military convention between Russia and Montenegro, February 3, 1914, *MO*, 3d Series, I, 165.

[93] Giers to Sazonov, December 10, 1912, *IB*, IV-1 (*MO*, XXI-1), p. 404, note 3; Thurn to foreign office, December 12, 1912, *OUA*, V, 4889; Sazonov to Benckendorff, December 17, 1912, *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1928), II, No. 763. The best account of the London Ambassadors' Conference is given by E. C. Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, chps. XII-XV.

> We are in agreement with you that Scutari is above all a Montenegrin question, and we do not consider it desirable to bring this question into connection with unquestionably Russian interests.[95]

Furthermore, he instructed Benckendorff that Scutari should be associated with the general question of the Albanian frontier and that therefore no concessions should be made concerning Scutari until special consideration was given to the wishes of both Serbia and Montenegro concerning the region on the northeastern frontier of the projected Albanian state.[96]

During subsequent meetings of the London Ambassadors' Conference a compromise along the lines suggested by Sazonov was worked out. Accordingly, the Russians agreed that Scutari was to remain in Albania, while the Austro-Hungarians conceded such places as Djakovo and Dibra to Montenegro and Serbia.[97]

Montenegro, however, refused to accept such an arrangement and continued her military operations against Scutari. The powers attempted to persuade King Nicholas to call off the siege of Scutari through diplomatic pressure, promises of financial aid, and naval blockade, but Nicholas chose to defy the united European powers until May, 1913. This was perhaps the most dramatic chapter in the history of King Nicholas' reign, but it is one which lies somewhat outside the limits of the present paper and will therefore not be presented in any detail here. Moreover, such a presentation would not be too fruitful because no important new documents pertaining to this subject have been published since the Scutari affair was analyzed in 1938 by E. C. Helmreich in a special chapter of his *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*.[98]

Montenegro was finally obliged to capitulate to the powers when Austria-Hungary threatened to take independent action against Montenegro at the beginning of May, 1913. Montenegro then stood completely alone and therefore considered it inadvisable to run the risk of an Austro-Hungarian invasion. The moment was nevertheless a precarious one, for an Austro-Hungarian invasion of Montenegro and the Montenegrin-occupied part of the Sanjak would probably have involved Serbia in a conflict with the Dual Monarchy. This, in its turn, would have obliged Russia to intervene in order to defend her diplomatic and strategic interests in the Balkans.

After the Scutari crisis Montenegro was a negligible factor in European diplomacy. Before this crisis and, especially, prior to the beginning of the First Balkan War, Montenegro had been strengthened financially, militarily, and diplomatically by her close ties with Russia. However, Montenegro's role in precipitating the First Balkan War had put an end to the financial and military aid she had been receiving from Russia; and King Nicholas'

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[94] Benckendorff to Sazonov, January 22, 1913, *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel*, III, No. 836.

[95] Sazonov to Benckendorff, January 24, 1913, *ibid.*, No. 838.

[96] *Ibid.*

[97] Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 287-94.

[98] Chapter XIV, "Montenegro versus Europe."

defiance of the united powers of Europe in the early part of 1913 had made Russia increasingly reluctant to continue the diplomatic assistance she had so often extended to Montenegro between 1910 and 1913. Moreover, Montenegro's army and economy had been severely taxed by the Balkan wars. Her army had suffered heavy losses and, what perhaps was more serious, had demonstrated itself to be poorly led, trained, and equipped. The Montenegrin campaign against Scutari had been singularly unsuccessful, and this town was finally taken only as a result of negotiations with the Turkish commander, and not as a direct result of Montenegrin military operations.[99] After Montenegro had been obliged to leave Scutari in May, 1913, her army was in a deplorable condition. Military and financial aid was desperately needed from abroad, but this was not forthcoming because both Russia and Austria-Hungary had pretty much lost patience with King Nicholas. When such aid was seriously discussed by Russian political and military leaders during the first half of 1914, no one taking part in the special conferences devoted to this subject was very enthusiastic about spending the large amounts of Russian money needed to equip and train an army that practically had ceased to exist.[100] Both the civilian and military leaders present at these conferences seriously questioned whether it was to Russia's interest to strengthen Montenegro at that particular moment. It was pointed out that the stronger Montenegro's army was, the more likely King Nicholas would be to undertake dangerous independent action; and it was emphasized that the Russian government then favored a union between Serbia and Montenegro, which any strengthening of the Montenegrin government would have obviously delayed.[101] As the Russian minister to Montenegro argued somewhat later in a letter of June 27, 1914: Austria-Hungary and Italy were the powers which were most interested in an independent Montenegro, while Russia approved of a Serbo-Montenegrin union; so why should Russia give money to Montenegro?[102]

Montenegro's subsidy was not renewed before the outbreak of World War I, so her army, being in an exceedingly poor state of preparation, played a relatively minor role in the war.[103] The money Russia had sent to Montenegro between 1910 and 1912 therefore contributed relatively little to improve Russia's strategic position for the major European war about which so many civilian and military leaders in St. Petersburg and elsewhere were thinking during the years immediately preceding 1914.

A few years before, especially before the Balkan wars and the formation of the Balkan alliance, Montenegro had been of much greater importance for the calculations of Russian policy makers. Then it had still been possible to believe that the exploits of Montenegrin arms in the past justified the expectation that Russia could build up an army in Montenegro that would perhaps be of more than nuisance value for Russia in the event of a war with Austria-Hungary. Then King Nicholas still had not demonstrated that he was most unreliable and would only follow Russian advice when he was forced to or when it suited his own convenience. His independent and provocative policies in the Balkans were not only exasperating for the Russian foreign office but even threatened the general peace of the Balkans and Europe. In 1911 a general war could easily have started had Serbia or Bulgaria decided to support Montenegro in a common war against Turkey. At the beginning of 1912, Russia could have easily been involved in a war if there had been any truth to the rumors that Austria-Hungary, with the complicity of Montenegro, was to move into the Sanjak of Novibazar. Again, if Montenegro had not yielded to Austro-Hungarian pressure in 1913 over Scutari, a war between the Balkan allies and the Dual Monarchy would have probably resulted; and Russia would have almost necessarily become involved in such a conflict. Finally, Russia most definitely did not appreciate Montenegro's role in precipitating the First Balkan War.

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[99] See E. Czegka, "Die Mobilmachung der europäischen Mächte im Sommer 1914: Serbien und Montenegro," *Berliner Monatshefte*, XIV (1936), 16; Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 313-14; Giesl to foreign office, November 28, 1912, *OUA*, IV, 4679.

[100] Reports of conferences on the question of renewing the military convention with Montenegro, February 3 and April 13, 1914, *MO*, 3d Series, I, 165 and II, 209.

[101] *Ibid.*, II, 209.

[102] *MO*, 3d Series, III, p. 452, note 1.

[103] See S. Gopčević, "König Nikola von Montenegro und seine Politik," *Grenzbote*, I (1916), 180; G. Hubka, "König Nikolaus von Montenegro," *Deutsche Revue*, XLVI (June, 1921), 179.

In view of this record, it is not surprising that the Russian government decided during the first part of 1914 that the renewal of the military convention with Russia's troublesome ally of 1910-1912 was not a matter of particular urgency.

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THE GROUP BASIS OF AUSTRIAN POLITICS

by Alfred Diamant

IN THE past Austrian politics has usually been analyzed in terms of a struggle between competing homogeneous classes represented by highly disciplined political parties. In this struggle the conflict between the "red" (anti-clerical) city of Vienna and the "black" (clerical) countryside was considered the alpha and omega by students of Austrian politics who seldom went beyond the crude concept of class, made no attempt to identify the various groups existing in Austrian society, or to explore their relations to the political process.[1]

In the United States Arthur F. Bentley first drew attention to the role of groups in the political process in 1908.[2] But almost half a century elapsed before David B. Truman applied the lessons of *The Process of Government* to the study of the political process in the United States.[3] Under the influence of the work on American politics by Truman, V.O. Key, Earl Latham, D. C. Blaisdell, and others, the study of European political systems, by American as well as European students, has turned from the exclusive attention to classes and political parties to the study of the social groups which form the basis of these parties and on the role of interest groups in politics.[4] The present study in an attempt to apply to Austrian politics the analysis of the group process by Bentley and his school. Before this can be done, two questions must be answered: (1) what are the operative principles of the group process; and (2) is it possible to measure in a meaningful way the extent to which Austrian politics conforms to these principles?

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[1] This is true of the monumental two-volume work of Charles A. Gulick, *Austria. From Habsburg to Hitler* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1948) as well as Mary Macdonald's brief *The Republic of Austria, 1918-1934. A Study in the Failure of Democratic Government* (London, 1946), and the many other books, scholarly and tendentious, which have been written about the Austrian republic and the nature of politics during the republican period.

[2] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government. A Study in Social Pressures* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1949; this is a reissue of the book first published in 1908).

[3] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process. Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York, 1951).

[4] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York, 1947); Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics. A Study in Basing-point Legislation* (Ithaca, 1952); Donald C. Blaisdell, *Government Under Pressure* (New York, 1957). However, there are some pioneers, like Bentley in the United States, who paid close attention to the role of groups in the political process long before the recent re-discovery of Bentley. The principal work along these lines has been done by Rudolf Heberle, now in this country; see his work on political groups in Schleswig-Holstein and similar studies contained in *Social Movements. An Introduction to Political Sociology* (New York, 1951). The concern over the role of powerful groups has received additional impetus from the steady increase of the power of the large corporations in America. Reviewing the work of C. Wright Mills, John K. Galbraith, and A. A. Berle, Jr., Earl Latham made the significant suggestion that present-day students of the corporation would profit from "the extensive writing on the political theory of corporations done earlier by Figgis, Maitland, Pollock, Laski, and von Gierke." He also points out that "one of the liveliest and most fruitful political inquiries among the English, in the early years of this century, concerned the political role of group interest, including the corporation, in the great debate on philosophical pluralism." *Political Theories of Monopoly Power* (College Park, Maryland, 1957), p. 10. Professor Latham is quite correct in suggesting that present-day group process enthusiasts ought to cease claiming radical discoveries in the presence of a large body of literature which has attempted to deal with problems substantially very similar to those raised by modern interest groups and the twentieth century corporation.

David Truman summarized his findings about the group process in America under three headings: (1) There is a multiplicity of access points to the governmental process in America, that is to say, the decentralization of government as the result of federalism, the loose organization of political parties, on the national as well as the state level, and the diffusion of leadership in Congress, make it possible for organized interest groups to seek out the most responsive points of decision-making:

> The total pattern of government over a period of time thus presents a protean complex of crisscrossing relationships that change in strength and direction with alterations in the power and standing of interests, organized and unorganized.[5]

(2) There is widespread multiple or overlapping membership in organized groups, and few individuals are totally absorbed by membership in only one organized group. Consequently, organized groups are often restrained from excessively partisan action not by outsiders, but by those of its own members who also belong to another group whose interest may not coincide with that of the first group.[6] However, this overlapping group membership alone cannot be credited with restraining all the excesses of interest groups, for in the crucial areas there is often little overlapping of membership, as for example, between the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the National Association of Manufacturers. (3) There exist in American society not only potential interests which will become organized when existing organized groups act in a manner deeply distasteful to them, but also what Truman called unorganized or majority interests which ". . . are so widely held in the society and are so reflected in the behavior of almost all citizens that they are, so to speak, taken for granted"; these he identified as "rules of the game," belief systems or ideological consensus.[7] These rules will be reflected in all social institutions, including politics. Most individuals will acquire them early in life and defer to them as a matter of course. But those individuals or groups who violate them will eventually pay dearly for their transgression. Truman concluded that it was not overlapping membership in organized groups alone but "multiple memberships in potential groups based on widely held and accepted interests that serve as balance wheels in a going political system like that of the United States."[8]

The subsequent analysis of the group basis of Austrian politics during the period of the first Austrian republic, 1918-1934, will show that this "balance wheel" was lacking in Austria because overlapping membership in groups was not widespread, and the major Austrian groups were not committed to a common set of "rules of the game" and did not share a "general ideological consensus." Truman speculated about the kind of politics that would develop under conditions tentatively identified as present in Austria during the period 1918-1934:

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[5] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

[6] For example, the national leadership of American trade unions has probably been forced to modify somewhat its stand on racial integration because of the opposition from many of its southern members who also belong to the Klan or the White Citizens' Councils.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 512.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 514.

> Overlapping membership among organized interest groups and among these and potential groups is . . . the principal balancing force in the politics of a multigroup society such as the United States. . . . It follows that the stabilizing effects of overlapping memberships may be limited or eliminated if they operate primarily or exclusively within sharply defined social strata or classes. . . .
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> The process through which unorganized interests restrain the activities of organized groups may not become operative in time to avert serious crisis. . . . The claims of both organized and unorganized interests may assume an explosive character as a result of restraints on the ability to organize, in consequence of the rigidity in the established patterns of access. . . . The frustration of group claims may be dangerously prolonged and the bitterness of group conflict may be intensified through class interpretations of the rules of the game.[9]

There is little doubt that this description of "morbific politics" fits the Austrian pattern, even though Truman was simply trying to predict the possible patterns of revolution in the United States.

In succeeding sections of this essay the dynamics of group conflict in Austria between 1918 and 1934 will be examined under four headings: (1) the nature, composition, and organization of the major groups; (2) group conflict and adjustment during the constitution-making period 1918-1920, and the manner in which the constitution of 1920 reflected the relative strength of the major groups; (3) the effects of the post-war economic collapse on the major groups and the creation of a group balance as a result of economic recovery; and finally (4) the breakdown of this group balance and the subsequent destruction of the Austrian republic because of a complete failure of consensus over fundamentals of political and social organization. Such an examination will lay bare the elements of "morbific" politics in Austria and perhaps help point the way toward the creation of social conditions and political institutions which will strengthen the second Austrian republic, and save it from the fate of its predecessor.

I

The political and social development of the Austrian Republic was dominated by the existence of three major groups which the Austrian historian Adam Wandruszka has called *Lager* (camps).[10] Each *Lager* drew its support from specific social groups and each had a political organization which acted as the political representative of its interests. Each *Lager* attempted to develop a *Weltanschauung,* foster social and ideological homogeneity among its followers, and establish "totalitarian" control over the entire lives of its members. These three *Lager* were the Socialist, the Nationalist, and the Christian-social conservative (*christlichsozial-konservativ*).[11] Though the origin of these three camps can be traced to the national, social, and religious struggles in the Hapsburg Empire during the nineteenth century, the dismemberment of the Empire had little effect on the composition, organization, and ideology of the three camps. The social structure of the "Austrian" half of the old Empire proved remarkably stable, and as a result, the political organization which served the various *Lager* during the republican period differed little from that of the monarchical era. The growth of National Socialism and the question of the *Anschluss* upset the normal relations between the three camps in the early 1930's. But when Austrian politics returned to "normal" after 1945 the three *Lager* re-emerged. Occupation policies temporarily strengthened the Communist Party, and Nazi taint forced the members of the Nationalist camp to take cover in the *Österreichische Volkspartei,* the political representative of the Christian-social conservative camp. This compares with the tactics of the French Right which, after World War II, sought shelter in the M.R.P. or the R.P.F. before returning to its accustomed political affiliations. However, from the establishment of the Austrian republic in 1918 until its demise in 1934, the three *Lager* were clearly recognizable entities, each with a distinct composition, organization, and ideology.

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[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 519, 523.

[10] Adam Wandruszka, "Österreichs politische Struktur. Die Entwicklung der Parteien und der politischen Bewegungen," *Geschichte der Republik Österreich,* ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1954), pp. 289-495. This is the first serious and scholarly treatment of the Austrian republic to come from a group of Austrian scholars since the end of the Second World War.

Of the three, the Socialist *Lager,* the camp of the industrial workers, most nearly attained homogeneity and a high degree of cohesion. It drew its principal strength from the industrial workers in Vienna and the industrial centers in the provinces. It also had a considerable following of middle class intellectuals, especially Jewish intellectuals, who found in that *Lager* career opportunities as organizers, educators, party theorists, and propagandists not open to Jewish intellectuals elsewhere.[12]

The political representative of the Socialist *Lager* was the Social Democratic Party. In addition, the so-called Free Trade Unions were so closely allied with the Social Democratic party organization, like the Trade Union Congress in Great Britain with the Labor Party, that they were considered an integral part of the Socialist *Lager.* Through the Social Democratic party, the trade unions, and a host of other organizations the Socialist *Lager* had created a separate sphere of life for its members, a separate universe in which industrial workers lived among fellow Socialists in municipal public housing units, read Socialist newspapers, joined Socialist stamp collecting or pigeon fancying clubs, attended Socialist adult education classes, and listened to Socialist symphony concerts.[13] They enrolled their children in Socialist youth organizations, hiked through the Vienna woods with comrades from the Socialist *Naturfreunde* (Friends of Nature), and stayed overnight in mountain lodges maintained by Socialist alpine clubs. At work they belonged to a trade union whose shop stewards and principal leaders sat in city hall, state legislature, and the national parliament as members of the Social Democratic fraction. After his death, the Socialist worker in Vienna left instructions for his body to be cremated in a municipal crematorium operated by a socialist municipal administration. This last act of the worker's earthly career was also his ultimate gesture of defiance against a clerical, bourgeois world. The Christian Social federal government, urged by the Church, had tried to prevent the construction and operation of the crematorium, ostensibly on technical, legal grounds. Actually, the Christian-social conservative camp opposed cremation on religious grounds and attempted in this way to enforce its *Weltanschauung* on a resisting proletariat.

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[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 291-292.

[12] Joseph Buttinger, one of the principal figures in the illegal Socialist movement between 1934 and 1938, estimated that before 1934 eighty percent of the intellectuals who joined the Socialist movement were Jewish and that there were secret arrangements by the party executive to insure an "Aryan" majority in the party's top echelons: "The Austrian worker's awe of mental achievement gave to many intellectual Jews the first and deepest happiness of their lives. This was their real escape from the loathsome Ghetto . . ." *In the Twilight of Socialism. A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria* (New York, 1953), pp. 80-81. Even though Jewish intellectuals joined the Social Democratic party in large numbers, the Jewish members of high finance, big business, and industry did not share this radicalism and supported, instead, various conservative and fascist organizations because they "protected" business and industry. See Franz Borkenau, *Austria and After* (London, 1938), pp. 106-107.

The overwhelming majority of Austrian workers considered active membership in the Socialist *Lager* their way of protesting against the privileged position of the old nobility, the clergy, and the industrialists which seemed to have remained untouched by the establishment of a democratic republic in 1918. This protest also found expression in an extremely militant ideology, *Austro-Marxismus,*[14] a term that became synonymous in Europe with extreme left-wing Marxism. The emphasis on violent class struggle and on the determination to seize power by force contained in the Social Democratic Party's *Linz* program of 1926 greatly exaggerated the doctrinaire Marxist tendencies of the Socialist *Lager.* Austrian Socialists never applied this doctrinaire Marxism; they pursued instead a gradualist policy and were committed to democracy and to change by peaceful means.[15]

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[13] "After 1918 the party had not only grown to be a mass organization of unique size and vigor but a spiritual power whose effects were lasting and profound. . . . Far beyond the realm of politics it shaped the lives and thoughts of its active members . . . Its broad organizational structure had room for all trades and professions. It enabled all ages to organize their entertainment requirements, their educational plans, their purposes in life, their cultural desires, their hobbies, even their follies, and fuse them 'ideologically' with the aims of the party in serious and ridiculous fashion. In this mass of hundreds and thousands, anyone capable of rising above the merely personal found in the party a new meaning to his life. This fulfillment was as strong and as enduring as a religious tie." Buttinger, *op. cit.,* pp. 20-22.

[14] In spite of his pro-Socialist bias, Gulick's chapter on Austro-Marxism is an excellent summary and critique; Gulick, *op. cit.,* vol. II, *Fascism's Subversion of Democracy,* ch. XXVII, "Theory and Practice of Austro-Marxism," pp. 1363-1400.

[15] I would agree with Gulick that the general outlook of Austrian Socialists was "dictated by their steadfast adherence to the principles of democracy and of intellectual

As a result, the opponents of the Socialists, especially the Catholic camp, came to identify the republic of 1918 with the Socialist *Lager* and considered Social Democracy the chief enemy of Catholicism.

During the first decade of the Republic the Nationalist *Lager* was the weakest of the three camps. It was composed of anti-clerical middle class groups in urban as well as rural areas. Under the influence of the social, economic, and national struggles the German middle class of the Hapsburg Empire had split in two during the 1880's. Those who emphasized social and economic problems, chiefly members of the lower middle class threatened by large-scale enterprises in distribution and manufacturing, together with the bulk of the peasantry who had remained safely in the Catholic fold, followed Karl Lueger into the Christian-social conservative camp and into the Christian Social party. Those who were more concerned with the threats to the national supremacy of the Germans within the Empire followed Georg von Schönerer and his anti-clerical, Pan-German program. These anti-clerical nationalist groups formed the nucleus of the Nationalist *Lager* in 1918.

Two political parties represented the Nationalist *Lager* between 1918 and 1934. The *Grossdeutsche Volkspartei* drew its strength from urban middle class groups, chiefly white collar professionals and civil servants. Defense of the civil servants, and lobbying for civil service legislation consumed most of the energies of that party.[16] The *Landbund* represented a group of well-to-do anti-clerical peasants in Carinthia and Styria. In Carinthia the *Landbund* gained the support of East Prussian Protestant peasants who had fled from East Prussian territories ceded to Poland after the war, and had taken over land vacated by Carinthian Slovenes who had been forced to migrate to Yugoslavia in 1918.[17] Both parties collaborated with the Christian-social conservative camp until 1934. In fact, their votes in Parliament were indispensable for an anti-socialist majority. The rise of the Nazi movement rapidly deprived these two parties of most of their followers. Ultimately the Nazis drew a large number of middle and lower middle class voters into the Nationalist *Lager*.

The Christian-social conservative camp centered around the Catholic Church and around those groups which accepted the teachings of the Church on social problems: peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie. The lower middle class in the cities and on the farm, artisans, shopkeepers, some white collar workers, and above all the peasants, constituted the social base of that *Lager*. This camp also received the support of financial and industrial leaders who sought to fashion a political instrument with which to destroy the powerful position of the industrial proletariat and of the Socialist *Lager*. In this manner the Christian-social camp became the focal point of an anti-socialist alliance.

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and spiritual freedom . . . and by their deep sympathy with those who suffer and need help"; *op. cit.*, p. 1400.

[16] Georg Maria von Alexich, *A Study of the Political Parties in Austria, 1918-1938* (Georgetown University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1948), pp. 218-226.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 227-229.

The Christian Social Party founded by Karl Lueger during the last decade of the preceding century and a multitude of Catholic organizations, most of them closely supervised by the clergy, were the principal organizational weapons of the Christian-social conservative *Lager*.[18] Catholics considered this network of organizations indispensable in their struggle against bourgeois-liberal, as well as socialist influences, in Austrian life. They feared that the Socialists would be able to win over a majority of Austrians and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat on the Russian model—a fear which seemed to be well-founded in view of the extremely doctrinaire Marxian ideology proclaimed repeatedly by the Social Democratic Party at its annual party conferences and during every election campaign.

The Christian-social conservative camp considered the fight against socialism a struggle to be waged along two fronts: *in* parliament and *outside* parliament. The inter-party rivalry in the federal, state, and local representative bodies was intensified by concurrent rivalries in the field of trade union organization, and cultural, educational, and recreational activities:

> The struggle must be conducted along two fronts: in parliament among the deputies, and outside parliament among the Austrian people. Therefore Catholicism must be prepared to fight on two fronts. . . . Because Socialists have focused their energies on the task of obtaining a majority in the legislature, Catholic action must do everything to create the sort of electorate which will choose a parliament where the Socialists' strength will be reduced and the enemies of religion [sic] will not have a majority.[19]

Aemilian Schöpfer, a prelate of the Catholic Church and a leader of the Christian Social party in the Tyrol reflected in this statement the commonly accepted assumption during the inter-war period that a political movement which could gain a clear majority in the legislature would immediately proceed with a complete reshaping of the country's social, economic, and political institutions in line with the party's *Weltanschauung.*

To counter the Socialist network of youth organizations, hiking clubs, weight-lifting, and pigeon fancying societies, Catholics attempted to create a similar network of organizations in which the faithful would follow a Catholic pattern of life and a Catholic *Weltanschauung,* just as the Socialist *Lager* tried to create a socialist world for its own people.

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[18] Aemilian Schöpfer, "Katholizismus und Politik," *Katholizismus in Österreich. Sein Wirken, Kämpfen und Hoffen,* Alois Hudal, ed. (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlagsanstalt, 1931), pp. 448-449. However, Alexich was of the opinion that the Catholic youth groups, for example, which had a highly complex organizational structure in each parish and diocese did not amount to very much; *op. cit.,* pp. 86-87.

[19] Schöpfer, *op. cit.,* pp. 442-443.

[20] For a recent biography of Vogelsang who was the most influential of Austrian Catholic social theorists see Johann Allmayer-Beck, *Vogelsang. Vom Feudalismus zur Volksbewegung* (Vienna: Herold, 1952). Vogelang's writings which were scattered in numerous periodicals and newspapers have been drawn together and presented as a more or less comprehensive system by his son-in-law Wiard von Klopp. See Klopp (ed.), *Die sozialen Lehren des Freiherrn Karl von Vogelsang. Grundzüge einer katholischen Gesellschafts- und Volkswirtschaftslehre nach Vogelsangs Schriften* (2nd rev. ed.; Vienna: Reinhold-Verlag, 1938.)

The social and economic policies pursued by Christian Social governments which controlled the federal executive with the help of the two Nationalist parties from 1922 until 1934, favored big business and industry, as well as the big land owners, at the expense of the artisans, small traders, and peasants. The pursuit of such policies created a serious conflict between Christian Social policies in favor of big business and industry, and Catholic social theory, based on the social Romantic program of Karl von Vogelsang and his school, which favored the "small" man on the farm and in the city.[20] They also conflicted with the strongly felt social and economic needs of these "small men" who made up the rank and file of the Christian Social party.

II

When the Austrian *Reichstag* was recalled into session in 1917 after a three-year interval, the Christian Social Party, the political instrument of the Christian-social conservative camp, was one of the few political or national groups of the old Empire prepared to support a government which had the confidence of Emperor Charles I.[21] Neither the representatives of the Socialist nor of the Nationalist *Lager* shared this last-ditch loyalty to the Empire and the Hapsburg dynasty of the Christian Social conservative camp. Even as late as October, 1918, when the disintegration of the Empire reached its climax and all parties and groups demanded the establishment of a republic and the democratization of all segments of public life, the Catholic camp was not prepared to accept more than a constitutional monarchy. After Charles I had published, on October 18, 1918, his federation manifesto which was to stem the separatist tide sweeping all the non-German nationalities of the Empire, the Christian Social deputies in the *Reichstag* issued a declaration in which they accepted the democratization of Austria, but only within the framework of a monarchical form of government. This stand was supported even by the left wing of the Catholic camp, the Catholic trade union organization. This preference for monarchy continued long after the establishment of the Austrian Republic in November, 1918. For example, Bishop Sigmund Waitz, writing in a Catholic weekly magazine in 1920, considered the republic the work of Anti-Christ in alliance with Freemasonry.[22] He warned that the acceptance of the republic would weaken the Catholic faith and reminded his readers that the major Catholic social theorists from Aquinas to Donoso Cortes and Emmanuel von Ketteler had considered monarchy the "ideal form of the state."[23]

In spite of such pro-monarchist sentiments the Catholic camp reluctantly accepted the republic in 1918 and, fearing the influence of the social-

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[21] Viktor Bibl, *Der Zerfall Österreichs,* vol. II: *Von Revolution zu Revolution 1848-1918* (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1922-24), pp. 520, 529; see also *Reichspost*, the official organ of the Christian Social party, February 8, 1918, and Brita Skottsberg, *Der Parlamentarismus in Österreich* (Göteborg: Elanders Boktrykeri Aktieboklaget, 1940), pp. 132-133.

[22] Bisch Dr. Sigmund Waitz, "Papst Leo XIII. und die französische Republik," *Das Neue Reich* IV (1920), 5-7, 27-31, 39-41, 59-61, and 71-74.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

ist workers and their ideology, soon arrived at a *modus vivendi* with the political parties of the Nationalist camp. This bourgeois, anti-socialist, alliance lasted from 1922 to 1934, chiefly because both partners feared the socialist camp more than any disagreement which might arise between them over the issue of clericalism. Under the influence of the Enlightenment a large segment of Austria's urban bourgeoisie had become strongly anti-clerical, much like the urban middle class of France. But faced with a strong and militant Socialist *Lager* the Nationalist parties made common cause with the Christian Social party to form a coalition which could muster a majority in the federal parliament. As a result, the first Austrian Republic was governed by an anti-socialist, bourgeois coalition which contained both pro-clerical and anti-clerical groups. The Nationalists abstained from forming an anti-clerical majority with the Socialists, and the Christian Socials did not press decisions on religious education, church, marriages, etc.

The Constitution of 1920[24] was written by an all-party coalition, but reflected the balance of political power during the first post-war years, namely, the predominant strength of the Socialist *Lager*.[25] The two political figures who were most prominent during the constitution-making period also played major roles in the political life of the first Republic. Ignaz Seipel, a priest, who later was Chancellor of Austria longer than any other individual, spoke for the Christian Socials in the constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly, and Otto Bauer, the chief spokesman of Austrian socialism until his death in exile in Paris in 1939, represented the Socialists. Hans Kelsen did the technical work involved in drafting the constitutional document.

The three basic principles of the 1920 Constitution were democracy, federalism, and legislative supremacy. The Catholic camp proposed a federal distribution of power in order to preserve the position of the historic Austrian *Länder,* chiefly rural in character, whose state governments were controlled by lop-sided Christian Social majorities. Catholics made this their principal demand and, as a result, reluctantly agreed to compromise some of their other constitutional proposals, especially their plan for a strong president and cabinet, and for single-member constituencies. On these points the Christian Socials had to bow to the radical-democratic *Zeitgeist* of the post-war era. The Socialists who were considered the principal proponents of democracy believed that a constitution which deserved the adjective democratic must insure that the voice of the people be fully heard in the decisions of the state. Two institutions were considered necessary to carry out that democratic mandate: proportional representation and an omnicompetent assembly. Proportional representation would assure that all groups in the country were represented according to their strength among the electorate. The legislators chosen on the basis of this most democratic of electoral systems would then form an assembly which would rule supreme over all other organs of government. In this way the Socialist *Lager* planned to avoid a repetition of conditions under the Empire when a curial system of representation had deprived them of a voice in the legislature proportionate to their strength in the country. They were also determined to create a legislature which would not be at the mercy of ministers responsible only to the head of the state, a legislature where ministers governed by playing off parties against each other.

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[24] A good short analysis of the Constitution can be found in Macdonald, *op. cit.,* pp. 23-45. Ch. IV, "Das Werden der Bundesverfassung," pp. 89-218 in Skottsberg, *op. cit.,* is excellent because the author is concerned not so much with the legal details, as with presenting an analysis of the political forces which produced the constitution. The principal treatises on the constitution are Hans Kelsen, *Österreichisches Staatsrecht* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1923) and Ludwig Adamovich, *Grundriss des Österreichischen Staatsrechtes* (2nd edition; Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag, 1932). A violent condemnation of the 1920 constitution can be found in Erich Voegelin, *Der autoritäre Staat. Ein Versuch über das Österreichische Staatsproblem* (Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag, 1936), pp. 89-101.

[25] Hans Kelsen, "Der Drang zur Verfassungsreform—Eine Folge der politischen Machtverschiebung," *Neue Freie Presse,* October 6, 1929. Kelsen considered the 1920 document a constitutional and legislative success "with which both major parties, though deeply divided over ideological issues, could be well satisfied, and, in fact, were well satisfied at that time [i.e. during 1919-1920]."

Federalism, democracy, and legislative supremacy were the key principles of the new constitution.[26] Catholics were *willing* to accept the first; they were *forced* to accept the others. The Socialists, on the other hand, who had accepted a federal distribution of power only reluctantly, proved to be the principal beneficiaries of that arrangement. Austrian federalism, though more highly centralized than its American prototype, enabled the Socialists to put into practice their program of social reforms in the city of Vienna which had been accorded the dual status of city and of *Land* (province) by the Christian Socials who wanted to prevent any contamination of the Catholic countryside by the "red" capital city. The Socialist city administration of Vienna, backed by a sympathetic federal constitutional court. maintained its autonomy and prevented interference with its program of social reforms and high taxation of real estate and luxury goods by a central government controlled by an anti-social coalition.

Another feature of the constitution which was affected by the clash between Socialist and Catholic *Weltanschauungen* was the bill of rights.[27]

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[26] The process of compromise and adjustment which led to the agreement on the Constitution of 1920 is an excellent example of the protracted and painful efforts needed to reach agreement between two great political camps which start all discussion from totally divergent positions. The Social Democrats presented constitutional drafts calling for a unicameral, omnicompetent legislature and a unitary state. The anti-Socialist groups presented drafts which were strongly federal, if not confederate, and had provisions for a balance of powers between legislature and executive. In the successive stages of the haggling among the *Lager* each side modified its own position, until in 1920 the constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly could announce that the camps had reached substantial agreement on a constitutional document into which each had been able to incorporate some of its proposals. For the first and the last stage of the Social Democratic and Christian Social drafts see Konstituierende Nationalversammlung Deutschösterreichs, *Stenographische Protokolle*, Beilagen nos. 231 and 888, dated May 14, 1919, and June 25, 1920, respectively; see also Skottsberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190, 204.

[27] In his report to the Constituent Assembly Seipel stated frankly that there was no hope for agreement on this topic; the report is reprinted in full in Ignaz Seipel, *Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung* (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1930), pp. 90-106.

During the constitutional debate the two *Lager* quickly realized that they would be unable to effect a compromise on the question of individual rights. and especially on the problem of church-state relationships. That conviction was so strong the subject was not even opened for discussion in the constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly. Catholics avoided the subject because they feared that in any discussion of individual rights, Socialists and the liberal bourgeois representatives might make common cause and force through a radical separation of church and state. In her book, *Der Parliamentarismus in Österreich,* Brita Skottsberg reports Kelsen's observations on the civil rights issue:

> According to a memorandum sent me by Kelsen the Christian Socials did not want any codification of the basic individual rights. They preferred to continue in force the old Basic Law of 1867 which was liberal in its own day, but was rather backward when compared with the Weimar constitution. The Christian Socials feared that Socialists and Nationalists would use any attempt at codifying individual rights to impose the principle of separation of church and state. They feared a weakening of the Catholic Church in Austria. However, the Socialists gave way on that point—an event which Seipel considered a great success for the Catholics.[28]

The basic Law of 1867 had been forced on Francis Joseph I by the liberal bourgeoisie following the defeat of Austria at Sadowa. It attempted to protect the rights of the individual usually associated with the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, to separate church and state, and to eliminate Church control over education. Subsequently the Basic Law was weakened, and as long as the Hapsburg dynasty ruled Austria the social power of the reigning house and of the aristocracy protected the Catholic Church from the effects of the Basic Law of 1867. Governments and civil servants were given to understand that the Hapsburgs took seriously their duties as loyal servants of the Church.

The only post-war modifications of the 1867 Law were made in obedience to the minority provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain. As a result, the position of the Church in Austria after 1918 remained largely what it had been before. When Christian Social-dominated governments controlled the republic they gave the Church substantially the same protection and assistance it had received under the Hapsburgs.[29] Church-state relationships were not changed radically until 1934 when a new Concordat with the Holy See was incorporated in the Corporative Constitution of May 1, 1934.[30]

Hans Kelsen has pointed out that a constitution is

> the expression of the political forces at work in a people . . . It certifies

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[28] Skottsberg, *op. cit.,* p. 214; see also the book by Austria's principal Social Democratic leader Otto Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution* (Vienna: Wiener Vollsbuchhandlung, 1923), p. 224.

[29] Max Freiherr Hussarek von Heinlein, "Die kirchenpolitische Gesetzgebung der Republik Österreich," in Hudal (ed.), *op. cit.,* pp. 28-29, 40.

[30] See Johann Häring (ed.), *Kommentar Zum neuen Österreichischen Konkordat. Text des Vertrages mit Erklärungen* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 1934).

> to the existence of an equilibrium between the groups striving for power. The demand for constitutional change which becomes so insistent that it can no longer be disregarded constitutes a sign that a shift of power has taken place which demands recognition in the constitution.[31]

The provisions of the 1920 Constitution correctly reflected the political balance of power during the post-war years, that is to say, the predominant position of the Socialist *Lager*. However, after 1922 an anti-socialist bourgeois coalition controlled the executive and administrative branches of the central government, as well as most *Land* governments, but was continuously frustrated by an omnicompetent federal assembly in which the Socialists held enough seats to prevent constitutional changes without their consent. The anti-socialist camps became increasingly dissatisfied with assembly rule and pressed for constitutional reforms which would give expression to the changes in the strength of the three *Lager*. Brita Skottsberg pointed out that the 1920 document established a "constitutional monism," a rigid concentration of political power which made impossible any adjustment in the position of the major branches of government.[32] As a result of this rigid constitutional framework the Catholic camp was forced to work in a political system which had been fashioned largely by their opponents. They submitted to the radical *Zeitgeist* of the post-war years because they felt not strong enough to resist it. But when they saw the radical post-war flood recede their demands for constitutional reform became ever more insistent. The Socialists, on the other hand, fundamentally committed to peaceful change and democratic procedures—in spite of the radical theses adopted by their party convention—became the principal defenders of the constitutional order of 1920.

III

The struggle over the constitution of the new Austrian republic was only one symptom of the vast upheaval caused by the end of the war, the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, and the post-war economic collapse. The struggle over constitutional formulae was, after all, a struggle over what group should control the economic and social policies of the government of the republic. An understanding of the conflict between the *Lager* during the post-war period requires, therefore, some knowledge of the socioeconomic effects of post-war conditions on the various camps and their constituent groups.

The sharp decline in the level of economic activity and the rapid and disastrous decline in the value of the Austrian *Krone* between 1918 and 1922 were followed by restoration of a stable currency and a moderate economic recovery. This contributed to the establishment of a short-lived balance between the three *Lager* which was destroyed by the economic collapse of 1929 and the rise of the Nazi movement. Economic dislocation and increasing Christian Social impatience with the constitutional settlement of 1920 served to lay bare the lack of consensus on fundamentals of political and social organization.

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[31] Kelsen, in *Neue Freie Presse*, *op. cit.*

[32] Skottsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

The rump Austria created by the Treaty of St. Germain was an economic anomaly. It retained the old empire's center of finance and commerce, the city of Vienna, as well as some of the principal industrial areas, but was cut off from the empire's sources of food stuffs and raw materials. As a result, its unbalanced economic system could not hope to achieve a healthy level of economic activity in an era of excessive economic nationalism. This weakness of the Austrian economy affected all social groups, and intensified the political and social tensions in the young republic.

The working class suffered badly after 1918, but its relative position in the Austrian economy improved considerably compared with pre-1918 conditions. The Socialist *Lager* proposed a number of major economic reform measures which, it hoped, would improve the economic position of the working class. Of these, only one, nationalization of key industries, was not adopted.[33] Among those enacted into law the most important were the fiscal and social welfare program of the city of Vienna, and the social legislation forced through the national parliament by the Socialists in the first post-war years.[34] However, the total economic picture for the inter-war period was less favorable for the industrial worker, and after the collapse of 1929 permanent mass unemployment became a principal feature of working class conditions.[35]

The social groups which supported the Catholic Church and subscribed to Catholic social theory were hit hardest by the post-war economic debacle. The urban middle class of professional people, small property owners, and artisans suffered severely because of the disappearance of the Empire and the currency inflation of the early 1920's. Vienna had been the capital of a large Empire which required the services of many types of experts, civil and military servants, lawyers, doctors, fiscal specialists, etc. Most of these were no longer needed by the small state created in 1918. The general lowering of the level of economic activity caused by the dismemberment of the Empire also affected other middle class groups, such as artisans and shopkeepers.

The position of these middle class groups deteriorated sharply after 1918 while that of the two competing groups improved: the new upper class, and the industrial workers. The currency inflation had destroyed or severely damaged many of the "old" bourgeoisie while fostering the rise to prominence of a group of war and postwar profiteers.[36] It also helped to improve the relative position of the industrial workers whose weekly wages and strong bargaining position afforded them a better protection against the effects of the dizzily declining *Krone* than the fixed salaries or income from savings and government bonds of the middle class. The four bourgeois groups most severely affected by the post-war economic chaos were certain parts of the established entrepreneurial group, the *rentiers,* the *Hausbesitzer,* and the free professions and civil servants. The established entrepreneur group had suffered from the disappearance of war production, but it was confident that it could reestablish its position, if it were only freed from troublesome government controls and the financial burden of welfare legislation forced on the country by the Socialists. The *rentiers* were almost wiped out when the new Austrian government repaid imperial war bonds in worthless paper currency. The *Hausbesitzer,* an important and fairly large urban middle class element whose property consisted entirely of rental housing, suffered severely because government controls kept rents at prewar level of paper currency and thereby effectively expropriated the owners of rental housing. The position of the free professions and of the civil servants declined sharply because Government pay scales did not keep pace with currency inflation and because an impoverished population could not afford the services of its professional people. This last group were the members of what has been called the *Altwiener Patriziat,* the elite of intellectuals, artists, and administrators who were the "real" rulers of the old Empire, an empire which, lacking the popular political base for a constitutional monarchy, was governed by a professional class. As Otto Bauer has pointed out, this last group was the "real loser of the World War." Its members hated both the rising working class below them and the newly-risen speculators and profiteers above them.

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[33] Bauer, *op. cit.*, section 11, "Die Revolution in den Betrieben," p. 161-182; see also Gulick, *op. cit.*, vol. I: *Labor's Workshop of Democracy*, pp. 134-143.

[34] The best and most sympathetic analysis of the record of the Viennese Social Democrats can be found in Gulick, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, in the chapters on cooperatives, municipal housing and tenant protection, welfare work, education, child and youth, and workers' cultural activities, pp. 309-643.

[35] Friedrich Thalmann, "Die Wirtschaft in Österreich," in Benedikt (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 495-500.

The difference in outlook between the entrepreneur group and the other three was reflected in the social and economic theories which appealed to them:

> Books like Othmar Spann's *Der Wahre Staat* and Ludwig Mises' economic treatises represent the two types. The former wants to return to Adam Müller and Romantic political thought, the latter to Bentham and the liberal Manchester school. Spann represents the flight into the Romantic ideal of a corporative state, of a bourgeois intelligentsia destroyed by currency devaluation. Mises, on the other hand, personifies the rediscovered self-consciousness of an entrepreneurial group carried upward by the boom resulting from the collapse of the currency and demanding the abolition of all state and trade union imposed restrictions.[37]

In short, the entrepreneur group found congenial the liberal economics of Mises while the other groups applauded the revival of Romantic political and social theories.

The economic position of the peasants did not deteriorate as sharply as that of the urban middle class. The peasants profited from the scarcity of

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[36] See C. A. Macartney, *The Social Revolution in Austria* (Cambridge, 1926), pp. 217ff. for a dramatic description of these profiteers and their "deals."

[37] Bauer, *op. cit.,* p. 211.

food following the end of the war; later on Christian Social governments influenced by their agricultural constituents shielded the Austrian peasant from the effects of fluctuating world prices in agricultural commodities by protective tariffs and import quotas.

By 1924, Austria's post-war economic and fiscal troubles had been solved, largely with foreign aid administered through the League of Nations. But the post-war economic recovery which began in 1922 was short-lived. The collapse of the Vienna Creditanstalt in 1929 led to a general depression from which Austria did not fully recover before 1938.

The extreme political radicalism of the immediate post-war period abated quickly, but had certain long-range effects on the three *Lager,* chiefly the Christian-social conservative camp. The Socialist *Lager,* which was the most homogeneous of the three, maintained a high degree of cohesion throughout the republican period. There were continuous disagreements between the right wing of the camp, represented by trade union leaders and led by Karl Renner, the man destined to head the Austrian state after the second World War as he had after the first, and the left wing of intellectuals and party theorists. But these disagreements never weakened the common front which the camp presented to the outside world. This seeming cohesion was chiefly the result of Otto Bauer's work whose ideological pronouncements were radical enough to satisfy the left wing, while his political leadership was sufficiently astute and realistic to satisfy the trade unionists. The groups making up the Nationalist *Lager,* though subject to the sort of fission process familiar to any observer of the French "stagnant pools of the center" had little impact on the development of group balance in the country. Because these groups emphasized pan-German nationalism they were no match for the Nazis who soon deprived the parties of this *Lager* of their political following. The Christian-social conservative *Lager,* however, because of its social and economic heterogeneity, felt the effects of post-war radicalism more strongly than the other two camps. The conflicts and tensions which arose in the Catholic camp reflected the delicate balance between the three *Lager* which existed during the 1920's. The collapse of the group balance within the Catholic camp signalled the breakdown of the balance between major camps. For this reason an analysis of intra-Catholic group conflicts will provide a better understanding of the dynamics of group adjustment during the republic period.

The radicalism of the post-war period had three important long-range effects on the Christian-social conservative camp. First, under the impact of this radical *Zeitgeist* Catholics accepted the republic. They tried to stem the democratic tide by offering a program of "democratic monarchy." But in 1918 such a concession proved insufficient, and Catholics submitted to what they considered irresistible demands for "democratization." Their opponents charged that Catholic acceptance of the republic had been grudging and hedged with many reservations. Catholics, on the other hand, claimed that they had been sincere in that acceptance and pointed to the statement by their leader, Ignaz Seipel, that the Austrian constitution "must for all time be based on democratic principles."[38] However, when Seipel discovered in later years that the *Heimwehr,* a fascist armed formation, was the one hope for a "true democracy" in Austria his opponents wondered what sort of definition of "democratic principles" Seipel had in mind when he addressed the Constituent Assembly in 1920.

Next, the leadership of the Catholic struggle against radicalism fell into the hands of Viennese industrialists who provided the funds for carrying on this fight. As a result, the industrialists gained control of the Christian Social party, and forced on that party an economic and social program favorable to big business and industry, but not necessarily to the "small man" on the farm and in the city. Ernst von Streeruwitz who was federal chancellor for a short time in 1929 described in his memoirs how the *Hauptverband für Industrie* established a fund for the creation and continued operation of an armed formation which would be able to check the Socialists.[39] Streeruwitz, who was a leading industrialist and active in the *Hauptverband,* also took it for granted that industrialists would have to respond to what he considered the continuous provocation and arrogance of the workers and the trade unions by gaining a voice in the affairs of state. Streeruwitz chided Christian Social politicians for failing to grasp the importance of economic affairs and economic policy. He complained about the difficulties he had in convincing the peasant politicians who ran the Christian Social party apparatus of the need for assigning industrialists good positions on the party ticket, an important consideration where a rigid list system is in operation.[40] Ultimately, industrialists gained a controlling voice in the Christian-social conservative camp which was never successfully challenged. Present conditions in Austria reflect similar arrangements. The present Austrian chancellor, Raab, who had represented industry in the *Heimwehr* before the Second World War, now leads the *Volkspartei,* the successor of the Christian Social party.

The peasants in the provinces often differed with the Viennese industrialist leadership in Christian Social affairs. Immediately after the end of the War the peasants joined the workers in demands for the abolition of established privileges. The peasants wanted their sons and husbands back from the army to till the soil, they wanted to be freed from government food regulations, and wanted to curb the rights of the nobility to maintain wild game which destroyed the peasants' crops.[41] As a result, the provincial peasants under the leadership of Jodok Fink of Vorarlberg, the westernmost Austrian *Land,* became the radical wing of the Christian Social party.

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[38] Quoted in Adolf Merkl, *Die ständisch-autoritäre Verfassung Österreichs. Ein kritisch-systematischer Grundriss* (Vienna: Julius Springer, 1935), pp. 1-2.

[39] The proposal to create and subsidize an armed force was greeted with sneers, and the man who had made the proposal was asked whether he had ambitions to become a general. But the motion was passed, nevertheless, even though a large number of those present seemed to be ready "to capitulate before the red terror." Ernst Ritter von Streeruwitz, *Springflut über Österreich. Erinnerungen, Erlebnisse und Gedanken aus bewegter Zeit* (Vienna: Bernina Verlag, 1937), p. 216.

[40] *Ibid.,* pp. 380-383.

[41] Wandruszka, *op. cit.,* p. 320.

Though this post-war radicalism of the peasants was short-lived, it left a deep imprint on Catholic political attitudes. Furthermore, the peasants and their leaders who did not have to contend with powerful Socialist party machines in their rural districts were often less militantly anti-Socialist than their colleagues from Vienna. The relations between the Viennese and the provincial groups of the party were further complicated by the fact that the Vienna wing was itself divided. The Catholic trade union group led by Leopold Kunschak and Franz Hemala was often at odds with the militantly anti-labor leadership of the industrialists.[42]

The rise of armed formations, like the *Heimwehr,* was a third long-range effect of post-war radicalism. These armed formations had been founded for a dual purpose: to help repel external aggression, much like the *Freikorps* in Germany, against Austrian territory right after the end of the war, and to oppose the armed formation of the Socialist *Lager.* The *Heimwehr* originated in Carinthia and Styria, while similar groups were formed in other provinces as well.[43] However, there were few attempts to unify these groups which fell into one of two categories: (1) a nationalist wing, primarily in Carinthia and Styria, which was completely absorbed by the Nazis before 1934, and (2) a clerical wing, primarily in Upper and Lower Austria, led by Rüdiger von Starhemberg, which supported the corporative state and became part of the *Vaterländische Front,* the single political movement established by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg in 1934. At first the *Heimwehr* was financed almost entirely from domestic sources, but later on Mussolini supplied both funds and ideological inspiration.

During the last years of the Republic the *Heimwehr* came into conflict with the moderate and urban trade union elements of the Christian-social conservative *Lager.* In this controversy the *Heimwehr* represented the new demands for an authoritarian government while the trade union group were the last remnant of "democratic" sentiment and advocates of compromise with the Socialists. The *Heimwehr* bitterly attacked what they considered the evil democratic tendencies of the Catholic trade union leadership and referred to those in the Catholic camp who were willing to attempt an inter-party compromise with the Socialists as "being unable to wait to go to bed with the red whore."[44]

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[42] Rudolf Schlesinger, *Central European Democracy and Its Background. Economic and Political Group Organization* (London, 1953), pp. 318-319. Most writers on Austria had a tendency to attach too much importance to the disagreements between the Viennese and the provincial Christian Socials. They seemed to have taken their cue from Otto Bauer's *Die österreichische Revolution,* an avowedly Socialist tract, which influenced not only Marxists like Schlesinger but also non-Marxists like Skottsberg. The cleavage existed for a short period right after the First World War, but when the peasants discovered that the new republican government continued to requisition agricultural products and that the workers' councils insisted on collecting food for the starving cities by force, if necessary, the radicalism of the peasants disappeared rapidly. Nevertheless, men like Jodok Fink continued to play important roles in republican politics and managed to soften somewhat the anti-democratic tendencies in the Christian-social conservative camp.

[43] For a brief treatment of the *Heimwehr* see Wandruszka, *op. cit.,* pp. 359-368. See also the thoroughly unreliable and biased autobiography of one of the principal Heimwehr leaders: Ernst Rüdiger Prince Starhemberg, *Between Hitler and Mussolini* (New York, 1942).

These disagreements and controversies were inevitable, because the need for a united anti-Socialist front had brought many divergent social groups into the Christian-social conservative *Lager*:

> . . . [it] included nearly all the non-Socialist forces, from near Fascists and open representatives of the vested interests . . . to advanced social reformers and to the working class element in the Christian trade unions.[45]

Nevertheless, the groups within the Catholic camp managed to settle their differences, just as the three *Lager* had been able to arrive at a *modus vivendi* following the ebbing of post-war radicalism and the stabilization of the currency.

IV

The period of political peace during the 1920's was even shorter than the period of economic stability. The fundamental struggle between the Socialist and anti-Socialist camps grew more bitter after the burning of the Ministry of Justice building in 1927 by Socialist mobs incensed over the acquittal of members of the *Heimwehr* who had fired on a Socialist political procession and had killed some of the participants:

> In Austria with a well-developed two-party system, the transition from a parliamentary democracy to a regime operating under extra-parliamentary pressure began to rise early . . . The interlude between the establishment of some degree of political equilibrium after the [currency] stabilization crisis and its shattering by a new right-wing offensive did not last longer than two years . . .[46]

The rise of the Nazis in the early 1930's isolated the Christian-social conservative camp completely. The Nazis absorbed the followers of the *Landbund* and *Grossdeutsche Volkspartei,* leaving the two parties' ministers in the cabinet without popular support. Catholics were now forced into a two-front war against Socialists as well as against Nazis. This isolation and the lack of a majority in parliament forced Catholics to suspend the constitution in 1933, and led to civil war and abolition of the republic in 1934.

For almost a decade the struggle between the three *Lager* was carried on under the rules of the Constitution of 1920. The demands for constitutional reform which arose in the late 1920's were, as Kelsen has pointed out, an expression of the changed power relationships.[47] The anti-Socialist camps who had gained control over the executive were able to eliminate Socialist influences in army, police, and civil service which had made itself felt in the state machinery as a result of Socialist domination during the early post-war period. But as long as Austria was governed by an omnicompetent assembly whose powers had been diminished only slightly by the constitutional amendments adopted in 1929, Social Democracy was assured a voice in public affairs. Such a stalemate between *Lager* which face each

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[44] Leopold Kunschak, *Österreich, 1918-1934* (Vienna: Typographische Anstalt, 1934), pp. 100-101.

[45] Schlesinger, *op cit.,* p. 254.

[46] *Ibid.,* p. 312.

[47] See above, n. 25.

other suspiciously and fully armed cannot be maintained indefinitely. It encourages the extremists in both camps to silence the moderates and to demand a change of the rules, by force of arms if that cannot be done by constitutional processes:

> The power of the opposition Social Democrats created conditions in Austria in which latent civil war between Social Democracy and the right wing of the bourgeois camp coexisted with hardly veiled coalition with the more moderate elements in the same camp; any shift in the relations of strength within the two main camps . . . might bring about the breakdown of the artificial equilibrium.[48]

In short, the victory of the *Heimwehr* and the extreme right wing of the Christian-social conservative camp over the moderates and the permanently weak left wing of trade unionists of that camp paved the way for the extremists in the Socialist camp to sound the call for a violent revolution and civil war.

Thus, each *Lager* tried to become the center of all the loyalties of its followers, and the contest for the votes of the people turned into a struggle for their souls. The Christian Social party was correct when it insisted that the *Kinderfreunde* (socialist youth organization) and the *Freidenkerbund* (socialist atheistic society) were "non-political means to a political end and had, therefore, the greatest political significance."[49] It realized that the youth organizations and the free thinker societies were part of the network of organizations with which the Socialists tried to spread their "theology," win new followers and maintain the loyalty of the faithful. The Socialists, on the other hand, considered the Catholic Church not simply a religious institution but a propaganda arm of the Socialists' principal political opponent:

> The peasant's enmity against the proletariat was nourished by the clergy . . . The clergy strengthened and organized the peasant movement as the most potent force against the revolutionary proletariat. Newspaper and sermons from the pulpit told the peasant that the revolution would socialize his property and destroy the Church.[50]

Even C. A. Macartney whose *The Social Revolution in Austria* is critical of the Social Democrats pointed out that:

> the Catholic Church of Austria is the real enemy of Socialism. She is the living representative of the old order. . . . She is the upholder of conservatism, loyalty, piety, respect, and obedience. . . . Until her hold over the spirits of the people has been weakened, Socialism, the very reverse of all this, cannot move. The Catholic Church, too, was and is an active political force. . . . Therefore we find that the real battle of Austrian Socialism is directed against the Church . . . Under these circumstances the Socialist maxim that "religion is every man's private affair" is really a direct challenge, since Catholicism admits no neutrality.[51]

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[48] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 272.
[49] Schöpfer, *op. cit.*, p. 441.
[50] Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
[51] Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

Ever since the days of Emperor Joseph II's enlightened reforms (1765-1790) and of Georg von Schönerer's anti-Hapsburg and anti-Catholic *Los von Rom* (Away from Rome) movement during the last decades of the nineteenth century, political struggles in Austria have encompassed religious rivalries, and religious rivalries have been turned into political controversies. Under such conditions political parties become armed camps of religious crusaders, determined to drive the infidels from the field:

> In practice, political parties behind whom there were arraigned important private interests always had a tendency to become totalitarian, that is to say, tended toward suppressing those who disagreed with them. This is especially true of the dogmatic ideological Austrian parties which almost take on the *character of a religion.*[52]

When parties take on the "character of a religion," as they did in Austria, they endanger democracy, for a party which considers opposition to its ideas and programs "heresy" destroys what Ernest Barker has called the essence of democratic government—discussion.[53] Ultimately, a party which claims the entire loyalty of its followers subverts the common political institutions by becoming totalitarian, that is to say, it first turns into a state within a state, and then attempts to take over the state.

V

According to David Truman American democracy has three characteristic features: (1) multiplicity of access points to the governmental process; (2) multiple or overlapping memberships in organized groups; and (3) the existence of potential interests as well as unorganized or majority interests which constitute an ideological consensus or a system of "rules of the game." But the balance wheel of this system is "multiple memberships in potential groups based on widely held and accepted interests." There can be little doubt that democratic politics cannot operate where this balance wheel is lacking. However,. a high degree of consensus and a stable democratic system is possible even when there are only a few access points to the governmental process, as in Great Britain which has a unitary system of government, rather than a federal one, and high disciplined parties, quite unlike their loosely-organized American counterparts. Somewhat the same conditions existed in Austria. Austrian federalism had an extreme centralist bias and Austrian parties, though they had a formal federal structure, were highly centralized and subject to the working of the "iron law of oligarchy" —an oligarchy located in party headquarters in Vienna. Therefore it would seem that a stable democratic system of politics is possible even without a multiplicity of access points to the decision-making process. Can the same be said about Truman's second and third features, multiple and overlapping membership in groups, and a widely-held set of rules of the game?

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[53] P. T. Lux, *Österreich 1918-1938. Eine Demokratie?* (Graz: Leykam Verlag, 1946), p. 3.

[53] Democracy is not a solution, but a way of seeking solutions . . . The core of democracy is choice, and not something chosen." Ernest Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (London, 1951), p. 207.

Austria's experience between 1918 and 1934 indicates that the absence of these two features definitely threatens the stability of a democratic state and leads to "morbific politics," that is to say, civil war and revolution.

The existence of political parties in Austria which claimed the entire lives of their followers eliminated almost entirely widespread overlapping or multiple membership in groups. Members of the three camps belonged to separate organizations in all spheres of their lives, and as a result these organizations were never restrained from excessively partisan action by the fact that some of their members also might belong to other organizations whose interests might coincide with those of the first group. But the most severe threat to Austrian democracy came from the lack of widely held "rules of the game." The first Austrian republic lacked a common consensus on questions of social, political, and economic organization. The three *Lager* differed over church-state relationships, over the nature of the constitution and the organization of the principal organs of government, and over the major outlines of Austria's socil and economic organization. As a result, political parties became ideological "fortresses"behind whose walls gathered the faithful to defend their belief system and from which they sallied forth to slay the infidels. Under such conditions, no party could trust the ballot box because it feared that the other side would use a majority position in legislature or executive gained at the ballot box not for the purpose of furthering its policies through constitutional means, but for the overthrow of the existing order and the creation of a new one based on its own "theology."

Because of this lack of consensus Austria's three *Lager* inevitably drifted toward civil war. A government dominated by members of the Catholic camp suspended the constitution in 1933 and replaced it with a corporative state under authoritarian leadership in the following year. However, no single *Lager* should be blamed for the destruction of Austrian democracy in 1933-34; all three bear part of the responsibility.

The course of events since 1945 suggests that the two major *Lager*, the Socialist and the Christian-social conservative, have recognized the crucial importance of a common consensus on the principles of political and economic organization. In addition, the declining importance of Vienna and the industrialization of Austria outside the capital city have helped to blur the old cleavages between "red" Vienna and the "black" provinces.[54] The existence, since 1945, of a coalition government composed of the two major camps, representing over ninety per cent of the electorate, is a sign that neither Catholics nor Socialists trust the other to govern alone. But it also signifies the willingness of these two *Lager* to place the continued existence of the republic above armed party warfare. In short, there is strong evidence now that the question of regime, the question of the form of government, has been settled in Austria, just as it was finally settled in France after the Dreyfus affair. Austria's major *Lager* have finally grasped the significance of the course of events between 1918 and 1934, i.e., that democratic politics is possible only if the question of regime has ceased to be an open question. It will be rewarding to study the dynamics of group conflict in Austria under conditions of group consensus during the coming years. The present study has attempted to provide the framework for such an analysis.

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[54] In the presidential election held May 5, 1957, the Social Democratic candidate Adolf Schärf polled a 250,000 plurality over his People's Party opponent Wolfgang Denk. Schärf succeeded to an office held by Social Democrats since the establishment of the Second Republic. However, election figures revealed that Denk had polled an impressive number of votes in "red" Vienna while Schärf did unexpectedly well in the "black" provinces. It has been suggested that "this shift in the territorial distribution of Austria's two majority parties results probably from the progressive industrialization of the provinces and from what has been called the 'provincialization' of Vienna dating back to the years of German occupation." Ernst Pisko, "Austrian Socialist Wins," *Christian Science Monitor,* May 6, 1957.

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THE RUMANIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1952: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

by Randolph L. Braham

I

THE Communist acquisition of power in Rumania followed a pattern which was pursued, with minor variations to fit local conditions, by most of the Central and Southeast European states now in the Soviet orbit. There is general agreement on the theory that Rumania's sovietization has been achieved in several well-differentiated stages. The first phase began with the successful overthrow of the Antonescu regime on August 23, 1944[1] and lasted until the inauguration of the Groza Government on March 6, 1945. In this period the Rumanian Communists and the Soviet occupation authorities condoned, for tactical reasons, the establishment of representative coalition governments in which most of the cabinet posts were occupied by military leaders. In addition to representatives of the traditional Rumanian political parties, the first post-armistice Sănătescu Government of National Unity included, for the first time in Rumanian history, representatives of the Communist and Socialist parties—Mr. Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu and Mr. Constantin Titel Petrescu respectively. However, while democratic elements participated widely in the management of public affairs, the governmental apparatus itself was gradually infiltrated by elements loyal to the Communist Party.

Though the Communists enjoyed some prestige in the immediate post-armistice period they were by no means popular. Their success in hampering the efforts of the Sănătescu Government to combat the disastrous effects of the war was due primarily to factors transcending internal Rumanian affairs. The fundamental factor in determining the course of Rumania's political development during this time was the presence in the country of the Red Army. Under the pretext of needing order and security behind the lines it encouraged the Rumanian Communists in their demand for the establishment of a "friendly and truly democratic government." The one force which could have offered some, if temporary, resistance—the traditionally conservative Rumanian Army—was absent from the country fighting alongside the Soviet Army in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The preservation of internal order was entrusted to two Communist-indoctrinated Rumanian divisions—the "Tudor Vladimirescu" and the "Horia, Cloșca și Crișan"—recruited from among the Rumanian prisoners of war in the USSR. In addition, the political vacuum prevailing in the countryside with the concomitant concentration of political leadership in the capital played into the hands of the Communists.

After a long political crisis fomented by the Party, the Sănătescu Government of National Unity was reorganized on November 5, 1944, only to be replaced the following month by a government under General Nicolae Rădescu. The Communists came nearer to their cherished goal of securing the Ministry of the Interior and thereby obtain control over the entire state apparatus by winning the appointment of the now purged Teohari Georgescu as Undersecretary. A new political crisis occurred in January 1945, subsequent to the return from Moscow of Ana Pauker and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the two leaders of Rumanian Communism. Under the cloak of the National Democratic Front the Communists, violently denouncing the National Peasant and National Liberal parties, demanded a replacement of the government. The crisis mounted steadily and reached a climax on February 24, 1945, when shots were fired during a mass demonstration in Bucharest.[2] The Soviet Union now openly interfered in the person of Andrei Vyshinsky demanding, in violation of the then signed "Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe," that a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza be installed. The King had no alternative but to accept the ultimatum and on March 6, 1945, he announced the formation of the Groza Government.[3] In addition to the groups making up the National Democratic Front[4] the new government also comprised representatives of a few newly created mass organizations.

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[1] For a study of the Rumanian armistice negotiations preceding the *coup* see: Alexander Cretzianu, "Rumanian Armistice Negotiations: Cairo, 1944." *Journal of Central European Affairs XI,* (Oct. 1951), 243-258; F. C. Nanor "The First Soviet Double Cross" *ibid.,* XII (Oct. 1952), 236-258.

With the installation of the Groza Government, Rumania entered the second phase of its transformation into a People's Democracy. While governmental coalitions were still in existence during this period, opposition was only nominal. The external forms of parliamentary democracy continued to be neatly preserved but the actual control of the government was in the hands of the Communists who gradually transformed themselves from a ruling minority into a dominating majority. In appearance they continued to press only for the achievement of strictly democratic aims but in reality they were laying the foundations for what is now called the "socialistic transformation" of the state machinery.[5]

The technique employed by the Rumanian Communists was similar to the one used by their counterparts in the other satellites. Using the National Democratic Front as a cover they first infiltrated and then took over the control of the parties composing it. The Social Democratic Party, first split then purged of its leaders, was formally dissolved and merged with the

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[2] Barry Brannen, "The Soviet Conquest of Rumania," *Foreign Affairs*, New York, Vol. 30 (Apr. 1952), 470.

[3] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), pp. 50-52.

[4] In addition to a few smaller organizations the National Democratic Front was composed of the following: the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Ploughmen's Front, the Union of Patriots, the People's National Party, the Hungarian Democratic Union—MADOSZ, and the dissident factions of the National Peasant and National Liberal parties.

[5] For greater details see: Alexandre Cretzianu, ed. *Captive Rumania. A Decade of Soviet Rule* (New York, 1956); Georg Mergl. "Rumänien. Von der Kapitulation zur Volksrepublik," *Osteuropa*, Stuttgart, Vol. 3, June 1953, pp. 213-219; Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, 1951), Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 278-292, Stephen Fisher-Galati, ed. *Romania.* (New York, 1957)

Communist Party to form what is now called the United Workers' Party of Rumania. While the Union of Patriots never achieved any real importance and served merely to attract to the National Democratic Front the non-proletarian elements, the Ploughmen's Front has in the post-war period become the rural arm of the Communist Party. Founded in 1933 by Petru Groza, the late Chairman of the Presidium, the Ploughmen's Front offered a program that appealed to the dissatisfied Rumanian peasantry. Demanding the enactment of sweeping agrarian reforms, the mechanization of agriculture, the elimination of nepotism and the establishment of a truly democratic regime, it partly succeeded in attracting the peasant masses from the hold of the National Peasant Party which had to a certain extent discredited itself in the 'thirties by entering into a temporary political agreement with the Iron Guard.[6] The Communist Party's initial prestige was furthermore enhanced by its success in obtaining the Soviet Union's approval for the reestablishment of Rumanian administration in Transylvania and by the immediate recognition of the Groza Government by the USSR.

With the deterioration of the international situation and the growing anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiment in the country, the Groza regime became increasingly dictatorial in character. Encouraged by the Western Powers and by the outcome of the Potsdam Conference of August 1945, King Michael demanded its resignation and replacement by a more representative government. On September 4, Groza and Tătărescu were received in Moscow and accused the leaders of the historical parties, Mr. Maniu and Mr. Brătianu, of attempting to create disunity between the government and the people on the one hand, and the King on the other. Supported by the Soviet Government Groza defied the King's request and continued in office. The King thereupon left Bucharest for his palace in Sinaia and, breaking off every contact with the government, refused to sign governmental decrees. After a bloody interlude on November 8, the political impasse was eventually solved by the Moscow Conference of December 16-26, 1945, in accordance with the provisions of the Communiqué issued by the Big Three.

Though one of its stipulations required the holding of "free and unfettered" elections "as soon as possible," the reorganized Groza Government decided, much to the dismay of the Western Powers, to hold the elections as late as November 19, 1946. In the interim the campaign against the opposition was intensified; freedom of the press, speech and assembly was curtailed. To the surprise of no one the Communist-dominated National Democratic Front won, in the by now well-known manner, an astounding victory. It obtained over 80 per cent of the almost six and a half million votes cast.[7]

Considering the election results as a vote of confidence on the part of the people, the Groza Government began a concerted and systematic drive towards the complete eradication of the last vestiges of opposition. The technique employed was simple and effective. The opposition parties were accused of having been transformed into "organizations of spies and plotters," which, with the aid of "certain imperialist powers," aimed at the "violent overthrow of the people's government." The opposition party leaders and key figures were arrested, brought before the "people's courts," made to confess in public and duly condemned.

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[6] Andrew Gyorgy. *Governments of Danubian Europe.* (New York, 1949), p. 148.
[7] Andrew Gyorgy, *op. cit.,* pp. 150-151.

After the dissolution of the historical parties and the imprisonment of their leaders, there came the turn of Tătărescu.[8] He was eliminated for harboring "fascist" and "reactionary" elements in his ministry. The three most powerful figures of the Rumanian Communist Party—Ana Pauker, Vasile (László) Luca (both now purged) and Emil Bodnăraș—were summoned to head the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defense respectively, and encouraged to bring about the full conversion of Rumania to the monolithic, one-party state system.

There was, however, one more obstacle to be overcome, namely the monarchy. King Michael undoubtedly enjoyed great popularity among the Rumanian masses. Whatever his collaboration with the Antonescu regime his prestige was increased by the *coup* which he helped engender on August 23, 1944,—an act of heroism that was recognized even by the Russians when they bestowed upon him on July 19, 1945, their highest military decoration, the "Order of Victory." The King's popularity was cleverly exploited by the Communists for bringing about revolutionary changes in the country without risking the outbreak of open revolt. But as Soviet economic and political pressure increased and the dissatisfaction of the masses became increasingly apparent, he was more and more regarded as a symbol of unity and national independence. The Communists, fully aware of his dangerous implication, decided to do away with the monarchy. They asserted that the monarchy was no longer consistent with the new conditions in the country and that it represented a serious obstacle on the path of Rumania's further development. The King was forced to abdicate on December 30, 1947.[9] With the monarchy abolished and the regime of People's Republic proclaimed in January 1948, Rumania entered the third phase of its communization.

Along with the establishment and consolidation of the new regime came a radical shift in the Party line with regard to Rumania's internal and foreign relations. Internally, the Party no longer found it necessary to preserve the outward manifestations of a parliamentary democracy and dropped even the pretense of collaborating with nonproletarian elements. This view was eloquently elaborated by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in the January 1, 1948, issue of the now dissolved Cominform journal *For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy*:

> The resignation of Tătărescu and his group means the removal of the last

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[8] Released in the early part of 1955 in line with the "amnesties-policy" followed in the Soviet orbit.

[9] For the text of King Michael's abdication proclamation see: *Rumanian Review*, Bucharest, nos. 5-6, 1948, p. 9.

> representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie from the government; it means that the proletariat and its allies no longer share state power with the representatives of the exploiting classes . . . The proletarian vanguard, in close alliance with the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia, is the backbone of the government.

Hand in hand with these developments the Party program was also revised to fit the newly created conditions. As immediate objectives it now advocated: (1) the strengthening of the leadership of the working class in all fields of governmental, economic, social and cultural activities; (2) the acceleration of the development of the socialized sector of the economy; (3) the elimination and eventual liquidation of the capitalist elements in the countryside.[10]

Externally, the identification with, and the emulation of, the Soviet Union was officially asserted. Whereas prior to the establishment of the new regime emphasis was laid upon the prevailing differences between the Soviet system and that of the People's Democracy, the Communists now proclaimed their substantial identity. The decisive role of the Soviet Union in bringing about the establishment and preservation of the regime of People's Democracy in Rumania was no longer denied.[11] In fact, one is never permitted to forget that the new regime is based upon the cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union and that any tendency to weaken the ties with the USSR would be considered as inimical to the best interests of the people.

II

The Constitutional Development

The transformations that have taken place in the political and socioeconomic structure of the new Rumanian society were reflected by the two constitutions which had been adopted since the regime of People's Democracy was inaugurated. If the gap between the constitutional provisions and the realities of the political life prevailing in the country was never really bridged, these two constitutions tended, in accordance with Communist constitutional theory, to reflect the specific stage of development achieved at the time of their drafting.

Whereas the 1948 Constitution[12]—advanced as it was from the Soviet legal point of view—preserved some outward manifestations of "bourgeois constitutionalism," the present Constitution, adopted on September 24, 1952, very closely approximates to its Soviet prototype.[13] It reflects the enormous transformations that have taken place in the political and socio-economic life of the country since the proclamation of the regime of People's Democracy. In the interval the political supremacy of the Communist Party has been recognized; the means of production, transportation and banking have been nationalized; the "socialist sector" of agriculture has been widened by the ever growing influence of the state through the establishment of state farms and tractor stations; collectivization of the land has been consistently pursued through a policy aiming at the elimination of the "kulak elements" and the support of the lower and middle strata of the peasantry;[14] two monetary reforms have radically changed the economic status of the people; the administrative-territorial units of the country have been revised and redivided into 18 regions; the size, structure and functions of the central and local governmental agencies and of the judiciary have been transformed along Soviet lines; the first Five-Year Plan was inaugurated; the class structure of Rumanian society has been altered; the last remnants of the organized opposition have been eliminated and the rank-and-file of the Party purged of "unreliable" or "deviationist" elements.

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[10] Manifesto Program of the Front of Popular Democracy of March 3, 1948. *Rumanian Review*, Bucharest, nos. 7-8, 1948, pp. 32-38.

[11] Teohari Georgescu. "Political Foundations of the People's Democratic System," *For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy*, Bucharest, June 1, 1949, pp. 4-5.

[12] For a study of the 1948 Constitution see: G. M. Razi, "La Constitution de la République Populaire de Roumanie," *Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé*, Paris, Apr.-June, 1951, pp. 262-298; P. B. Steanu, "Constitutionalism in the Satellite States," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XII (Apr. 1952), 56-69.

[13] The Constitution as adopted differed little in substance from the original Draft submitted to the Assembly on March 27, 1952, by the Constitutional Commission headed by

The new Constitution[15] incorporates the bulk of these changes and is therefore considered as the most advanced among the satellite constitutions.[16] It fully reflects the official Communist view on the character of the People's Democracy. The now accepted theory maintains that the People's Democracies are "states of the toiling classes, headed by the working class, states of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, states of a new socialist type."[17] It, furthermore, asserts that the regime of People's Democracy is a type of dictatorship of the proletariat differing only in form but not in essence from the Soviet model. According to this line the state in the People's Democracies differs from the contemporary Soviet state:

1. in the difference of historical conditions and the difference, derived therefrom, in the forms of exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat;
2. in the different phase of development in which it rests, the different stage of historical development. In the People's Democracies, antagonistic social classes still exist, capitalism has not been completely liquidated and socialism is only being built. In the USSR, there are no antagonistic

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Gheorghiu-Dej. Out of the 18,836 "suggestions for amendments" offered by the population only 34 were accepted. Of these, 28 were primarily editorial.

[14] P. Nichita, M. Ionescu and T. Udrea. "Lupta masselor populare pentru reforma agrară și lichidarea moșierimii ca clasă in preajma lui 6 martie 1945." In: Academia Republicii Populare Romîne: *Studii și referate privind istoria Romîniei. Din lucrările sesiunii lărgite a sectiunii destiinte istorice, filozofice si economico-juridice* (21-24 *decembrie* 1953). Partea II-a. (Bucharest: Editura Acamemiei Republicii Populare Romîne, 1954), pp. 1787-1813.

[15] The constitutional text used in this study is taken from: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, *Report on Draft Constitution of Rumanian People's Republic. (Constitution of Rumanian People's Republic.)* Bucharest: Publishing House of the Rumanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, 1952.

[16] L. Schultz, "Die neue Verfassung Rumäniens, eine Entwicklungstufe zum 'Vollsozialismus'." *Europa Archiv,* Frankfurt am Main, Vol. 8, no. 7, Apr. 5, 1953, pp. 5585-5590.

[17] Gordon H. Skilling, "'People's Democracy' in Soviet Theory," *Soviet Studies,* London, Vol. 3 (July 1951), p. 21, as taken from N. P. Farberov's *Gosudarstvennoye Pravo Stran Narodnoi Demokratii* (Moscow, 1949), p. 6.

> social classes, capitalism has been totally liquidated, socialism has been built and a Communist society is being built.[18]

The basic features of the new Rumanian society were outlined, in accordance with this definition of the concept of People's Democracy, in Chapter I of the new Constitution. It defines the Rumanian People's Republic as a "state of working people of town and country" (Art. 1). The political foundation of the state is "the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry, an alliance in which the leading role is held by the working class" (Art. 2). The two articles seem to reflect the social transformation of the country by emphasizing the political supremacy of the two "toiling classes" under the leadership of the Communist Party.

One of the most important factors in determining the character of a People's Democracy is its relation to the Soviet Union. The early theoreticians of the state of People's Democracy (I. P. Trainin, A. Leontiev, E. S. Varga) failed, in the views of N. P. Farberov and B. S. Mankovsky—the leading representatives of the current line[19]—to demonstrate sufficiently that "the People's Democracy is built on collaboration and friendship with the Soviet Union." The late Georgi Dimitrov went even further and stated that "any tendency toward weakening this collaboration with the USSR is directed against the very existence of the People's Democracy."[20]

Faithful to this view, Art. 3 of the Constitution states that

> The Rumanian People's Republic came into being and was strengthened as a result of the liberation of the country by the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the yoke of fascism and imperialist domination, as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists by the masses of the people in town and countryside headed by the working class under the leadership of the Rumanian Communist Party.

Whereas the previous Constitution failed to mention the role of the USSR, the present document refers to the Soviet Union and the Red Army not less than five times. It is, in this context, interesting to note that the 1952 Constitution seems to make a differeniation between "state sovereignty" and "people's sovereignty." While the Soviet Union is depicted as the liberator of the country whose "selfless and brotherly support . . . ensure the independence, State sovereignty, development and flourishing of the Rumanian People's Republic," the "Armed Forces of the Rumanian People's Republic stand guard over the borders of the country, guard over the sovereignty and independence of the Rumanian people" (Par. 4 and 5 of the Introductory Chapter). [21]

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[18] Hilary Minc, "Some Problems in the People's Democracy in the Light of the Leninist-Stalinist Teachings on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Political Affairs*, New York, Vol. 29 (Aug. 1950), p. 96.

[19] This line seems to be still in force in spite of the many nationalistic, titoistic views that have been sprouting in the post-Stalinist era.

[20] Georgi Dimitrov, *Political Report Delivered to the V Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party* (Sofia: Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948), p. 52.

[21] Veler Velerim, "Rumänien. Innenpolitik. Neue Verfassung der Volksrepublik." *Osteuropa*, Stuttgart, Vol. 3, Feb. 1953, pp. 55-58; an agreement regulating the "temporary

The social-economic sectors of the national economy are outlined in Art. 5. They are: "the socialist sector, the sector of small-scale production of commodities and the private-capitalist sector." The foundation of the former consists of the "socialist ownership of the means of production" existing in the form of state or cooperative-collective property. In this sector, according to Par. 2 of Art. 6, "the exploitation of man by man is abolished." While the new constitution follows in the footsteps of the earlier one in declaring that the land belongs to those who till it, it also stipulates specifically that the

> Peasants who are members of collective farms have for their *personal use** a plot of household land, and, as their personal property, the husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements—in accordance with the rules of the collective farm. (Par. 2, Art. 9)

This provision represents an important deviation from the text of the Draft Constitution which had stipulated the peasants' *"personal property rights"** to the land as well.[22] Articles 10 and 11 deal with the other two sectors, emphasizing that the state pursues a policy of supporting the peasants with small and medium holdings and the handicraftsmen against exploitation and aims at "restricting and dislodging the capitalist elements" (Par. 2, Art. 11). It is in this respect that the socio-economic structure of the People's Republic of Rumania differs from that of the USSR. According to Art. 4 of the Stalin Constitution, the economic foundation of the USSR is based upon "the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system." In Soviet society there is no room for the "private-capitalist sector," and with the abolition of all bourgeois classes completed, the USSR is depicted as the only country which so far has reached the preliminary stage in the transition to Communism, variously referred to in Marxist literature as "Socialism" or "the first phase of Communism."

The state system of the Rumanian People's Republic is elaborated in Chapter II. It is depicted as a "People's Democracy representing the power of the working people" (Art. 16). The state: (a) "defends the independence of the people against the enemies of the working class"; (b) furthers the economic development of the country by means of "socialist industrialization" and the "gradual socialist transformation of agriculture"; (c) organizes the planned economy; (d) organizes and directs the Armed Forces; (e) safeguards the security of the citizens by suppressing the enemies of the

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stationing of Soviet troops in Rumania" was signed on April 15, 1957. At the May 24, 1958 Moscow Conference of the Warsaw Pact nations it was subsequently decided to withdraw all Soviet forces from Rumania "in the nearest future."

[22] In line with the "New Course" policy followed in the Soviet sphere in the post-Stalin era, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party recommended during its July 1956 session that the By-Laws of Collective Farms be modified so as to allot the peasants full property rights to the plots of land on which their homes and the auxiliary buildings of the collectives are built.

*Italics by the writer.

people; (f) directs the financial affairs of the country; (g) administers the banks and the nationalized enterprises; (h) directs the public education; (i) administers the health programs; (j) ensures the development of culture "national in form, socialist in content"; and (k) ensures the observance of the Constitution and the laws in force (Art. 17).

The Constitution provides for the administrative-territorial division of the country into 18 regions. These are: Arad, Bacău, Baia Mare, Bîrlad, Bucharest, Cluj, Constanța, Craiova, Galați, Hunedoara, Iași, Oradea, Piteși, Ploești, Stalin (formerly Brașov), Suceava, Timișoara and the Magyar Autonomous Region.[23] The new territorial reorganization of the country seemed surprising since only a few years before (September 6, 1950) the Grand National Assembly "unanimously" adopted a law (Law No. 5/1950) drafted and submitted to it by the Central Committee of the United Workers' Party (Plenary Meeting of May 15-17, 1950) by which the former administrative division of Rumania into 53 departments (județe), 424 districts (plăși) and some 6000 communes was consolidated into 28 regions, 177 districts and 4,052 communes. The aims of the administrative redivision were stated in Art. 1 of the Law of 1950: (a) to ensure the development of industry and agriculture in the interest of socialist construction and of raising the standard of living of the working people; (b) to bring the state organs closer to the working people; and (c) to ensure the guiding political role of the working class and its alliance with the working peasantry. Although economic factors were certainly taken into consideration, the main purpose of the reform was the increasing effectuation of the principle of "democratic centralism" which, in practice, meant the tightening of the grip over the lives of the Rumanian people. The further reduction in the number of regions cannot but signify an even greater centralization of the state machinery in the hands of the Communists.

A novel feature is the establishment of the Magyar Autonomous Region (Arts. 19-21) in the territory inhabited by compact Magyar and Székely population including the districts of Ciuc, Gheorgheni, Odorhei, Reghin, Sîngeorgiu de Pădure, St. Gheorghie, Tîrgu Mures, Tîrgu Secuesc and Toplița.[24] The Party view with regard to the establishment of the Magyar Autonomous Region is the contention that political and material conditions for the establishment were made possible by the "correct and consistent application . . . of the line of (the) Party in the national question based on the Lenin-Stalin teaching."[25] Rumanian national circles, on the other hand, regard the move as a further demonstration of the USSR's policy of *divide et impera* attempting to bring about a split between the two nationalities reminiscent of the Hitler-inspired Vienna Accord of August 30, 1940.[26]

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[23] The number of regions was reduced to 16 by the incorporation of Arad and Bîrlad into adjacent regions by virtue of a constitutional amendment passed by the Grand National Assembly on March 29, 1956. See: "Legea Nr. 5 pentru modificarea articolelor 18, 19 alieneatul 2 şi a articolului 50 din Constitutia Republicii Populare Romîne" in: Ministerul Justiției, *Colecție de legi, decrete, hotărîri și dispoziții, 1956 1 Martie-30 Aprilie* (Bucharest, Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Economică şi Juridică, 1956), pp. 48-50.

[24] The number of districts has been increased to 10 by the addition of the district of Cristure Secuiesc by virtue of a constitutional amendment passed by the Grand National Assembly on March 29, 1956. See *ibid.*

Chapter III of the Constitution deals with the highest organ of state power. In the pyramidal structure of state power the Grand National Assembly occupies, at least from the point of view of Soviet constitutional theory, the highest rank to which all other organs of state power are subordinate (Art. 22). It is conceived as the sole legislative organ (Art. 23) and as directly competent to (a) elect the Presidium; (b) appoint the Government; (c) amend the Constitution; (d) decide on questions of war and peace; (e) set up the national economic plans; (f) approve the state budget and the fixing of the taxes; (g) establish, fuse and abolish Ministries; (h) amend the administrative division of the country; (i) grant amnesty and (j) exercise control over the application of the Constitution (Art. 24). The Grand National Assembly is elected for a term of four years by citizens of Rumania "voting by election districts on the basis of one deputy for every 40,000 of the population" (Art. 25). Though the Constitution provides for the election of deputies on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot (Arts. 93-99), the exercise of political rights in accordance with these democratic principles is made impossible by the provisions incorporated in Arts. 86 and 100. According to them the Communist Party is the only political group permitted to exist[27] and to nominate candidates.[28] The laws adopted by a simple majority (Art. 26) are signed by the President and Secretary of the Presidium and published in the Official Gazette (Art. 27). The Assembly is convened twice a year by the Presidium for ordinary sessions (Art. 28), and for extraordinary sessions whenever the Presidium or one third of the total number of deputies deem it necessary (Art. 29). For the conduct of the sittings, the Assembly elects from its midst a President and two Vice Presidents (Art. 30). It also elects a Credentials Commission for the validation of the credentials of the deputies elected (Art. 31) and it may appoint commissions of investigation, de-

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[25] Gheorghe Apostol, "About Draft Constitution of Rumanian People's Republic," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy,* Bucharest, Aug. 15, 1952, p. 2.

[26] It is interesting to note that during the Hungarian uprisings of Oct.-Nov. 1956 the Rumanian security authorities found it necessary to arrest the leaders of the Hungarian demonstrators in Transylvania who sympathized with their kinsmen in Hungary, and that both Rumanian and Soviet Army units stationed in the Magyar Autonomous Region had to be heavily reinforced. See: Welles Hangen, "Rumania Arrests Unruly Magyars," *New York Times,* Oct. 30, 1956.

[27] The existence of other parties composing the National Democratic Front is purely nominal since they are under the control of the Communist Party.

[28] The universality of suffrage was for a time restricted by the provisions of Article 5 of the Electoral Law of September 25, 1952. According to it the following groups were declared unfit to vote or be elected: former landowners, former industrialists, former bankers, former wholesale traders and the "owners of private commercial enterprises and small industrial enterprises which [were] not nationalized and which [were] based on the exploitation of hired help." For the text of the Electoral Law of September 25, 1952, see: "Noua lege electorală reperistă," *Cronica Românească,* New York, Dec. 1952, pp. 44-60. Article 5 of the 1952 Electoral Law was abolished by the Grand National Assembly during its session of November 27-30, 1956.

termining at every occasion their specific powers and mode of functioning (Art. 32). As for the deputies of the Assembly, they enjoy the same privileges as were specified in the earlier Constitution. In addition to their participation in the proceedings of the Assembly and in the work of its commissions and committees—a more or less rubber-stamping function—they may address inquiries or interpellations to the government or the individual Ministers. These must be answered, orally or in writing, within a maximum of three days (Art. 33). They enjoy immunity from arrest or prosecution and cannot be held to legal responsibility without the consent of the Assembly or, in the interim between its sessions, of the Presidium (Art. 34).[29]

The Presidium, consisting of a President—who is also the titular head of the Republic—two Vice Presidents, a Secretary and thirteen members, is elected by the Grand National Assembly (Art. 35) and is accountable to it for all its activities (Art. 36). The following activities fall within the jurisdiction of the Presidium: it (a) convenes the sessions of the Assembly; (b) issues decrees; (c) interprets the laws in force in Rumania; (d) conducts referendums; (e) annuls the decisions or orders of the Council of Ministers not conforming to the laws in force; (f) releases and appoints Ministers on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers during the interim between the sessions of the Assembly; (g) institutes the titles of honor of the Republic; (h) awards decorations and institutes military titles and diplomatic ranks; (i) proclaims a state of war on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers during the interim between the sessions of the Assembly; (j) appoints and recalls the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; (k) orders partial or total mobilization; (l) pardons and commutes punishment; (m) ratifies and denounces international treaties; (n) appoints and recalls the plenipotentiary representatives of the Republic; (o) receives the letters of credence and recall of foreign diplomatic representatives in the country; (p) proclaims a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout the country for the maintenance of public order or the security of the state (Art. 37). After the dissolution of the Grand National Assembly on the expiration of its term of office, the Presidium orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding three months from the date of the expiration. In the interim the Presidium retains its powers until the newly elected Grand National Assembly, which is to be convened by it not later than three months after the elections, elects a new Presidium (Arts. 39 and 41). In case of war or national emergency the Assembly may prolong its mandate for the duration of the emergency (Art. 40). The provision included in the previous Constitution giving the Assembly the right to dissolve itself before the expiration of its mandate has not been embodied in the new Constitution. As a matter of fact the inclusion of such a provision would have been meaningless, because if invoked it would not bring about a governmental crisis necessitating the election of a new Assembly and the setting up of a new government—as would be the case in a Western type of democratic government—since both the Assembly and the Government of a People's Republic are dependent upon the whims of the Party.

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[29] For a study of the social origin of the deputies to the National Assembly see: M. Dogan, "L'origine sociale du personnel parlementaire d'un pays essentiellement agraire: la Roumanie," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie,* Brussels, 1953, pp. 165-208.

Though the constitutional theory of legislative power vested exclusively in the Assembly is constantly maintained, precedent both in Soviet and satellite legislative history reveals the preponderance of the Presidium. While the legislative function of the Presidium is performed in terms of "decrees subject to subsequent approval by the Assembly," its outweighing role is manifest in both the relatively small number of legislative acts passed by the Assembly and the conversely large number of laws enacted through the Presidium. Though both the Assembly and the Presidium legislate, in practice at least, at the initiative of the Government,[30] the leading force behind all legislative maneuvers is the Communist Party. This exclusive role of the Party has even received a juridical status in the Stalin Constitution (Art. 141) and in the new Rumanian Constitution (Art. 100), insofar as only the Party or its affiliated organizations have the right to nominate candidates to the Assembly, which organ in turn elects its Presidium and appoints the Government. Thus, in spite of the constitutional primacy of the Assembly in legislative matters, its main function, like that of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, is the ratification of governmental decrees. It is also the forum through which governmental policies are publicized and rubber-stamped for public approval.

Besides its legislative prerogative the Presidium also acts as a "collective president" fulfilling the need of a continuously operating body. In spite of the constitutional provisions relating to its collective functions, the Chairman of the Presidium is, by virtue of his activities, regarded as the titular head of the state. His functions are generally those of any other president of a republic performed in the collective name of the Presidium. Unlike the heads of some other states, however, he does not have the right to dissolve the Assembly nor does he possess a veto power over its legislation. In fact, both in practice and constitutional theory, he is subordinate and accountable to the Assembly and, consequently, to the Party.

The Council of Ministers, designated as the highest organ of executive and administrative power in the state (Art. 42), is discussed in Chapter IV of the new Constitution. The Council of Ministers is theoretically appointed by the Grand National Assembly. It consists of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister), the Vice Chairman, the Ministers and the Chairman of the following committees or commissions: the State Planning Committee; the State Control Commission;[31] the State Supply

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[30] Most cabinet members occupy high functions in the Party hierarchy as well. For a list of members and adjunct members of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party with a specification of their functions see: *Cronica Românească,* New York, Jan.-Feb. 1956, pp. 19-22.

[31] The State Control Commission has been invested with sweeping powers with regard to its tasks of supervising the smooth functioning of the state apparatus. For the text

Committee; the State Agricultural Products Delivery Committee; the Committee for Higher Education; the Arts Committee and the Committee for Cinematography (Art. 43). The Council of Ministers accounts for all its activities to the Assembly and during the interim between its sessions to the Presidium (Art. 44). It is empowered to issue decisions and orders "in pursuance of the laws of operation" which are binding throughout the territory of the Republic (Arts. 45 and 46). In addition, it: (a) coordinates and directs all the institutions under its jurisdiction, including the Ministries; (b) adopts the necessary measures for the effective functioning of the country's economic life; (c) adopts measures for the safeguarding of public order and the security of the state; (d) guides the foreign policy of the country; (e) directs the Armed Forces and establishes the annual contingent of citizens to be called up for military service, and (f) sets up, whenever circumstances require, special commissions or committees for economic, cultural, juridical and military affairs (Art. 47). The Ministers are entitled to issue orders and instructions and to verify their execution in conformity with laws in operation or with the decisions emanating from the Council of Ministers (Art. 49). All activities of the Ministers which are inconsistent with the specified provisions can be annulled by the Council of Ministers (Art. 48). Whereas the previous Constitution failed to elaborate on the type and number of Ministries, the new document, following the model of the Soviet Constitution, fully enumerates them. Their relatively large number seems to reflect the greater ramifications of the new economic system with emphasis on specialization and planning. Originally, the Constitution provided for the establishment of 30 Ministries. During its session of March 16-22, 1957, however, the Grand National Assembly passed a law reducing the number of Ministries to 16. The Chairmen of the State Planning Commission and of the State Control Committee were made members of the Council of Ministers. According to Stefan Voitec, who introduced the bill for the reorganization of the Council of Ministers, the changes involved "reduction of the number of Ministries by merging some of them . . . the establishment of branch departments within the framework of certain Ministries . . . and a marked increase in the authority of the Ministries, from the Ministers down to the heads of the basic units . . ." Taking into consideration the new changes the Constitution provides for the setting up of the following Ministries (the mergers are shown in parentheses): Foreign Affairs; Internal Affairs; Agriculture and Forestry (Agriculture, Forestry, State Farms); Trade (Home Trade, Foreign Trade); Construction and Building Materials (Constructions, Building Materials Industry, Lumber Industry, State Committee of Architecture and Construction); Finance; Armed Forces; Consumer Goods Industry (Light Industry, Food Industry); Heavy Industry (Metallurgical and Machine Building Industry, Electric

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of the law regulating its organization and functioning, see: "Regulament pentru organizarea și functionarea Comisiei Controlului de Stat" in: Ministerul Justiției, *Colecție de legi, decrete, hotărîri și dispoziții 1956 1 martie-30 aprilie* (Bucharest, Editura de Stat, 1956), pp. 106-112.

Power and Electrotechnical Industry) ; Oil and Chemical Industry (Oil Industry; Chemical Industry) ; Education and Culture (Education, Culture) ; Justice; Mines; Health and Social Welfare; Transport and Communications (Railways; Road, Sea and Air Transport; Posts and Telecommunications) and Affairs of Local Organs of State Administration.

Unlike the Constitution of 1948, the new document does not deal with the responsibility of Ministers for unlawful deeds committed during the exercise of their function. A vague notion of such responsibility is implied in Par. (f) of Art. 37, according to which the Presidium, in the interim between the sessions of the Assembly, may dismiss Ministers from the Government on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the Constitution fails to specify the right of Ministers to attend the sittings of the Assembly. In spite of the constitutional provisions specifying its executive and administrative functions and its responsibility before the Assembly, the Council of Ministers is, in practice, an executive state organ effectuating the directives of the Party. This is revealed both by the number and range of compulsory statutes, rules and regulations emanating from it and by the fact that almost all the Ministers occupy high positions in the Party hierarchy.

Chapter V of the Constitution deals with the local organs of state power. These organs in regions, raions, towns and rural localities are the People's Councils (Soviets) elected for a term of two years (Arts. 51 and 52). Their functions are specified in Articles 53-55. The People's Councils direct the local work of the organs of administration subordinate to them; direct the local economic and cultural affairs; maintain public order; ensure the observance of the laws; draw up the local budgets; adopt decisions and issue orders within the limits of the laws in force, and "organize the active participation of the working people in the management of state and public affairs."[32] The executive and administrative organs of the People's Councils are the Executive Committees consisting of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, a Secretary and members. In small localities the executive and administrative organ of the People's Councils consists of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and a Secretary (Art. 59).[33] Members of the Executive Committees are elected by the deputies to the People's Councils (Art. 56) and are responsible for all their activities both to their respective People's Council and to the Executive Committee of the directly superior People's Council (Art. 60). This principle of pyramidal responsibility is applied to all the sections of the Executive Committees set up by the People's Councils for the performance of certain functions and activities determined by law

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[32] In line with the decentralization program outlined by the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party in December 1956, the Grand National Assembly approved during its March 1957 session a law broadening the jurisdiction of the People's Councils.

[33] For the text of the law specifying the composition of the Executive Committees of People's Councils in regions, raions, towns and rural localities see: "Hotărirea Nr. 361 (din 17 martie 1956) privind compunerea comitetelor executive ale sfaturilor populare regionale, raionale, orășenești, și communale." In: Ministerul Justiței, *Colecție de legi, decrete, hotărîri și dispoziții 1956 1 martie-30 aprilie* (Bucharest: Editura de Stat, 1956), pp. 123-125.

(Art. 61). The sections are subordinate to the respective People's Council and Executive Committee as well as to the corresponding section of the Executive Committee of the directly superior People's Council and to the respective Ministries (Art. 62). On the expiration of the mandate of the People's Councils, the Executive Committees retain their power until the election of new executive organs by the newly elected People's Councils (Art. 63).

Soviet constitutional theory emphasizes the distinction between the People's Council and the Executive Committee, depicting the former as an "organ of state power" with directive functions and the latter as a mere executive and administrative organ of the council.

The People's Councils are built on the same hierarchical principle as the Communist Party, constituting a structural power pyramid. At the bottom of the pyramidal structure are the People's Councils of the towns and rural localities, followed by those of the districts and regions. The supposed principle guiding this hierarchy is that of "democratic centralism" which implies a downward flow of directives emanating from the apex of the Party or Government and a reduction in the autonomy of the subordinate People's Councils to matters which are strictly local in scope and nature.

Justice in the People's Republic of Rumania, according to the new Constitution, is administered by the Supreme Court, the Regional Courts, the People's Courts and the Special Courts. Their organization, competence and procedure are established by a separate law (Art. 64).[34] The main function of the courts is the defense of the political regime and the protection of communal property and of the rights of citizens (Art. 65). Unless otherwise provided for by law all judicial cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors (Art. 66).

The Supreme Court, whose chief function is the supervision of the judicial activities of all the courts (Art. 72), is elected by the Grand National Assembly for a term of five years (Par. 1, Art. 67). The judges, theoretically independent and subject only to the law (Art. 70), and the people's assessors are elected in accordance with the provisions of a special law (Par. 2, Art. 67). All judicial proceedings are conducted in the Rumanian language with special provisions for the use of other languages in areas inhabited by compact groups of other nationalities or minorities. Persons not knowing the language in which the judicial proceedings are conducted are constitutionally guaranteed the right to acquaint themselves with the material and the privilege to use their own language in the summation of their case (Art. 68). Unless otherwise provided for by law all judicial proceedings are public (Art. 69) and the sentences are pronounced in the name of the people (Art. 71).

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[34] For the text of Law No. 5/1952 on the "Organization of the Judicature" see: *Buletinul Oficial*, Bucharest, no. 31, June 19, 1952. For amendments see: Legea Nr. 2 (din 6 aprilie 1956) privind modificarea Legii nr. 5/1952 pentru organizarea judecătorească. In: Ministerul Justiţiei *Colecţie de legi, decrete, hotărîri şi dispoziţii 1956 martie-30 aprilie* (Bucharest: Editura de Stat, 1956), pp. 51-62.

The supreme supervisory power over the observance of the law by all central and local governmental organs of state power and administration, as well as by all officials and citizens, is vested in the Procurator General of the Rumanian People's Republic (Art. 73).[35] He is appointed by the Assembly for a term of five years and he, in turn, appoints his deputies and the Procurators of the local units for a term of four years (Art. 74). Whereas the organs of the Procurator's Office are independent from all local governmental organs, being subordinate only to the Procurator General, the latter is responsible to the Assembly and, in the interim between its sessions, to the Presidium (Art. 75). From the organizational point of view the Prosecutor's Office consists of a General Procuratura of the Rumanian People's Republic located in the capital and the local units which are organized on a territorial basis in accordance with the administrative division of the country. The General Procuratura is divided in the following eleven sections: (1) the Directorate of Military Procuraturas; (2) the Directorate of General Supervision; (3) the Judiciary Directorate for the Supervision of the Application of Court Decisions; (4) the Directorate for the Special Supervision of the Activities of Penal Investigation and Inquiry of the Agencies of State Security; (5) the Directorate of Penal Inquiry and of Supervision of the Activities of Penal Investigation of the Agencies of the Militia; (6) the Directorate for the Supervision of the Application of Court Decisions and for the Supervision of Places for Detention and for the Execution of Sentences and Medical and Pedagogical Measures; (7) the Directorate of Cadres and Education; (8) the Directorate of Accountancy; (9) the Bureau of Studies and Statistics; (10) the Sector of Internal Management and (11) the Secretariat (Art. 16 of Law No. 6/1952).

In the Western Democracies the superiority of constitutional law over simple law is a traditionally well-established fact. In line with the principle of separation of powers the supervision over the constitutionality of laws is entrusted to the judiciary. Soviet theory of constitutional law, on the other hand, rejects the idea of placing any power above that of the Assembly on the assumption that the latter represents the will of the people. For this reason the Rumanian Supreme Court, unlike the Supreme Court of the United States for instance, has no power of interpreting the constitutionality of laws and it is more of an auxiliary than an independent branch of government. While the Presidium is entrusted with giving interpretations of the laws in force (Par. c., Art. 37), the Assembly exercises "general control over the application of the Constitution" (Par. j., Art. 24). Similarly, the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies make no difference between the power competent to modify the Constitution and the powers established by the Constitution. This fact accounts for the non-rigidity of the constitutions in the Soviet sphere. An amendment to the Constitution is adopted in the same manner as an ordinary law with the exception that the percentage of the votes required for passing it is increased. Rumania requires a two-thirds majority (Art. 105).

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[35] For the text of Law No. 6/1952 "For the Setting Up and Organization of the Procurator General's Office in the Rumanian People's Republic" see: *Buletinul Oficial*, Bucharest, no. 31, June 19, 1952.

The constitutional provisions conceal the true nature of the Marxist-Leninist concept of justice which has been adopted in Rumania and the other countries in the Soviet orbit. The modern principles of penal law—*nullum crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege*—applied and observed in all civilized countries, have been replaced with the concept of "class justice." Marxist doctrinaires assert that the aim of "proletarian class justice" is the preservation of the régime of the dictatorship of the working class[36] and the complete elimination of "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" elements.[37] If this principle of "class justice" failed to receive juridical embodiment in the two Rumanian Constitutions framed under the régime of People's Democracy, it nevertheless found a clear expression in Decree No. 132 passed by the Assembly on April 2, 1949. Article 1 of the Decree states emphatically that the function of the judiciary is the defense of the socio-economic structure of the state and of the rights and interests of state institutions and civic organizations. Furthermore, it emphasizes that the aim of the judiciary is the "strengthening and furthering of popular democracy" in the country (Art. 2).

The people's assessors perform in practice a much greater function in judicial proceedings than the ones specified by the Constitution. The Minister of Justice is authorized to detail them from one court to another whenever circumstances require it.

Thus there are actually special teams of people's assessors which the Ministry of Justice can use whenever the political interests of the Party demand it. For a while the required impartiality of judges was further impaired by the restrictions imposed by the electoral laws on the right to participate in the election of people's assessors. This privilege was until lately restricted to "democratic" elements only. Similarly, the right to nominate candidates is vested solely in the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations (Art. 64 of Decree No. 132/1949).

In discussing the new role of justice and law, Vasilescu Alba, a prominent Communist jurist, asserted that "all legal rules, being the expression of the will of the working class, must be understood and interpreted in the light of the class struggle."[38] Justice is thus an "executive organ of the will of the working class." Positive law, when in disagreement with this principle, must give room to the "juridical conscience of the proletariat.[39]

The fundamental rights and duties of the citizens of the Rumanian People's Republic are enumerated and elaborated in Chapter VII of the Constitution.

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[36] In Communist parlance the term "working class" and "proletariat" is usually identified with the Communist Party.

[37] One cannot sufficiently stress the different meanings attributed to certain words by the Communists. Thus, anyone opposed to the régime is labelled "reactionary," "anti-democratic," etc. Those favoring the régime are referred to as "progressive," "democratic," etc.

[38] "Statul poliţienesc," *Cronica Românească*, New York, Oct. 1, 1950, p. 25.

Almost all post-war constitutions contain detailed juridical provisions for the assurance of fundamental social and individual rights. The emphasis placed on individual rights as opposed to social rights (or vice versa) varied with the given historico-political conditions. The stipulation of individual rights exclusively in the famous declarations of the rights of man, notably, the Virginia Bill of Rights, the American Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, enacted as an aftermath of the British, American and French Revolutions, had given room after the end of World War I to the inclusion of a series of social rights. This was necessitated, on the one hand, by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and, on the other, by the economic and political consequences of the war. The inclusion and coexistence, on an equal footing, of individual and social rights, in the post World War I constitutions[40] was superseded after the Second World War in most European constitutions, and particularly in those of the People's Democracies, by a shift in emphasis from individual to social rights, for the upholding of which the state has assumed wide obligations.

In one of his last works on constitutional law the late Professor Boris Mirkine Goutzévitch classified the post World War II declarations of rights into three categories:[41]

1. Declarations that recognize, beside the classical freedom of the individual, certain social rights, having the same importance and value as individual rights;
2. The declarations of the People's Democracies which establish the "functional" primacy of the social rights over individual rights;
3. The declarations of the Soviet Republics which establish the "political" primacy of the social rights over individual rights.

Illustrations for the first category are the declarations of rights included in the French Constitution of 1946 (Preamble), the Italian Constitution of 1948 (Fundamental Principles) and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany of May 8, 1949. While some distinction could have been made in the past between the second and third categories, the primacy of social rights in the People's Democracies today is not only "functional" but, like in the Soviet Union, also political. This can be illustrated, for instance, by the provision relating to freedom of the press, speech and assembly. Article 85 of the Rumanian Constitution states:

> In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the system of people's democracy, the citizens of the Rumanian People's Republic are guaranteed by law:
>
> (a) freedom of speech;
> (b) freedom of the press;
> (c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
> (d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

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[39] *Ibid.*

[40] See, for instance, the Weimar Constitution and the Yugoslav Constitution of June 28, 1921.

[41] Boris Mirkine Goutzévitch, *Les constitutions européennes* (Paris, 1951), 2 vols.

> These rights are insured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

Article 125 of the Stalin Constitution differs little, if at all, in substance or phraseology:

> In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law:
>
> (a) freedom of speech;
> (b) freedom of the press;
> (c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
> (d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations.
>
> These civil rights are insured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communication facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

Freedom of the press, of speech, and the like, is consequently conceived no longer as a right of the citizen but as a purveyance of the state. The right and freedom of the citizen to write, to publish or otherwise express his views—as conceived in the classical theory—has now been reduced to the right to express views that are in line with the propaganda or tactical needs of the Party.

Similarly, Article 86 of the Constitution assures the right of the working people to unite in public organizations, cooperative societies, youth and women's organizations. The juridical formula for safeguarding the monolithic character of the regime has been found in the contention that associations of a "fascist" or "anti-democratic" character, or participation in them, are prohibited and punishable by law. Emulating the provisions of Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution, the Article continues:

> The most active and conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and of the other sections of working people unite in the Rumanian Workers' Party, the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the people's democratic system and to build the socialist society.
>
> The Rumanian Workers' Party is the leading force of the organizations of the working people as well as of the state organs and institutions. All organizations of the working people in the Rumanian People's Republic rally round it.

The central strategic position of the Communist Party has, as in the USSR and Albania, received juridical sanctification. In fact, notwithstanding the legal discrepancies existing between the constitutions of the several People's Democracies, the main difference between them and the Stalin Constitution lay, until 1950 at least, in the legal position of the Party. Whereas Articles 126 and 141 of the USSR Constitution openly refer to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as being the vanguard in "the struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system," the satellite constitutions, with the exception of that of Albania, made no mention of its role. It even failed to receive juridical recognition in the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic of July 22, 1952. The August 20, 1949 Constitution of the People's Republic of Hungary, which for a long time was considered as the most advanced one, faintly refers to it in Article 56. Dealing with the right of organization this article asserts that the state "in fulfilling its tasks . . . bases itself . . . on the working class, led by its *advanced guard** and supported by the democratic unity of the whole people." The open and uncontested rule of the monolithic Communist Party has thus reduced and transformed the meaning of the classical ideas of civil and individual rights, and replaced them with the Marxist-Leninist principles of "class justice." Manifestations of freedom must be confined within the framework of the régime and conform to the given Party line. Any demonstration of freedom directed against the "democratic order" is punished by the severest application of the "people's law."

Within this framework of "class justice," the new Constitution provides for the assurance of certain social and individual rights. First place in the hierarchy of rights is given to the right to work. This is "guaranteed" by the socialist transformation of the economy and "the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment" (Art. 77). The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of working hours to eight in factories and offices, less in the more arduous trades. This is supplemented by the establishment of rest homes, sanatoria, and cultural establishments (Art. 78).[42] The right to maintenance in old age and in case of sickness or disability is ensured by the development of social insurance and free medical service (Art. 79). The right to education is ensured by the universal, compulsory and free elementary education and by the system of state scholarships awarded to deserving students (Art. 80). The equality of rights in all spheres of economic, political and cultural activities is guaranteed to all citizens irrespective of their nationality, sex or race. Any transgression of these provisions by the manifestations of race-hatred, chauvinism or restriction is punishable by law (Art. 81). The national minorities are guaranteed the free use of their language in all cultural and educational establishments. In administrative divisions inhabited by compact groups of minorities, the state organs and institutions are obliged to use both the official Rumanian language and the language of the respective minority (Art. 82).[43]

In addition to these constitutional provisions, the legal protection of the rights of minorities and nationalities in Rumania is asserted by the Statute for Nationalities (Law No. 86) of February 7, 1945[44] and by Law No. 630 of August 6, 1945.[45] Article 1 of this latter law states that

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[42] While it is true that some improvements were made lately in the wage system and in the old-age insurance set-up, the constitutional provisions relating to the reduction of working hours seem puzzling in light of the introduction of the piece-work system and of production norms (Labor Code of May 20, 1950, as amended) and the adoption of the Soviet model of "stachanovism," competitions and "voluntary labor."

> any person undertaking an investigation into the ethnical origin of a Rumanian citizen in order to establish his legal position in the course of judicial, administrative, police or other proceedings, shall be deemed to have committed the offence of racial discrimination and shall be punished by the penalty of imprisonment for a period of three months to one year.

Some distinction was made at the beginning with regard to the German ethnic group, which had actively collaborated with Nazi Germany. The original decision to expel the Germans from the country, however, was officially changed in December 1948, when the Rumanian Communist Party—apparently on orders received from Moscow—decided to replace the denunciation of the German minority as a whole and to encourage instead the class struggle within its ranks. The resolution of the Party maintained that "the struggle against their own bourgeoisie . . . (would) open a new perspective to the German working population of Rumania, working alongside the Rumanian people and other nationalities."[46]

Whereas at the beginning Zionism enjoyed a tremendous popularity and even received latent, if not active, support from the Communist-dominated government during the Jewish-British-Arab disturbances in Palestine, the December 1948 Communist resolution on the national question declared:

> Zionism of any color is a political nationalist and reactionary movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie which tries to isolate the Jewish working people from the other peoples and to hinder them in their struggle against capitalism in the ranks of the anti-imperialist camp.

Notwithstanding the legal and constitutional provisions relating to the defense of the rights of nationalities and minorities, the official policies of the Party in regard to these questions are based on the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.[47] The conception of national culture, Stalin warned, should not be understood in the "bourgeois" sense. "National culture" from the Marxist point of view is a culture *national* only *in form* and *socialist in content* aiming at the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[48] In fact, this principle received juridical crystallization in Par. j. of Article 17 of the Rumanian Constitution according to which the state

> ensures the development of the culture of the Rumanian people and of the culture of the national minorities *socialist in content, national in form.**

Women are given equal rights with men in all spheres of cultural, economic or political activities. The institutions of marriage and the family are protected by the state which grants aid to mothers of large families and

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[43] H. Hartl, "Die Nationalitätenpolitik des Kreml in Rumänien," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik,* Heidelberg, Vol. 24, July-Aug. 1953, pp. 381-386.

[44] For text see: *Yearbook on Human Rights for 1946,* United Nations, 1947, pp. 248-49.

[45] *Ibid.,* pp. 249-51.

[46] *La Roumanie Nouvelle,* Bucharest, no. 14, December 30, 1948.

[47] Joseph Stalin. *Marxism and the National Question* (New York, 1942), p. 222.

[48] *Ibid.,* p. 207.

*Italics by the writer.

to unmarried mothers (Art. 83).[49] Freedom of conscience and religious worship is guaranteed. The school is separated from the church and except for the training of personnel by religious denominations no congregation may open or maintain institutions of general education (Art. 84).[50] The inviolability of the home, the privacy of correspondence (Art. 88) and of the citizen is guaranteed. No person may be placed under arrest without the decision of a court or "of the procurator" (Art. 87).

The constitutional provisions regarding the inviolability of the person are rendered meaningless by virtue of two legal stipulations. They are the exclusive privilege of the Communist Party or its affiliated organizations to nominate candidates in the election of judges, and the extra-judicial power of the Procurator-General to order arrests. Since there can be no writ of *habeas corpus* against the Procurator General—always a loyal servant of the Party—it evidently follows that the arrest of any individual is left to the Procurator's discretion.

Hand in hand with the rights enumerated above, the Constitution specifies the following duties of the citizens of Rumania. It is the duty of every citizen to: abide by the Constitution and the laws in force; safeguard and develop public socialist property; maintain labor discipline; actively contribute to the strengthening of the power of People's Democracy; further the economic and cultural advancement of the country (Art. 90); serve in the Armed Services (Art. 91) and defend the fatherland (Art. 92).

The only international provision inserted in the Rumanian Constitution, as in those of the other People's Democracies, is the provision of a "right of asylum" accorded "to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people" (Art. 89).[51] The inclusion of the right of asylum is not, of course, a monopoly of Soviet constitutional law. Similar provisions have been made by the new Western Constitutions. The Preamble of the French Constitution of 1946 and Article 10 of the Italian Constitution also provide for the right of asylum to "anyone persecuted because of his activities in the cause of freedom."

It is interesting to note in the light of the present Soviet-directed "peace movements," that the constitutions of the People's Democracies, like that of the Soviet Union, fail to provide for the safeguarding of peace and the promotion of cooperation among the peoples of the world. While provisions of this kind have received juridical status in the new constitutions of the democracies of Western Europe along with clauses guaranteeing the upholding of international treaties, they are conspicuous by their absence in the constitutions of the People's Democracies. The French Constitution of 1946, drawing upon a long tradition of democratic life, states that the

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[49] "Codul Familiei (Legea nr. 4/1953)" in: Ministerul Justiţei, *Colecţie de legi, decrete, hotărîri şi dispoziţii 1956 1 martie-30 aprilie* (Bucharest; Editura de Stat, 1956), pp. 63-91.

[50] The intensification of the drive against the churches is manifested by the fact that the new Constitution fails to give recognition to the Rumanian-Orthodox Church as being "autocephalous and unitary in its organization"—a provision which had been incorporated in Par. 4 of Art. 27 of the 1948 Constitution. See also: Raoul Bossy, "Religious Persecutions in Captive Rumania," *Journal of Central European Affairs* XV (July 1955), pp. 161-181.

[51] The specific clauses of the satellite and Soviet constitutions empowering their respective Presidiums to declare war and partial or general mobilization in case of aggression against their own states or against another state toward which they have assumed obligations of mutual defense under international treaties are more or less academic since most, if not all, of these "international treaties" have been concluded among the states within the Soviet orbit. See: "Soviet Alliance System. 1942-1948" and "Soviet Alliance System. 1948-1949." In: *Documents and State Papers* (Washington; Department of State, July 1948 and March and April 1949).

> French Republic, faithful to its traditions, abides by the rules of international law. It will not undertake wars of conquest and will never use its arms against the freedom of any people.

Furthermore, Article 26 of the French Constitution states:

> Diplomatic treaties duly ratified and published shall have the force of law even when they are contrary to internal French legislation.

Similar provisions have been inserted in the Italian Constitution (Art. 10) and in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Art. 25). This international tendency of modern constitutional law is not of novel origin. The Constitution of the United States already included such a provision (Section 2 of Art. VI) and it was afterwards also incorporated in the French Constitution of 1791. The reappearance of this international tendency in contemporary constitutional positive law seems to manifest the indivisibility of the principles of international order, peace, democracy and freedom. The governments of the People's Democracies, following the lead of the USSR, enacted instead a series of laws providing for the severe punishment of the crime of "war-mongering." In Rumania such a law was adopted on December 15, 1950.[52] Its value is primarily political and propagandistic in nature for the term "war-mongerer" is usually attributed only to those opposing or resisting the regime of People's Democracy.

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Whatever the merits or shortcomings of this Constitution, it should be borne in mind that the state of People's Democracy, like the Soviet state, is not a juridical state in the true sense of the word. Its government is not based upon a compromise of rules of law to which all citizens, irrespective of their ideological conceptions or political affiliations, are equally submitted. In Marxist terminology the Soviet state, like the state of People's Democracy, is a "class state," a state of class dictatorship. Since, in such a state, the people as a whole are identified with the "working class" which, in turn, is in practice identified with the Party, if not with its leading hierarchy, the constitution of a People's Republic must be considered primarily from its political and propaganda aspect, rather than from a strictly formalistic or legalistic point of view.

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[52] For the text of the law see: *Cronica Românească,* New York, Jan. 1951, pp. 71-72.

THE BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA NATIONAL ARCHIVE IN SARAJEVO

by Peter F. Sugar

DURING the winter of 1956-57 I had the opportunity to do some research in the National Archive of Bosnia-Hercegovina in Sarajevo, Jugoslavia (Državni Archiv Narodne Republike Bosne i Hercegovine u Sarajevu). This archive is not well known in the United States, certainly less well known than such other Jugoslav archives as those in Belgrade, Zagreb or Dubrovnik. It is known in America that since the Second World War those files of the Austro-Hungarian Common Ministry of Finance which deal with the Dual Monarchy's administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina are to be found in Sarajevo. These files, together with those of the local central government (*Landesregierung für Bosnien und die Hercegovina*), those of the regional governmental offices (*Kreisbehörden, Bezirksbehörden, Exposituren*), and those of various other offices, such as the courts, the custom houses, tax offices, and many others, add up to some 350,000 documents for each of the forty years of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Among these documents are not only those which the day by day administrative and legal routine produced, but also the confidential papers which were kept separately in Vienna and Sarajevo under the title of *Präsidial-Protokol,* and the even more secret private correspondence between various officials serving in Bosnia-Hercegovina and their superiors in Vienna. Complete and interesting as these documents are, they would not warrant special notice if they contained merely information concerning administrative and legal matters and practices. They contain much more, and most of this additional information would certainly be of great value to many of our historians. I will, in the following few lines, mention a few subjects on which the material in the Sarajevo archive sheds new or additional light.

Much can be learned from these documents about Austria-Hungary's relations with Serbia, Montenegro, Albania—which is treated as an autonomous if not independent country—and to a lesser extent with Turkey. As far as the first three countries are concerned many Austro-Hungarian decisions and much of the subsequent action were influenced by the reports and advice reaching Vienna from Sarajevo. For several years Sarajevo maintained relations with Cetinje independently from Vienna! The *Landesregierung* was well qualified to act as the adviser to the Common Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Not only did it rule a Slav population, not only did it keep a close watch on the borders of the mentioned countries and on the events beyond these borders, but it also received all other information gathered by Austro-Hungarian observers all over the world. The reports from Zimony (Semlin or Zemun), Austria's main listening post on the left bank of the Danube facing Belgrade, were also sent to Sarajevo. Diplomatic historians

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In transcribing Arab words I followed the method used in Hans Wehr, *Arabisches Wörterbuch für dis Schriftsprache der Gegenwart,* (Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig, 1952) interested in Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy could find much valuable material in these documents and reports. Closely connected with this policy are three other issues on which the Sarajevo archive has much material. The first of these, to connect two separate problems because they are treated as one in the documents, is Russia's Balkan policy and Panslavism. Reports from Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, Cetinje, Vidin, Plevje, Salonika, Kiev, Odessa, and St. Petersburg together with those from Croatia, Dalmatia and Southern Hungary were placed in the presidential files of the Common Ministry of Finance's Bosnian Bureau if they dealt with these two subjects, and they are now in Sarajevo. In the same files can be found the documents dealing with the Serbian national movements and secret societies, and, in later years, with the Jugoslav movement. The third subject to which I referred concerns the awakening and development of Bosnia-Hercegovinian ethnic and political consciousness, the activity which stemmed from this new awareness, and the steps taken by the authorities to suppress this feeling and activitiy. It is not necessary to point to the importance of these issues.

Military historians will find as much material in Sarajevo as their colleagues working in he diplomatic field. Besides the varied information dealing with military units in Bosnia-Hercegovina, disciplinary problems, and troop developments, they will find the reports of all commanders from the commanding general down to the officers in charge of isolated military or gendarmery posts. They will also be able to study mobilization plans, march routes, and the plans for the utilization of the local manpower.

In another field, cultural history, the documents in Sarajevo have even more to offer. The Austro-Hungarian educational and school methods are not only fully described, but the reasons and discussions which led to these "colonial" scholastic practices can also be fully studied in this document collection. Then, there is ample material available for the investigation of Austria-Hungary's attempt to gradually introduce municipal self-government in cities which often were only slightly bigger than average villages, and for the examination of the phenomenon that the success of this attempt made it necessary for the Dual Monarchy to discourage the development which she had originally fostered. Yet, by far the most interesting cultural subject deals with the internal self-rule of the various religious groups and with their bitter rivalry in which ethnic, linguistic, religious, national, and political considerations played a much larger part than did the purely religious issues. This is a very rewarding subject which in its implications transcends both the forty years in question and the geographical region in which this rivalry occurred. To mention one more cultural subject, I will point to Austria-Hungary's treatment of newspapers, literary and political publications as well as book-sellers. The study of this policy could easily furnish some possible explanation for repressive practices elsewhere and in other periods.

There are other Austro-Hungarian methods, not limited to Bosnia-Hercegovina, which can be studied better—for reasons of archival policy—in Sarajevo than anywhere else. Among these subjects are the fiscal and monetary jugglings of the government, its colonisation attempts, as well as sanitary or purely administrative procedures. The practice which should be of the greatest interest concerns the organization and the activities of the secret police. From the little I saw of these documents I gained the impression that the Gestapo and its red equivalents could easily have learned some additional tricks from their Austro-Hungarian predecessor, who achieved better results without cruelty or concentration camps than these organizations did or do.

For the economic historian the National Archive of Bosnia-Hercegovina should be even more rewarding than for historians laboring in other fields. The study of agriculture alone offers enough material for several highly interesting studies. Besides the problems of production and land reform, which were always tampered with but never solved, Bosnia-Hercegovina had to face difficulties arising out of such outdated institutions as the tithe or corvée which the Dual Monarchy did not abolish. Mines, deforestation, public works, taxation, emigration to Turkey and the United States, commerce, and industrialization—on which I worked—are only a few among the many large issues that can be studied to great advantage in Sarajevo.

The enumerated topics do not exhaust the subjects on which ample information is available in the old Austro-Hungarian files. The importance of these topics among the causes of the downfall of the Dual Monarchy is obvious, and they could, if properly exploited, add greatly to our knowledge of the last four decades before the First World War. Yet, what made me value this collection of documents more than anything else was the fact that in a sense they are "contemporary," dealing with matters and problems which Eastern Europe and some other parts of our world are facing today. These Austrian documents suggest numerous comparisons and parallels with issues in our own days. I would not be surprised if a competent investigator were to find answers to some of these present day problems in the documents in the archive in Sarajevo.

The files of the Austro-Hungarian Common Ministry of Finance are not the only archival treasure of Sarajevo. If somebody would like to begin his study earlier than 1878 he will find the files of the Austrian Consulate in Sarajevo in the same archive. This archive is only one of four to be found in Sarajevo. But before I leave the National Archive in order to say a few words about the others, I would like to mention that this archive is well organized, very competently managed, and that its reading facilities are very good. Modern microfilming equipment is also available and turns out professional work.

Among the other archives that of the Oriental Institute deserves to be mentioned first. It contains the nearly complete collection of the Ottoman documents referring to the Vilayet of Bosnia from the orders received from Constantinople down to the *sigil*-s of the *Quadi*-s in the smallest communities. Besides administrative, legal and military documents numerous papers dealing with different aspects of the economy and cultural materials are also included in this collection. This almost unique archive is also well organized and managed, and it offers good working facilities. The material of the Oriental Institute can be supplemented by the documents kept in the National Museum's Library. Those interested in Muslim Theology, culture, or in the affairs of the Bosnia-Hercegovinian Muslims under Ottoman rule will find highly rewarding materials in the Gāzi Husref Bey archive which can be supplemented with the documents kept in the various *Madrasa*-s and even more by those kept in the offices of the *Ra'is el-Ulema* (Vrhovno Islamsko Starješinstvo u F.N.R.J.) including the files of the *Waqf* Commission and those of the Supreme *Šari'a* Court. Finally, the fourth archive, the one of the City of Sarajevo, contains, besides papers relating to the city's history, a rare collection of maps, underground newspapers and numerous illegal pamphlets which are of great importance for the history of the opposition to Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Hercegovina and also for the history of the Jugoslav movement. As the Austro-Hungarian police was very effective in finding and destroying these publications, the collection of the Sarajevo City Archive must be valued very highly.

In conclusion I would like to point out that the archivists and historians in Sarajevo welcome foreign scholars and facilitate their work as much as they can. This, together with the fact that living in Sarajevo is not expensive for an American, and that the cultural life of the city is surprisingly active, should help to make the exploitation of the rich materials in Sarajevo even more desirable to our historians than the available material in itself would already warrant.

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SERBIA IN 1897: A REPORT OF SIR CHARLES ELIOT

by Barbara Jelavich

THE following description of conditions in Serbia in the reign of Alexander Obrenović was written during Sir Charles Eliot's tour through the Balkans in the autumn of 1897, when he held the post of Secretary in the British Embassy in Constantinople.[1] Later he incorporated large sections of the first half into his lively book on the Ottoman Empire, *Turkey in Europe* (London, 1908). It will be noted, however, that he omitted the more critical portions and those with direct political implications. The report, read in its entirety, is of interest not only because it presents the views of an informed British diplomat, but also because the reactions of the author toward the general level of Balkan political morality are almost typical of those of the British observer in the second half of the nineteenth century. The account is, in addition, one of the few general discussions of a Balkan country to be found in the British diplomatic records.

Notes on a Journey to Ujitse and along the Serbo-Bosnian Frontier. (Confidential)

The first part of this journey, via Obrenovatz and Valievo, passes through the low rich lands which border on the Save, and form one of the most fertile portions of Servia. The population, as everywhere else in the rural districts, consists exclusively of peasants. A few of them, however, are considerable landed proprietors, and possess incomes amounting to over 1,000 £. As a rule, they make no attempt to imitate European ways or leave their simple agricultural life. The only outward sign of wealth which they exhibit is to keep a brougham to go to town on market days. There are few servants, and those few mostly poor relations. The household work and waiting at table is done by the women of the family. The origin of this peasant democracy can easily be explained by the peculiar circumstances attending the Turkish occupation of the country, which established an aristocracy of Ottomans and a subordinate class of Christians, among whom all social distinctions were obliterated.

The Boyards and Phanariotes supplied the Roumanians and Greeks with an aristocracy, and even in Bulgaria the Chorbajis represented an upper class intermediate between the peasants and the Turks. But, after the loss of their national independence, nearly all the most distinguished and valiant Serbs retreated to the mountainous districts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or else became Moslems, with the result that the present Kingdom of Servia contains the descendants of the least vigorous and enterprising portion of the nation.

The social equality resulting from this state of things has of course its good side. Poverty is almost unknown, and nearly everyone is comfortably off. But the entire absence of large properties or large fortunes makes it very difficult to execute any works requiring capital or enterprise. Communications are defective, mines cannot be worked, and no industry seems to flourish except the export of raw products. The Servian produces pigs, but he cannot export ham.

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[1] Inclosure in Eliot to Salisbury, FO 105/118, No. 70 confidential, Belgrade, September 17, 1897.

One characteristic of this part of Servia which strikes a traveller coming from Turkey—or even from Bulgaria—is the extent of cultivation. There is no waste land; every inch is private property and used for the cultivation of corn and maize, for orchards, gardens, pasturage. But equally striking are the simplicity of the methods of cultivation and the amount of weeds, not humble tares, but enormous thistles and creeping plants, which seem to strangle the crops, run riot over the gardens, and invade the high roads. No attempt seems to be made to check them. In this, as in everything else, the Servian has no eye for neatness or finish. Clean linen is unknown, or at least unapparent, and a dirty table-cloth might be appropriately chosen as the national flag. Another obvious characteristic of Servian country life is the café or wine-shop which forms the centre of every village. At all hours of the day and night one may see people sitting in front of this edifice and conversing. This habit is indicative, not so much of intemperance as of the national vice of talking. As soon as the Servian peasant has performed the simple operations necessary to ensure the existence but not the perfection of his maize, his plums and his pigs, he sits down and engages in endless and resultless discussion about small local politics, the wicked ways of Austria, and fine commercial schemes which never come to anything. For instance, for many years there has been much discussion respecting the construction of a depot for pigs at Belgrade, so that they might be sold in Servia without obliging the owner to take his animals to Austria and bring back those he cannot sell, as is now the case. The utility of this project was undoubted and its execution easy. Yet after many years' talk only the foundations of the Servian depot have been laid, while the Austrians, grasping the importance of the question, have constructed a depot at Semlin.

The fact is, that in Servia nothing succeeds, because nothing is prosecuted with energy and thoroughness. King Milan, who abdicated because he was worried and tired of being a King, is the type of his nation.

A remarkable instance of the gradual and mysterious collapse which seems to end every enterprise is afforded by the Extraordinary Session of the Skupstina which met this year. Its results, as officially announced, seemed satisfactory and businesslike. The army had been improved and rearmed, the necessary expenditure being covered by additional taxation, while the general finances of the country had been set in order by an advantageous loan contracted in London. It subsequently, however, became clear that this account was altogether illusory. The loan is a failure, and the measures adopted are inadequate to pay for the contemplated armaments, part of which will have to be abandoned unless obtained as a present from France or Russia. Such misrepresentations show great disingenuousness on the part of the Ministry, and under the present Constitution it is almost impossible to obtain a Chamber endowed with any power of discrimination or criticism. Three-fourths of the Deputies must be peasants. These, understanding no question of policy more abstruse than such matters of taxation or local administration as affect their daily life, are ready to vote on more general and important interests exactly as their party orders. The remaining fourth, who are not peasants, are nominated by the King, and naturally are equally uncritical for other reasons. Unfortunately this ignorance, superficiality, and want of staying power are accompanied by a readiness to embark lightly on dangerous enterprises. The strong warnings addressed to the Servian Government in the spring by Austria and Russia have kept the country quiet during the year, but the large sums of money which are being disbursed in Macedonia on Servian "propaganda" (a ridiculous waste, if one considers the financial embarrassments of the country) show that the Government are ready to be imprudent in any way which is allowed them.

To a certain extent the Servian cause in Macedonia has been successful, but this success is to be attributed, I think, less to any innate strength than to the policy of Russia and Turkey. The former pushes Servian interests in order to prevent the future of the peninsula falling into the hands of the Bulgarian element, and the latter is always glad to favor any movement which promotes disunion among the subject Christian races.

From Valievo I proceeded to Ujitse, and thence to the Valley of the Drina, which forms the frontier between Servia and Bosnia. The country here is mountainous and of singular beauty, but sparsely inhabited and little cultivated. The population resemble the Montenegrins in their dress and habit, and look more martial and less comfortably prosperous than the dwellers in the plains. There are hardly any roads, and I often found the peasants quite ignorant of the country 10 or 15 miles distant. Towns and large settlements are rare, but the inhabitants meet at fixed periods at some central point where a temporary village of booths is constructed, and a fair held for the sale of cattle and other products. I saw one of these meetings, which offered a curious spectacle of national costumes and customs, and heard some of the old national epics describing the battle of Kossovo and other episodes of Servian history. These rhapsodies, some of which were published in an excellent translation by the late Lord Lytton, are sung in a monotonous chant to the accompaniment of a single-stringed guitar, but with such genuine feeling and expression that the whole effect is not unpleasing.

In this district, particularly near the Bosnian frontier, still exists the old Servian system of communal villages, based on the family called Zadruga. In the most ancient form every village consists not merely of one family but of one house, a vast shapeless building, to which a new room is built on whenever a male of the family is married. In most cases, however, the plan of a common house has been abandoned, and the Zadruga consists of a number of huts close together, each occupied by a married couple.

In all cases the whole property of the village is common, and the entire community is ruled by the oldest member, whose authority is despotic, and without whose permission no member of the Zagruda can leave it or marry. As a rule this patriarch is the eldest of several brothers, and on his death his authority passes to the one next in age, but, should his widow survive him, she is treated with great respect, and no important step taken without consulting her.

A large Zadruga often consists of a family of sixty or seventy persons. Marriages are a constant source of dispute in the Zadrugas, for, as women are regarded as workers, each family is anxious to marry its sons (as a woman passes into her husband's Zadruga), but to retain all its daughters as long as possible. The result of this system is that elopement is the ordinary preliminary to wedlock.

Even in large villages and small towns the remains of the Zadruga system may be observed, each quarter being usually inhabited by a particular family, from which it takes its name. But except in this district, the communal system once apparently universal in Servia, exists no longer. In other parts land is private property, but every owner is obliged to contribute to a common store a certain amount of grain and other produce in kind. These provisions can be taken by the State for military purposes, or may be used for the common needs of the villages should they suffer from any disaster, as for instance the inundations of this summer. The State guarantees to every tax-payer 2½ hectares of land, which cannot be seized for debt. This regulation is said to have in some ways an unfortunate effect, as the peasant is unable to borrow money in order to improve his estate. He cannot mortgage his land, and has usually nothing else on which to raise a loan.

During part of our journey we were the guests of the Archimandrite of Racha, a large monastery near the Drina. But though the buildings were extensive, there was only one other monk, who acted as chaplain, whereas the Archimandrite occupied himself with the estates of the convent, and lived like a country gentleman. In the church was preserved a sword, with which one of his predecessors had slain many Turks. The old ecclesiastical frescoes in this part of Servia are remarkably Italian and not Byzantine in character. Patriotic Servian historians (and patriotic science is one of the most notable products of the Servian intelligence) have even conjectured that the renaissance style of art originated in Servia, and spread to Italy. However this may be, it is clear that Roman influence dominated Servian art in the 14th and 15th centuries.

The estate of Racha was considerable in extent and apparently well managed, but the monastery was generally unpopular, and involved in perpetual quarrels with the peasants because the Archimandrite refused to allow them to cut wood in certain forests where they claimed that custom allowed them the right. The Church seems less influential in Servia than in the other Balkan States. The married priests are simple peasants, and the monasteries, from the inmates of which the higher clergy must be chosen, rarely contain more than two or three monks, who are practically the servants of the Abbot. The churches are little frequented, and recently the influence of the clergy was further diminished by a law forbidding their election as Deputies, on the ground that they are servants of the Crown and eligible for a pension. But, if the Church and the priest are neglected in rural Servia, the school and the schoolmaster receive a great deal of attention. The former is generally the most conspicuous building in the village, and the latter an important member of society. The education imparted is on the whole good and useful, particularly as German is taught in relatively low classes, but the amount of time expended on national history and geography seems excessive. The latter is for patriotic purposes somewhat loose in its frontiers, and the young Servian learns to regard Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Servia, and large districts of Hungary as parts of a greater fatherland.

It would have been impossible for a foreigner to travel alone in these districts, and I was only able to make the journey owing to the courtesy of two Servian gentlemen, Colonel Rashitch, Marshal of the Court, and M. Pavlovitch, Administrator of the Royal Domains. They were endeavouring to find a suitable summer residence for the King, as it is thought His Majesty would do better to make acquaintance with the interior of his own country than to annually visit foreign watering-places, and, besides, the Queen is most anxious to remove every excuse for his going abroad and meeting King Milan. I had several conversations on general political subjects with my companions. As they were court officials and not politicians, their views have perhaps some interest as representing, if not the ideas of the King, at least sentiments to which he has no objection.

They seemed to have no doubt as to the entire identity of Montenegrin interests and policy with those of Servia. Both countries, they said, were working together for the advancement of the Servian race in Macedonia, and recognized that they were one people. They naturally did not touch on the possible union of the two countries under one dynasty, but, from all I hear, I am inclined to believe that if anything happened to King Alexander the Prince of Montenegro would be welcomed as a Ruler by the mass of the population. It was clear that my friends did not consider there was any understanding between Servia and Bulgaria to be compared to that existing with Montenegro. Their jealousy of that Principality was amusing. They would not allow that it had any good or strong points, or that there were any Bulgarians in Macedonia. They insisted that the Slavonic inhabitants of that country were all Serbs, and that Servia must ultimately obtain a seaport on the Aegean, since Austria-Hungary blocked the way to the Adriatic. While deploring the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an act of great injustice, they deprecated any attempt to spread Servian national ideas in those provinces or in Slavonia, consoling themselves with a distant vision of the dissolution of the Austrian Empire, from which would emerge a greater Servia. They appeared not to contemplate the possibility that they might some day be absorbed by Austria.

I need hardly observe that the whole course of Servian history since the race first appeared in South-Western Europe has been characterized by an incapacity to combine in any political unit and a tendency to break up into small groups, so much so, that few people realize how large is the area occupied by people of Servian race and language, but bearing other names. The example of Poland is not encouraging, and shows that a Slavonic race may entirely lose its national existence.

My companions were unreserved in their execration of the Austrian Empire. They complained that Austria-Hungary not only occupied a large extent of Servian lands, and prevented the natural expansion of the kingdom, but even endeavored with persistent and deliberate malignity to check all commercial and industrial progress. As soon as any productive enterprise was started in Servia, the Hungarians, aided by their

Government, set about to destroy it, or buy it up and get the profit into their own hands. As another instance of Austrian spitefulness, they instanced the difficulties thrown in the way of trade between Servia and Bosnia, which had ended by annihilating the commerce between the two countries, although when both were Turkish provinces it attained considerable proportions.

I may remark parenthetically that I have observed during a summer spent in the Balkan Peninsula that, though Austria is undoubtedly hated, Russia has lost much sympathy. This is perhaps a matter of little importance, as the power of Russia and various considerations of local interest will always secure her as many Russophiles as she wants. But I think that her attitude in the conflicts of the Armenians and Greeks with the Turks has produced a deep impression among these nations, who still look upon Turk and Christian as the natural division of the human race, and has gone far to destroy any sentimental idea which may have existed that she is the champion of Christianity against Islam in the East.

I also heard much about the financial position of Servia, and of the great desire of the Government to interest European capitalists in that country.

My companions complained that first-class business houses would not take up any enterprise started in Servia, and that there was a widespread delusion, originating in Austrian calumnies, to the effect that Servians are not trustworthy, and cannot be depended on to fulfill their engagements. I fear, however, that this mistrust is not unfounded, and that the unsatisfactory economic position of the country is not altogether the result of external causes. As already indicated, the main obstacle to any progress is the uniform well-to-do but not wealthy condition of the population. The incentives of poverty and superfluous wealth are alike lacking.

The peasants cannot be induced to make any immediate sacrifice for their ultimate advantage. For instance, they are invariably opposed to the construction of new roads, because the expense falls on the villages through which they pass, although the loss entailed by defective communications is obvious.

At the present moment heavy rain is falling, and it is anticipated that it will be impossible to export the plum harvest from the Ujitse district because all communications will be blocked. Secondly, the municipal as well as State finances of Servia are a chaos of corruption. No official seems to have a knowledge of the elements of financial science; the present Minister, M. Vouitch, possesses the rare quality of having a reputation for honesty, but his capacity appears not to be much greater than that of his predecessors. To the confusion created by naive ignorance must be added the element of bribery and speculation.

A Commission which has recently been inquiring into the condition of the Municipality, whose disorders had attracted public attention, has made a Report too bad for publication, which establishes that every public Department has a deficit, with hardly any improvements or municipal works having been executed.

Further, the national instinct to fleece the foreigner is so strong that it can hardly be repressed by considerations of self-interest. This characteristic is shown in small matters by the exorbitant hotel bills which are presented to foreigners who have made no bargain beforehand, and which are always upheld by the authorities, who say they cannot side against their own people. In more serious matters, it leads to the appropriation of money belonging to foreign Companies.

Bad, however, as is the economic state of Servia, it is not necessary to prophesy immediate disaster. Oriental countries do not collapse for want of money in the way one would expect, and although Servia cannot emulate the genius of the Porte, that great master of living with dignity on a deficit, her connection with Turkey has been long enough for her to learn how to become rotten without decomposing.

The most considerable foreign enterprise ever started in Servia is the concession recently given to M. Luther, a German subject, to develop electrical power out of the Iron Gates and other cataracts on the Danube. The Servian authorities express great satisfaction at this concession, which, among other advantages, is said to have brought in a very considerable sum to King Milan in return for his good-will. Experts differ in their estimate of the particular use which can be made of the electrical power to be obtained from the Danube, but, even neglecting the nominal *raison d'être* of the enterprise, the rights over mines, forests, etc., granted to the concessionaire are of extreme importance, and, extending as they do over a large stretch of country from Brnjica, on the Danube, to the Roumanian frontier, cannot but enormously increase German influence in Servia, and possibly will strike a blow at the present commercial preponderance of Austria-Hungary.

Public security in the provinces does not seem to be as great as might be expected from the general state of civilization. Murder and brigandage are prevalent methods of contention between political parties. When recently at Nisch I heard many complaints abot the laxity of the present Radical régime, the Government appearing unable or unwilling to punish any crimes committed by their supporters. Political murders are said to be common in the district, and convictions for them almost unknown. Brigandage is also not rare. I am informed that about two years ago a high official stated that nearly all the money deposited in provincial savings banks in Servia was employed in organizing bands of brigands. This brigandage has usually a political character. What promises to be a sensational trial is just commencing, the prosecution of M. Taïshitch, an eminent Radical, once described as "the Cato of Servia," for employing and harbouring brigands. It would appear that about a year ago a village schoolmaster called Batzkovitch wrote a book against the Prince of Montenegro. He was subsequently surprised in a country inn by a band of brigands, who seized him and then deliberately shot him before the assembled peasants. M. Taïshitch is accused of being the instigator of the crime, and of having endeavoured to enable Brkitch, the leader of the band, and others, to escape to Herzegovina.

September 17.—Today's paper announces that Taïshitch has been acquitted, but detained pending the hearing of an appeal, and condemned to pay costs—a judgment which is somewhat difficult to explain.

(signed) C. N. E. Eliot

NOTES

Vlastimil Kybal (1880-1958)

With the death of Vlastimil Kybal on January 2, 1958, Czechoslovakia lost a veteran diplomat and the historical profession an able historian, scholar, and linguist.

A native of Czechoslovakia, Kybal obtained his Ph.D. at Charles University in Prague in 1903, then studied at the Sorbonne at Paris and at Bonn-am-Rhein. In 1911 he was appointed lecturer, subsequently professor, in Western European History at Charles University, there coming into contact with Thomas G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš, with whom he undertook undercover activities on behalf of Czechoslovak independence.

In 1917 Kybal became a signer of the Czech Writers' Manifesto of Independence, the birth cry of the future republic. After its establishment, at the invitation of President Masaryk, he entered its diplomatic service. For two decades Kybal enjoyed a distinguished diplomatic career. As Czechoslovak Minister to Italy (1920-25), he witnessed the rise of Mussolini. When accredited to Portugal and Spain (1928-34), he observed the last years of Alphonso XIII and the first years of the Spanish Republic. He served also as Czechoslovak Minister to Brazil and Argentina (1925-27), and to Mexico and to the countries of Central America (1935-39).

Two weeks before Hitler's entry into Czechoslovakia in 1939, Kybal retired from active diplomatic service. After the occupation, he came to the United States to lecture at the California Institute of Technology. In 1943 he became a visiting professor of History at the State University of Iowa; in 1944, a research fellow in history at Yale; and in 1948, was appointed a visiting scholar at Columbia University, since which time he has resided with his wife in New York City.

A prolific writer, Kybal has published some twenty-five books in Czech, German, Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and English, in addition to which he left many unpublished manuscripts. Four of his publications had been awarded prizes from Czech learned societies. After completing his "Diplomatic Memoirs," covering the years 1920-39, and an unpublished four-volume biography of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his later years he returned to writing on his first love, on religious and historical subjects of the Middle Ages, particularly a triology—*St. Francis of Assisi, Blessed Agnes of Bohemia,* and *John Hus.*

Kybal held decorations from Italy, Spain, and Mexico. His devotion to the Czechoslovak Republic was never questioned, nor did he ever despair of its future.

University of North Dakota Felix J. Vondracek

The following news release from the offices of the Ford Foundation under date of April 16, 1958, will, even at the late date of publication of this number of the *Journal,* be of interest to our readers:

The Ford Foundation today announced an appropriation of $500,000 for a program of scholarly and cultural exchange with Poland and other East European countries.

The funds will finance visits by professors, research scholars, graduate students, and experts from these countries to the United States and Western Europe. The principal objective of the program is to enable outstanding persons in these categories to establish contacts with their counterparts in the West and to learn about recent developments in their respective fields.

The action reported today represents an extension of the Foundation's program of exchange with Poland, which was inaugurated in April, 1957, and also supported by an appropriation of $500,000.

Funds from the first appropriation are financing travel and study in the United States for approximately forty Polish professors, students, and scholars. Thus far twenty-three have arrived in this country. Most of them are studying or conducting research at leading universities.

Similar assistance is being provided to another thirty-one such Polish nationals for travel and study in West European countries. Sixteen have been selected for the United Kingdom, eight for France, and seven for Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden.

In each country, visits last from two months for the experts to a full academic year for the professors and students.

Another purpose of the program is to support visits to Poland by a number of American scholars. Thus far about ten Slavicists and five outstanding economists and sociologists have been selected. The first of the Americans, Professor Paul Lazarsfeld, of Columbia University, went to Poland in February. Professor Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, went in March, and Professor J. Kenneth Galbraith, of Harvard University, in May.

The first appropriation has also been used for the purchase of American and West European scholarly books, periodicals, and library equipment for distribution to Polish educational institutions. In September, 1957, a grant of $80,000 was made to the University of Poznań for the purchase of such materials for eight Polish universities. The Foundation expects to allot funds from the new appropriation for similar purposes in Poland and elsewhere in East Europe.

About two-thirds of the Polish exchangees selected to date are scholars, mostly young university professors. Their fields of study include sociology, economics, architecture, international relations, and the humanities.

"Officials of the American universities where the Polish exchange scholars are studying report that they are of high caliber and that they are adapting themselves well," Henry T. Heald, president of the Foundation, said today.

Mr. Heald said that one of the major objectives of the Foundation's activities in Europe is to encourage democratic relations between East Europe and the West.

"By extending its program of educational exchange with Poland to include other countries of East Europe, the Foundation hopes to help reinforce the positive desire that exists in East European and university and professional circles for contact with their colleagues in the West," he said.

The Foundation is carrying out the program through grants to educational organizations in both the United States and Europe. Thus far six such organizations have received a total of $344,000. Besides the University of Poznań, these include the Institute of International Education, New York; the British Council, London; the National Office of French Universities and Schools, Paris; the German Academic Exchange Service, Bonn; and the University of Geneva, Switzerland.

Another $12,000 went to CARE, Inc., New York, for services in connection with the purchase of books and library equipment on behalf of the University of Poznań.

* * *

On March 29, 1958 a Far Western Slavic Conference was formed at a meeting of about thirty scholars from institutions from the western United States and Canada which took place at Berkeley. An ad hoc organizing committee was set up, consisting of David Cattell, University of California, Los Angeles; H. H. Fisher, San Francisco State College; Charles Jelavich, University of California, Berkeley; J. St. Clair-Sobell, University of British Columbia; S. H. Thomson, University of Colorado, and Donald Treadgold, University of Washington. It was decided to hold a two-day meeting in the spring of 1959, at which papers would be presented and officers elected, and plans for future activity of the Conference discussed and formulated. The treasurer, Professor Treadgold, History Department, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, is in a receptive mood for membership dues of one dollar, and Professor Fisher, Chairman of the Committee, would gladly hear from interested colleagues as to their research interests, so as to be better able to guide the planning for the first meeting of the Conference.

* * *

The Conference on Central European History (see *Journal,* April 1958, p. 69) appointed a sub-committee to collaborate with an Austrian Committee, headed by Professor Hugo Hantsch, interested in organizing international utilization of the Archives of the Habsburg Monarchy. This Committee consists of Arthur J. May, University of Rochester; Hans Kohn, C. C. N. Y., chairman; Friedrich Engel-Janosi; Robert A. Kann; S. Harrison Thomson, University of Colorado; and R. John Rath, University of Texas, secretary.

* * *

The Fourth International Congress of Slavists is to meet in Moscow in September, 1958. Twenty-five scholars from the United States and three from Canada are scheduled to attend. Means had not, as of the time of going to press, been found to defray the expenses of *all* the participants, but it appears probable that the American representation, both in attendance and on the program, will be substantial.

* * *

One sees by the press that Professor Stranjaković of the University of Belgrade has recently been sentenced to "from four to six years of rigorous imprisonment" after a trial, part of which was open to the public. Two other defendants, Krekić and Pavlović, old Social Democrats, received heavier sentences. The two latter have long been active in Social Democratic politics, but it is something of a mystery why Professor Stranjaković, a highly respected historian and never known as engaged in adventures, was included in the trial. Someone must have been writing a book. That is always a serious matter.

* * *

An editorial committee of Polish sociologists, historians, economicists, littérateurs and publicists has just issued the first number of a new English language monthly, *Polish Perspectives* (May, 1958). The articles are in the fields of economics, sociology, literature ("Conrad under Polish Eyes"), and political speculation ("The Atom-free Zone"). There are informative Notes on recent events in Poland in all the relevant fields, news of the theater, art, and short book reviews. It is a good beginning and should be encouraged. The Editorial Office is on the seventeenth floor of the Palace of Culture in Warsaw. One year's subscription $2.85.

* * *

The Subcommittee on Grants of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, co-sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council awarded, this past spring, sixteen grants for research and named six alternates. Many of the awards were for projects directly concerned with Russia. A number, however, concern the Western Slavs or the area of Central Europe:

Herman Freudenberger, Instructor in History, Brooklyn College, for research on the woolen goods industry of Bohemia and Moravia, 1750-1850 (alternate).

Henry Kucera, Assistant Professor of Russian and Linguistics, Brown University, for research in Western Europe on coexistent phonemic and morphological systems as manifested in literary Czech, the Czech common language, and transitional forms.

Allan A. Kuusisto, Associate Professor of Government, University of New Hampshire, for research in Finland on Finnish democracy since World War II.

Ivo J. Lederer, Instructor in History, Yale University, for research in Yugoslavia on Nikola Pašić, the transition from Serbia to Yugoslavia, 1878-1920, and Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference.

Irwin T. Sanders, Professor of Sociology, University of Kentucky, for research on the sociology of Balkan life.

Stavro Skendi, Assistant Professor of Slavic Languages, Columbia University, for research in Western Europe on the Albanian national awakening, 1878-1912.

S. Harrison Thomson, Professor of History, University of Colorado, for research in Western Europe on Poland's place in European history.

Bernard Ziffer, Chief Librarian, Library of the Free Europe Committee, New York, for research on Polish economic thought (alternate).

BOOK REVIEWS

Falk, Minna R., *History of Germany: From the Reformation to the Present Day.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. 438. $6.00.

It may be granted at the outset that there is a place for a volume on Germany suitable for "the American student who wants to review the facts for himself in brief and compact form" (p. ix). A number of short histories of Germany has appeared since 1919, both in English and in translation from the German, but no one of them is ideal. The volume of Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization* (1954), the work most likely to be thought competitive with the present volume, is quite differently organized and covers, chronologically, primarily only the period since 1789 to the present instead of beginning with the Reformation as does Professor Falk. That the volume by Professor Falk will not compete successfully will be due, this reviewer feels, to insufficient editing. It is a great pity that the editors and the publisher of a *History of Germany* did not work over the manuscript in the interests of idiomatic English, consistent spelling and translation of proper names, a sound index and the addition of a few basic maps. As it is, the volume will confuse more than aid the ordinary student, although some of the chapters are better presented than others.

The first one hundred pages of the Falk volume take the reader to the Congress of Vienna. This arrangement leaves, roughly, one hundred and fifty pages for the period to 1914 and the remainder—from 424 pages of text—for the twentieth century. Both teacher and student are likely to find the division of time and space useful. The chronological arrangement of material is interrupted, beneficially, for chapters on "Frederick the Great," "William I, Emperor of Germany," "Bismarck's Foreign Policy," and "William II and His Entourage." It is not interrupted to include discussion of letters and the arts in Germany, matters which the author says were "in some cases of more importance to outsiders than to the Germans" and "did not motivate Germans" and "did not motivate Germans as much as did Prussian actions" (p. ix), and there are fewer economic "facts" than the Preface might lead the student to expect. These omissions indicate that Professor Falk, like everyone else, must select the data presented; the reader depends on what the author considers important. There is, however, no annoying over-riding thesis about the Germans and their history. Prussia is given an important rôle in the narrative of the formation of Germany from a group of independent states to an empire; but a strong feature of the volume is the attention paid to German states other than Prussia. The economic importance of German unity is recognized, although there is little emphasis on the work of the Liberals and of liberalism, and neither appears as an item in the too-brief index. For a writer who holds that Germany followed men rather than ideas and who in the concluding paragraph of the book says, "Germany's problem, however, is that so long as the principle of leadership is more important than the ideas espoused by those leaders, unscrupulous individuals may try to revive militarism. . . ." (p. 424), Professor Falk uses too many names without adequate identification, and, again, the index fails to help the student to assemble what data there may be about a man. On the other hand, separate periods of German history stand out, each with a personality of its own, such as the student may well remember.

In conclusion Professor Falk says that Germany has "a potential for sound government, not a conviction" (p. 424). She has proved the lack of "conviction," but a main criticism of the content of the volume may well be that the student loses a glimpse of the "potential" so far as Germany's past is concerned. The loss seems unfortunate.

Santa Monica, California PAULINE R. ANDERSON

SCHUMACHER, BRUNO, *Geschichte Ost- und Westpreussens.* Zweite veränderte und vermehrte Auflage, herausgegeben vom Göttinger Arbeitskreis, Würzburg: 1957. Pp. xiv, 402.

Books concerning the history of provinces do not usually allow broad synthetical views to develop, and therefore the political point of view becomes prominent. Either the past is represented as uniting the province with the neighbor's lands or sharply juxtaposing them. So generally Polish scholars, when writing the history of Polish Pomerania or Russia point out the links uniting positively or negatively those lands with Polish or Lithuanian "Hinterland"; some German scholars in their books underline all that separates them from the neighbors and all that links them to Germany. Of course, it would usually be a one sided view of the problem. The book of the late Professor Schumacher, published first in 1937, bears the characteristics of such a provincial history.

While compared with the first edition, the book shows few changes in the preface and in the text. The most prominent are the addition of notes and of some chapters at the end concerning the years after 1918. The notes give information about the basic German literature of the problems. Polish historical literature, even when published in Fhench or English, is, with a few exceptions, not mentioned. Thus a tight wall has been built between the East and the West. The reader cannot acquire a critical view of the problems and such a lack of criticism can have as a result tragic consequences. Foreign scholars will scarcely find new problems in Schumacher's book; he takes no notice of questions proposed by the Poles and does not discuss them. The reader cannot acquire information on the state of investigation on the Polish side. I think it is regrettable that the notes are not treated in a more exhaustive way.

The new chapters (26-29) concern events from 1914 to 1945. The author has written in a more exhaustive way the history of the Russian occupation in Prussia in 1914 and 1915, the texts directed against the treaty of Versailles are not changed in the new edition, but in the edition of 1937 the author expresses the hope that a revision of frontiers would be realized in a peaceful way. In the edition of 1957 he quotes some Polish books that prove, as he thinks, that Eastern Prussia was under a Polish military menace: In the edition of 1937 the reader will find eulogies of Hitler and his Gauleiter in Prussia, Koch; in the edition of 1957 we read an account on the "Osthilfe," but there is a lack of a history of Nazism in Eastern Prussia and Danzig. The name of Rauschning is not even mentioned. The author divides the responsibility for provoking World War II between Poland and Germany, saying that Eastern Prussia was in opposition against the war policy: only the name of Goerdeler is mentioned. The history of the Nazi occupation of Polish Pomerania is omitted. Generally the lack of Polish literature does not allow the author to be a sure guide in the problems of contemporary history: e.g. he does not know why the Poles in Polish Pomerania adopted in 1918 an attitude of inaction, while Polish sources tell of preparations for an armed rising at the moment of the expected landing of the Haller troops in Danzig, a scheme that was known to German authorities. More information is given by Schumacher's book on the campaign of 1944-1945 in Eastern Prussia, but the Russian literature is not quoted.

Schumacher's book is a scientific popularization on a serious level and on a clear political basis.

University of Toruń, Poland Karol Górski

Schöffer, I., *Het nationaal-socialistische beeld van de geschiedenis der Nederlanden. Ein historiografische en bibliografische Studie.* Arnhem-Amsterdam. Van Loghum Slaterus, J. M. Meulenhoff, n.d. Pp. 359.

This book is much more than its title would suggest. By a thorough analysis of National-Socialist historiography and of its derivation from other schools of historical writing, the author, while concentrating upon the Low Countries and their relationship to the *Reich,* has made a notable contribution to the history of the imperial idea, and has moreover raised the question of the future direction of historiography in general.

The book is a model of organization and thoroughness; appended are a table analyzing 43 fascist periodicals, a list of 1038 sources arranged by subject, period and country, and 13 biographical sketches. There is a bibliography and an index of persons.

Thoroughness is so combined with subtlety that there are few paragraphs which do not surprise the reader with some unexpected perception. The first chapter may serve as an example. The author did not feel he could embark upon his main theme before offering a definition of National-Socialist ideology, and one which is original for its attention to positive (by this the author does not mean morally acceptable) as well as to the usually catalogued negative features.

How to apply the principles of National-Socialism to the Low Countries proved to be a very tricky question even for those who were united in their admiration of the régime in Germany. Those familiar with the history of the Low Countries will not be surprised to learn that provincial particularism was again a major obstacle. Where was the "nation"? Was the movement to solidify the existing Kingdom of Belgium or of the Netherlands, or to work for their dissolution in preparation for a new state including all who spoke Netherlandish? Or should these join their High German brothers in the *Reich?*

Jealousy of the province of Holland was an issue which was convenient and natural for the Germans to use. Holland was guilty of exploiting not only the other Low Countries but Germany as well. The year 1648, which confirmed at once the primacy of Holland and the disunity of the Empire, was a symbol of a fundamental antagonism. German romantic nationalism had little regard for a Holland which was complacently bourgeois. (What the author has to say about Von Treitschke's important influence on German thinking on this matter, pp. 124-125, is carefully *nuancé*). The general tendency was to withhold admiration of the Revolt of the Netherlands and of Holland's subsequent greatness, and to concentrate instead upon medieval folklore.

There was a possibility that national-socialism would take on in the Low Countries, because it shared its Romantic origin not only with German nationalism and imperialism, but also with the anti-revolutionary and pan-Dutch (*groot-Nederlandse*) movements in the Netherlands (p. 119). But Dutch rationalism and patriotism were too strong. Pieter Geyl, despite the fact that he had supported the last-named movement after the first World War, was the first historian to be arrested and deported to concentration camp when the Germans occupied the Netherlands in 1940. This was a fitting tribute to the man who has shown that the regent class of Holland's Golden Age was able to assure, along with handsome profits, a larger measure of intellectual freedom than could be found anywhere else in the seventeenth century.

Since the Germans did not win the war, it has not been necessary to rewrite the history of the Low Countries, and of the world, along National-Socialist lines. But neither is it sufficient to revert to the kind of nationalism which prevailed in western Europe before the war. The value of this study of the bankruptcy of National-Socialist historiography lies above all in what it implies for the future progress of historical studies.

Lawrence College GORDON GRIFFITHS

RATH, R. JOHN, *The Viennese Revolution of 1848.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957. Pp. 424. $6.50.

This volume relegates other books on the same theme to the back shelves. The reader gets a vicarious feeling that he is watching momentous events unfold at first hand under the direction of a minutely-informed guide who knows Vienna like the palm of his hand; a diagram of the Hapsburg capital in 1848 heightens this sense of reality. By means of varied and abundant excerpts from pieces of original literature, notably from the Austrian Revolution Collection accumulated at the University of Colorado, Professor Rath has imparted vivid freshness to his narrative, and, with exemplary thoroughness, the Vienna press of the revolutionary year has been studied. So numerous are the quotations that the closely packed pages have the appearance in places of a source-book; it would seem that some of the translations could have been laid aside without impairing the value of the whole. In the space thus saved, the abrupt, one paragraph conclusion of the book might well have been expanded into an appraisal of the causes of the insurgent defeat and of the long-term implications of 1848.

A preliminary sketch surveys the Austrian environment on the eve of the mid-century turmoil, the character of the prevailing régime, the deep and dark discontents, and offers a short analysis of the social structure. The eight months of rebellious episodes are developed in an orderly fashion—from the street explosions in March, which blasted the aged Prince Clemens Metternich off his proud pedestal, through the outbreaks in May, which carried the partisans of change to the zenith of their power, into the bitter August strife, and then on to the climactic October humiliation at the hands of loyalist troops, Prince Alfred Windischgrätz commanding. Revolutionary developments elsewhere on the Continent are introduced only if and when they impinged directly upon the Viennese scene.

Rath points up the vital role of the intelligentsia,—especially of the turbulent, revolutionary-minded elements among university students,—and its quite consistent allies, the miserable wage workers, who indulged in Luddite vandalism and from first to last furnished the brawn of the revolutionary fighting forces. When Karl Marx, on a visit to Vienna, interpreted the August rising in keeping with his class-struggle formula, he was laughed to scorn by participants, though Rath himself thinks the August conflict constituted "a kind of limited class struggle" (p. 296). He concludes, however, that "the Viennese proletariat and their radical spokesmen were, in fact, almost as terrified of socialism as were the upper classes," for all alike abhorred socialism "as a diabolical scheme to overthrow organized society" (pp. 240, vii). In its essence, the revolutionary ferment reflected the creed of liberalism which, alackaday, "meant too many things to too many people." Save for the most extreme extremists, faith in Emperor Ferdinand the Benevolent and loyalty to the crown verged upon the pathetic until just before the curtain dropped on the drama.

Such basic features of the revolutionary year as the adventure in constitutional, parliamentary government, the emancipation of the soil-people, widespread support for the ideas of appeasing concessions to the varied nationalities of the realm and of a greater Germany, a flurry of anti-Jewish sentiment, popular hatred alike of Prussia and Russia as well as such minor idiosyncrasies as the Swobody Institute and the German-Catholic movement are deftly woven into the narrative. Scores of personalities who appeared on both sides of the barricades, many of them obscure, are commemorated in a valuable *dramatis personae* (Kossuth chose Turin as his principal residence in the post-revolutionary era, not England, as is here stated).

Rath has been remarkably successful in approaching his task in the spirit of 1848, not of 1776, nor 1917, nor 1957. Yet loose phrases from the present-day vocabulary of democracy, western-style, have intruded themselves. How can the scholar possibly know that "most Viennese" were "gay and light-hearted as always," or know what "The Viennese" thought or hoped about this or that? How can one know what "the populace" or "the people" really did or wished or felt? How indeed? Sharper language would have removed such inexact abstractions from the manuscript. Equally, is anything in history authentically inevitable? Or is not the term inevitability a handy device with which to dodge the responsibility of historical thought? But to carp on a few blemishes would be petty. Rath has earned high praise for an authoritative work, a sterling contribution to the growing body of literature written on this side of the Atlantic illuminating the history of the realm of the Hapsburgs.

The University of Rochester ARTHUR J. MAY

VIERHAUS, RUDOLF, *Ranke und die soziale Welt*. Neue Münstersche Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung. B. I. Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1957. Pp. 260. DM 19.

The Ranke tradition is still very much alive in Germany and with it, as Vierhaus' book, a prize dissertation of the University of Münster, shows, the unquestioning acceptance of Ranke's basic premises typical among earlier generations. Apparently Ranke's *Weltbild* and the political traditions which made it acceptable to the public are still part of the intellectual equipment of western Germany. This book shows well how vast the cocoon of research, comment, and plain adulation spun around Ranke's work has become over the years. And more Ranke studies may be expected in the future because of the new sources made available since the war: the collections of letters and those parts of the *Nachlass* left in western Germany (the other parts entrusted to the *Preussische Staatsarchiv* perished in a fire).

Perhaps the best parts of this occasionally pedantic and repetitive, but entirely creditable study are those describing Ranke's *milieu*, the static and hierarchically ordered society in which he grew up and continued to live, the narrow social contacts typical of this class, the strong tradition of naïve loyalty to the *Landesherr* in professional families such as his, the combination of Lutheranism and humanism in his education, and finally the *Obrigkeitsstaat* of pre-March Prussia. Within this framework the author has no difficulty disproving the reproach that Ranke paid no attention to social questions. He shows that Ranke followed with keen interest the course of contemporary events; he gave several courses on contemporary history (which fact might have been given more emphasis in a Germany where *Zeit-*

geschichte still encounters deep suspicion among academic historians). The better part of Ranke's life was overshadowed by revolutions. And although Ranke, a conservative committed to the *Obrigkeitsstaat,* had no use for mob violence or even the competition of political parties for power in the state, he could hardly overlook either in the shaping of contemporary events. Yet after careful analysis of Ranke's usage of the terms *Gesellschaft, Volk, Masse, Stand, Klasse, Proletariat,* even the author must concede that Ranke did not hold a clear conception of "the social question" and that he took no interest in the lot of the working class. Given his premises, why should he? Yet he was not entirely at ease in his ignorance, as may be seen from a hurried (if somewhat cryptic) comment on French events in 1863: *"Und die Frage über den Pauperismus? Man erschrickt sie zu berühren: selbst auf diesem Wege der Wohltätigkeit. Doch ist schon etwas wahres daran. Wohltätigkeit."*

When all this has been said on behalf of the author, one cannot but go on to ask: while Ranke stands justified on the grounds of his own premises, are those premises still valid today? Vierhaus himself stands far too close to the Ranke tradition, whether merely as a result of his studies or by political conviction, to fathom the criticism of Ranke made by "outsiders" either in Germany, England, or the United States. One need not deny Ranke's contention that politics is always more important than social events by themselves (where, anyway, lies the boundary?). The point is that one cannot gain a valid insight into the course of events, certainly not in modern history, without the extensive awareness of social forces which the practitioners and theoreticians of liberalism and socialism have cultivated in the past two hundred years. How cognizant was Ranke of the corpus of social knowledge existing in his time? Vierhaus does not seem to be better informed than his hero.

American historians will find this book a good avenue into German Ranke studies and will profit from its analysis of the mental and political climate in which Ranke worked. But they will be reluctant to give up their broader basis of judgment in favor of the narrow historical one proposed by Vierhaus. Should we consider Ranke merely as a product of his time to be cast aside with the times, or as a challenge for future historians as well? Whoever favors the latter alternative must put up with the irreverence implicit in any criticism of Ranke stemming from standards prevailing in different ages and different countries.

University of California, Riverside THEODORE H. VON LAUE

FR.-CHIROVSKY, NICHOLAS L., *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. 178. $3.75.

Dr. Fr.-Chirovsky considers the economic aspects of the political growth of Russia as one of the most revealing features of Russian political thought and action. But he also attempts to show that Russian imperialism and the modern Soviet Union have evolved from a Muscovy-Mongolian tradition. The racial and cultural differences between the three major ethnic groups is given considerable attention. The Muscovites (Great Russians) are thought to have been as much as 80% Mongolian. The Byreloruthenians (White Russians) and the Ukrainians (Little Russians) are considered to be largely Slavic. Peter I changed the name 'Muscovy' to 'Russia' officially to emphasize the unity of the three major ethnic groups. Previously only the Ukrainians and the White Russians had been known as Russians (Men of Rus).

The aggressive imperialist spirit is felt to have been a heritage of the Mongols rather than of the Slavs. There was much territorial expansion that had little political, economic, or religious justification. "The inherited conquest instinct of Genghis Khan" may have been at work, while much of Russia's own territory was left relatively undeveloped. The author refers to Stalin's remarks about the 'Great Russians' at the end of World War II, in 1945, for the purpose of building up the superiority of the 'Great Russians.' But Stalin himself was a Georgian, and in 1945 there were still several other 'Non-Russians' on the Supreme Council or in the Politburo.

The author takes up the long-standing controversy over the origin of the modern Russian state. He presents a well-documented case for the theory that the history of modern Russia begins with the emergence of the Suzdal, Rostov, and Vladimir principalities in the Moscow area, rather than with the city-states of Novgorod and Kiev. Since he devotes considerable space to the Muscovy-origin theory, it seems that the Novgorod-Kiev theory should at least be stated. The influence of the Varangians continued for several centuries, and the House of Rurik occupied the throne of Russia until the death of Ivan IV in 1584.

Most of the commercial intercourse between Russia and the West took place through the Baltic area. It appears that the rôle of Novgorod and the Hanseatic League should have been developed further. Novgorod was never a member of the Hanseatic League, but it was for several centuries the trade-center between Russia and the West. The White Sea was Russia's only free outlet to the West from about 1550 to the founding of St. Petersburg in 1703. The defeat of Charles XII at Poltava in 1709 ended the hegemony of Sweden in the Baltic, and Russia was henceforth free to trade with all of Western Europe.

Dr. Fr.-Chirovsky has presented his material in an interesting style, and with considerable conviction. The work is well documented, and the number and quality of sources indicates careful preparation. It represents a valuable contribution to American historical literature on Russia, and as the author himself points out, "misunderstanding of the true character of the history of Russia may cause or result in mistaken political moves on the part of the Western powers" (p. 157). Certainly the Western powers could have used the services of a few authorities on the History of Russia both at Yalta and at Potsdam.

San Jose State College ANDREW P. LASSEN

DORPALEN, ANDREAS, *Heinrich von Treitschke*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. Pp. 345. $6.00.

Against a competently delineated background of a century of German history Andreas Dorpalen has given us a finely drawn pen portrait of the always controversial Treitschke. Professor Dorpalen knows how to write entertainingly without superficiality. Never mordant, occasionally ironical, he has treated Treitschke and Germany with the loving care and humorous objectivity which alone make each understandable.

Without any showy insistence, Dorpalen utilizes social and psychological analysis to explain Treitschke's virtual monomania. Scion of a newly created Saxon noble family, doomed from early youth to ever-increasing deafness, young Heinrich was a bundle of contradictions, every one of which reflected some facet of *Paulskirche* Germany. A young person endowed with more than the usual mortal's share of the Life Force, expressed in physical vigor and moral courage, Treitschke would simply not give in, either to his affliction, to his contradictory impulses, nor to the passive, unimaginative pietism of his father, a professional soldier, attached to the Wettin court. Under the influence of the romantic nationalism of his teachers at the Holy Cross School in Dresden and at Bonn, Treitschke found a purpose in life: the unification of Germany. A lingering tendency to poetic effusions and artistic isolation from the rough philistine world around him he gradually sublimated into patriotic doggerel and far more effective prose. The inward revolt against his father's bourgeois parochial origins was transmuted in his fiery personality into a quarterless battle against German particularism and Manchester materialism. The craving for aristocratic identification, without the supposedly weakening effects of "feminine" *Kultur,* absorbed from his mother, Marie von Oppen, stimulated Treitschke to become the knight errant of Prussia.

Thus the fearless young teacher drew to himself an eager audience when he spoke out for the Prussia-Germany of his ideals. Unable to enjoy the lesser pleasures of easy conversation because of his deafness or the joys of relationship with women because of a mild complex, Treitschke drew the full measure of life's bounty in the classroom, or in a small gathering of fellow believers, or with pen in hand before an imaginary audience. Then his sense of isolation, of inferiority and frustration was temporarily dispelled; in his mind's eye he became the selfless hero preaching and fighting for the New Germany. And he really did become a kind of "trumpet of the Lord," at least of the Hegelian Jehovah who arranged history for so many educated Germans in the sixties. Through the *Preussische Jahrbücher* he broke out of the academic setting and was soon in contact with the political hurly-burly of German liberalism. While it is hard to say whether Treitschke brought more to or took more from the ideological posturing and the positivist relativism of Liberal *Machtpolitik,* the author keeps unrelentingly before our eyes the picture of the German tragedy, the sale of her western European birthright for a mess of pottage. Treitschke became a Bismarckian spokesman, abandoning step by step every safeguard from tyranny which he had once praised. He was only 37 in 1871, at the height of his prestige as a scholar and a publicist; yet the formation of the Second Reich began for him a sour and premature old age.

To be sure, the seventies were to be years of national acclaim for the famous herald of German unity, and there was even domestic happiness with Emma von Bodman, like his mother, a daughter of ancient German nobility. But the crass, materialistic Germany which had been created as if on his very own prescription of unprincipled power politics, was too naked a revelation of the inner contradictions in German society which he had so painfully distorted and repressed in himself. The stamping and shouting of green students could never make up to the increasingly misanthropic Treitschke the loss of the aesthetic trimmings and veils of illusion which he had done so much to create. His creativity was by no means gone: the great five-volume history, though uneven, at least is full of literary excellence; and the lectures of the seventies and eighties did much to form German *Weltpolitik,* for better or ill. The scholar and the man gradually deteriorated into querulous criticism of everything new. Anticlimax is upon every page of Treitschke's life after 1871. Yet the Treitschkean spirit survived to plague the Germans long after they had forgotten the old professor. Germany's enemies were to affirm that Treitschke *was* Germany, and *schwarz-weiss-rot* nationalism in the twenties borrowed his worst features, including his antisemitism, to prepare as unwittingly as he, the way for another pied piper.

University of Nebraska ROBERT KOEHL

Pobóg-Malinowski, Władysław, *Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski, 1864-1945,* Vol. II, part I, published by the author, 1957. London. Pp. 666.

The one-volume *Recent History of Poland,* planned by the author seven or eight years ago, trebled under his prolific pen: the second volume is to contain two parts, the first being almost double the size of the initial one. The author is to be admired for his energy and perseverance in pursuing, single-handed, his arduous task, helped only by the *émigré* Diaspora of subscribers scattered throughout the world.

The first part of the second volume covers the period of over twenty years from the beginning of 1919 to the spring of 1939, from the first steps of independent Poland to the eve of her destruction. Marshal Piłsudski is still Malinowski's hero, and much of the book revolves around him. There is, however, more tendency than in the first volume, to take into consideration the point of view of his opponents, and to deal with them in a more dispassionate manner.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of the book is the fact that it assembled so much material on Piłsudski himself and on his handling of foreign relations, the field where the Marshal achieved his greatest successes. This is especially true as far as his federalist policy of the years 1919-1921 is concerned. The chapters pertaining to the background and the course of the Russo-Polish war of 1920, and the Ukrainian problem at that time, are among the best. Piłsudski and his doings seem always to inspire Malinowski with vigor and imagination. And again, the disappearance of the author's hero deprives the book of much of its color, drive, and even purpose. That is perhaps why the chapter "Poland without Piłsudski" is unduly short and superficial. There is no doubt about the Marshal's historical rôle in recent Polish history. His achievements are lasting and increasingly recognized by his compatriots, irrespective of their political coloring. But the history of a nation cannot be reduced to the story of one man, however prominent he was. After all it was soon after the Marshal's death that Poland recovered from the great depression, embarked upon a more sensible economic policy, made interesting experiments in regional planning, and surpassed the 1913 index of industrial production. Moreover, the years 1936-1939 were the period when the younger generation of Poland first began to make its mark on the country's life, politically, culturally, and economically, gradually overcoming old complexes, divisions, and "orientations." That is why "Poland without Piłsudski" deserves more than 89 out of 666 pages.

Despite these qualifications, Malinowski's book is, thus far, the first attempt to deal systematically with the entire period after the rebirth of the Polish Republic. The amount of Polish and East European material collected by Malinowski is truly impressive, although the main Western sources were not used, e.g., the recent valuable publications of diplomatic papers by the British Foreign Office and the United States State Department. Personal contacts of the author with many leading personalities of the interwar Poland were obviously a great help to him, but this cannot make up for the omission of the important source material.

Boston College M. K. Dziewanowski

Hammond, Thomas Taylor, *Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution: 1893-1917.* Studies of the Russian Institute. N. Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. x, 155. $3.50.

This book achieves its author's aim to review "the theories and principles underlying Communist tactics in the trade union movement today," as reflected in Lenin's pronouncements on capitalist trade unions. It gives a lucid account of the problem of leadership, the conflict between the trade unions and the Party, the Party "cells" technique frequently applied in many Communist "front" organizations, and the perennial issue of politics versus economics in Marxist thought.

At the basis of Lenin's program for revolutionary action was his deep distrust of the masses and his thirst for power which he was willing to give only to the revolutionary Party *élite*. Hence the clearly subservient rôle he assigned to trade unions. He saw them merely as a tool of the Party and a rather "loose" movement designed to spread widely over the masses, whereas he wanted the Party to have a tight organization with limited and select membership, and carrying a lofty task of leadership. The theory of leadership was designed to deprive the labor movement—accused by Lenin of serving only the bourgeoisie—of its spontaneity and subordinate it to revolutionary socialist ideology, in practice of authority of power-seeking members of the highest Party echelons. While trade unions were to avoid carrying the Party label, they were to be at all times secretly directed by the Party, giving rise to the Party "cells" technique. The basis was thus laid by Lenin—as it transpires from many quotations collected by Mr. Hammond—for an authoritarian chain of command in the Communist system and also for a divorce of theory and practice, dream and reality. It is on this basis, it may be added, that the present-day Communist leadership, to use the expression of Edward Crankshaw, "wraps itself away from reality," shielding its many false pretentions, the greatest peril for the system, as was dramatically demonstrated by Milovan Djilas in his recent book *The New Class*. The important issue of politics versus economics, reflecting the divergent dialectics of Marx and Lenin, is given attention in the chapter on Lenin's criticism of Economism. "Lenin," says the author, "while professing loyalty to Marx, acted directly contrary to Marx's formula" (p. 25). Lenin denied that the economic struggle should have precedence over the political struggle. It is the practical outcome of Lenin's policy, however, which is most revealing. One simply cannot speak of Communist theory without referring to Communist practice. What Lenin achieved for Marxism in Russia was, in terms of Marxist doctrine, an illogical success. By asserting that politics should take precedence over economics, he implied the falsity of the Marxian theorem which he had reversed; yet, in practice, by his victory he made it possible for Marxist doctrine to fructify.

This painstaking and well-documented book reads like a thesis and is unduly pedantic in its otherwise praiseworthy effort to exhaust all the references to capitalist trade unions which can be traced in Lenin's writings. The author's interest does not lie in many-sided discussion: he gives instead a formalistic and didactic treatise. The string of often long and unwieldy quotations is a burden in a short book, although it may be an asset in a thesis. The study follows the rules of traditional uniformity: the exposition is straight, most comments are appended to each section and there is no attempt to view Lenin's thoughts on trade unions in the oblique light of criticism by simultaneously describing and commenting on theory and events, doctrines and policies.

The author's concern is with Lenin's ideas on trade unions rather than his actions towards them. This was because Lenin considered the latter unimportant. And because he had little to say about trade unions under socialism, the subject of this book has definite limitations. Yet within these restricted limits (and because they are so narrow) more room should have been found to relate Lenin's thoughts on trade unions to the climate of social thought during his lifetime. The study inevitably tends to become a catalogue of items on a single issue. The author avoids the wider, related problems and disregards the cultural and historical background against which Lenin's ideas originated and developed. And mainly because Lenin often said the same thing over and over again, the book is occasionally repetitive and makes unexciting reading. For this reason some of the problems mentioned by Mr. Hammond should have been given more attention. Among these, the question of workers' control, the various views of the Economists, or Lenin's actual impact on the Soviet trade unions come to the fore. Altogether, the publication of this slim and specialized volume as a hard-cover book seems slightly hasty, although its content would make a good basis for some valuable articles.

University of British Columbia W. J. STANKIEWICZ

Memoirs of Michael Karolyi, Catherine Karolyi, transl. N. Y.: Dutton, 1957. Pp. 392. $6.50.

The autobiography of Count Michael Karolyi is an impressive human document. Had it been published as a novel, it could have been criticized as a fantastic and incredible story. Alas, Karolyi's life is only a mirror of tragedies in which the Hungarian nation was enmeshed in recent decades. Simultaneously it reflects the bewildering confusion of a Hungarian aristocrat who was searching for light and truth through trials and errors.

As the rich scion of one of the oldest families of Hungary, Michael Karolyi, during his formative years, had few contacts outside the exclusive world of ultra—conservative aristocracy. While a student in Budapest, before the turn of the century, his pocket money was equal to the salary of the Hungarian Prime Minister. Later his interest was concentrated on travel, women and gambling. His unsystematic education provided him with little organized knowledge and his inquisitive mind remained undisciplined. Although he knew little of the realities of life, he recognized clearly some major social and political problems of historic Hungary. It is a strange coincidence that his uncle, Alexander Karolyi, founder of the cooperative movement in Hungary, called his attention to Karl Marx whose writings and ideology impressed and later captivated his mind and emotions.

After a globetrotting period, Karolyi plunged into politics and played a leading rôle in cooperative and agrarian movements. He belonged to the left-wing in the Independence Party and advocated the secret ballot, social reforms and a federative structure of the Monarchy. During World War I he made no secret of his pro-French sympathies. In the summer of 1916 he formed a new party which was openly anti-German and stood for a separate peace. This record qualified him for the leading political rôle after the defeat of the Central Powers. Karolyi reached the summit of his political career in October 1918 when he became Prime Minister and later President of the Hungarian Republic. But amidst disintegration of the Monarchy, he was belatedly elevated to these high offices. He prepared a radical agrarian law, distributed his huge estate to peasants, and through his Minister of Nationalities, Oscar Jászi, he attempted to transform historic Hungary into a modern democratic state. They proposed the establishment of an "Eastern Switzerland" and tried to persuade the nationalities to live together on a new basis as a commonwealth. Since, however, the Allied and Associated Powers committed themselves to support the claims of the Slav and Rumanian nationalities, it was too late for a compromise. With secession from Hungary, the nationalities shifted from a defeated country to the camp of victorious nations. The occupation of Hungarian territories by the successor states was authorized by the Supreme Council of Paris. Since the Rumanian, Yugoslav and Czech armies advanced even beyond the demarcation lines and occupied territories with purely Magyar inhabitants, Karolyi frankly admitted that his confidence in the Entente powers and in the principles of President Wilson had been misplaced. "For the torpedoing of democratic Hungary, and for the Communist *coup d'état,* the Entente was responsible. Nothing remained for me but to retire . . ." (p. 157). During the subsequent Communist régime, Karolyi left the country and returned only twenty-seven years later. In his last office, he represented the Hungarian Republic from 1947 to 1949 as Minister to France.

The years in exile proved to be a particularly trying period for him. To the disappointment in Western democracies and the sudden change from great wealth to poverty was added the unfounded accusation in Trianon-Hungary that he was responsible for the dismemberment of the Country. The "Red Count" was described not only as a Coriolanus but even as an outright traitor to his nation. Although Karolyi was not an experienced politician and committed serious mistakes while in office, he could not have changed the catastrophic consequences of a lost war into victory.

In politics, however, nothing succeeds like success. In an era of political convulsions, as the leader of a defeated country, he belatedly tried to realize political ideas and reforms which should have been carried out long before and under more favorable political circumstances. The fact that he was let down by the West for which he exposed himself during the war, became a source of bitterness in him. In exile he turned entirely to the left and accepted the Marxist gospel as the only cure for all political and social injustices. This caused his differences with his friend Oscar Jászi who "was passionately opposed to the Soviet system," while Karolyi felt that "European Socialism needed Soviet Russia's backing, even if we did not agree with the means they employed" (p. 208). The combination of his anti-American prejudices and pro-Soviet convictions obsessed his judgment even more after his return to Hungary when he usually accepted the Communist interpretation of events and considered the opponents of Communism as reactionaries. He seemed to live in an atmosphere of wishful thinking and could hardly see the real problems of a country occupied by the Red Army and dominated by Muscovite Communists. It may well be that he knew better than his attitude showed but the idea of another exile was repugnant for him. "To live in a capitalist world from where the atom bomb would be used on the East seemed an impossible decision for me. I belonged to the East and my place was there amongst my people, whatever errors they were committing" (p. 359). Rajk's trial was the rather curious straw which finally caused his break with the Rákosi régime. The second exile gave him a chance to write his memoirs in the tranquility of a small village among the Mediterranean Alps.

The volume he produced is interesting and informative especially for his years in exile but contains few revelations for specialists in Danubian affairs. Since Karolyi apparently wrote without archives or research, some of his factual statements are erroneous, particularly in the period following World War II. As a whole the book is more of a description of the political and social climate between 1910 and 1950 as seen through Karolyi's peculiar looking-glass than a systematic account of political happenings in which he was involved. However it may be, this well-written autobiography presents a dynamic and revealing personal story and belongs to the category of easily readable memoirs. The inside picture he gave of the émigré life and psychology between 1920 and 1945 is unique and part of it is of true literary quality.

University of Notre Dame STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

GORDON, HAROLD J., *The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919-1926*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xvi, 478. $8.50.

The rôle of the *Reichswehr* in the critical years preceding Hitler's rise to power has been the subject of numerous scholarly investigations and great public concern. Professor Gordon of the University of Pittsburgh offers a new appraisal of this disputed subject in his illuminating study of the evolution and structure of the 100,000-man army. His findings are at variance with the generally held opinion "either that the German army is the embodiment of a militaristic tendency inherent in the German people, or that the German people have been the victims of an organization dedicated to the subversion of their peaceful, democratic instincts."

Mr. Gordon bases his study on personal papers and published sources hitherto virtually unexploited for this topic. The most important of these are the Seeckt Papers and the *Reichstag* debates. He has also made use of army lists, medical reports, and official military histories. These materials have been supplemented by information gathered through interviews and correspondence with former members of the *Reichswehr* and prominent political figures of the Weimar Republic.

The author gives an excellent account of the development of the *Reichswehr* from its beginnings in the unruly Freikorps to the compact and efficient army of General von Seeckt. Faced with serious internal dissension and the threat of foreign invasion, the Government clearly saw the need for maintaining a well-organized, reliable army. It would have been impossible to create such an army, Mr. Gordon asserts, if the leaders of the *Reichswehr* and of the Weimar Republic had not successfully collaborated. The author also credits the *Heeresleitung* under the leadership of General von Seeckt with accomplishing the difficult task of welding the remnants of the Imperial army and the heterogeneous *Freikorps* into a nearly autonomous, professional army capable of expansion and modernization.

The defects of this army Mr. Gordon sees in the fact that it was not representative of the general population, but only of certain segments of it. For this he places the responsibility on the Allies as much as on the German Officer Corps. The Treaty of Versailles, by insisting on a professional army rather than on universal military conscription, determined the basic structure of the *Reichswehr*. In limiting the number of yearly replacements to five percent, it made impossible large scale dismissal of undesirables. Even if this had been legally possible, there were not enough Republican youths who showed an inclination for the military life to take the place of ultra-nationalist conservatives. This disinclination had as much to do with the one-sided composition of the army as any deliberate policy of selection. Mr. Gordon acknowledges that the anti-democratic predisposition of the *Reichswehr* did in fact hamper its dealings with the Republic, especially on lower levels; on the other hand, he points out, neither did the major political groups within the Republic make much effort to convert the army to acceptance of the Republic. The overt hostility of the Majority Socialists to everything military only strengthened the army's disdain.

It is surprising that Mr. Gordon does not give a fuller account of General von Seeckt's negotiations with the Red Army. Perhaps he feels that this has been done elsewhere or that it deserves a special study, but a more explicit statement of this aspect of Seeckt's career should have been included here.

The author provides an index and an appendix which lists the original *Freikorps* units as well as those that entered the Provisional army and the *Reichswehr.* Annotations in the Critical Bibliography are too sketchy to be of much value to the serious student of military affairs. Professor Gordon's work does, however, make a significant contribution to a better understanding of the Weimar Republic and merits consideration by the general reader and the student of German affairs alike.

Hoover Institute and Library HILDEGARD R. BOENINGER
Stanford, California

REITLINGER, GERALD, *The SS. Alibi of a Nation 1922-1945.* N. Y.: The Viking Press, 1957. Pp. 502, $6.50.

The author of this volume has presented us with well written portraits of Heinrich Himmler and a number of SS leaders around which he has woven a vivid account of the history of the SS, from its insignificant begining to its gradual encroachment into spheres of the German police, army and governmental ministries.

However, the dazzling display of biographical details should not disguise the fact that Reitlinger's documentation and methodology are weak and sometimes almost frivolous. Observing, for example, that Himmler in his first Poznan (Posen) Speech referred admiringly to Lenin and Stalin, Mr. Reitlinger omits any suggestion that here was an identification with totalitarian leadership, and rather speculates that "Himmler may have been especially conscious of his own Mongolian appearance." Since Himmler's wife was six years his senior, Reitlinger asks "Was Himmler's rigidity of mind and inaccessibility to horror due to a lack of motherly love?"

Reitlinger's seeming authority may be questioned on both minutiae and large issues. He writes that Himmler "was the only top-flight Nazi leader who came from Bavaria" (p. 14), yet Bouhler, Goering and Sauckel (all mentioned by the author) were native Bavarians. He writes that Himmler printed nothing "till he was past the age of thirty-five" (p. 22), yet the Nazi Party printed his booklet *Der Reichstag 1930: Das Sterbende System und der Nationalsozialismus* in 1931, when he was thirty-one years old. When the author writes that Himmler's home was in the villa "Am Donnerstag" (p. 52), he repeats the error Willi Frischauer made in his biography of Himmler. Himmler's Berlin villa was actually located in Dahlem, Dohenstieg Nr.10. Reitlinger is also in error when he calls Hans Jüttner the successor of Gottlob Berger in the SS Leadership Office (pp. 153 and 366). Berger headed the SS *Hauptamt,* Jüttner the SS *Führungshauptamt,* another SS agency. The author carelessly designates the successor agency of the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps, WVHA Division C (p. 262); but it was Division D. There are numerous other examples of mistaken spelling and dates, some evidently derived from unverified secondary sources.

Turning to weightier matters, one may share Mr. Reitlinger's anger that many SS crimes have gone unpunished, or that the new West German army has not barred from its ranks Waffen SS Officers up to the rank of Colonel (p. 401), without accepting his derisive treatment of the anti-Hitler resistance. Even Wheeler-Bennett, a devastating critic of the military members of the resistance, acknowledged that von Hammerstein was closely associated with the plan to seize and arrest Hitler in 1938 and later "kept alive the embers of the resistance"; but Reitlinger says only that Hammerstein "flirted with the Resistance Circle" (p. 466). Similarly Reitlinger's scornful description of the "Kreisau pinks" (p. 309) contrasts with Wheeler-Bennett's more accurate description of the Kreisau Circle, whose members were deeply religious and recognized the hideous evil of Nazism.

Reitlinger's title thesis derives from his view that the Nuremberg tribunal's decision declaring the majority of the SS a criminal organization was "psychologically the most dangerous of errors . . . it should have been made on the German nation as a whole, instead of providing the German nation with a convenient scapegoat" (p. 452). Elsewhere he calls for critical attitudes, before allowing "a famous alibi" to exonerate other agencies (p. 125), on the grounds that the number of SS men involved in the forcible deportations and resettlements was small in relation to the magnitude of the crimes. But Reitlinger's own critical attitude is not always founded on thorough research; for example, in mentioning the German police and the Reich Commissariat for the Strengthening of German Folkdom (pp. 126-128), he omits the crucial fact that these "other agencies" had been Nazified and taken over by Himmler. Moreover, some of Reitlinger's own evidence bears on more than strictly German phenomena: of the twenty-nine SS divisions which existed in 1945, sixteen were mainly composed of foreigners (p. 387), and he has written that "in actions against the Jews the SS could use most sections of the Polish population, and in the Ukrainian areas one might say the entire population" (pp. 126-127); in actuality the SS became an international organization.

It should, of course, be emphasized that the SS received very important assistance from other Nazis and comfort from those who accepted the ideological trap of identifying the "best" Germans with the most loyal Nazi activities; it is equally important not to neglect, as Reitlinger does, the fact that where ideology was ineffective, the SS instituted its bureaucratized terror, whose force was felt also by many Germans.

Reitlinger's choice of the SS for extensive exploration must be welcomed. He frankly admits that the question of the nature of the SS cannot be plainly answered. One of his conclusions, that "Hitler had to tolerate the messy infiltration of the SS into the army and the civil service, but did no more than tolerate it and never showed that he liked his state of affairs" (p. 453), requires qualification. In the case of von Fritsch, Hitler specifically encouraged the "messy" frameup which the SS had prepared against the Commander oft he Army. The case of the ministries is even clearer, if one reflects that the *Führer* had empowered the SS with the performance of such political tasks as he did not want to entrust to the regular bureaucracy, because the SS, not bound by the prevailing norms, was rather bound to him "by bonds of a specially stressed personal loyalty."

Reitlinger's conclusion that the aims of the SS were "not the tasks of revolution but the tasks of racial intolerance" (p. 454), also appears too limited. Any meaningful assessment should not omit a fuller treatment of the SS as a bureaucratic institution and the ideological conceptions which Himmler imparted to this "order," fashioned partly after the model of earlier crusading societies; moreover, it should not overlook the rôle of the SS engineers of terror directed against the home population. The author's zeal to defend his "alibi" thesis has introduced distortions which are regrettable. A definitive study of the nature of the gruesome SS remains a necessity for a better understanding of the totalitarianism of our time.

University of California, Berkeley MANFRED WOLFSON

ROOS, HANS, *Polen und Europa. Studien zur polnischen Aussenpolitik, 1931-1939* (Tübinger Studien zur Geschichte und Politik, Nr. 7), Tübingen: Mohr 1957. Pp. 421.

This is undoubtedly the most important study to date of Polish foreign policy in the crucial period from 1931 to 1939. Perhaps a more suitable title for this book would be "Polen, Deutschland und Europa," since about three fourths of its text is devoted to the account of Polish-German relations in that period. This imbalance should not be entirely attributed to a natural tendency on the part of a German historian to take greater interest in relations between Poland and his own country. After all, in the thirties the policy of Poland toward Germany did indeed assume a particular importance, and, moreover, German sources have become available in far greater abundance than is the case with the sources of other countries. Still, even with the sources available in 1955 it was possible to present a fuller picture of Polish-Russian and Polish-French relations, let alone Polish-British relations, barely touched upon in the book.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part covers the last four years of Marshal Piłsudski's rule, the period in which the marshal veered Polish foreign policy to a "new course." The new course consisted in the emancipation from under the French tutelage, in finding a *modus vivendi* with Germany, and then in establishing and maintaining a balance between Germany and the Soviet Union. The question turned on the point whether Germay could be induced to adopt a new attitude toward Poland. Describing at length Polish reaction to Hitler's accession to power and to the other fateful events of 1933, Roos tries to prove that in March and April of that year Piłsudski pressed for a preventive war or at least wanted to occupy East Prussia, and to this end sounded out Paris and perhaps London. The trouble with this thesis is that it rests in the main on German sources, which should in this case be used with utmost caution if not altogether discarded. The rumors that emanated from Warsaw about an impending preventive war and were timed with troop movements in the Corridor, were calculated to frighten the Germans into accepting the Polish bid for the normalization of relations between the two countries. Hence in the absence of any documentary evidence—Polish and/or French—the story of Piłsudski's repeated attempts to initiate a preventive war must be relegated to the realm of legends. There are also *lacunae* in the account of the negotiations leading to the German-Polish declaration of nonaggression, caused by the author's failure to consult so important a source as J. Lipski's "Materials on the Polish-German declaration of non-aggression" in *Bellona* (1951). The effects of this declaration are examined at length. Especially illuminating are the chapters on the Ukrainian, Danzig and Austrian questions, the estrangement between Poland and France and Czechoslovakia, and Poland's attitude toward the "East Locarno" plan. The second part of the study deals with Beck's "policy of equilibrium" in the years 1935-1937 and his endeavors to create a "Third Europe" in 1937-1939. It ends with the Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw in January 1939, which spelled the final breach between Poland and Germany and the bankruptcy of the policy inaugurated in 1933-34.

Considering that the author lacks the knowledge of the Polish language, the number of references to Polish materials—in particular those to be found in such Polish periodicals as *Wiadomości* (London) and *Kultura* (Paris) — is impressive indeed. He is also familiar with much of the Polish literature on the subject. The numerous quotations from, and references to, the Polish press are taken from the contemporary German translations and resumés published in *Osteuropa*. The most notable feature of the book is its copious documentation. However, the author has a tendency to use interchangeably and indiscriminately documentary and journalistic evidence, the latter often of a very questionable nature. Also he has evinced hardly any caution with regard to memoirs and all sort of *ex post facto* testimonies. Yet all in all this is an excellent study, belonging in the best tradition of solid and objective scholarship. Utmost care has been exercised in editing it, and as a result Polish names and titles are rendered impeccably throughout, an outstanding achievement considering the size of the book. Only very few errors slipped in, for instance on p. 229, n. 24, the biography of Vladimir Slavik is given instead of that of Juraj Slavik, a former Czechoslovak minister of interior.

Russian Research Center ZYGMUNT J. GASIOROWSKI
Harvard University

LUNDIN, C. LEONARD, *Finland in the Second World War.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957. Pp. ix, 303. $5.00.

This remarkable book is at the same time an essay in historiography and an account of Finland in the Second World War. Lundin has used almost exclusively memoirs of Finnish and German politicians, diplomats, and military leaders, and effectively points up many contradictions between them on matters of basic importance. The fundamental disagreement concerns the nature of the Finnish-German *Waffenbrüderschaft* from 1941 to 1944. German writers cited have their own conception of this relationship, and Finns another wholly distinct one. Some differences in interpretation might hinge on the fact that the Finnish-German relationship was seldom 'written down.' Except for President Ryti's famous letter to Hitler, which came at a fairly late stage, there were few written commitments. It may be that the two parties drew drastically different conclusions from verbal discussions. Lundin is correct, however, in assuming that such misunderstanding cannot account for all discrepancies. For example, there is the important question of whether Mannerheim in 1941-1942 favored a campaign against the Murmansk Railway. Mannerheim flatly denies that he did. Waldemar Erfurth, German liaison officer at Mannerheim's headquarters, claims that disagreement between Finnish and German military leaders concerned how, not whether, the railway should be attacked. It is hard to see in what way the historian can extricate himself from such difficulties. Lundin has performed a valuable service in reminding us of the problems of writing history mainly on the basis of memoirs and diaries. Even an intelligent leader (for instance, both Mannerheim and Erfurth) may not always be a reliable original source.

The historical account *per se* falls into three periods: the Winter War, Finland's war against the Soviet Union 1941-1944, and the Finnish struggle against German troops in Lapland, 1944-1945. All three wars are discussed adequately, but by far the most outstanding analysis is that of the second. East Karelia as envisaged in Finnish war aims during the depths of Soviet despair 1941-1942 and German military cooperation with Finland receive first-rate treatments. It is noteworthy that Olavi Paavolainen, one of the most perceptive of modern Finnish writers, is given proper emphasis. Without doubt, Finnish war aims as proclaimed in June-July 1941 revived Mannerheim's 1918 promise that his sword would not rest until all Karelia was free (that is, until East Karelia became Finnish territory). Finland's later difficulties must of necessity be evaluated in the light of these professed war aims.

Lundin's analysis of events leading up to the Winter War raises several basic questions. Reference is made (page 52) to "one rather sharp public speech by Molotov"; presumably this is the crucial speech to the Supreme Soviet, on 31 October 1939, in which the details of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations were first published. This speech may have been the turning point in these discussions, for after informing the entire world of the nature of Soviet demands, the Kremlin was hardly likely to be conciliatory. Molotov's final offer to the Finns, that the Soviet Union receive a base on the southern Finnish coast as a result of purchase or exchange (rather than by lease), so that Finnish sovereignty wouldn't be violated, is dismissed (page 56) as "a curious letter . . . which offered a legalistic formula to ease the transfer of territory by Finland." Whatever the lack of merit in this proposal, it deserves precise description. Soviet creation of the "Democratic Government of Finland" is characterized (page 62) as "an extraordinarily stupid move." Actually, this action may indicate that Soviet war aims involved total destruction of the Finnish state, not merely acquisition of strategically-located territory. There are relatively few errors in translation or nomenclature. Most confusing is the translation of *Kansallinen kokoomuspuolue* as "Concentration Party;" more accurate would be "National Coalition Party," and more descriptive, "Conservative Party."

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy MARVIN RINTALA

VON KLEMPERER, KLEMENS, *Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century.* Foreword by Sigmund Neumann. Princeton: University Press, 1957. Pp. 250. $5.00.

This book is an important one. Most works covering the period have been written from the point of view of Weimar, treating all anti-democratic opinion merely as opposition. Professor von Klemperer believes the various conservative individuals and their following can be considered as one element even though there was a vast difference between nineteenth century German conservatism and the post-World War I varieties. He finds his conservatives among the socialists of 1918 as well as among the Junkers and as a result he includes many figures claimed by other parties at one time or another. The author devotes special attention to Moeller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and Ernst Jünger. Neither Moeller nor Jünger are as well known here as they should be. The Nazis used Moeller's writings constantly for propaganda purposes and Jünger was the idol of many of the German youth of the twenties who found the republic drab and monotonous compared with the excitement Jünger sought and inspired. When their hero gravitated into Nazi circles, most of them followed him. But when, disillusioned, he managed to obtain a post in Paris after 1940 where he retreated to the safer realms of poetry and mysticism, his following were not so fortunate. Their only recourse was to join the 1944 anti-Hitler Putsch which some few of them did.

Buttressed by a great deal of painstaking research, this is a provocative book. Its main thesis is not always convincing, partly because, as Professor Neumann points out in his extremely interesting foreword, the terms "conservatism" and "liberalism" have had their meaning so abused that "one may be inclined to dismiss them despairingly as adequate tools of conceptual clarification."

Professor von Klemperer cannot accept the premise that the Weimar Republic failed simply because too few Germans ever really wanted it. He says that in the earliest post-war period before the hard facts of Versailles were known, conservatives as well as socialists and democrats *were willing to accept* the new government. But passive acceptance is hardly sufficient proof of support or defense of any régime. The appearance of post-war problems destroyed even passive acceptance on the part of these conservative elements and so Gleichen, Moeller and Stadler, to mention only a few of the leaders, developed followings having only one thing in common—antiparliamentarianism. That led Rathenau and a few others formerly in the group to disavow them. Everywhere one turns in the history of the antirepublicans of this period in Germany, one finds individual cases rather than groups of men bound together by principles and programs. Opposition, like passive acceptance, is hardly the basis for a strong party development. Neo-conservatism as a name for these anti-Weimarites gives the impression of a common interest far stronger than I believe to have been the case. Among this group are listed Thomas Mann and the Strasser brothers, Hans Zehrer and Jünger. Yet Mann wanted a real conservative party and supported the republic at critical periods, while the Strassers wanted a social revolution. If we accept the author's premise that neo-conservatism was primarily of an intellectual nature rather than a political one, we look in vain for a philosophy arising from its ideas. But however much Professor von Klemperer believes that neo-conservatism deserves to be considered as one force, he is too good a historian to overlook facts. Somewhat reluctantly, to judge by the explanations which precede the statement, he points out that "the Republic become more and more the scapegoat for any unhappy generation which turned its eyes toward the promised Third Reich." Furthermore he states that "despite the example of Rathenau and Moellendorff they did not manage to outline a program on which they could have agreed."

However controversial the conclusions may be, the light cast upon these individuals is a great aid to historical knowledge. The bibliography deserves special commendation too.

New York University Minna R. Falk

Čulinović, Ferdo, *Razvitak AVNOJ-A.* Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1957. Pp. 134.

November 29, 1943, is a milestone in the modern history of Yugoslavia. That day, 142 delegates met at a Bosnian village, Jajce, at the second session of the Antifascist Committee of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia—AVNOJ—to lay down foundations for the future political structure of Yugoslavia. It carried resolutions which proclaimed AVNOJ as the supreme legislative and executive body of the country, denied the government in exile any right of representation, enunciated the principle of a federative system of government, forbade the King to return to the country before the nation had decided the question of monarchy, etc.

The Jajce meeting was preceded by the first session at Bihać, in November 1942, and by local "elections" of National Committees in scattered areas under the administration of the Yugoslav partisans. It was followed by Tito's agreements with the government in exile in 1944, by the Big Three Yalta recommendations in February 1945, and finally by the Proclamation on the foundation of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, on November 29, 1945.

Professor Čulinović, who is a scholar in jurisprudence, analyzes the constitutional meaning of these important events and reaches the conclusion, against the opinion of some other theoreticians, that the Jajce meeting founded the new Yugoslav state. AVNOJ became, in his opinion, the only sovereign representative of the Yugoslav nation, both internally and externally; it became, also in terms of international law, the supreme organ of the state, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia thereby ceased to exist. Moreover, it proclaimed the principle of the unity of power, of legislature and executive (without mentioning judiciary), which he considers as a progressive step in political theory and practice as against the "obsolete" separation of governmental powers. He further maintains that the Jajce meeting upheld the juridical continuity of Yugoslavia in international relations, though the national revolution cut off any legal ties between the royal and republican Yugoslavia.

This double-standard approach makes it difficult for Professor Čulinović to avoid some inconsistencies and contradictions in his thesis. If Yugoslavia became a Republic and if its sole representative was AVNOJ after November 1943, it is hard to reconcile with this assumption Tito's agreement of 1944 with the King's Prime Minister, J. Subašić, which at least in theory provided for the possibility of a continued monarchy. It is equally difficult to follow his thesis in the light of Tito's acceptance of the Royal Regency in 1945 in a republic which supposedly had existed since November 1943. And even more elusive is his argument that the Federative Yugoslav Republic existed *de jure* since that time if it is known that the Allied Powers recognized the Yugoslav government, composed of Tito's and the King's representatives, as provisional only in 1945.

Professor Čulinović considers the change in Yugoslavia as a result of revolution. He would be moving on safer ground had he abandoned the attempt to present its juridical implications as a constitutional evolution and had his analysis emanated consistently from the revolutionary foundations of the new Yugoslavia.

University of Denver JOSEF KORBEL

CRETZIANU, ALEXANDRE, *The Lost Opportunity*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1957. Pp. 188. 18s.

The lively debate on whether British or American strategists were right on the question of striking at Hitler's empire through the Balkans is likely to occupy our attention for some time to come, as the active participants in the discussions and decisions of the time continue their revelations. It will never be solved beyond all counter-argument for the simple reason that the war was won by the "Overlord" strategy, and what would have happened as a result of some other strategy is speculation. The deplorable political consequences of the Soviet occupation of the Balkans have naturally encouraged such speculation and, incidentally, have led to some exaggerations of motives and the actual proposals of those who argued the case for a Balkan strategy at the time. The two occasions were in 1943, in connection with the Italian campaign and after Italy's surrender, and in 1944 when it was proposed to go eastward instead of into southern France. According to his own account (*The Second World War,* IV, 826; V, 210-211; VI, 61-66, 101) Churchill himself, cited here as the tireless advocate of a Balkan invasion, never proposed an Allied invasion of the Balkan Peninsula; in 1943 he favored giving greater help to anti-Nazi partisans, taking some Aegean islands and bringing Turkey into the war, and in 1944 he proposed a strike through the Ljubljana gap to Vienna and possibly Budapest, which might have saved Hungary from Soviet occupation but not Rumania and Bulgaria. Against this the author cites statements from the memoirs of Hull and Leahy, and says, rightly, that Churchill's suggestions were so consistently rejected it is impossible to say how far-reaching they might have proved in practice (p. 175). But the real argument of the book does not rest on precisely what Churchill did or did not advocate, rather on the author's own view that, strategically as well as politically, a "great mistake" was made.

Mr. Cretzianu, who as a Rumanian diplomat was not privy to what was going on in the councils of the Allies, does not offer any startling new information on these points. Indeed, he makes a telling point of how unaware he and his colleagues were of the decisions that were being taken and of those that were going by default, how they lived in a kind of dream world of hope and expectation constantly subject to surprise and disillusionment. He argues the case of "lost opportunity" on the basis of the wartime revelations published up to the time of writing and his estimate of "the softness of the underbelly." He does so with conviction and with well-reasoned analysis; but it is one outsider's opinion, not history's final judgment.

It is an opinion, too, that has its special slant, for the author sees the whole problem as a Rumanian who would have liked Allied military strategy to perform the task of saving his country from Soviet occupation as well as that of defeating Germany. In retrospect, it may be unfortunate that the Western Allies did not fit their strategy to this political objective; the peoples of Eastern Europe and the cause of freedom have paid a heavy price for their failure to do so. But we cannot be sure that Mr. Cretzianu's judgment is the right one. Would it have been so easy? Would German control have vanished from the Balkan countries at the first appearance of Allied forces? Might we have not kept the Russians from the lower Danube at the cost of seeing them on the Rhine?

The great service of this book is the additional light it sheds on the development of Rumanian policy during the war: how Rumania got in and how it tried to get out, the maneuvers of Mihai Antonescu and the attitudes of the Marshal, and the curious situation in which Stirbey negotiated with the Allies in Cairo on behalf of both Government and opposition. Mr. Cretzianu himself at Ankara had a key rôle where he served his country well in a lost cause. He put his hopes in the West, as did Maniu and the other democratic leaders in Rumania. We cannot be surprised that they felt let down, particularly in the summer of 1944 when the Rumanian offer to surrender and "plan of action" went begging for two months (p. 144). He attributes the Allied delay to the famous Churchill proposal whereby Russia should play the hand in Rumania while Britain did the same in Greece. In fact the explanation was simpler. The Allies were still acting *à trois* in the Rumanian armistice negotiations; they were merely waiting for Rumania to accept the terms offered and quit the war, not to make conditions by calling for the dropping of Western airborne forces in Rumania and the signing of an armistice before Rumania actually broke with Germany. Undoubtedly the Western powers paid too little heed to the difficulties within Rumania in bringing off the surrender successfully with the German army in the country. On the other hand, one could not help being surprised at Rumanian optimism in thinking that somehow, even though Rumania had gone all the way to Stalingrad as an ally of Hitler and lay in the path of the Red Army, it could make a deal whereby the Western powers, while still at war as allies of Russia, would prevent a Soviet occupation. A number of hard facts—geographical, military, political—determined the fate of Rumania after the defeat of Hitler. Was the "lost opportunity" ever really there?

Council on Foreign Relations JOHN C. CAMPBELL
New York

KERSTEN, FELIX, *The Kersten Memoirs 1940-1945*. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 314. $5.00.

The present Memoirs represent in great part a translation of an earlier version which appeared in Germany in 1953 under the title *Totenkopf und Treue*. Their importance derives from the fact that they contain notes of conversations between Felix Kersten, the Finnish manual therapist, and his patient Heinrich Himmler whose painful suffering from frequent stomach spasm made him dependent upon his masseur.

In his essay introducing the Memoirs, Professor H. R. Trevor-Roper convincingly disproves the widely-held view that Count Folke Bernadotte, then Vice

President of the Swedish Red Cross, played the major part in the rescue of thousands of concentration camp prisoners during the final weeks of the Third Reich. He shows that much greater credit is due Kersten, who worked at Himmler's headquarters "as a foreigner, without any power except the power of physical and intellectual manipulation," and he is "pleased to support with such authority as I possess the accuracy of these memoirs of Felix Kersten" (p. 21).

Might not Kersten's own claim that the cause of the release of prisoners "was essentially a medical problem . . . it was Himmler's stomach-cramps which enabled me to rescue my protégés" (p. 306) still be examined? It should be possible to pay tribute to Kersten's undoubted achievements, without overlooking various factors which were also at work around Himmler. In his own memoirs, published under the title *The Labyrinth,* Walter Schellenberg (head of RSHA Division VI and after 1944 head of the unified Foreign Intelligence Service) reveals that in 1942, after learning that Stalin—impatient for the opening of a second front—showed dissatisfaction with the Western allies, an occasion presented itself for increasing inter-allied rivalry by bargaining with both Russia and the West, while Germany still had enough strength for such a bargaining position. Schellenberg adds that in August 1942 upon obtaining Kersten's agreement on efforts toward a compromised peace, he conferred with Himmler, who then gave him full authority for such clandestine moves.

This is generally consistent with Kersten's own account, according to which, in October and November 1943, he had preliminary talks with Mr. Abram Stevens Hewitt, his patient and President Roosevelt's so-called "special representative in Stockholm," in which Schellenberg participated also. These details (pp. 188-197) showing the extent of Himmler's own readiness to accept difficult terms, are interesting enough; they also should be weighed along with Kersten's "stomach-cramps" thesis. Further evidence for the suggestion that various rescue actions were perhaps part of larger negotiations aimed at splitting the Russians from the Western allies is given by Alex Weissberg's book *Die Geschichte von Joel Brand,* published in 1956 at Cologne. Weissberg reports in detail on transactions starting in 1942, during which SS leaders—with Himmler's approval—accepted ransom money in exchange for a halt in the deportations of Jews from Slovakia and Hungary. These activities proceeded independent of Kersten; when he learned of them through one of his patients, he opposed them "on moral grounds" and took credit when Himmler "at last took a stand against the demands for money" (p. 204). Unfortunately Kersten's memoirs here show discrepancies with the earlier version, where he had claimed that despite his efforts "Himmler continued to declare that the ransom money could not be relinquished" (Doubleday edition, 1947, p. 220). Probably these inconsistencies are due to Kersten's eagerness to exaggerate his own importance; therefore it would seem prudent to accept mainly those parts of the memoirs that can be corroborated independently, especially in the "Himmler Files," now at Alexandria, Virginia under U. S. Army administration.

The Memoirs contain many valuable details which would be helpful for any student of the SS. They reveal that Himmler gradually wanted to overthrow established practices in modern medicine—by returning to nature cures, herbalism, sauna baths, special diets etc.—just as he opposed Christianity and Roman law in favor of aspects in religion and law which he considered more "natural" and more "ancestral." This "archaic revolutionary"—so we might call him—differed from other "universal cranks" (Gerald Reitlinger's term), precisely because he had the power to put some of these ideas into practice within the ranks of the SS, with results which became painfully clear when they were disclosed at the Nuremberg proceedings.

University of California, Berkeley MANFRED WOLFSON

ZINK, HAROLD, *The United States in Germany 1944-1945*. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1957. Pp. x, 374. $7.50.

The ending of the allied occupation of Western Germany with the giving of sovereignty to the Federal Republic in 1955 naturally suggested the desirability of a comprehensive review of American activity in Germany since 1944. Professor Zink of the Political Science Department of Ohio State University has now provided it. No one is better qualified to do so. An original member of the planning team set up in England early in 1944 and later an important member of the Office of Political Affairs in the early rounds of the occupation, he is the author of the well-known *American Military Government in Germany* published in 1947. In 1950-51 he served as chief historian of the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany.

Mr. Zink begins with a short statement about the significance of our occupation of Germany following World War II, pointing out not only its importance for our relations with the Soviet Union and our present major allies but also for the development of the general programs in such areas as foreign aid, information, cultural relations and exchange of persons. In methodical, historical order he then describes and analyzes the many aspects of the occupation program—planning, organization, personnel, policy, denazification, governmental affairs, education, the economic and fiscal, public safety, youth work, women's activities, religious affairs and the rest. Finally he devotes chapters to the problem of democracy in Germany, the special case of Berlin, and an evaluation of the occupation effort in general.

During the author's service as chief historian in the office of the High Commissioner his staff began the production of a series of monographs of the work of the different branches of that Office. In making his summary Mr. Zink has naturally drawn heavily upon these works. But he cites much other literature in addition; in fact, the careful footnotes and extensive bibliography are not the least valuable features of this volume.

Professor Zink courageously gives his considered judgment on many controversial aspects of the occupation and on the performances of individuals prominent in it. Most informed people of similar background will probably find comparatively little to challenge in these evaluations. It perhaps should be said, however, that most of the more detailed personal tributes seem to go to fellow scholars temporarily turned administrators. Members of the legal profession, among others, might well feel that had the author had a comparable acquaintance with those of their group involved in occupation affairs he could have been equally generous in his ratings of them. This reviewer also feels that Mr. Zink has been over-kind in his exculpation of President Roosevelt in connection with his acceptance of the Morgenthau plan (p. 87), when there appears to be considerable evidence that as early as 1943 Roosevelt himself was voluntarily abandoning the Atlantic-Charter principles enunciated in 1941. Similarly, an even stronger protest must be registered against the near-whitewash treatment given to American policy and actions on the problem of the German food supply in the years 1945-7 (p. 299),—in the reviewer's opinion one of the most disgraceful episodes in our history. But these are matters of personal judgment, on which men of good will have long differed.

The volume is unquestionably a sound piece of well-organized, conscientious scholarship which should become the standard work on the subject.

Washington, D. C. Marshall Knappen

Weymar, Paul, *Adenauer; his authorized biography.* (Translated from the German by Peter de Mendelsohn.) New York: Dutton, 1957. Pp. 509. $5.95.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer has emerged as one of the most dominant, if not domineering, personalities on the post-war scene. Whether or not he will rank next to Bismarck as the outstanding statesman of modern Germany, a claim that Adenauer himself modestly rejects, remains to be seen. But such have been his efforts and achievements that his rôle in German history can surely not be overlooked either by future historians or by writers of current biography.

Paul Weymar has presented a wealth of information on the man who rose from the headship of the Cologne city administration to the Chancellorship of the federal republic. From the pages of this biography arises the picture of a man whose main features of character are similar to those of his face. The man whose face has been variously described as that of an Indian chieftain, a Tibetan monk, or a Japanese samurai has indeed as much pride, poise, and patience as any of them. He also has their aloofness and secretiveness. His determination and shrewdness are proverbial and the epithet Old Fox has been applied rightly. But mention must also be made and is made frequently in the book of a deeply rooted Christian and occidental outlook. Adenauer's official biographer has clearly brought out these features, but he is somewhat less perceptive in regard to such negative traits of his hero as autocratic habits and lack of cordiality.

Mr. Weymar divides his book, which is rather well translated, into four parts. The story of Adenauer's early life and that of his family is rather appealing and the author does well in outlining certain characteristics such as self-reliance, tenacity, and practicalness which greatly helped Konrad Adenauer in his later career. The second part of the biography covers the years of Adenauer's tenure of office as *Oberbürgermeister* of Cologne (1917-1933) and is somewhat better known. He was undoubtedly one of the best city administrators Germany ever had and certainly one of the most courageous. Probably no other incident in the long span of the Adenauer administration of Cologne is better known than the flag incident of February 1933 when the resolute lord mayor ordered the Swastika flags on the Rhine bridge to be taken down and even refused to receive the *Führer.* There are also to be found detailed references to Adenauer's autocratic handling of such issues as the creation of the Cologne green-belt and of the suspension bridge across the Rhine. Most interesting, however, is the discussion of the charges of separatism which were first brought against the later chancellor in 1919 and have never since been quite forgotten.

The third part of Weymar's book is the most moving as well as the most upsetting. It describes in detail the ordeal to which the Herr Oberbürgermeister and his family were exposed between 1933 and 1945. The Adenauers experienced at times the full brunt of Nazi persecution whose ruthless methods have been forgotten only too soon by those who were not subjected to it. It is probably no exaggeration to state that Frau Adenauer died as the result of Nazi ruthlessness. The account of how her husband was twice helped to escape certain death belongs to the most memorable episodes in his life as well as in this book.

The last and largest part of the biography deals with the amazing come-back of Adenauer since 1945. Yet it is this section which seems the least interesting partly because it lacks the written source references and partly because the author is so much in sympathy with his hero as not to see his political shortcomings. Weymar ascribes the spectacular recovery of West Germany almost entirely to the *Bundeskanzler*. This, no doubt, is an exaggeration in spite of the fact that he was largely responsible for such attainments as the founding of the C.D.U., improvement in relations with France, furtherance of European integration, progress toward West German sovereignty, the settlement with Israel, and the *Mitbestimmungsrecht* of German labor in large industrial enterprises. Unfortunately, there are no references to the Chancellor's eastern policies which basically do not seem to differ from those of Stresemann.

Since decades will go by before a definitive study can be made of Adenauer's tenure of office as *Bundeskanzler* Weymar's biography will have to be accepted as the best available for some time. It has the advantage of being based on a great variety of personal interpretations and recollections of those who have been in touch with the "Granite Chancellor." But it lacks all reference to written sources without which no biography can stand the test of time or of scholarly examination and without the sifting of which no man can be accepted into the Hall of Fame of history. In putting aside this interesting if incomplete biography one is reminded of the Chinese proverb that great men are like great mountains; they have to be viewed from the distance in order to be fully comprehended.

University of Texas F. GUNTHER EYCK

TOMAŠIĆ, D. A., *National Communism and Soviet Strategy*. With the assistance of Joseph Strmecki. Introduction by Elmer Louis Kayser. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. x, 221. $4.50.

A chief contribution of this little book is its utilization of hard-to-get-at sources. Professor Tomašić has not only made use of numerous works in Serbo-Croatian, including the official party history, and of the returns of the crucial Yugoslav election of 1920; he has also contacted former members of the Yugoslav party (and in particular ex-politburo member Ante Ciliga) and persuaded them to put down their experiences and observations in manuscripts now on file at the Indiana University library.

From Professor Tomašić' use of these sources the reader acquires new insights into the history of the Yugoslav party (which history is, in fact, the main concern of the work). There is, for example, the rôle played by the *prechane,* or Serbs of Bosnia, who belonged from the beginning to the left wing of the party. They drew their inspiration from the pre-war terrorist organization *Mlada Bosna* (some of them had actually been members) and they provided key personnel for the youth organization at the University of Belgrad, from which so much of the present-day leadership stems. The Communist rising of 1929 was centered in Lika, among the *prechane* of northwestern Bosnia, while the massacres perpetrated by the *Ustashe* drove these Serbs *en masse* into the Partisan ranks.

There are also some useful interpretive ideas in the book. Professor Tomašić makes a case for the existence within the Yugoslav party of a sharp division between those whom he calls the professional conspirators and those whom he designates as technocrats. The conspirators endured the rigors of prison and survived the horrors of the little war on the mountain. Their strength is their fanaticism and their devotion to the party. The technocrats are the engineers, the economists, the physicists whom the party must admit as members after the seizure of power. The technocrats not only have distinct interests and different attitudes, they tend to push the *kristalni* aside. Professor Tomašić suggests that this fissure may also exist inside the Soviet party.

The author devotes but scanty space to national Communism in the Satellites. He does not mention the first ministry of Imre Nagy. A comparative analysis of the programs of Nagy, Gomulka, and Tito, he does not attempt. His view of national Communism is based primarily on his reading of the Yugoslav case, and on copious quotations from the sacred texts of Marxism-Leninism. He regards the Yugoslav party as dogmatically Orthodox and as having now re-entered the Soviet Bloc, in part because of the threat to its solidarity created by Western influences, as illustrated by the Djilas case. National Communism he considers both a Leninist tactical maneuver and an unstable juxtaposition of incompatibles designed to organize more effectively the relations among Communist states on the one hand, and between Communist rulers and their subjects on the other.

Unfortunately the work is marred by a number of slips which must be attributed to haste in composition and proof-reading. The most notable of these is the statement that the Communists received "over 16 per cent of the total vote" (p. 15) in the election of 1920. Working from the same official source, this reviewer reaches a percentage of 12.4. But this and similar oversights do not alter the fact that *National Communism and Soviet Strategy* is a useful contribution to our knowledge of a difficult and controversial subject, Communism among the Yugoslavs.

Wayne State University R. V. Burks

Korbonski, Stefan, *The Story of the Polish Underground State, 1939-1945*. F. B. Czarnomski, transl. New York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. 495. $6.75.

Whenever contemporary historians, or those of the future, select epics of the mid-twentieth century they will have to include that of heroic Warsaw in 1944. It illustrates the indestructible spirit and will of a courageous people who, after five years of life under German occupation, arose practically unarmed to overthrow the military might of Hitler's armies.

The same event will also serve as a perfect illustration of the very effective but exceedingly inhuman character of Soviet military and diplomatic strategy which provoked the Warsaw uprising and then allowed the Germans to liquidate its heroes.

The Destruction of Warsaw by Nazi Germany was apparently desired by Moscow as a stepping-stone to the subsequent enslavement by the Kremlin of this wartime ally. For sixty-three days the Red Armies watched from the outskirts of the city the liquidation of its unarmed and hungry civilian population by the Germans. After 250,000 of the citizens of Warsaw were killed and the rest deported only then did the Red Armies enter to claim the victory. The dead did not challenge them.

Stefan Korbonski, one of the political leaders of the Polish underground organization which was organized and controlled by the Polish Government in London, wrote a book called "Fighting Warsaw." The original version was written in Poland and was to have been published there. It was an objective and informative work. When Korbonski left Poland taking the manuscript with him, he plunged into exile politics. Being an ambitious man he attempted to elevate himself into a position of prominence. It is, presumably, because he wished to raise his stature that he altered the original text, This is to be regretted. As a result, "Fighting Warsaw" serves largely as a background for Korbonski's activities. It is, in effect, his diary. The greatest part of the book is devoted to his life.

Korbonski spent most of the war years in the civilian section of the Z.W.Z.

(later called A.K. or the Home Army) which was General Sosnkowski's underground military organization. He was in charge of a secret radio station which maintained contact with London. The underground organization in Poland was under the direction of the Vice-Premier of the Polish Government in London, Jankowski, who remained in Poland and was assisted by fifteen prominent leaders, who did not number Korbonski among them. When Jankowski and his fifteen colleagues were treacherously arrested by the Soviets early in 1945 Korbonski took over as a deputy for the absent Jankowski. His new position was never confirmed by the Polish Government in London. It was in this new capacity that Korbonski issued a declaration to the Polish people encouraging them to cooperate with the Lublin Committee, appointed by Moscow, but discouraged them from collaborating with the U.B. or Communist Security Police.

During the Moscow Conference which settled the composition of the Provisional Government of Poland Korbonski resigned and Bialas took over Jankowski's function. Korbonski was arrested in Kraków. The then Vice-Premier of the Provisional Government, Mikołajczyk, demanded that he be released on the order of the Council of Ministers. Korbonski was released and stated that his declaration urging the Poles to collaborate with the Lublin Commiteee freed him from prison. When the Polish Peasant Party, under the leadership of Mikolajczyk, attempted to oppose various totalitarian policies of the Provisional Government Korbonski urged the disbanding of the Party. His motion was rejected.

After the 1947 election Mikołajczyk proposed that the Peasant Party vote against the new Communist budget. Korbonski and Kiernik, together with Wycech, Koter, and Banach voted against Mikolajczyk's motion presumably in order not to endanger the Party. Subsequently, when the Communists began to persecute the Party, to arrest and even to kill its members, Korbonski decided to escape from Poland. He first tried in vain to reach freedom via the Carpathian Mountains. Later he succeeded via the Baltic Sea.

However, when he thought about the fate of Mikołajczyk he was of the opinion that he should stay, come what may. "The former Premier of Poland, presently the Vice Premier in jail or even facing the execution squad! This may open the eyes of the West. This will shake the conscience of the world. But to extend this martyrdom to the Council of the Party and to me as its member would be a mistake. We should go abroad." Besides the Communists, certain political opponents of Mikolajczyk would have undoubtedly been pleased to see him executed. Fortunately, the Polish nation seems to appreciate the fact that he is still alive.

Had Korbonski published the original copy of his book it would have been a worthy and informative contribution to the study of Soviet methods in the enslavement of a nation which wished to be free.

University of Colorado EDWARD J. ROZEK

SHUCHMAN, ABRAHAM, *Codetermination, Labor's Middle Way in Germany*. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. 247. $4.50.

The literal translation of *Mitbestimmungsrecht,* the demand of German Labor for the right to participate in economic decision-making, has enriched the American vocabulary by a new term: Codetermination. In view of the vagueness of this term it is hardly surprising that many of the prevalent notions about its meaning are erroneous. For this reason alone, this pioneer study in English would deserve high praise, which unfortunately, however, cannot be given without weighty reservations.

Shuchman begins with a good general classification of the types of decision-making involved in codetermination. He shows that in actual practice a great deal of "codetermination" is little more than co-operation, ranging from the right to protest to the right of consultation. When we reach codetermination properly so called, we find that it seldom means the right to "co-make" decisions and that still more rarely does it go beyond the areas of social and personnel affairs to that of economic policy in the enterprise. A further classificatory refinement bears on the organizational level of codetermination: the enterprise level, where it has become quite extensive; and the supra-enterprise level (Economic Chambers, Economic Councils etc.) where it is very limited or has remained an unfulfilled aspiration.

Shuchman gives also a good survey history of the struggle for the introduction of "economic democracy" in Germany since the mid-19th century, the rôle of Trade Unions, Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, Works Councils, *"Kathedersozialisten,"* and the emergence of codetermination as the ideology of the German Labor movement. Unfortunately, the account stops with the adoption of the 1951/52 federal legislation, leaving unanswered the important constitutional and political questions raised by the 1955 *Personalvertretergesetz* (pertaining to codetermination of government workers and employees). The five pages alloted to federal legislation in practice since 1952 are likewise too scanty to permit any estimation of Shuchman's authoritative statements regarding the success or failure of present codetermination.

The author's major concern is the mere presentation of what he himself calls the "ideology" of codetermination as seen by German Labor leaders. He devotes over 60 pages of the book to extensive quotation and summary of these views and leaves the reader slightly puzzled as to his own views, or whether the views of German Labor are to be taken as his own. It is interesting to note that among the books German Labor regards with scriptural reverence is *Jenseits des Kapitalismus,* written in 1946 by Richard Loewenthal, a member of the SPD's "radical" *Neubeginnen* wing during the Nazi exile, under the pseudonym Paul Sering. One wonders to what extent Loewenthal (now very active as a political analyst in England), as an avid student of the Yugoslav Workers' Councils scheme, has modified his views? (It seems that Schuchman was not aware of the identity of the author.)

It is also to be regretted that the implications of "full" codetermination as envisaged by German Labor for the fate of political democracy are not very systematically discussed. The final chapter of only three pages leaves the reader with completely contradictory answers to this problem. Does the absence of codetermination in recent political Labor agitation suggest that Labor and the SPD have become aware of the fundamental issue which was eloquently formulated by a German editor in 1951: "If codetermination should only be a preliminary step toward socialization, it would have failed in principle, since there is no codetermination under socialization"?

The book suffers from exasperatingly shoddy editing. Lines are missing and others appear twice (pp. 76, 104, 134, 195). The subtitles on pp. 138 and 146 are incorrect. The present German parliament is not called *Reichs*tag as on p. 127, etc. To sum up: A not too critical and complete presentation.

University of California, Berkeley HORST DUHNKE

SETHE, PAUL, *Zwischen Bonn und Moskau.* Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Heinrich Scheffler, 1957. 3. Auflage. Pp. 180. DM 8.80.

For Germany the Cold War has been another "war of lost opportunities." Again and again, since 1945, Paul Sethe asserts, the rivalry and mutual fears of the remaining Great Powers led them to court the Germans; yet the German Federal Republic threw away every opportunity to obtain the reunification of West and Middle Germany. It is not hard to understand the German public's demand for this book, which brought it to a third edition between November 1956 and March 1957. Appearing at a time when the Germans felt particularly disenchanted with their Atlantic Pact allies (Suez crisis) and with Khrushchev's Geneva spirit (Hungary), this skillful blend of contemporary history and political journalism appeals to a reborn German pride. Sethe could also take advantage of a temporary set-back in Adenauer's popularity in 1956, accusing his government of too rigid attachment to the United States for security. His uniform advice at all junctures would have been, and still is: negotiate directly with the Russians with the intention of really paying something for German unity.

Sethe's tone is a familiar one among German scholars and political journalists. Every nation in the world except the Germans, he implies, knows that everything has its price, that self-interest comes before charity, and that in the last analysis, *Realpolitik* is the only *Politik*. The Federal Republic has committed the double error of believing that the United States was intrinsically interested in German reunification and in rejecting, out of hand, all Russian efforts to negotiate in the matter. Out of their deep-felt need to have security (*Geborgenheit*), the German public, as much as the Adenauer régime, have let themselves be talked into believing that reunification could only be obtained by intimidating Soviet Russia in close alliance with America. Instead, the Soviet Union has actually hardened its position *vis-a-vis* German reunification in exact proportion to its own increasing military strength. In fact, after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union has been less inclined to compromise on Germany than in 1952.

The year 1952 was a kind of turning point in the relations between Bonn and Moscow, according to Sethe. He bases much of his argument on the proposals made in the Russian note of March 10, 1952, addressed to each of the three other occupying powers. At this point, he believes, before rearmament had actually taken place, Bonn and the West were at their maximum bargaining effectiveness. The Russians had not yet perfected atomic weapons; they were willing to buy off the Germans with reunification, because they truly feared an American-German military combination. Believing that the Russians would concede still more to a stronger Germany, Adenauer postponed all negotiations, against the advice of a few independent journalists who warned that Germany should not repeat the uncompromising inflexibility of Bülow, Holstein, Hertling and Hitler. From the explosion of the Russian hydrogen bomb, on August 12, 1953, on, the Russians gradually came to fear Germany's divisions less and less; and to work instead for a *detente* with the United States, based on recognition of the European *status quo*, of which the German Democratic Republic was to become a permanent factor.

The sweeping endorsement of Adenauer's policies in the September 1957 German elections seems to indicate that Sethe's concerns are not taken so seriously at the moment. The desperate fate of the seventeen million Germans east of the Elbe and Werra, and perhaps even of the lands east of the Oder and Neisse, cannot move the West Germans from their newfound *Nibelungentreue* toward the Atlantic bloc. Yet students of German politics will do well to read Sethe's book carefully, for the exceedingly well expressed views of this popular historian (*Schicksalsstunden der Weltgeschichte; Epochen der Weltgeschichte; Kleine Geschichte Russlands*) could prepare the way for a new *Dolchstoss* legend as virulent as the old. This book is more than a storm signal; it could shape the thinking of a new German generation. In its idiom, its blend of cool calculation and moral indignation, and its express aim, it is directed to the future.

University of Nebraska ROBERT KOEHL

CONNELL, BRIAN, *Watcher on the Rhine. A Report on the New Germany.* London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1957. Pp. 281. 21s.

Here between the covers of one small book are really three rather oddly assorted ones, interspersed with one another: a detailed, sympathetic, and quite convincing description of a microcosm in which the author and his wife lived in 1956 at Niederdollendorf, opposite Bad Godesberg, on the Rhine; a fine assembly of personal histories and character sketches of currently prominent Germans; and some sweeping generalizations about Germans and "German" traits which this reviewer finds a little less convincing.

The reviewer had his introduction to the Rhineland west of Koblenz in 1918-19 as a member of the old AEF and army of occupation; the author had his as a student in Berlin in the middle of the Nazi period, where the reviewer was then doing some research. The author observed the German scene for British naval intelligence, then returned in 1945 via Hamburg and the Elbe with the British armed forces, remained for some years as a journalist, and returned again ten years later while the reviewer was working with the Embassy and living just across the Rhine from Niederdollendorf. Author and reviewer thus observed many phenomena at the same time, from slightly different vantage points, and reacted to them quite similarly as to fundamentals, sometimes differently as to trivialities.

Differently: imagine an Englishman complaining (p. 264) furiously about German cooking, or the rigidities of German etiquette! It seems awkward to carry flowers to one's hostess upside down; but what of that? Opinions differ as to the beauty of the Bundestag building; but is it as garish as all that? (229). Not all of Bonn is beautiful; but is it hideous? (218) Given time and wine enough, a group of idle adolescents on the Drachenfels may be heard droning through the Horst Wessel Lied, or trying to do so; but when the reviewer heard that, a hundred Germans within earshot pretended not to hear. When the author heard some older people, similarly inebriated, try the catchy war-time U-boat song *Wir fahren gegen Engelland* (p. 213), they supposed no outsider was listening. To most denizens of the "Bonn Aquarium" who work there, life is much less boring and—one hopes—more useful than it seemed to Mr. Connell—looking on or sharing the facilities of the Embassy Club or of the local restaurants. Zauendorf (194) is presumably old Zorndorf: but how can that drawn slugfest be called a Russian victory? (194)

Again differently: the author seems to the reviewer to be overstating when he says (p. 21): "It is almost as if the Germans, in spite of their vast technical knowledge and undoubted intellectual attainments, somehow have no mind. And if they have, then it is a schizophrenic mind, which can take in certain impressions and fail utterly to apply them to the sum of experience in some other part of their brain." There is no perfect transfer of intelligence, and Connell is not the first to accuse the Germans of schizophrenia or of national paranoia; but one may still question whether they are that bad.

Similarly: No Englishman or American who knows anything about Nazi Germany will react favorably to the reappearance of the black breeches and jackboots of the old SS, or of the too-familiar black leather overcoat or jacket, or to the appearance or bearing of the tough-looking young fellows occasionally seen wearing them, although these now discredited articles of clothing are admittedly well adapted as costume for the now-so-ubiquitous motorcycle rider. Occasional reminders of 1919 or of 1936 give the experienced observer the impression that "this must be where we came in" . . . . "The economic foundations of the boom are still only skin deep (65) . . . . The pension laws favoring former civilian officials and military men with tenure are being abused by a disturbing number of former Nazi (122) . . . . Men such as Pastor Martin Niemöller, once heroic in resistance to the Nazi, seem now to be politically bewildered (124) . . . . "Germany's tragedy is that too few of the surviving democrats are good politicians and a bare handful of the few able politicians are good democrats." (243) When will the Germans develop the strong sense of communal political responsibility which they still need? (248) Will civilian control of the armed forces be endangered by the removal of Blank, the decline of Baudissin, and the rise of Strauss? (207, 210)

Still similarly: there are heartening signs. The acceptance of a capital levy on those least heavily hit by the war for the benefit of those bombed out, dispossessed, or displayed by it. (97) The citizenship training offered by such organizations as the Federal Center for Home Service (*Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst,* 234). The unanimity with which the Bundestag passed an appropriation to make such restitution to the Jews as is still possible. (239) The character of President Heuss, and the affectionate esteem in which he is held. And above all, the respect paid so far to the first sentence of the basic law: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all State authority."

Although the author refrained from prophesy, he will not have been surprised by such subsequent developments as: the continuing trend of opinion toward European Union. The Adenauer election victory. The increasing electoral strength of the moderate "middle" parties, the more liberal-conservative attitudes of the Social Democrats, and the decline of the extremist parties of both right and left. The political emergence of such new leaders as Willy Brandt (Berlin) and Franz Etzel (new Minister of Finance), with Carlo Schmidt (Socialist) and Ludwig Erhard (Minister of Economics) still going strong. The author closes his book on an appropriately hopeful note by quoting his forward-looking, staunch old vintner landlord: "We must try to make it different for the young people this time."

Univ. of Wisconsin C. V. Easum

SHORTER NOTICES

Historia, I. *Zeszyty naukowe.* Uniwersytet wrocławski im. Bolesława Bieruta, Seria A, Nr. 8. Wrocław 1957. Pp. 193.

The newly founded University of Wrocław has just issued its first scientific historical publication, Fascicle I of *Historia.* It contains three substantial articles by younger members of the staff, based on their doctoral or magisterial researches in various sorts of sources. The first study, by Mieczysław Walter (pp. 5-104), is an investigation of the membership of the cloister of the Cisterian nuns at Trzebnica in the years 1589-1741, in order to ascertain just how Polish it remained under Hapsburg rule. The anti-Polish character of the measures adopted by the Hapsburgs is made quite clear. The second paper, by Zbigniew Kwaśny, on the glass factory Josephine in Szklarska Porębu 1841-1864, is an examination of the labor force at work in the factory, as to origin, increase in personnel, working conditions, and wages. The decline in real value of their wages and the poor sanitary provisions had its effect on mortality—especially from lung diseases, which, in any event, greatly increased toward the end of the period under consideration. The third study, by Zygmunt Szkurłatowski (pp. 147-191) is an examination of the administration of the great feudal landed estates in seventeenth and eighteenth century Poland. During this period the great feudal landowners were facing an economic crisis and, to avoid catastrophe, put further pressure on the peasants. In the face of peasant resistance, the owners gave thought to efficiency, and various "Instructions," *e.g.* by S. Pawlik, were popular manuals of reorganization and economical utilization of labor and produce.

All these studies exhibit rigorous discipline and patient handling of mostly untouched archival material.

S. H. THOMSON

PURKOVIĆ, DR. MIJDRAG AL., *Kćeri kneza Lazara.* Melbourne, 1957. Pp. 112.

Dr. Purković, an historian by profession and Secretary of Serbian Writers in Exile, has given us in his book a number of brief biographical sketches of the "Daughters of Prince Lazar." This is the second volume in the series *Srpska Misao* (Serbian Thought), edited by Uroš Stanković, and dedicated to the eminent Serbian historian Nikola Radojčić.

Serbian historians have long been interested in a precise identification of the descendants of Prince Lazar who had two sons, Stevan and Vukan, and five daughters. The uncertainty about the Prince's daughters arises from a lack of reliable documentary materials on the subject and contradictions that exist in the materials which are available. According to the Pejatović chronicle the names of Prince Lazar's daughters were Olivera, Mara, Dragana, Jela and Todora; other sources include the name of Despina among the daughters; and Orbini mentions two other names, Mileva and Vukosava. This has hopelessly mixed up the Prince's family. It is a pity, writes Purković, that the Lazarevići did not emulate the Nemanjići by leaving us a fresco supplying their geneological tree.

The author apparently accepts the names of Prince Lazar's daughters given in the Pejatović chronicle as genuine and substantiates this by other documentary evidence. He gives us basic biographical data on each of the daughters. The lengths of the sketches vary, depending on the historical importance of the individual daughters and the availability of information. Thus, for example, thirty-seven pages are given to Mara and her descendants, but only three pages to Dragana. Beside being a well written and adequately documented book, it includes a genealogical table and reproduction of frescoes of Mara, Katakuzina (daughters of Mara's son Djuradj Branković) and Despina (believed to be daughter of Despot Jovan, grandson of Despot Djuradj Branković).

Stanford University WAYNE S. VUCINICH

TREMEL, F., ed., *Beiträge zur Geschichte von Murau.* Sonderband No. 3, *Zft. d. Historischen Vereines f. Steirmark.* Graz, 1957. Pp. 123.

The writing of local history must be very good indeed to rise above the level of mere antiquarianism. The six essays gathered together here only occasionally fulfill this requirement.

Walter Modrijan contributes a very thorough piece on the pre-Roman and Roman remains which have been found in the vicinity of Murau, without, however, coming to any significant conclusion about his material.

From a chronological table drawn up by Ernst Gasteiger we might well infer that neither the Hussite Wars, the Reformation, nor National Socialism ever came to Murau. (There are no entries between 1924, when the city hall was restored, and 1945, when the town was occupied by British troops.)

In an essay on Murau in the middle ages Friz Popelka presents more than one detail which might well be of interest to the general medievalist, (e.g. excerpts from the regulations of some local guilds) but narrows his political horizon with such determination that one is apt to forget completely that what happened in Murau must have had some relation to, say, the fortunes of the Hapsburgs.

In what is perhaps the strongest contribution to this collection, the editor writes about post-medieval commerce in Murau. He is, unforunately, limited by his choice of topic, since, as he admits himself, Carinthia and Styria were deeply involved in the general collapse of the German economy early in the second half of the sixteenth century; and Murau, in particular, never really recovered.

Inge Mayer discusses the art history of Murau at length, and notices what must be very nearly every *objet d'art* within its walls, without being in the least hindered by critical acumen.

Karl Stöffelmayer closes by celebrating the region as one rich in *Volkskunde.* This reviewer, not versed in the mysteries of that celebrated art, found the piece totally incomprehensible.

In his preface the editor expresses the hope that this collection will be emulated in other localities. It might also be hoped that Austrian historians, technically as capable as any, will some day raise their sights. It might be remembered, for instance, that the only general history of medieval Austria in print was written by an Englishman.

Colorado College PAUL P. BERNARD

TESKE, HERMANN, *Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Ein Kämpfer für den militärischen Fortschritt.* Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 86.

This brief biography of Colmar von der Goltz is one volume in a series which includes personages as diverse as Krupp and Lenin, von Clausewitz and von Gagern.

Although the author intends to show von der Goltz as a model of soldierly virtue and character, and writes a preface which sounds like a eulogy, he presents a well documented, quite objective evaluation of the man and his work. Excerpts from letters and memoranda reveal von der Goltz as a man of keen intellect and independent judgment who found it difficult to ingratiate himself to his superiors in order to gain promotions. Instead, this non-conformist in uniform found himself demoted from an officer of the German General Staff to military service in a provincial garrison for having written an essay which was subtly critical of antiquated methods in the training of the German army. He was given a chance to display his skill as an officer when he was sent to Turkey in 1883 to reorganize the army of Sultan Abdul Hamid. By 1895 he had forged demoralized Turkish soldiers into an army and trained an officers' corps. When he returned to Turkey in December, 1914, as military adviser to the Sultan, he soon found himself appointed adviser to Enver Pascha and Commander of the First Army Corps of the Ottoman Empire.

Thus, Colmar von der Goltz Pascha, denied active service or a position in the High Command of the German army during World War I, fought and died as Turkish field marshal in Bagdad in 1916.

His biographer obviously admires von der Goltz and is very critical of a General Staff which denied such a man position and rank commensurate to his ability. The documentary evidence cited fully justifies this criticism.

Vassar College ALMA LUCKAU

WENTZCKE, PAUL, *Heinrich von Gagern: Vorkämpfer für deutsche Einheit und Volksvertretung.* Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 86.

This book, written by one of Germany's most distinguished historians, is a biography of the foremost moderate liberal leader at the Frankfurt National Assembly. It has been based chiefly on Heinrich von Gagern's *Nachlass.*

In a short chapter Wentzscke discusses von Gagern's activities as a young *Burschenschaft* leader and as the leader of the liberal party in the Estates of his native Hessen-Darmstadt who opposed Baron du Bas du Thil's ultra-conservative government. The main part of the volume is devoted to von Gagern's activities in

1848-49, first of all, as premier of Hessen-Darmstadt, and then as president of the Frankfurt National Assembly and minister-president of the constitutional government established by that assembly. The author relates how von Gagern tried to hold in check the extremists both on the left and on the right who challenged his program to establish a moderate constitutional monarchy in the united Germany that was to come into being. Von Gagern's program, defeated at Frankfurt, was not to be realized before 1871, and then only in a less liberal form than he desired.

Throughout the book the author demonstrates his sympathy for both von Gagern and the national and liberal program which he championed. The volume differs from the usual monograph in that it contains neither footnotes nor a lengthy bibliography. It has been written, not for the historical scholar, but for the general public.

University of Texas R. JOHN RATH

KOSA, JOHN, *Land of Choice, The Hungarians in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957. Pp. vii, 104. $3.50.

John Kosa, a graduate of the University of Budapest, taught social history and sociology at the Universities of Budapest and Szeged. In 1950 he immigrated to Canada, and at present he is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Le Moyne College, Syracuse, in New York state. He undertook this study under the sponsorship of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration of the Federal Government of Canada. The Division of Citizenship in this Department is primarily interested in immigrants from the time they arrive in Canada until they receive their citizenship papers. When the Division was set up it was discovered that very few scholarly studies existed dealing specifically with the problems facing the immigrants and the attitudes of Canadians toward these newcomers. The Division has therefore set about with commendable zeal to gather information, and to encourage universities, foundations and individual scholars to study this continuing aspect of Canadian affairs.

This book is a very timely publication. Since it was begun a new wave of Hungarian immigration has arrived in Canada composed of some 36,000 Hungarian refugees which in one year more than doubled the number of Hungarians, or Canadians of Hungarian origin, in Canada.

The excellence of this book lies in the fact that it is a detailed and concrete study, through first-hand interviews, of a specific group of Hungarian immigrants. Moreover, since the author is intimately acquainted with historical and social conditions in Hungary he is able to supply explanations of group behavior which other observers could not interpret intelligently. This book is therefore, within limits, a solid contribution to the study of Canadian immigration.

The limits, however, should also be noted. For example, what he says about Hungarians in Eastern Canada does not apply in all respects to Hungarians in Western Canada. The book is only a partial study of "Hungarians in Canada." He deals very lightly with the part played by the churches, which in some cases is of great importance. He does not do justice to the Hungarian newspapers in Canada. These newspapers not only supplied newspaper items concerning events in the old country which were eagerly read, but also information concerning Canadian affairs which was of importance to the immigrants. The papers had also some significance in establishing political bias. In the opinion of the reviewer, Professor Kosa, like most sociologists, overstresses the factor of status, particularly in Canadian affairs. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that the author will continue this fruitful study of Hungarians in Canada and expand his investigations to other parts of the country.

University of Saskatchewan GEO. W. SIMPSON

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THE INITIATION OF *ROBOTA* ABOLITION IN BOHEMIA

by William E. Wright

JOSEPH II of Austria, like his royal colleague in Prussia, was devoted to the state, but in a more generous and humane sense. For two people only, his first wife and his mother, did he allow himself the diversion of personal affection. Otherwise no considerations distracted him from his dedication to the beneficent management of public affairs, and this concept of princely government marked him as what we have later come to call an "Enlightened Despot." It was in social organization, made regular and secure by the state apparatus, that man realized his full human potential. It followed, then, that if the state figured so prominently in human destiny as an instrument for good, it should be superior in power to all lesser institutions and to individuals. The exercise of this overweening power was to be directed, however, not in the individual interests of a monarch, statesmen, or bureaucrats—that is, not to the benefit of the governors exercising the power of the state—but rather toward the welfare of all the people comprehended in the jurisdiction of the state.

The fact that posterity has charged Joseph with being sometimes petulant, willful, and lacking in understanding in no way detracts from the essential beneficence of his intentions.

As the self-designated servant of the people and the state, Joseph II had some very definite ideas, consonant with the climate of enlightened opinion of the eighteenth century, about the order of society most efficacious in insuring the common weal. The record of his frenetic reform program bears witness as to what he conceived to be in the common welfare and how earnestly he desired to realize the ideal.

One stone, and a large, important stone at that, in the edifice of the perfect state was a vigorous, productive, prosperous peasantry. The economic security of the entire society depended upon the peasantry, for, as the Physiocrats had theorized, the life-blood of the economy was drawn from the soil. If the land were efficiently exploited by the peasants, then the material welfare of the empire would be assured internally and *vis-à-vis* external threat. How was this to be accomplished?

Whether Joseph drew his answer to the question from the contemporary economic theoreticians or from his own practical observations is not of importance here. What is important is that he had a positive answer and spared no pains, his own or anyone else's, in putting it into effect. His answer was to free the peasant of enervating financial burdens and personal obligations to the landlords, and to grant the peasant proprietary interests in the land that he tilled.

The Emperor was here no pioneer. His mother before him had been interested in improving the lot of the peasant, both because her humane instincts were revolted by the oftentimes inhumane treatment meted out to the serf by his lord, and because she wanted to increase her tax income from the land and its produce. Since the strength of the opposition to agrarian reform from noble and ecclesiastical land holders exceeded Maria Theresa's estimate of her own strength, she had to be content with agrarian reforms confined to her own estates. In 1775 she accepted the proposal of Karl Anton von Raab, a lesser bureaucrat, to parcel out the land to the serfs at moderate rentals, allow them to buy equipment and animals necessary to farm the land, and give them personal freedom from *Leibeigenschaft*.[1] The plan proved to be profitable to all concerned on two experimental estates, and the Empress ordered Raab to extend his system to other imperial estates. It was hoped, futilely, that other landlords would follow the good example set on the imperial estates. The merits and demerits of the system were widely discussed among the landlords, with the weight of opinion, not surprisingly, falling to the demerit arm of the scale.

Raab's system had been in operation for almost six years before Joseph II succeeded his mother as full sovereign of the Habsburg lands, and it continued to be so quietly successful that it was no longer a controversial topic of discussion. For this reason, and because he busied himself with many other affairs of state, Joseph was not immediately concerned with the reform taking place in the imperial estates (*Kameralherrschaften*). This signified no reduction of the Emperor's interest in the condition of the serf; an attestation to his sustained concern for agrarian problems is to be found in his patents to abolish *Leibeigenschaft* throughout Bohemia and buttress the serf's rights to ownership of the land. Only after the publication of these two patents did Joseph shift his interest to the extension and completion of the *Robotabolitionssystem*[2] inaugurated by Raab during the last years of Maria Theresa's reign.

Shortly before the patents of November, 1781, were issued the *Hofrechenkammer*[3] submitted a report to the Emperor on the incomes of those *Herrschaften* where the Raab system was in effect. Joseph found that the system was ". . . ganz gewiss nutzbar . . . und auszubreiten erwünschlich" because it was, as he judged it, good economically and politically in that it increased population, industry, agriculture, and animal husbandry. The *Hofkanzlei*[4] was directed to draw up, as soon as possible, suggestions for the extension of the system to all *Kameral,* municipal, ecclesiastical, and former Jesuit lands under the supervision of the state.[5] Then by *Handbillet* of 22 January, 1782, Joseph repeated his wish that further action be taken to accelerate the introduction of the *Robotabolitionssystem* to the *Herrschaften* and *Güter* in Bohemia and Moravia which were state administered.[6]

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[1] There is disagreement on the use of the term *Leibeigenschaft* for describing the condition of the Bohemian serf in the eighteenth century. It has been urged that *Erbuntertänigkeit* would be more accurate. Since Joseph II and his contemporaries used the term and it gained currency from his time, it will be used here. For a summary discussion see Robert J. Kerner, *Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, 1932, p. 273.

[2] Both *Robotabolitionssystem* and *Robotreluitionssystem* were used in the 1780's. Here the former will be used.

[3] Also called the *Hofrechnungskammer*.

There was considerable discussion in the *Hofkanzlei* and *Hofrechenkammer* as to ways and means of perfecting the system.[7] Finally, in January of 1783, Joseph took a report from Leopold Graf Kollowrat, president of the *Hofkammer,* and Rudolph Graf Chotek, *Oberster Hofkanzler,* concerning the introduction of the system on the *Herrschaft* at Libtschow, which served him as an occasion to outline his *Grundsätze* for continuation of the *robota* abolition program.[8] The stated principles became the subject of a Resolution of 4 February, and on 10 February, 1783, a rescript went out to all *Länderstellen* repeating the guiding principles of the system, delineating the instruments by which it was to be accomplished, and appointing the personnel to conduct the program.[9]

The rescript opened with the Emperor's statement that he was convinced that the abolition of *robota,* if properly instituted, would be of benefit to the state and the landlords (*Obrigkeiten*) as well as to the subjects (*Untertanen*). Therefore it was to be put into effect on all cameral, former Jesuit, *geistliche,* and municipal lands. Considering local conditions, and the variations in means necessitated by those conditions, the following principles were to be observed: (1) Physical *robota* was to be abolished, at least for the most part; (2) The *Obrigkeit's* farm lands (*Mayerhöfe, Mayergründe*) were to be divided and distributed to the serfs; (3) Full ownership of land was to be granted to the serf. Joseph declared himself "unwiderruflich und gnädigst entschlossen" to get the introduction of the system under way on a broad scale.[10]

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[4] *Die vereinigte böhmisch-österreichische Hofkanzlei,* abbreviated here, as it often was in the eighteenth century, to *Hofkanzlei.*

[5] Karl Grünberg, *Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Böhmen, Mähren, und Schlesien,* 2 vols., Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1893-1894, vol. II, p. 423.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Wiener Hofkammerarchiv, *Robotabolitions-Sachen,* fascicle 2, Generalia und Zirkulare, *passim.* Each fascicle of the *Robotabolitions-Sachen* may contain from several hundred to over a thousand pages of manuscript documents. Within each fascicle documents are grouped together according to subject matter under a number, month, and year. Related documents are often folded within a principal document, and, therefore, a single reference may support several documents. The date of the document does not necessarily correspond to the reference month of the document. As all documents hereafter cited will be from the same series, *Robotabolitions-Sachen,* subsequent references will be by fascicle, number, month, and year.

[8] Fasc. 3, 23 ex Februario 1783.

[9] *Ibid.,* 40 ex Octobri 1783; Grünberg, II, 424.

[10] "1. Die Abolition der Natural Robot wenigstens zum grössten Theil; 2. Die Vertheilung der Herrschaftlichen Mayerhofs Gründe nach Maas ihrer Zahl und Laage;

Following this statement of intent and policy, the rescript provided for a separate *Robotabolitions-Hofkommission* and for *Hofkommissionäre* to be sent to each land of the Bohemian Crown, Bohemia and Moravia.[11] Johann Paul von Hoyer was appointed commissioner for Bohemia, and Freiherr von Kaschnitz held the same office for Moravia. To complete the mission in each land, the commissioner was assigned a representative from the regular clergy and from the public at large. The commissioners were ordered to report quarterly to the *Hofkanzlei* and to the newly formed *Robotabolitions-Hofkommission* as they progressed in establishing the system.

The *Robotabolitions-Hofkommission,* charged with the supervision of the commissioners, was an adjunct to the *Hofrechenkammer,* an altogether reasonable arrangement since the conduct of the reform hinged on evaluations of labor and land, records of incomes from estates, assignment of ground rents, and considerable other accounting. Moreover, the *Hofrechenkammer* had already worked with Raab when his system was being inaugurated, and was, therefore, experienced in the process. Karl Graf von Zinzendorf was named to the presidency of both the *Hofrechenkammer* and the *Robotabolitions-Hofkommission.*[12]

Zinzendorf was a Saxon by birth, but took service with the Habsburgs and conducted himself so wisely and efficiently that a modern historian has described him as one of the "fähigsten Köpfe der josephinischen Zeit."[13] He was educated in the law at the University of Jena, and in 1763 he accepted the position of *Kammerer* from Maria Theresa. Shortly thereafter he was made *Kanzlei Direktor* of the Lower Austrian *Commerzial-Congress.* From 1764 to 1776 Zinzendorf travelled almost constantly to all corners of Europe studying commerce and trades. He saw and heard much and his reports to Vienna on the commerce and industry of Europe revealed him as a sharp observer and a man with the ability clearly to analyze and understand problems. In March 1781, Joseph II wrote his brother Leopold for his opinion of Zinzendorf as a candidate for high office in the Austrian financial administration.[14] Leopold replied that Zinzendorf was the most capable man in his

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3. endlich die Einräumung des vollkommenen Eigentums den Unterthanen von den von ihnen wirklich schon besetzenden Haus- und Überlands Gründe." Fasc. 3, 23 ex Februario 1783.

[11] Silesia had been incorporated into Moravia for purposes of administration. After 1742 there were only three *Kreise* left in Austrian Silesia, and that did not justify a separate *Land* administration.

[12] Fasc. 3, *Resolution* of 23 January, 1783, 23 ex Februario 1783, and *Vortrag,* 30 April, 1784, 71 ex Aprili 1784. See also Gaston Graf von Pettenegg, ed., *Ludwig und Karl Grafen und Herren von Zinzendorf. Ihre Selbstbiographien,* Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1879, pp. 200, 202, 203.

[13] Friedrich Walter, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung,* II. Abteilung, I. Band, 2. Halbband; "Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs," no. 35; Vienna: Adolf Holzhausens Nachfolger, 1950, p. 47.

[14] Alfred Ritter von Arneth, *Joseph II. und Leopold von Toskana. Ihr Briefwechsel von 1781 bis 1790,* 2 vols.; Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1872, I, 21. Joseph to Leopold, 28 March, 1781. Joseph remarked that at least Zinzendorf had seen and read a few things.

[15] *Ibid.,* I, 22. Leopold described him as well travelled, full of zeal, royal, likeable, and well educated.

acquaintance for a high finance post.[15] Joseph found an able man to direct the abolition system he had in mind.

For greater clarity in understanding the questions and problems that arise in the abolition of *robota* and the parcelling out of land to the serf, it is necessary first to indicate the types of *Herrschaften* involved and the general organization of each. *Herrschaften* or *Güter* were estates in land, the delimitations of which were registered in the *Landtafel.* The registered owner could be either an individual or a corporation. Of the individual owners, the foremost was the monarch himself; the others were usually noblemen. Corporations such as cities and religious orders were also landlords. The owner was the *Obrigkeit* (lord) of the *Herrschaft,* and, until the time of Maria Theresa and Joseph, exercised police and judicial powers over all persons residing on the estate; the state recognized only the citizenship of the *Obrigkeit,* and the *Obrigkeit* dealt with the subjects (*Untertanen*) of the *Herrschaft* as their sovereign lord. If the *Obrigkeit* did not reside on the estate, or if it were too large for him to oversee personally, he could, and did, appoint overseers as his representatives.

Within the bounds of the *Herrschaft,* and subject to the superior rights of *Obereigentum,*[16] there were two basic classifications of land and land holders. *Rustikal* lands were those occupied by serfs for life tenure and registered in the *Kataster* (land roll) as serf-held lands. The *rustikal* serf could not be dispossessed of his land except for commission of crime, excessive indebtedness, or slothful husbandry. The *Kontribution* (land tax) levied by the state was assigned to the several serf holders and collected by the *Obrigkeit* for remission to the state treasury. For the protection and justice afforded him by the *Obrigkeit*—in the late eighteenth century this was more a theoretical than a real benefit—and for the use of the *Obrigkeit's* mill, buildings, etc., the *rustikal* serf paid money fees and performed *robota,* that is, he worked the lord's fields, hauled supplies, deliver produce to market, cut wood, etc.

The balance of the *Herrschaft* land, not held by *Rustikalisten,* the lord retained in his own name on the *Kataster.* This land was seldom taxed (*Extraordinarium*) before the reign of Maria Theresa, and even then the good Empress' land tax levies on the *Obrigkeit's* land was set at a much lower rate than that on the *rustikal* land.[17] In order to put his *dominikal* land into production and obtain income from it, the *Obrigkeit* leased some of it for short periods to unlanded serfs, called *Dominikalisten* after the denomination of the land that they leased. In consideration of the lease of land the *Dominikalist* paid a rental fee, delivered payments in kind, and performed *robota* as did the *Rustikalist,* but the Dominikalist's obligations were usually greater than those of his more fortunate fellow.

Finally, the lord kept some land under his immediate control and had it tilled by *robota* of the serfs on the estate. From time to time the

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[16] A right nearly approximating eminent domain, but limited to the narrower scale of the estate.

[17] Josef Pekař, *České katastry, 1654-1789,* 2d ed.; Prague: Historický Klub, 1932, p. 291.

Obrigkeiten acquired *rustikal* land despite the prohibition against such acquisition. This might be accomplished by removing the *Rustikalist* from his holding for the reasons cited above, or, more often, by simple illegal seizure. The confiscated *rustikal* land was then treated as *dominikal,* except that the *Obrigkeit* had to assume the *Kontribution* liability for it. The practice was, however, to recover the amount of the tax payment by wringing more in payments from the serf.

In addition to the two classes of land-holding serfs, there were two further classes of serfs: *Häusler* and *Inleute.* The *Häusler* occupied a house on the lord's land and might have a small plot of garden land adjacent, but he supported himself and his family primarily by farming the lord's land. The *Inleute* were usually without fields of any kind and lived by performing various services at the lord's house, in his fields, or in his mills or brewery.

The distinctions between the classes of serfs were not always absolutely defined. It was possible for a serf to be at the same time a *Rustikalist* and a *Dominikalist.* If he could afford to pay the fees and accept the obligations, a *Rustikalist* could also lease *dominikal* land and farm it as well as his own.[18]

Now the state-administered *Herrschaften* fell into several categories. The state was full owner and *Obrigkeit* of the *Kameralherrschaften,* and the supervision of the estates was delegated to bureaucratic administrators. Profits from the industry of the estate went to the state treasury. However, between the services and fees tendered by the serfs, and the accounting to the state the administrator oftentimes found sufficient privileges and income to warrant his adopting the attitude of a private *Gutsherr* toward the serf-lord relationship. Although he was a civil servant, not an owner, the administrator of a *Kameralherrschaft* would not necessarily take the abolition of *robota* lightly.

The lands sequestered from the Society of Jesus when it was suppressed in 1773, the *Exjesuitenherrschaften,* were administered in approximately the same fashion as *Kameralherrschaften.* The state supervised the lands of the religious orders, even the land of those orders not suppressed by Joseph's monastic reforms. The clerics still resided on the estates, remained the *Obrigkeiten* of the land, and supported themselves from its produce; but any surplus income was drained off by the state into various welfare and education funds. The interests of the churchmen in the land and their attitudes toward the abolition of *robota* and land partition to the serfs were identical to those of the private *Gutsherren.*

A final category of state-controlled estates was that of land held by cities and towns under royal charter. The city administration acted as *Obrigkeit* of the land, but since the city was dependent upon the monarch for its charter, the state was in ultimate control of the land. Over all these

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[18] For discussions of the organization of *Herrschaften,* the classes of serfs, and the land tax see Kamil Krofta, *Přehled dějin selského stávu v Čechach a na Moravě,* Prague: Rolnícká Tiskárna, 1919, pp. 117-23, 140-43; Josef Pekař, *Kniha o Kosti,* 3d. ed.; Prague: Melantrich, 1942, pp. 221-22; Pekař, *České katastry, passim,* especially chapters X and XI, pp. 289 ff.; and Grünberg, I, 1-87, 108-18.

Herrschaften of whatever description or organization, Joseph wanted to extend the *Robotabolitionssystem.*

The extensive estate-agriculture system had proved to be inefficient, for the lords had made such exorbitant demands on the peasant for *robota* that the peasant had very little time or energy left to cultivate his own fields. Even the forced labor of *robota* produced meager returns to the lord compared to the time invested. The serf had no heart for it and worked accordingly. Whatever time the serf had left for his own fields he was little inspired to efficient cultivation, for his land tenure, despite protective laws to the contrary, was subject to the arbitrary will of his lord. He lived from day to day, not planning the development of his land for the future, as the efficient exploitation of the land required. Joseph wanted to reinforce the tenure of the *Rustikalisten,* greatly lengthen the term of leases to the *Dominikalisten,* and relieve them of *robota* obligations so that they might realize the full productive potential of their lands.

The principles laid down on 4 February for the introduction of *robota* abolition were very general, and it was natural that von Hoyer and Kaschnitz should have questions concerning the practical problems involved. In answer, Joseph dispatched a *Handbillet* on 12 March, 1783, to Kollowrat for their instruction, and to be given to the *Hofkanzlei* and the *Länderstellen* for their information, and, as the Emperor put it, "exact compliance."[19] The new order stated that the *dominikal* lands were to be leased only, and the *Obrigkeiten* and *Untertanen* should reach mutual agreement on the extent of the lands to be leased and the obligations that the serf was to assume in payment for them. The commissioners were to see that the interests of both parties were protected. *Robota* was to be transmuted to money or grain payments, or to other obligations, as far as possible, but in no case was the lord's land to be tilled by *robota.* Full ownership was to be granted serfs on *rustikal* lands. Services required of the serf other than field work on the lord's land could remain in effect or be equated into money payments at the pleasure of the parties. Commissioners were cautioned that no reservations were to be allowed for a return to field *robota* after the expiration of leases on the *dominikal* lands.

Kollowrat was instructed to inform the commissioner secretly that if the *geistliche Obrigkeiten* should refuse, out of stubbornness, to reach reasonable agreements with their *Untertanen,* they should be threatened with a survey of the land. It was known that much of the land had not been declared when the land had been registered for taxation, and a threatened survey would make the *Obrigkeit* anxious to reach agreement before the threat was carried out and the true extent of their land tax liability was made known. The serfs were to have no notice of this instruction, however, because it would encourage them to be unreasonable in their negotiations with the *Obrigkeit.* Any hindrances to the introduction of the system were to be reported directly to Vienna.

The immediate task of the *Hofkomission* was to disseminate the instructions and information necessary, and generally to prepare the ground for the introduction of the abolition system to the *Herrschaften* indicated by the Emperor. In the spring of 1783 von Hoyer toured the *Kreise* of Bohemia and held meetings with the various *Obrigkeiten* and *Beamten* to acquaint them with the principles of abolition and to entertain their questions concerning it. During the months of May and June he explained the system and answered inquiries from representatives of towns and cities, bishops, abbots, monks, and *Beamten* administering *Kameralherrschaften.* His reports reveal a wide range of problems and attitudes toward abolition.[20]

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[19] Fasc. 3, 50 ex Martio 1783.

Invariably the question arose as to whether *all* the lord's land had to be distributed among peasants, and, if so, how would the *Obrigkeiten* support themselves. Hoyer's answer was that the *Obrigkeiten* could retain enough land in their immediate possession to maintain themselves, but in no case could they have the peasants work those lands by *robota.* The lords would have to furnish their own equipment and hire the labor. This stipulation insured against the *Obrigkeiten* withholding too much land for themselves—it would cost them too much to farm it. Further, *robota* abolition fees and land rents would compensate the lords for their losses in proceeds from *robota.*

Some *Obrigkeiten* expressed the fear that cattle and sheep husbandry would decline if they lost their lands. This was a sensitive subject with Joseph, for he considered animal husbandry to be very important to the general welfare and to the state. Horses were needed, for example, in war times.[21] The *Obrigkeiten* were not greatly concerned about the general welfare, but they hoped that by broaching this subject they could discourage continuation of the abolition program. But Hoyer had been instructed that the serfs could take the cattle and sheep with the land leased and continue breeding them. If the serf refused to take the cattle, the lord could keep them and rent pasturage, or, as a last resort, the lord could reserve enough land to maintain his herds.

Administrative *Beamten* of the government estates wished to know if they, too, could lease land. They were told that they could, but, to avoid suspicion of self favor, they were not themselves to choose the twenty to thirty *Strich* (*ca.* ¾ acre) of land allowed them, but rather to let a local judge make the allotment and set the rental fees that they were to pay.

The representatives of Dobřan inquired if they were permitted to lease their lands to city folk or "outsiders" if local peasants should refuse to lease. The answer was in the affirmative. An often asked question concerned the right of the serf to put leased land to a use other than that to which the lord had put it. The decision was that the serf could use it for any crop he wished, but that when his lease aproached expiration, and if he did not intend to renew it, he must re-sow the land in the crop that the landlord had previously raised. A specific example was suggested wherein a serf might use meadow land for an orchard. The ruling was that if the serf could afford to pay the rent for the period before the orchard became productive he could plant fruit trees if he so desired.

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[20] Fasc. 4, 10 ex Julio 1783.

[21] Fasc. 2, *Handbillet,* Joseph to Zinzendorf, 27 Sept., 1784.

Concerning *rustikal* land held by the *Obrigkeiten,* the policy was to require that it be given back to serfs, but if the land was undesirable, and the serf refused it, the lord could keep it and lease it out, if possible. If nothing else could be done, the lord could work the land by his own means. However, the lord would have to pay the *Kontribution* on all *rustikal* land in his possession. If, perchance, the *Obrigkeit* had legally bought the *rustikal* land, then he could sell it back to the serf, if the serf would buy; otherwise the above procedure was to be followed.

The city of Ellbogen requested permission to test the abolition and partition system on a single portion of their land to see if the serf could and would pay the abolition fees and land rentals. They did not want to commit themselves entirely to a questionable proposition. Permission was emphatically denied. The whole *Herrschaft* had to be partitioned. They were assured that the rent and fees would be paid, however, because the serf gained so much in the system that he would not jeopardize his gains by failure to meet his obligations. Weather losses were to be sustained by the lessee, and fixed rentals were to be paid regardless of the vagaries of weather and crop failure. However, if acts of God rendered the serf unable to pay immediately, a postponement of payments could be arranged by agreement between the *Obrigkeit* and serf. Ordinarily, payments would fall due twice yearly, on the feasts of St. Gall (16 October) and St. George (23 April), and no rent could be demanded in advance.

One of the more unusual problems posed by land partition came from the city of Mělník. Their representative feared that *all* land had to be partitioned and leased out, and there would be no meadow for the city's horses. It would be inconvenient enough to have to give up the horses, but, he complained, without horses they would have no manure with which to protect the municipal water conduit from freezing in the winter. He was assured that the necessary fields for pasture could be retained by the city, and the manure supply would not be endangered.

There were also questions concerning *robota.* The first principle that had to be stated was that no *Untertan* could be *forced* to accept the abolition of *robota* and pay the fees therefor. Joseph wanted to accomplish abolition by agreement if possible. The problem of evaluating *robota* in monetary terms was of prime importance. The general rule was established that the fee should equal the value of the income produced by the labor. *Häusler* and *Inleute* subject to *Handrobot* were to pay six kreuzer per day for each day of *robota* from which they were released. Another problem raised was that of the serfs who had no definite *robota* obligations; for example, the serfs of the city of Karlsbad were required to work only when and where necessary. The Karlsbad representatives were told that they would have to reach some agreement on the equation of *robota* to money that satisfied both serfs and *Obrigkeit.* A number of questions were voiced concerning non-field *robota;* i.e., hauling, etc. The inquirers were told that the system would not regulate non-field *robota,* but they could reach agreements with the serfs to make money payment, instead of labor, if they wished.

Non-field *robota* was not abolished because it usually consisted of tasks that contributed to the general welfare of the *Herrschaft,* for example, road repair, building upkeep, etc. Since these tasks would have to be assigned by some authority, it might as well be the *Obrigkeit,* who was accustomed to the responsibility.

A few of the *Obrigkeiten* with whom Hoyer spoke had already worked out agreements for money payments for *robota* with their *Untertanen* and had parcelled out their lands. They asked if they had to re-write the contracts or should they continue under the terms of the present contracts. Hoyer informed them that they would have to submit their contracts to the *Robotabolitions-Hofkommission* for inspection and review just as if they were drafts (*Elaborata*) composed under supervision of a *Hofkommissionär.* The *Obrigkeiten* from religious orders, church lands, and cities were assured that the fees and rents from abolition and partition would compensate their losses in income from *robota* and land income.

As the questions asked in Bohemia might indicate, the introduction of the abolition system was not apt to be without complications. And these initial problems discussed by Hoyer were those anticipated only from the *Obrigkeit's* point of view. The peasant had not been consulted.

Nevertheless, Hoyer was quite sanguine in his report to Joseph of 27 June, 1783.[22] He described his journey throughout Bohemia and his meetings with the *Obrigkeiten* as a great success. He felt that all were well instructed in what was required, and the *Elaborata* already submitted for review seemed to indicate that both *Untertan* and *Obrigkeit* were satisfied. In Hoyer's opinion the only foreseeable difficulty would be occasioned by suspicious attitudes of the peasants toward the lords or commissioners, or if the lords and *Beamten* should simply be too stupid and stubborn about introducing the system. This statement was, in time, to make Hoyer a prophet, and he himself was in no small part responsible for the fulfillment of the prophesy.

Through the summer and fall of 1783 the *Robotabolitions-Hofkommission* continued its work in helping frame *Elaborata* and contracts between lords and serfs. The Commission also reviewed proposed systems to be made final in those *Herrschaften* where Raab had pioneered the system. They were not idling, either; some large and important estates were examined, disagreements resolved, and contracts approved.[23] But progress was not sufficiently swift to please Joseph.

On 12 November, 1783, Joseph sent Kollowrat a *Handbillet*[24] announcing his displeasure with the rate at which new introductions of the abolition system were being made. He charged the *Obrigkeiten* of the church and monastic lands with manufacturing difficulties to impede progress, and ordered that the *Gubernium* re-impress reluctant lords with the Emperor's earnestness in desiring the business finished. Hoyer was to be informed that he should begin exerting pressure on trouble-making *Obrigkeiten.* He was to threaten land surveys. If *Obrigkeiten* claimed, as they often had, that serfs refused to lease land or pay fees instead of performing *robota,* the serf must make a formal deposition to that effect before a *Hofkommissionär* or *Kreishauptmann,* stating the serf's reasons for refusal. In this way it could be determined if the *Obrigkeit* was using the serf as an excuse for not agreeing to a contract, or if the serf actually refused such an attractive proposition. One could also learn whether the serf had been apprised of what the true conditions and alternatives were. The depositions were to be sent immediately to the Commission in Vienna so that legitimate reasons for refusal might be examined and steps taken to remedy them.

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[22] Fasc. 4, 10 ex Julio 1783.

[23] For example, Brandeis, Fasc. 3, 40 ex Octobri 1783, Přerow and Podiebrad, 72 ex November 1783.

[24] Fasc. 4, 13 ex Novembri 1783.

Two weeks later, on 25 November, 1783, Joseph sent another *Handbillet* to Kollowrat requiring Hoyer and Kaschnitz to come to Vienna, and, within eight to ten days (before Joseph was to go on one of his many travels, this time to Rome), they were to submit a report indicating what had been accomplished on the church and monastic lands, what they hoped to accomplish in the next twelvemonth, what impediments to progress they had met, and what they needed to expedite their work.[25]

Hoyer lost no time in complying with the imperial wishes; his report is dated 27 November, 1783.[26] He avoided commenting on the progress made to that point, but he was quite voluble in indicating difficulties and hindrances standing in his way. The accountants, who had to review the division of lands and assignments of rents, and who had to evaluate the *robota* release fees, were inefficient, slow, and troublesome. Sometimes *Elaborata* went three or four times back and forth between commissioner and accountants. Most of the *Obrigkeiten* complained that the rents were set too low, and the value of non-field *robota* that they could require of the serf was set too high when figuring their future income after abolition of field *robota.* Some asserted that the serfs had as much land as they could farm, and they could not work any more land efficiently. Some maintained that serfs very heavily hypothecated their land and were not responsible enough to have land. Many *Untertanen,* on the other hand, would not accept the system because *all robota* was not abolished, only *field robota*; and, besides, they believed rumors that they would soon get their land completely free anyway, and would not have to perform any *robota* at all.[27]

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[25] Fasc. 4, 36 ex Novembri 1783: "In wie weit sie mit ihren Ausarbeitungen auf sämtlichen Geistlichen und Stiftungs Gütern nach der von Mir vorgeschriebenen Grundregeln gekommen sind. Was sie künftiges Jahr zu Stand zu bringen hoffen. In was die Hindernisse bestehen, so ihnen in Weggestanden sind und die sie abgehalten haben, weiters zu gelangen? Dann endlich diejenigen Hülfsmittel, so sie zu Beschleunigung dieses steets nach Meiner Gesinnung vorzuschlagen, sie für räthlich finden."

[26] Fasc. 3, 42 ex Novembri 1783.

[27] Rumors were spread, replete with distortions, about Joseph's intended land tax rectification, which in June of 1783 he had articulated by *Handbillet* to Hatzfeld, and again in November by the same means to Kollowrat. Fasc. 2, 29 ex Majo 1784; Grünberg, II, 432-33. This reform was not effected, however, until 1789.

Hoyer thought that the *Kreisämter* should inform the serfs that they could hope for nothing better than the present abolition system, and if they did not accept its provisions then outsiders would be brought in who would accept.

Finally, Hoyer proposed that a review board composed of three or four *Räte* be established at Prague to decide thorny issues arising from the contracts, and, if they could not themselves reach a decision, then the cases undecided should be sent to Vienna for resolution.

Coordination among government agencies was poor, and changes designed to render the introduction of this abolition system more efficient were not effected. Joseph spent the winter in Italy and was not at hand to press the issue, but when he returned to Vienna in April of 1784, he readdressed himself to the problem. He wrote Graf Kollowrat that progress on the church lands, ". . . ungeachtet Meiner ertheilten deutlichen Vorschrift," was still bound up in difficulties.[28] The various examinations of *Elaborata* by accountants and others were especially slowing the work. He commanded that Hoyer and Kaschnitz meet with the *Hofkanzlei* and seek means of reducing the time taken by the *Gubernium* and *Kreisämter* to review contracts.[29] Joseph warned that the proposed land survey and revision of the tax base should occasion no delay in the abolition program. After the new tax rectification was completed the abolition contracts could be adjusted accordingly. Meanwhile private agreements between *Obrigkeit* and *Untertan* should be encouraged.[30]

Hoyer and Kaschnitz met with the *Hofkanzlei* as ordered and gave their reports on the obstacles to putting the system into operation.[31] Since nothing had been done, apparently, to remedy the situation as he depicted it the previous fall to the Emperor, Hoyer's report repeated some of his complaints of that time. The serfs did not understand why they should continue to be held to non-field *robota,* and feared that the remaining, non-field *robota* days would come at precisely their busiest season of the year, when their fields needed attention. Team *robota* during the winter and fall when the roads were bad would ruin their draft animals and equipment. The *Untertanen* still expected that in the future a full *Bauer*[32] would have to pay only twenty per cent of his gross income to the lord, so they were not anxious to sign contracts that might prejudice their opportunity to take advantage of the coming law. Again Hoyer complained that the examining commission was too slow in reviewing the contracts, and the examiners lacked the knowledge to review them properly. A further delay was caused by the requirement that completed contracts be submitted to the *Oberster Burggraf* of the province before the contracts could go to Vienna for final validation.

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[28] *Handbillet,* 5 April, 1784, fasc. 3, 71 ex Aprili 1784.

[29] ". . . Die sichersten Modalitäten entwerfen, und Mir vorlegen, wie diese und andere noch bemerkende Hindernisse behoben, anstatt der verlängernden Gubernial Censur allenfalls die Kreisämtliche bestättigung jedoch mit der angemessenen Verlässlichkeit, die das Geschäft erfordert, eingeführet, und überhaupt zu möglichster Beschleunigung des Geschäftes allgedeihlicher Vorschuss gegeben werden möge." *Ibid.*

[30] "Der Gegenstand wegen der allgemeinen Lands Rectification hat hier keinen Aufenthalt zu verursachen. Ich werde hierzu schon das weitere seiner Zeit veranlassen. Indessen können privat-Einverständnisse zwischen Obrigkeiten und Unterthanen immer für sich gehen, die aber, wann im ganzen die rectificatorische Einrichtung fürgehen wird, derselben alsdann parificiret worden werden." *Ibid.*

[31] Report from Kollowrat to Joseph, fasc. 3, 71 ex Aprili 1784.

[32] As a matter of convenience for assessing taxes, the state set a standard for determining a full *Bauer* according to the amount of land he held and the taxes he was to pay on that land. The standard varied from place to place and time to time.

Kaschnitz had no complaints such as Hoyer's first two points, but he agreed that the commissions of review appointed by the *Landesstelle* were unnecessarily prolonging the process. The commissioners offered repeated unfounded criticisms, and would not accept his, Kaschnitz', partitions of land or abolition fees. Kaschnitz boldly suggested that if all review were set aside, and the contracts left to his judgment, the task would be accomplished much more efficiently. He reported that twenty-one contracts were sent to the *Gubernium* in September of the previous year, and he had received only three in return to date. He also reported that the *Gubernium* did not want him to attempt to install the system anywhere until it had previous notice of his plans. He suggested that the Emperor sign all completed contracts, as the Empress had done under the Raab system, because the peasants wanted only the highest authority to validate the terms.

Kollowrat added his *Votum* to the report, suggesting solutions to the problems raised. He was quite displeased with Hoyer's report. Kollowrat judged Hoyer's first two complaints to be merely a reflection on Hoyer's ineffectiveness as the commissioner. Hoyer should have explained everything more fully to the serfs and should have been more persuasive. Moreover, he should not have let any *robota* requirements remain in effect because elsewhere all *robota* was reduced to money payments. Hoyer had been too sympathetic with the *Obrigkeiten.* He had not computed *Herrschaft* expense and consumption in the gross income, and he apparently did not want to see through the subterfuges of the *Obrigkeiten's* accounting. When it could be proved *necessary,* abolition fees might be increased, but once an equitable contract had been arranged, the *Obrigkeit* should be coerced to sign.[33] As in the Raab system a continuation of really indispensable *robota* may be allowed, but the *Obrigkeit* should pay for it in wages equal to the value of the production resulting from the *robota.* Very definite time limits should be set for the performance of such permitted *robota.*

To obviate the effects of the rumors concerning the impending tax rectification, Kollowrat advised, it should be publicly announced that if the Emperor should issue any law improving the tax or land-owning status of the *Untertanen,* then all *Robotabolition* contracts would be revised to afford full benefit of the new law to the contracting serf.

Contracts should not be processed by the *Hofstelle.* Those contracts agreed to by both parties could be summarily ratified by the *Landeschef,* as could those with unfounded complaints. Those contracts to which one party had a well founded objection could be revised and ratified at the next meeting of the *Landesstelle.* If the *Landesstelle* should deviate from the principles outlined by the Emperor or delay action unnecessarily, the *Hofkommissionäre* should report it to Viena. In any case, Hoyer's present accusation of the *Landesstelle* was inexplicable as he, contrary to instructions, had submitted his contracts to the *Kreisämter,* not to the *Landesstelle.*

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[33] These remarks by Kollowrat were prompted by Hoyer having requested permission to raise *robota* release fees after accepting at face value an *Obrigkeit's* accounting figures indicating that the *Obrigkeit* was losing money on the abolition program. The figures offered were purported to be gross income amounts when, in reality, they were net, that is, expenses had been deducted already. Because of the devious ways of *Obrigkeit* accounting, the abolition system was to be based on gross income figures only.

Hoyer was also brought to task for leasing land only for periods of six years or less, whereas Kaschnitz was letting the serfs buy ownership rights. Further, he was not letting the serfs have the farm buildings of the *Herrschaften,* and he was basing wages for hired labor (*Lohnarbeit*) not on the value of production, but on the value of a *robota* day as prescribed in the *Robotpatent* of 1775.

In reply, Joseph agreed that only the most unavoidable *robota* should be allowed to continue, and where it could not possibly be abolished, the days were to be set so as not to interfere with the serf's own work schedule. But in no case was *robota* to be performed on the *Obrigkeit's Mayergründe.* Any continued *robota* would serve public, not private, interests. He declared that it was the commissioner's duty to bring about agreement between *Obrigkeit* and *Untertan,* considering local conditions and mutual advantages of the parties. The *Kreishauptmann* was to indicate by endorsement his approval of the tentative agreement, taking care that the serf understood the terms of the contract and that he signed only of his own free will and intention. Officials concerned were to be admonished to follow closely these orders.

Joseph expressed his anxiety that the contracts be quickly arranged, and that the commissioners bear in mind the forthcoming land tax rectification when drawing the contracts.

The Emperor rejected Kollowrat's suggested channel of review of the contracts. He ordered that after the *Kreishauptmann* had signed, the contracts were to be sent directly to Zinzendorf at the *Hofrechenkammer* for revision or approval. Finally, he himself would ratify the contracts by the imperial signature. This procedure was to become effective immediately and any contracts that were then in the hands of the *Länderstellen* were to be sent forthwith to the abolition commission at the *Hofrechenkammer.* ". . . weil Ich die Beförderung dieses Geschäftes und dessen Zustandebringung ernstlich betrieben wissen will."[34]

It is interesting to note Joseph's reaction to the charges that Kollowrat directed at Hoyer. His accusations amounted virtually to an indictment of bad faith and unfitness for his post. Yet Joseph, who had a well-earned reputation for severity toward officials who did not perform to standard, tended to excuse Hoyer and his practices, on the grounds that conditions were too varied on the several *Herrschaften* to judge Hoyer by accomplishments of others elsewhere.[35]

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[34] Fasc. 3, 71 ex Aprili 1784.

[35] *Ibid.*

This exchange of ideas and suggestions, and the Emperor's decisions based on them, did much to clarify the objectives of *robota* abolition and established an operable organization to attain those objectives. Instructions were not overly detailed so as to make the program too rigid, but commissioners were ordered to adhere closely to the policies outlined. It is noteworthy that Joseph, so often accused of excessive despotism, left the specific arrangements of abolition to the negotiations of lord and serf, so long as the result was within the limits imposed by policy. The obstacle of *Landesstelle* review of contracts was removed, and the contracts went directly from the commissioners and *Kreishauptleute* to the *Hofkommission,* where Joseph could expect more expeditious action in the spirit in which the abolition system was conceived.

Within the framework devised in April, 1784, despite later changes of personnel and the difficulties of reconciling disagreements between lord and serf, the system proved to be viable, and Joseph was embarked on a much more ambitious program of *Robotabolition* on government controlled estates than Maria Theresa and Raab had been able to conduct.

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PIETRO VERRI
A LOMBARD REFORMER UNDER ENLIGHTENED ABSOLUTISM AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

by Donald A. Limoli

FOR the history of Europe in the eighteenth century two of the most significant movements are the attempt to reform under Enlightened Absolutism and the spread of revolution after its outbreak in France in 1789. One of the areas in which extensive reforms were made under Enlightened Absolutism was Lombardy, a province of the Hapsburgs since 1713. In Lombardy, moreover, an indigenous manifestation of the European-wide Enlightenment occurred during the 1760's and there Pietro Verri, although an aristocrat by birth, came to the fore in the attempt to reform a highly stratified class structure, native administrative bodies dominated by class interest, and an economy in the depths of stagnation. Like many other Europeans, Verri believed the quickest way to reform was through the unchallenged will of an enlightened monarch. Enlightened Absolutism, however, did not so change conditions as to avoid the resort to reform by revolutionary means in 1789. For Verri, as for others, absolutism turned out in the end a disappointment and he was forced to decide whether or not he would work through the instrumentality of revolutionary ways involving change by the will of the majority rather than by the will of the monarch. But it also involved the question of how far a moderate reformer of the old era like Verri could identify himself with new, radical measures such as those of the French authorities and Lombard democrats who seized all power during the three years following the arrival of an army of the French Republic under Bonaparte in 1796.

Why a Reformer?

When Pietro Verri was born in 1728, his father, Gabriele Verri, with close ties to the court at Vienna and as Vicar of Provision for Milan was the most powerful official in Lombardy. A member of the dominant noble class, he was steeped in the spirit of caste, and he intended his first son, Pietro, to carry on the long family tradition of service in the highest offices of Milan.[1]

But the younger Verri was not in sympathy with the traditional ideals of the elder. By the age of twenty-one he was in complete revolt against the strict parental authority exercised in the attempt to mould a successor. His inclinations drew him not to the closed circles of the old, exclusive Lombard nobility, but to the cosmopolitan society that was beginning to spring up in Milan on the model of Paris. Pietro Verri became a dashing cavalier, attending the performance of new plays, taking part in discussions of current topics of interest at the *salon* of Duchess Serbelloni, and dabbling in literary art himself.

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[1] See Eugène Bouvy, *Le Comte Pietro Verri* (Paris, 1889), p. 1 f., and Nino Valeri, *Pietro Verri* (Milan, 1937), pp. 15 ff.

There was no place in the social structure of Milan, however, for a young noble at odds with his family. Participation in commercial activity was socially unacceptable to the nobility and strictly forbidden. Verri was all but disowned by his father and yet was not really a part of the mundane society he frequented. Besides, in time he tired of its petty concerns and fell into a state of deep dissatisfaction. Thus in 1759 he decided to secure an officer's commission in the Lombard regiment serving Maria Theresa in the Seven Years War in hopes of finding escape from the ennui bearing down upon him and his position as a social outcast. But Verri was again doomed to disappointment. In the army, he wrote from Bavaria, he had hoped to find cheerfulness and a sincere familiarity between man and man. But he discovered instead that the army was composed of the "refuse of society" and was mired in the depths of ignorance and indifference.[2] More than ever it seemed that there was no place for him to go.

It was at this time, however, that Verri met Henry Lloyd, a Welsh soldier of fortune serving the Hapsburgs and an intellectual with more than a passing knowledge of a wide variety of subjects. Verri was enthralled by Lloyd who awakened in him a keen interest in current questions of the day touching on matters of commerce, free trade, national wealth, etc.[3] Under Lloyd's influence his thoughts began to drift toward the idea of a political career in which he would be concerned with the problems that now interested him so much.

Thus it dawned upon Verri at the age of thirty-two that some of the best years of his life had been wasted in indirection. His true calling, he gradually came to believe, was that of a reformer who would set about alleviating the abuses of the economic and social system which he now distinctly perceived. But he realized, too, that for such a role preparation was necessary. "I have not read seriously the great writers," Verri wrote on Jan. 24, 1760, "and I must prepare myself."[4]

And in preparation he left the Bavarian front for Vienna in the early part of 1760 to spend much of the following year in a library reading Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Helvétius. At the same time he bent all his efforts toward securing a government position in Milan. What he wanted was some little office, some "little niche" in which he could serve the monarchy in his native province and begin the career he had decided upon.[5]

But even after securing a letter of recommendation from Kaunitz, the all-powerful chief minister of Maria Theresa, Verri failed to get a position on his return to Milan in early 1761. In desperation, therefore, he decided to make a study of all the documents filed in the archives of the Senate relating to the diminishing commerce of the state in order to draw attention to himself and demonstrate the need for immediate reforms. He resolved that for him there would be no more theater and no more diversions, but that by hard and constant work he would get to understand his country and make known its true condition.[6]

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[2] Carlo Cassati, ed., *Lettere e Scritti inediti di Pietro e di Alessandro Verri* (Milan, 1879-81), I, 32-4.

[3] See Emiliana Noether, *Seeds of Italian Nationalism, 1700-1815* (New York, 1951), p. 97.

[4] Cassati, *Lettere,* I, 113.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 116 f.

By mid-eighteenth century the social structure of Lombardy was marked by impenetrable lines of stratification. At the top was the nobility, divided into roughly three groups.[7] The old nobility was composed of families whose origins went back to the feudal system of the middle ages, although feudalism as an economic system was dead in Lombardy long before 1750. However, the families still retained great landed estates which formed the basis of their wealth and social position. The patricians, though also landed, were distinguished from the old nobility by the exercise of all civil power which gave them all effective power. Active service in office was a requirement for continued membership in their highly exclusive circle and engagement in commercial activity resulted in immediate loss of patrician status. The lesser nobility, established during the period of Spanish domination (1545-1713) in an attempt to create faithful functionaries, was hardly significant by 1750.

The power of the nobility was based, therefore, on land ownership, the exclusive privilege of civil service, or both. With the stern rule of primogeniture in full operation, careers in the army, clergy, and governing bodies were the only alternatives open to younger sons. For the daughters, it was marriage within their own class, or the convent. What emerges, consequently, is a picture of a class possessing wealth, privilege, and power, but constituting an essentially unproductive element in society.[8]

Closely allied to the nobility, of course, was the clergy. Great monastic corporations of the regular clergy drew their higher members almost exclusively from the nobility. And while most of the members of the lower ranks were venerable men devoted to their duties, many of the higher prelates lived lavishly off rich benefices and engaged openly in worldly activities.

The class with the greatest economic and political potential at mid-century was a nascent bourgeoisie. Amounting to 17 percent of the population of Milan and comprising merchants, bankers, small industrialists, and professional people, the bourgeoisie constituted an element in ferment. Ambitious and optimistic, they were engaged in the productive enterprises of the city and thirsted after political power commensurate with their economic importance.

At the very bottom of the class structure were the workers and peasants. The peasants formed a labor force for the great landed estates, worked land as tenant farmers, or farmed their own small holdings. The workers were still organized in guilds controlling each field of industrial activity. But by 1750 the guilds had fallen into a serious state of degeneration in which the number of master-craftsmen was arbitrarily limited and output carefully controlled in order to keep prices high.

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

[7] For the following see J. M. Roberts, "L'Aristocrazia Lombarda nel XVIII Secolo," *Rivista Occidenta,* Sept.-Oct., 1952, pp. 306-09.

[8] In 1768 the nobility of Milan numbered 5,160 or 4 percent of the total population. Only 350 of 1,935 adult men were first sons who could own land. 1,200 had no definite occupation and 1,330 were in the clergy. Of 1,925 adult women, over one half filled convents. See C. A. Vianello, *Il Settecento Milanese* (Milan, 1934), p. 61 f.

As to the government of Lombardy, the province was controlled by a series of independent magistracies each of which enjoyed complete autonomy in its own sphere.[9] The main governing body of Milan, the seat of the province, was the Council of the Commune, made up of sixty patricians who made decisions on all matters concerning the city and appointed an executive officer, the Vicar of Provision. The Senate of Milan, although its function was primarily judicial, actually constituted the stronghold of the patrician class, and protected its interests through an old precedent providing that no order was valid in Milan unless first approved by the Senate. Representing the province as a whole, but with only deliberative powers, was the Congregation of State, made up of delegates from five administrative districts.

Central control from Vienna was supposedly tight but actually very loose. The crown appointed a Governor, later called Plenipotentiary, to enforce its regulations, a Chancellor of State to keep a close watch on the magistracies, and an Imperial Chancellery in Vienna to help forge policy. Imperially instituted orders and reforms were circumvented, however, by the mere inertia of the various autonomous magistracies.

In the sphere of financial administration, conditions were equally bad. Certain improvements, it should be noted, had been made during the 1750's. Fiscal authority was centralized in the *Magistrato Camerale* and Pompeo Neri, a Tuscan reformer, was brought in to draw up a register of all taxable property in order to eliminate evasion. The authority of the new agency, however, was split between two independent branches of which it was composed, and even more important, the inefficient and corrupt system of indirect taxes was left untouched. These taxes, known as the *regalie,* consisted of duties on commodities such as tobacco, salt, and wine, and were in the hands of private individuals who had secured contracts from the government to collect them. Virtually uncontrolled, they were left free to gather in all they could for their own pockets beyond the minimum set by the government, and this at the expense of the poorest classes.[10] In 1750 all contracts were placed under the jurisdiction of a single general office called the *Ferma* in hopes of making government income more secure. But as it was set up as an autonomous unit, the tax farmers were actually left free to consolidate their positions and extend their authority.

The customs system was also sunk in the mire of inefficiency and corruption. Internal trade was hindered by numerous customs barriers between the various parts of the province. External trade was in the hands of big monopolists who alone could pay the high fee for the required export license and who, consequently, could arbitrarily set the prices they would pay for peasant-produced agricultural products.

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[9] For the following see Roberts, "L'Aristocrazia Lombarda," 317-18, and Franco Valsecchi, *L'Assolutismo Illuminato in Austria e in Lombardia* (Bologna, 1931), II-1, 15, 21.

[10] Modestino Manfra, *Pietro Verri e i Problemi economici del Tempo suo* (Milan, 1932), p. 74, and Alessandro Visconti, *Storia di Milano* (Milan, 1937), II, 491.

As a result of these conditions, Carlo Morandi maintains, the whole economy had fallen into a state of stagnation during the first half of the century. Because of the oppressive controls, a shift occurred away from the planting of grain, an old export staple, to other crops. The consequence was often prolonged famine prices in grain. Industry, on the other hand, was sapped by the multiplicity of internal tariffs and the restrictive controls of the guilds dominating it.[11]

What Verri set out to do in the study undertaken in 1761, therefore, was to trace the continual decline of the Lombard economy since the fifteenth century primarily as a result of bad government. "Our government has been a republic of robes," he wrote, "and it regards industry, science, and the courage to think as a principle of rebellion."[12] And he proceeded to attack the whole system of taxation, the restrictions on trade, and the parasitic existence of the nobility.[13]

This attempt made by Verri is highly significant, for it reflects to a great extent a general reawakening of thought in Lombardy, a native manifestation, in fact, of the European-wide Enlightenment. Everything in the province was astir. The bourgeoisie injected new vigor into the economy by turning to the factory system in order to increase production of wool, silk, and carriages. Some few liberally inclined nobles, having little to hope for in the continuation of the status quo, began to drift toward the bourgeoisie. Paolo Greppi of the old nobility shook off the shackles of tradition and became head of a large commercial house, while Francesco Melzi of the newer nobility dared to start thinking in terms of representative government. And Jansenism with its attack on the temporal power of the papacy, on the rigidity of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and on the corruption of the regular orders, found droves of sympathizers among the bourgeoisie.[14] Franco Valsecchi catches the essential point in calling it a struggle between a tenacious old world, defending the privilege of blood and authority of the church, and an evolving new one, rejecting the law of privilege in the name of the rule of ability.[15] And in no way is this struggle between two generations better characterized than in the conflict between Gabriele and Pietro Verri, the one who remained a staunch supporter of the old way, the other who became a moderate liberal reformer.

Verri was at the very center of the ferment of ideas and plans which took hold of Milan in the 1760's. Cut off from his family and in despair of getting a government position, in 1761 he organized with his admiring younger brother, Alessandro, an intellectual society, *Il Caffè,* comprised of young nobles who like himself were disgusted with the old order. Verri was the mentor of the group which met in his rooms for discussions of problems concerning economics, penal law, administration, morality, etc. It is from these sessions that Beccaria's famous treatise, *Of Crimes and Punishments,* emerged, a work suggested and to a considerable extent directed by Verri himself.[16] And in 1764 the group began publishing a journal also called *Il Caffè* which created a furor in Milan by the broadside attacks delivered against all prevailing abusive conditions—the idleness of the nobility, the corruption of the tax farmers, backward agricultural practices, and prejudice against going beyond the inadequate model of language provided by Dante. Even if it meant Italianizing French words, Verri argued, the language had to be vitalized and made capable of expressing new ideas produced by the original thinking of contemporaries.[17]

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[11] Carlo Morandi, *Idee e Formazioni politiche in Lombardia, dal 1748 al 1814* (Turin, 1927), p. 35 f., p. 47.

[12] Cassati, *Lettere,* I, 149-50.

[13] For a short analysis see Noether, *Seeds of Italian Nationalism,* p. 99.

[14] Morandi, *Idee e Formazioni politiche,* p. 145, and Aldo Ferrari, *La Preparazione intelletuale del Risorgimento Italiano* (Milan, 1923), p. 209.

The society, therefore, addressed itself to particular questions of current importance to Lombardy. It did, nevertheless, look to Paris for inspiration. As Verri himself expressed it, "I shall aways look upon d'Alembert, Voltaire, Helvétius, Rousseau, and David Hume as men of a superior order destined to live for centuries to come."[18] And in 1766 Alessandro and Beccaria journeyed to Paris to receive the plaudits of Voltaire, Holbach, Diderot, and others for the efforts of their Milanese group.

Verri, therefore, was abreast of the great currents of the European Enlightenment by the great era of reform in Lombardy. Although he was primarily concerned with the need for reforms in Lombardy, he also realized that Lombardy was only a particular aspect of a general European problem. In no respect is this more striking than in his concept that civil liberty must become a universal principle in Europe. Writing his brother in 1767, he voiced admiration for the institutions of England which guaranteed all Englishmen the precious right of civil liberty. But for the English channel, England might have spread the principle all over Europe through its power or its influence. England, however, had created a breach in the wall of despotism and had pointed the way for Europe to follow. Thus, he concluded, "To waste away or to be oppressed by external forces, or indeed to grant civil liberty, this is the alternative in which the states of Europe find themselves."[19]

Verri did not mean here that absolute monarchy must perish. He was in full sympathy with the great experiment of Enlightened Absolutism involving the idea that a rational approach could be taken to the solution of social problems and that rationally determined reform could most expeditiously be carried out by an all powerful monarch guided by a sincere concern for the welfare of his people.[20] This Verri saw as the best way of

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[15] Valsecchi, *L'Assolutismo illuminato,* II-1, 118-19.

[16] See Cassati, *Lettere,* I, 189, and Bouvy, *Pietro Verri,* p. 200 f.

[17] Noether, *Seeds of Italian Nationalism,* p. 102, and Ettore Rota, *Le Origini del Risorgimento, 1700-1800* (Milan, 1949), p. 575 f.

[18] Cassati, *Lettere,* II, 234-35.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 116 f.

[20] For an excellent analysis of Enlightened Absolutism see Valsecchi, *L'Assolutismo illuminato,* I, Chaps. 1-2.

overcoming the obstacles thrown up by the autonomous magistracies of Milan. The majority of men, he maintained, are motivated by old habits, tradition, and personal prejudice. To see how such men act it is only necessary to look at the tribunals of Milan which killed all innovations. It is impossible, therefore, for an assembly of men gathered together to execute any reforms. Thus he concluded, "Whenever essential changes have been made, whenever with some rapidity and happy success old disorders have been eradicated, it will be seen that it was the work of a single enlightened person against many private interests."[21]

Verri and the Era of Lombard Reforms under Enlightened Absolutism

The great era of reform in Lombardy spans the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, who in 1765 became joint monarch with his mother and in 1780 sole monarch at her death. While Maria Theresa retained ultimate power in her own hands during the period of joint rule, reform was moderate, motivated primarily by the necessity to centralize control in order to save the shaky empire which wavered under the assaults of 1740 and 1756. Under Joseph II, a student of the enlightened thinkers and an ardent admirer of the enlightened despots, it reached its greatest heights. But under both monarchs, reform and centralization was an empire-wide experiment. And in these years Verri threw himself completely into the struggle for reform in Milan. He was concerned mostly with the abolition of tax farming involving the recall of contracts relative to the *regalie,* and the establishment of an efficient state financial system. But it soon became apparent to Verri and others that, because of the opposition to financial reforms put up by the class-dominated autonomous magistracies, it was necessary to curb their political supremacy by altering the whole administrative system of the province.[22] Not until the advent of Joseph II was a successful assault made on the political system, but then it was brutally complete and fated to have far reaching consequences.

It was actually Verri himself who renewed the struggle for reform against the Lombard aristocracy which was started by Pompeo Neri in the 1750's with his register of taxable property. Upon the completion of his book on the decline of Milanese commerce in 1763, he sent it to Kaunitz along with an offer of his services. What he desired to stress as the greatest need of the province was the abolition of tax farming in order to give full benefits of taxation to the government, and the establishment of a royal commission to administer finances for the welfare of the state and devise a new tariff system which would be more conducive to the development of commerce and industry.[23] It was the modernization of Lombardy which was basic to Verri's economic thought. And his bold step produced immediate results. Impressed with Verri's work, Kaunitz authorized the establishment of a special *junta* which included Verri as an advisory councilor to reform the financial system of the province. Verri had at last found his "little niche."

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[21] Pietro Verri, *Meditazioni sulla Economia Politica* (Liverno, 1771), p. 232 f.
[22] Roberts, "L'Aristocrazia Lombarda," p. 316 f., p. 322.
[23] Cassati, *Lettere,* I, 166-68; IV, 140-41.

Although Verri was elated by his appointment, he soon found cause for extreme dissatisfaction. He was convinced, in the first place, that Vienna had killed any chance for real reform by including in the *junta* men with no knowledge of financial matters together with a representative of tax farmers who "made full use of the plurality of votes" to block all changes adversely affecting his interests.[24] To force the *junta* on the right road, he decided to take another daring step. With no authorization from Vienna, he published at government expense a balance of trade for the year 1752, revealing that Lombardy imported far more than it exported, and distributed it among the members of the *junta*. But this time Verri miscalculated the effect, drawing an immediate letter of rebuke from Kaunitz for acting without authorization,[25] and a storm of refutations from important Milanese patricians whose ability to govern was directly challenged by his revelations. Verri was completely chagrined and gave up any hope of reform by the *junta* in which he saw he had no power and which, he wrote to Illario Corte, a close friend at the Court of Vienna, decided all matters in secret conferences and presented him with the accomplished facts.[26]

And Verri's worst expectations were fulfilled. The work of the *junta* did not result in the abolition of tax farming, but in the establishment in 1765 of a new office, the mixed *Ferma,* to administer indirect taxes. The primary change involved was that along with two representatives of the tax farmers, a delegate of the government was to be included in order to establish at least a modicum of control. Ironically enough, the man selected was our Pietro Verri, already at odds with those who would maintain the old system. The mixed *Ferma* was attached to a new Supreme Council of Public Economy which in 1767 completely superseded the old *junta* and of which Verri was also made a member.

As government delegate on the new *Ferma,* however, Verri undertook a determined fight to secure the complete abolition of tax farming which in his view not only took from the mass of people more than they should pay in taxes, but also deprived the government of revenue it should receive while making it odious to the general populace. "The tax farmers," he declared with the establishment of the *Ferma,*" are and should be my enemies."[27] And in 1768 through a member of the Department for Italy he secured the authorization to draw up a plan for the complete abolition of the *regalie.*

Verri's position in the *Ferma,* however, was extremely difficult, for working to change the new financial system just established, he was bound to be in violent disagreement with other officials. In the *Ferma* he saw himself limited to the execution of measures which were contrary to his most basic principles, while he viewed all the subordinates in the office as

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[24] *Ibid.,* IV, 141.
[25] This letter is printed in *ibid.,* I, 176-78.
[26] *Ibid.,* IV, 112.
[27] *Ibid.,* I, 193.

"creatures of the tax farmers" upon whom he could have no effect.[28] And although the newly created Supreme Council of Public Economy was supposed to function as an instrument for further reform as well as the chief administrative body of the government in matters of general finance, Verri found himself continually outvoted on all proposals for reform. Branding the council as "a union of discards to whom it was desired to provide a gratuitous income," he virtually retired from it in disgust in August of 1767, in despair of any results.[29]

Verri, in short, was developing the feeling that the men upon whom Vienna had laid the task of devising reforms, most of whom were nobles, were not only incompetent, but were also opportunists who were betraying a trust for the sake of their own interests. He complained bitterly of mistreatment by Gian Rinaldo Carli, a former member of the *Caffè* group and now president of the Supreme Council, whom he accused of allowing himself to be dominated by a sense of his own importance and seeking nothing but personal power.[30] He came to view Cristiani, the Chancellor of State, as a man not only lacking any culture and great plans, but also a man of disgusting moral depravity interested only in himself.[31] Verri's letters to Illario Corte in the early part of 1768 show that he felt isolated and conspired against. He felt that there was no one who understood the nature of reform needed as he did and that his talents were not only not used, but also not appreciated.[32] Verri at this point presents the picture of a tragically embittered and completely frustrated man.

The chief difficulty as Verri came to see it in 1769 was what he called the "ministerial evil." What frustrated reform which would benefit the general welfare of the people was the existence of subordinate ministers between the people and the monarch who were either personally ambitious or became the unwitting instruments of private interests. Through them all the good intentions of the monarch were brought to nothing.[33] Thus, when Joseph II paid a visit to Milan from June 23 to July 15 of 1769 and publicly announced his desire to gather information for further reforms, Verri took new hope as he saw the possibility of bypassing the ministerial stumbling block.

During Joseph's visit, a series of conferences which included the principal figures of the government were held to discuss the *regalie,* the *Ferma,* the judicial system, commerce, industry, etc. Again Verri felt that most of the Milanese officials were fighting to save the *status quo.* He specifically thought that Joseph was given false information concerning the activities of tax farmers, that the *Ferma* was slavishly protected, and that Carli tried to make it appear that commerce was active, agriculture productive, and the income of the government secure.[34] For himself he decided not to attack his adversaries, but to cast a negative vote against all their proposals in order to discredit them and make clear his own position.[35] He became convinced that through Joseph all he had been trying to achieve could be realized. "All his discourses," he wrote Corte, "breathe goodness, beneficence, and paternity toward the people. . . . In a word, I see that the principles of His Majesty are those which I have always thought true."[36] Verri's direct activity was limited primarily to drafting a report concerning the *regalie* on salt. However, he did have one brief exchange with Joseph in which he pointed out that the population of the province was declining dangerously and that, because of the restrictions on the exportation of grains, the peasants were beginning to produce other products to the general detriment of the agriculture.[37] And as the conferences drew to a close, he became convinced that Joseph saw the need for the abolition of tax farming which prevented the establishment of a uniform and universal system of taxation. As for himself, Verri concluded: "My silence was an equivalent to war on the *Ferma*."[38]

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[28] *Ibid.,* IV, 145; III, 361.

[29] *Ibid.,* II,287-88.

[30] *Ibid.,* III, 316-17.

[31] *Ibid.,* IV, 153-54, 435-36.

[32] See *ibid.,* III, 294-95, 343-44.

[33] *Ibid.,* IV, 48, 52.

[34] *Ibid.,* p. 87, p. 93.

Verri's faith in Joseph was rewarded. By an imperial order of July 6, 1770, the *Ferma* was abolished. This meant the recall of all contracts pertaining to the alienated *regalie* and the end of tax farming as a system. And Verri, who had made this reform a personal struggle, was entrusted with drafting a plan for the compensation of the contractors and for the administration of the redeemed *regalie*. Until a new government body could be set up, however, Verri was given full jurisdiction over the administration of the *regalie* as the contracts came in.[39] The abolition of tax farming was Verri's greatest battle and greatest triumph in the era of Enlightened Absolutism.

The difficulties encountered in the attempt to reform indirect taxes indicated that the whole administrative system needed to be changed. Thus in May, 1771, Firmian, the Plenipotentiary, was called to Vienna along with Verri and several other councilors to participate in the task with the Department for Italy. By this time Verri was fatefully at odds with Firmian, who had done nothing to facilitate the tax reforms, but completely confident in Joseph II. And as Valsecchi notes, the main line of battle developed between Verri, seeking to establish a simple and unified system of administration, and Firmian, attempting to maintain the power of the chief minister through a multiplicity of subordinate bodies with ill defined jurisdictions.[40]

Verri, clearly established as a leading economic thinker and administrator, was charged with Pecci, a Milanese Senator, to draw up a plan for the administration of finance. In the meantime, however, Firmian, Cristiani, and others were able to push through the Department for Italy a general scheme which called for a two chamber Senate, civil and criminal, a House of Magistrates for general administration, a divided government council for the administration of finance, and a chamber of commerce with Verri as president.[41] For Verri, this was the very opposite of the unified financial system he desired. He attacked the divided and overlapping jurisdictions which the plan involved, convinced that it meant slavery of the province to the despotic will of the chief ministers. The Senate, he wrote, was the sole authority standing before the full despotism of the plenipotentiary.[42]

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[35] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 79 f.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[39] Manfra, *Pietro Verri e Problemi economici*, p. 103 f., pp. 106-08.
[40] Valsecchi, *L'Assolutismo illuminato*, II-1, 187.

Verri again saw his only hope in Joseph II and decided to make a personal appeal. Calling upon the Emperor with the excuse of presenting him with his study of 1763, he indicated dissatisfaction with the position offered him and openly spoke against the divided jurisdictions of the impending plan.[43] It appeared for a moment that Verri was about to reach the very summit of success, for after spending a whole sleepless night over the proected changes, Joseph decided that the Senate should remain undivided and that a new *Magistrato Camerale,* with Verri as president, should be established for the general administration of the province.[44] But when Joseph suddenly left for Hungary, Maria Theresa, who had accepted his suggestions, gave way under the pressure of the cabal. Although the *Magistrato Camerale* was retained, its general powers were somewhat diminished. Carli, Verri's old rival, was made president, while Verri himself was placed in charge of finances under his authority. And in addition, special honors and monetary rewards were bestowed upon Firmian, Cristiani, and the others, while Verri received nothing. Once again he felt that all his work, all his plans, all his personal self-sacrifice were disregarded and unappreciated.

After the attempt at administrative reform in 1771, Verri's main accomplishments were completed. He devoted himself henceforth to lesser but still important problems of commerce and tariff reform. Verri maintained that internal free trade was the first condition for commercial prosperity and that a flourishing economy depended upon the development of industry as well as agriculture. And in 1774 he began a long struggle to systematize the taxation of merchandise in transit and to secure the adoption of a protective tariff to foster the growth of Lombard industry.[45] For agriculture, on the other hand, he condemned the general prohibition of exports and threw himself into the battle for free trade in grains. All the enlightened ministers of Europe, he had argued in 1768, realize that free trade is the simplest and best system to insure commercial prosperity, a system produced, in fact, by the enlightened thought of the century.[46]

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[41] Bouvy, *Pietro Verri,* p. 147.

[42] Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 164-65, 168.

[43] *Ibid.,* p. 170.

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 171.

[45] Manfra, *Pietro Verri e Problemi economici,* pp. 190-94.

[46] Pietro Verri, "Progetto sul Piano d'Annona," Casatti, *Lettere,* III, 304.

But until Joseph II became sole ruler in 1780, little was accomplished in Lombardy by Verri or anyone else. With certain basic financial reforms realized in various parts of the empire, Valsecchi points out, Maria Theresa wished to go no further, remaining, basically, in the grips of tradition and the old way.[47] But with Joseph II, "the hope of the Enlightenment," the head of the *Aufklärungspartei* in Austria, confident in his own ability to reform, and demanding centralized power to do so, the way for radical innovations was open.

The multiplicity of existing jurisdictions in Milan was clearly incompatible with the need for simplification and centralization. The blow took six years to fall, but when it did come, it fell with devastating effect.[48] In 1786, by order of the Emperor, the Senate, the *Magistrato Camerale,* and the Congregation of State were all completely abolished at a stroke. Also ended was the old administrative autonomy of districts and cities. The new system instituted provided for a Council of Government, organized in departments, for the general administration of the province. Since in 1781 all religious orders which did not maintain schools or hospitals had been suppressed,[49] a special department of the new council was set up for the regulation of both the regular and secular clergy. The whole province was divided into eight districts, with an intendant appointed by the government over each. The autonomy of the magistracies was over, and centralization, with no limits on royal power, was complete.

The result was an immediate and violent reaction against Vienna by the Lombard aristocracy. And Verri, who had put complete trust in the Emperor a few years before, recoiled with the others! While he desired a broadening of political privilege, the complete destruction of the patrician class and all the institutions of Lombardy were alien to his innermost convictions. What he wanted for the patrician class was not destruction but political responsibility and social usefulness. Though in 1783 he attacked the clergy as a class separate from society intent on keeping the people in abject ignorance, and condemned the religious brotherhoods because of their seclusive, unproductive mode of life, he remained a practising Catholic all his life.[50] He was mildly anti-clerical, never anti-religious. And thus with the radical changes of 1786, Verri, who had fought against all the obstacles thrown up in the way of reform during the past twenty years, found himself defending the Milanese Senate, the stronghold of the patrician class interests, as the only means of defense against the onslaught of unlimited power, even when wielded by Joseph II.

Enlightened Absolutism and the French Revolution in the Balance

The key to Verri's reaction was the complete centralization of power in Vienna. By 1790 he clearly condemned Enlightened Absolutism as it turned out under Joseph II. Ettore Rota also argues that the whole attempt at economic reform turned out in the end a complete failure. Vienna, he maintains, refused to ally with the bourgeoisie and held down Lombard industry in order to protect industry in its German states which it saw essential to its development as a modern power.[51] And, in fact, in 1791 the bourgeoisie capped its struggle of resistence to heavy taxation of industry dating from 1786 by petitioning the emperor for the abolition of all restrictive imposts and the right of participation in government.[52] But although Verri had long advocated the abolition of restrictive taxes of all kinds, he did not turn against Vienna because of the great failure seen by Rota. The issue to him was complete absolutism. On the other hand, in reacting against unbridled absolutism, he also moved closer to the now highly articulate bourgeoisie, a highly significant step in his evolution as a liberal. He developed, in short, into a constitutionalist. Thus while he thought once again that Enlightened Absolutism might still succeed with the advent of Leopold II in 1790, he viewed it in a different light. When once more nothing came of it, he was left face to face with the revolution in France, which as time went on threatened to reach his own native province.

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[47] Valsecchi, *L'Assolutismo illuminato,* I, 81.

[48] For the following see *ibid.,* III, 209 ff. and Roberts, "L'Aristocrazia Lombarda," p. 223.

[49] See Vianello, *Settecento Milanese,* pp. 84-7. Reform of the clergy was started under Maria Theresa in the 1760's and resulted in the abolition of the inquisition, the end of the right of asylum, and the approval of papal orders by the royal government.

With the far reaching changes of 1786, Verri retired to private life not to re-enter office again until 1791. During this time his thoughts were centered on the old attempt at reform under Enlightened Absolutism and the new under the revolution in France. The problem of what caused the failure of the old way and the resort to the new was clearly in his mind.

The intentions of Joseph II, Verri wrote on his death in 1790, were basically good. He wanted to limit ecclesiastical power, humanize the penal code, and reform the judicial system so as to end arbitrary action not based on law. The problem he faced and failed to solve, however, was how to carry out reform over his vast empire in such a way as not to oppress and alienate his subjects in the process.[53] Instead of relying on gradual and moderate change, Joseph had tried to remedy everything at once by means of his own will alone and saddled Lombardy with an unendurable despotism in so doing. Thus, analyzing the condition of Milan in 1790, Verri concluded:

> Joseph II understood that the system was rotten, but did not understand that a simultaneous and universal destruction of the laws and practices of a country is a remedy worse than the malady. He took no account of opinion, which is also queen of the world, and made men feel all the unlimited power of a monarch who recognizes no other standard than his own will.[54]

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[50] Pietro Verri, "Decadenza del Papato, Idea del Governo di Venezia e degli Italiani in generale." Found in Angelo Ottolini, *Pietro Verri e suoi Tempi, con la Ristampa de suoi Scritti inediti* (Naples, 1921), p. 182 f.

[51] Ettore Rota, *L'Austria in Lombardia e la Preparazione del Movimento democratico Cisalpino* (Milan, 1911), pp. 70 ff.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-42.

[53] Pietro Verri, "Orazione Funebre per Giuseppe II, Imperatore e Re." Found in Ottolini, *Pietro Verri e suoi Scritti inediti*, pp. 155-57.

[54] Pietro Verri, "Pensieri sullo Stato politico del Milanese nel 1790." Found in Ottolini, *Pietro Verri e suoi Scritti inediti*, pp. 125-26.

Clearly Verri could not accept the absolute power of the monarchy at Vienna which reduced Lombardy to the status of a subject province through the total destruction of its old institutions. Consequently, he condemned the concentration of all power in a council directly subservient to Vienna, as well as the attack on the clergy accompanied by the destruction of monasteries and the appointment of prelates by the crown, and the attempt completely to dispense with the services of the nobility.[55]

And not only was Lombardy subjected to the inescapable despotism of the monarch in Vienna, but also to that of his subordinate ministers in the province. Ministerial despotism, Verri recounted, had its start under Maria Theresa when the Governor, Gian Luca Pallavicino, under whom Neri's reform of direct taxes was carried out, began to center all immediate power in his own hands, taking from the Senate its jurisdiction over the University of Pavia and the right of its president to perform the duties of the Chancellor of State during his absence.[56] But the high point was reached under Joseph II, for his greatest concern was to make his ministers mere executors of his commands. Any independence of thought was killed. Intent on keeping their little offices, they would say nothing which might displease their superiors, preferring to allow the country to fall into abject slavery rather than risk their own incomes.[57] It was the old ministerial evil, therefore, now transformed into the scourge of bureaucracy. While previously the ministers were pictured as the obstacle between the beneficent will of the monarch and the people, now they were seen as the low slaves of his will who fastened both his and their despotism upon the country.

Verri arrived at the conclusion, therefore, that there must be limitations upon the power of the monarch, that without these limitations, monarchy inevitably degenerated into despotism. And Verri's satirical piece of 1790, an imaginary dialogue between Voltaire and Frederick the Great in the realm of the dead, indicates that the outbreak of the revolution in France had some effect in focusing his thoughts in this direction.

In informing Frederick about the revolution that has occurred in France, Verri has Voltaire explain that it was caused by "the spirit of geometry [which] spread among the masses and gave it the habit of reasoning." As a result the whole nation became enlightened. It was realized that government existed for the welfare of the nation, not the nation for the caprice of government. "All power, Sire," Voltaire thus propounds, "is founded only on opinion, and from the time that national opinion is changed, revolution is inevitable."[58] And he rejects Frederick's contention that a strong army can enable a king to disregard opinion. Thus, when Frederick, pressed for a retort, asks Voltaire what he would have done if he had been king, Voltaire answers, "If I were born king, I would have been beguiled in my infancy like any other. I would," Voltaire continues, "have believed that I knew better than all other men, and that a generation was created to obey my wishes. I would have thought," he concludes, "that despotism is the natural state of man until my people finally raised its head, made me feel its force, and awakened me from a good dream."[59] He would have gone, therefore, the way of all monarchs into the abyss of despotism.

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[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 128-32.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 120 f.

[57] Pietro Verri, "Dialogo fra l'Imperatore Giuseppe II ed un Filosofo." Found in Ottolini, *Pietro Verri e suoi Scritti inediti,* p. 257 f.

[58] Pietro Verri, "Dialogue des Morts: Le roi Frédéric et Voltaire." Found in Ottolini, *Pietro Verri e i suoi Scritti inediti,* p. 163 f.

Voltaire assures Frederick, moreover, that the French will ultimately succeed in drafting a constitution which will be accepted by the National Assembly. And when asked what will become of Europe, he replies: "Up to now, France has given the rest of Europe pompons, dancers, hair dressers, and cooks; now its turn has come to give it the sentiment of liberty." As long as the rights of citizens were recognized only in England, the continent was immune to them. But with the revolution in France, enlightened ideas are loose in the very "abdomen of the continent" and are in books which are in the hands of everyone. People will compare the despotism under which they live with the liberty they see elsewhere. The result will be that "the abuse of power will become insupportable, the people will sense new forces, and will soon follow the example of the French."[60] These sentiments were not, it should be pointed out, completely new in Verri. As shown above his thoughts had turned as early as 1767 to civil liberty in England which he thought in time would spread to the rest of Europe. But under the impact of what occurred during the reign of Joseph II and the outbreak of the French Revolution, they were much more extensively developed and clearly defined.

For Verri, then, absolutism was reduced to a formula in which "one commands and the others obey, one thinks and the others follow."[61] As such it was hollow and vicious. One thing is clear, he declared, and that is "that for many centuries the Milanese have moaned under despotism, having no constitution which could place limits on the desires of the monarch or the minister invested in power by him."[62]

Therefore, when Joseph's successor, Leopold II, invited the Milanese in 1790 to inform him of conditions they wished to see changed and needs they desired to have satisfied, Verri asked above all for a constitution. As Archduke of Tuscany Leopold had been one of the most enlightened of the despots and had directed one of the most successful attempts at reform in Europe. Coming to Vienna in 1790, he represented the last of the Enlightened Hapsburgs and was faced with the task of saving what he could from Joseph's program which had aroused the hostility of the privileged classes throughout the empire. Thus it is not surprising that Verri's old ardor for reform through a beneficent enlightened monarch flamed brightly again:

> Now the children are invited, are urged, to present themselves to the

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[59] *Ibid.*, p. 166 f.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 173 f.
[61] Verri, "Giuseppe II ed un Filosofo," p. 258.
[62] Verri, "Stato del Milanese, 1790," p. 134.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 138 f.

> father, men to a sovereign man, beings who suffer to a sensible and virtuous monarch. If we do not express exerything, the fault will be ours. If with indiscreet and inopportune demands we discredit the public cause, the fault will be ours. If, wretchedly, we ignore principles and search for a dangerous system and a return to old prejudices rather than the stable reign of reason, the fault will be all ours.[63]

Verri saw Leopold's offer as the happiest event which had ever fallen to the province and he urged the other members of his class not to cover themselves with infamy by sacrificing this great chance to the attempt to retrieve all their former exclusive privileges which gave power to them alone. "The old system is dangerous," he wrote, "as it does not have a constitution for its base. . . . The worst that can happen is to return to such a dangerous condition."[64]

Thus, while putting hope in Enlightened Absolutism, Verri demanded constitutional limitations in order to avoid a repetition of what had occurred in 1786. And his draft for a constitution called for inviolable laws which would assure the monarch of the loyalty of his subjects, and insure the citizens the inviolability of their property, "the unique end of every government." This constitution was to be guaranteed and defended by a permanent corps which was to have free access to the monarch at all times in order to warn him against attempts by his ministers to circumvent it.[65] Verri's proposals, therefore, arose directly out of his experience in past years.

Verri's draft cannot by any means be called radical. But it does represent a tremendous development in his thought. Morandi places Verri at the head of an indigenous liberal constitutional current in eighteenth century Lombardy which developed side by side with the great liberal current of Europe and which ran directly into the Risorgimento of the following century. This current, in fact, he sees proceeding directly from Verri, and contends that its main force lay in the very fact that it was primarily indigenous.[66]

And between 1791 and 1793, Verri along with a number of other Lombard liberals threw himself into the fight to liberalize Milan's governing body, the Council of the Commune, still composed of sixty leading patricians, the most influential and powerful of whom decided all affairs in private conclaves among themselves.[67] Coming out of retirement to fill his seat on the council, Verri led the left, which included among its most important figures, Francesco Melzi, Gian Serbelloni, and Francesco Visconti, in a demand for full liberty of speech and the active participation of all members.[68] Decisions could not be intelligently and efficiently made, Verri argued, without free discussion of all matters on the basis of pertinent information available to all.[69] The outcome, however, was disappointing, freedom of speech being granted, but limited to the elder, most conservative members of the council.

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[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 140-43.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 143. Although Verri is not too specific, presumably this would be an elective representative body, free to inform the monarch of conditions needing attention and to ask for their remedy. See Morandi, *Idee e Formazioni politiche,* p. 174.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[67] The council, suppressed by Joseph II, was re-established by Leopold II in 1791.

[68] See Rota, *L'Austria in Lombardia,* p. 219, and Morandi, *Idee e Formazioni politiche,* p. 163.

All of Verri's bright hopes kindled by the proclamation of Leopold, in fact, were doomed to disappointment. A delegation of patricians, called from the governing councils of Lombardy's main cities, was set up to formulate requests. As Verri feared, what they asked for was the complete reestablishment of the old class dominated institutions which had been suppressed by Joseph II. There was not a murmur of the disinterest he had hoped for. There was no inclination whatsoever to share political power with the bourgeoisie who joined in the general clamor of 1791-92, generated by the attempt to break the power of the dominant patricians in the Council of the Commune. "Milan," Pietro wrote to Alessandro in disgust sometime in 1793, "is made for a despotic government. . . . The only good which can be hoped for is to have a prince who is righteous and benign, who recognizes merit, who is active and unlimited."[70]

This statement should not be regarded as evidence that Verri was back at the point he started from, faith in unrestricted Enlightened Absolutism. It was made at a time when he was filled with bitterness over the failure of his own class to show social responsibility, to follow, in short, his own example. After his constitutional project of 1790, Verri was actually in a state of flux in which the revolution in France loomed larger and larger as the key factor.

Writing sometime in 1790 or 1791, before the close of the French National Assembly, Verri attacked the prevalent opinion among the Milanese that the French Revolution was a social catastrophe. The nobles and the clergy, he declared, had good reason to be concerned, for they saw that the French people intended to end all distinctions between classes and recognize no mark of difference but merit. Thus, they also branded the most essential principles of the revolution, such as the rights of man, as dangerous abstractions. But this, Verri declared, only revealed the state of degeneration into which minds had fallen. "A nation which boldly breaks its chains, puts its tyrants to the fire, and appears as the protector of others . . . gives cause for applause and rejoicing."[71]

That the revolution had produced a certain amount of disorder, Verri contended, was natural. There are two ways, he pointed out, to pass from despotism to liberty. The one is by means of a despot himself who had reached such a high level of perfection that he renounces despotism, makes his country free, and grants it a constitution. "This is the first way," he wrote, "but I have never seen it happen." The second way is for the mass of people, tired of suffering, to unite their forces, reclaim their natural sovereignty, form a constitution, and draft laws to preserve liberty. As no one mind directs such a movement, disorder must result. But France, Verri thought, had been fortunate enough to make changes through revolution with only a minimum of disorder and tumult.[72]

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[69] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[70] Cassati, *Lettere*, IV, 255.

[71] Pietro Verri, "Alcuni Pensieri sulla Rivoluzione accaduta in Francia." Found in Carlo Morandi, "Pietro Verri e la Rivoluzione francese," *Archivo Storia Lombardo*, vol. 55, 534-35.

And Verri was optimistic about the way in which France was attempting to deal with its most pressing problems. It had already accomplished two great tasks. Its people had secured their liberty by rising in a body and were proceeding to triumph over anarchy through the formation of a National Assembly which legitimately represented the nation as a whole. Moreover, Verri was convinced that although the differences among the members of the National Assembly might prolong its work, in the end, the necessary decisions would be arrived at through the plurality of votes. "If my prophecy is correct," he concluded, "France will acquire a constitution, and in a few years, we will see it become the richest, most powerful, happiest nation of Europe."[73]

There is ample evidence here that Verri had swung completely away from his old concept that an assembly of men has never and can never accomplish anything and that durable reforms can only be accomplished through the will of an enlightened monarch. There is a sincere admiration expressed for a group of men gathered together in an attempt to draft a constitution for a nation, precisely what Verri had hoped would be asked for by the Lombards in 1790. And again he repeated that a new light was burning in the heart of Europe and could not fail to influence other governments.[74]

But with respect to Italy, it should be stressed, Verri contended that a revolution could not cause anything but disastrous turmoil. Lombardy, he wrote, was politically immature, and not ready for what the French had done. The common people had to be educated and enlightened, Verri concluded, and the nobility prevailed upon to give way.[75] Thus it was slow preparation that Verri was forced to call for in view of an often indifferent general populace and a highly class conscious aristocracy.

Together with his proposals of 1790, this fragment marks Verri as a moderate constitutionalist with a profound respect for the attempt to establish a constitutional monarchy in France. As such, he was utterly shocked by the execution of Louis XVI on January 21, 1793. Before the turn of the year he had written Alessandro that the French seemed dedicated to maintain the new order of things, and that he did not think a great number of intelligent men were sorry or unhappy over the changes they had made. He could not accept the view, generally expressed among both rich and poor, that "the philosophers are rabble and the French rabidly fanatic."[76] On February 6, 1793, another letter to Alessandro read:

> The conduct of the French has revolted my soul. He [Louis XVI] was not legally proven guilty. Even if he was, his person was inviolable. The

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[72] *Ibid.*, p. 535.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 536.
[74] *Ibid.*
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 536 f.
[76] Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 187 f.

> execution can prove fatal to France, which has made itself not only an enemy of sovereigns, but also of the people, horrified by the carnage of the first days of September.[77]

Verri showed no understanding of the internal struggle in France which resulted in the execution of the king. He had no knowledge of what was going on aside from major events, no comprehension of the political forces involved in the struggle for power. He simply could not understand why the king should be executed with the danger of arousing the monarchs of Europe or plunging France into a state of anarchy and desolation. Having followed the early years of the revolution with complete sympathy, his reaction was one of shock and dismay. Thus in bewilderment he wrote, "With a majority of five votes to decide such a thing! I do not understand it."[78]

Verri did not desert the moderate liberal convictions he had arrived at because of the execution. He had maintained earlier that "tyranny is a grave evil, be it exercised by one, by few, or by many."[79] And he viewed the reign of terror as a period of tyranny as vicious as any that had ever existed under monarchical despotism. He saw it as a time of fanaticism, unreason, and moral degeneration. "Heaven knows when this flood of bestiality and viciousness which crushes good sense and reason will end," he wrote Alessandro on May 21, 1794.[80] When posters appeared in Milan urging the massacre of the government and the nobility as the quickest way to overthrow despotism and achieve liberty, Verri was aghast. "They want to massacre first and save questions for later," he angrily declared.[81] Lombardy, he hoped, would escape the pestilence of violence engulfing Europe. Reason would some day return and fanaticism would be forgotten. And thus, he confided in Alessandro on June 11, 1794, "We are faithful to our Sovereign. . . . We pray to God to keep far from us the turbulent movements which convulse all Europe."[82]

Verri and the Revolution in Lombardy

At the same time that Verri was condemning the turn to fanaticism in France, however, he was also beginning to writhe under the application of increasingly despotic measures by Austria in an attempt to immunize Lombardy against the effects of revolutionary ideas and influences. In April, 1793, an order of the previous year, providing that every individual of French nationality who had shown tendencies to violate law and order was subject to expulsion, was extended to include Corsicans and Genoese who had been in France since 1789. And during 1793-94, the prohibition of the importation of foreign books and pamphlets was enforced with new vigor. In addition, a close watch was maintained on all Lombards known for their liberal ideas.

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[77] *Ibid.*, p. 189.
[78] *Ibid.*
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[80] *Ibid.*, p. 191.
[81] *Ibid.*, p. 255 f.
[82] *Ibid.*, p. 191 f.

As early as 1792, therefore, Verri complained of political intolerance against all men intellectually inclined and angrily castigated the opening of his mail by postal functionaries.[83] By 1796 he was completely disgusted, especially with the conduct of Archduke Ferdinand, who had been placed at the head of the government in Lombardy at the start of the decade and who by 1796 had resorted to the use of police measures. Ferdinand, he bitterly wrote in his account of the French invasion, regarded all cultured and enlightened men as his personal enemies. He arbitrarily arrested innocent people merely because he disliked their opinions, and unjustly prohibited the introduction of journals from France. By the time the French arrived, Verri concluded, the Austrian government had made itself hated by the reasonable portion of the population.[84]

When it became obvious in the spring of 1796 that an army of the French Republic under Bonaparte might soon be in Milan, Verri was thus in a curious position. He had sympathized with the revolution during the stage of constitutional monarchy, had reacted violently against the reign of terror, and yet was disgruntled with the Austrian administration as inept and intolerant. He was old, sixty-eight by then, and he had no great plans for himself or for a society he had spent a lifetime trying to reform. His struggle had already been waged. It had been partly won and partly lost, but, in the main, it was over.

Thus as Bonaparte's army began to move on Milan, Verri took a position of neutrality. He desired the Milanese neither to resist the French nor to aid them. He wrote Alessandro on April 2, 1796, that he was deeply appreciative of all the good things the Hapsburgs had done for him and could not think of repaying them with disloyalty.[85] Above all, he was fearful of what might happen when the French arrived. Anxiously following the movements of the French army day by day, he prepared to seek refuge with his family in the country. Though he hoped the French would not arrive, on May 14, 1796, he again wrote his brother, this time to say, "We are subjects of the invincible French Republic."[86]

By a decree of May 19, 1796, the city council of sixty patricians was suppressed and the administration of the city given over to the provisional government, called the Municipality, which had been set up before the arrival of Bonaparte to deal with the crisis. French authority was centered in a military commission. But included among the members of the Municipality was Pietro Verri. Although he protested that at his age he desired to be left to the tranquillity of private life, it was insisted that he take a seat on the new body because of the prestige which had grown up around his name. Thus Verri was thrown into the vortex of politics that came to characterize the Lombard Triennio.

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[83] *Ibid.*, p. 252. It should be noted, however, that Verri feared his mail was being opened and read as early as 1769. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[84] Pietro Verri, "Storia dell'Invasione dei Francesi Republicani nel Milanese nel 1796." Found in Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 384-5, 388.

[85] Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 194.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

And with the abolition of all marks of class distinction on May 18, he informed Alessandro that his mail should henceforth be addressed not to Count Pietro Verri, but simply to Citizen Verri. In his deepest heart, he had never liked the use of titles, which he saw as a sign of vanity. Thus he did not really feel despoiled of anything.[87] But within a very short time, Verri was to be violently at odds with the Lombard democratic movement of which this was but one of the first outward manifestations.

The democratic movement was not a completely new phenomenon in 1796. Rota traces its origins to the period of general furor touched off by the attempt to reform the city council in 1791-92. The execution of Louis XVI, he maintains, marked the point of departure from the moderate liberal group led by Verri. During the years 1793 to 1795, talk about revolution, complete equality, and extinction of class privilege, concepts alien to the liberals, rose to a crescendo. The whole period was one of excitement and expectation.[88] And as Morandi points out, with Bonaparte on the point of entering Milan in the spring of 1796, the leading democrats from all over Italy converged on the city, making it a revolutionary powder keg.[89]

In no sense, however, did the democrats constitute a closely knit party. The movement was carried along by diverse elements of society. Nobles who resented the authority of Vienna and members of the clergy, many of whom were Jansenists, joined forces with the bourgeoisie. The basic, most important element, however, was the bourgeoisie who at last saw the opportunity not only to achieve political power, but also through a policy of expansion to obtain access to the sea for their land-locked state which was essential for the development of their full commercial potential.[90]

Thus, as Baldo Peroni points out, with the bourgeoisie at the base of the democratic movement, it was inevitable that the whole system which had held them in a position of social and political inferiority would be attacked. Their program, he continues, can be summed up in one word, liberty. "This meant at once civil liberty, social equality, a free economy, a republican government, and above all, national independence."[91] Thus both social change and national independence—of Lombardy for some and of Italy for others—was demanded. In some cases the democrats and unitarists were one and the same people and, if not always the same people, at least the relationship between them was very close. Filippo Buonarotti regarded the revolution in Italy as a prelude to the unification of the whole peninsula and proposed to the Directory that he lead the unitarists with its backing.[92] More generally, as Peroni suggests, the idea of an independent Lombard republic was the great powerful concept which bound the diverse elements of the whole democratic movement together.

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[87] *Ibid.*, p. 211 f.

[88] Rota, *L'Austria in Lombardia,* pp. 222, 224 f.

[89] Morandi, *Idee e Formazioni politiche,* p. 194.

[90] Rota, *L'Austria in Lombardia,* p. 260 f., pp. 288 ff.

[91] Baldo Peroni, "La Passione dell' Independenza nell Lombardia occupata dai Francesi," *Nuova Rivista Storica,* vol. 15, 64.

[92] See Jacques Godechot, "Les Français et l'Unité italienne sous le Directoire," *Revue internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionelle,* April-June, July-Sept., 1952, p. 97 f. The Directory refused support, Godechot contends, when it learned Buonarotti was involved in Babeuf's Conspiracy of Equals.

As soon as the first republican soldier entered Milan on May 14, 1796, the democrats came out in the open and organized themselves in numerous revolutionary clubs. The most important organization, however, was the Society of Friends of Liberty and Equality, later called simply the Popular Society. Saliceti, the civil commissioner of the Directory with the army in Italy, gave it his open approval and did everything possible to foster its growth. The primary objective of the Popular Society was to form a solid democratic following among the masses of the city to support the attack on the privileged class. The society, therefore, led by the most ardent democrats who had converged on Milan, tried to keep alive the atmosphere of revolutionary enthusiasm and expectation which engulfed the city with the entry of the French.[93]

The democrats and unitarists fully expected that Bonaparte and the French would give them full support in achieving their program. Bonaparte, of Italian blood, appeared as a glorious liberator who would give Lombardy not only liberty and equality, but also nationhood. Thus the democrats accepted the retention of all ultimate power by the French and the imposition of heavy requisitions in money and kind in view of their greater aspirations. Their immediate objective, nevertheless, was the conquest of public offices. And in this they were successful. Bonaparte was willing, naturally, to use the democrats just as they wished to use him, and thus drew on the Popular Society to fill the Municipality.[94] The second tactical device used was to bypass Bonaparte and approach the Directory. And three delegates from the Municipality, Gian Serbelloni, Fedele Sopransi, and Carolo Nicoli were dispatched to Paris to secure a reduction of the requisitions being imposed, and to get its consent for the recognition of Lombardy as an independent republic.[95] The democrats, however, were placed in a difficult position when revolts against the French began to occur because of the heavy requisitions. Furthermore, while many of the Lombard democrats were also Italian unitarists, neither Bonaparte nor the Directory intended to unify the peninsula. When by the middle of 1797, it became apparent, in short, that Bonaparte was using Lombardy as a point of departure for his own career, the democrats faced a serious crisis. Not only did they become disillusioned, but they could not deliver all they had promised.[96] And though the Cisalpine Republic was created on June 29, 1797, it became a subservient dependency of France, rather than the nucleus of a new Italy.

A day before the Cisalpine Republic was finally established, Verri died. In the preceding year and a half, however, Verri had bitterly opposed the democratic program as far too radical for a people without preparation and had written off many of the leading democrats as opportunists seeking to destroy the nobility in order to gratify their own ambitions for power. At the same time, he reacted against the imposition of French authority and the spoliation of the province by the heavy requisitions levied by the French. And yet, while at the time of his death the democrats were just beginning to realize the impasse they had reached, Verri rejected monarchical government once and for all. It was not as a Jacobin that he finally proclaimed himself a republican, but as a moderate liberal on the basis of principles he had first enunciated in 1790. This was the final effect of the impact made by the revolutionary period upon his slowly matured political concepts.

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[93] See Samillo Montalcini, *La Republica Cisalpina* (Bologna, 1917), cix ff.

[94] Peroni, "Passione dell' Independenza," p. 63 f.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[96] See Morandi, *Idee e Formazioni politiche*, pp. 240-49.

From the very first days of the French occupation Verri viewed the Municipality as an instrument of fanatic democrats intent upon carrying out radical, destructive measures. The majority of its members, he complained, were drawn from the Popular Society, which was dominated by Saliceti, who promised them political power and liberty in order that he could freely proceed to plunder the province.[97] As a result, the Municipality was dominated by young men with no experience who, for the power and liberty promised, threw all moderation aside. On the other hand, Verri condemned the leaders of the Jacobins in the Municipality, especially Serbelloni, Visconti, and Porro, as men who really had no sympathy for popular government, but who wished to use it as a means to make themselves absolute masters of the country.[98] As for himself, he felt he was in an extremely precarious position. Having been a noble and an Austrian official, he was sure that had he not been on the Municipality he would have been arrested or exiled with the rest of the patricians of the old city council.[99] Nevertheless he allied himself with Parini, against whom he had fought for the modernization of the language during the 1760's, in opposition to the dominant Jacobin majority. But when on August 6, 1796, the body was purged of opposition, and Parini was forced to resign, Verri was left to stand alone against what he saw as a coalition of the radical leaders with the French, the former seeking to use it as a means to attain power, the latter to despoil the country without lessening their appeal.[100]

Verri thus came to hold both the French and the democrats responsible for the requisitions which were imposed on the province with the arrival of the French. In receiving the representatives of the provisional government at Lodi before his entry in Milan, Bonaparte had promised that property would be respected. On May 19, however, a tribute of twenty million francs was levied on the province. Lombardy was also required to feed and quarter the army. Shortly thereafter carriages and horses began to be requisitioned for army officers, and the art treasures of the province confiscated as booty of conquest to meet the financial needs of the Directory in Paris. The French, Verri thought, had made a primary error of politics in abusing the confidence of their subjects with these arbitrary impositions and the Municipality, he declared, had sold itself out by not firmly opposing them.[101]

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[97] Verri, "Storia dell' Invasione," pp. 399 f., 405 f.
[98] *Ibid.,* p. 308.
[99] Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 219.
[100] Verri, "Storia dell' Invasione," p. 430.
[101] Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 214, 238.

Verri, however, placed the blame primarily on the commissioners sent out by the Directory to guard its interests rather than on the French nation as a whole. The French army, he repeated many times, was composed of honest, courageous, sensible men. And the French nation, he declared, "is good and humane. . . . They live without power and pride, and treat us as good friends."[102] But the commissioners, especially Pinsot, who was sent to collect the twenty millions, Verri viewed as vicious and detestable. When Pinsot, by a letter of June 9, 1796, gave the Municipality four days to present a list of one quarter of the wealthy citizens in every municipality, he was furious. Not only was he indignant over the fact that the burden was imposed primarily on the wealthy, which meant the nobility, but he was infuriated by the imperious way in which Pinsot acted. Referring to the system of taxation which had been established in Lombardy during the period of reform under the Hapsburgs, he exclaimed: "In a province where tribute is collected on such a base, Pinsot proposed a new method of collection which one would use on an isolated island in the Pacific Ocean where public economy is ignored."[103]

And Verri also reacted to the decision that requisitions of horses and carriages would not be included as part of the twenty millions originally levied. The province was being pillaged and plundered, Verri complained, not to support the army in Italy, but to support the army of the Rhine. Worst of all, the Municipality allowed itself to become the instrument of what he termed "the systematic spoliation of our country." And on June 8, 1796, he sadly lamented to Alessandro, "Many years, perhaps a generation will pass before Milan recovers the luxurious appearance it once had."[104]

What Verri rebelled at above all else, however, was the attempt made by the radical democrats in the Municipality to use the imposition of requisitions to destroy the wealth of the nobility. The Lombard nobility, Verri believed, could not be compared to that of France. It did not wield opressive power over the people, having lost all feudal rights long before the coming of the French. When it was proposed to impose a forced loan on twenty of the richest families in the province to meet debts the Municipality had incurred in provisioning the army, Verri saw it as open class war. The idea that equality of fortunes was necessary for the existence of a republic, he declared, he could not accept. That the wealthy alone should pay, he rejected as socially unjust. "Such is the progress of social science among us," he concluded to his brother. "Decide for yourself if I can support such principles. I suffer and I am silent."[105]

As far as Verri was concerned, the Municipality had succumbed to fanaticism. He had no hope that anything could be accomplished through it. He fully realized that the French were using the democrats for their own purposes and were unlikely to relinquish their authority. Thus he thought that the attempt to approach the Directory had no chance of success. Besides, he believed the three delegates sent were completely lacking in any ability. Serbelloni, he related, declared before he left, "Citizens, either I will leave my bones in Paris, or I will bring you liberty." And, Verri sardonically commented, "Seven weeks later he returned accompanying Madame Bonaparte."[106]

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[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 222, 217.

[103] Verri, "Storia dell' Invasione," p. 413 f.

[104] Cassati, *Lettere*, IV, 215.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 235. Verri himself had to contribute 30,000 lire besides giving up two horses and quartering several officers.

Within a few months, in fact, Verri was in full revolt against the arbitrary power wielded by the French authoriites. The great shortcoming of the French régime, he maintained, was its failure to offer Lombardy anything positive. Mere harangues about Austrian tyranny could not capture the confidence of the Lombard people which should have been the first objective. The arbitrary imposition of tribute made the development of such public confidence impossible. The promise of respect for property and persons, Verri charged, had been flagrantly violated. No basis for loyalty to the French existed. Lombardy was treated no better than a conquered province.[107]

And Verri, for whom civil liberty had become a primary article of faith, began himself to feel intensely oppressed. With the establishment of a committee for censorship in the Municipality in August, 1796, he informed Alessandro, "It is necessary to use the greatest discretion, and more of that than my free mind will use to write you."[108] At least liberty could have been expected from the French Republic. Verri's attitude is most clearly expressed in his account of how Pavia was placed under martial law during June, 1796, for revolting against the French garrison because of the requisitions. France, Verri wrote, had deserted the course of liberty in Lombardy. It had given the province over to military commanders who were motivated by nothing other than an envy for the old evil of servitude to absolute power. Thus, he significantly concluded:

> This I know for certain, that the benevolent spirit of philanthropy which France first proclaimed, and the fraternity which it promised, has not been translated into action, and that all the good and cultured people, who at first were drawn by their hearts to the Republic, will not remain there if they are not persuaded that the commissioners and the commandants abused them through their avarice, and not on the instructions of the Directory.[109]

Verri was profoundly disappointed. If at least civil liberty could be achieved, he declared earlier, all the sacrifices which the Lombards had to make would not be too high a price. But, he sadly wrote on August 27, 1796, "We are in the position of a people awaiting a Messiah who never comes."[110]

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[106] Verri, "Storia dell' Invasione," p. 409.
[107] *Ibid.*, pp. 397-99.
[108] Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 230.
[109] Verri, "Storia dell' Invasione," p. 403 f.
[110] Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 215, 236.

What Verri came to expect from the French was no more nor less than the establishment of an independent republic. Maintaining his own moderate liberalism, he did converge to this extent with the democrats. His own economic principles, of course, were in complete harmony with those of the bourgeois democrats. But above all, civil liberty had become the essential point of Verri's political code.

Toward the middle of 1797, Verri began to be more optimistic. In an article of December 3 and 6 of 1796 for the *Termometro politico,* one of the many journals which sprang into existence during the Triennio, Verri wrote that in order for a country to live in tranquillity and security, it must be governed by just and intelligent ministers. But when a sovereign pretends to be the absolute master of a state, he went on, all the inhabitants will be in the hands of the ministers that he nominates. And the choice must necessarily be bad, for a single sovereign cannot know all the needs of his country or interests of his subjects. The people, on the other hand, rarely err when judging the honesty of a man and the confidence he merits. Thus the choice of ministers must lie with the people. He warned, however, against the dangers of demagogues who can turn the heads of the people during elections. He proceeded, therefore, to elaborate a plan for direct elections by which those eligible to vote would select a group of notable people who would choose the most able and honorable among their number as ministers.[111]

Verri had clearly left his old faith in Enlightened Absolutism behind him. And in another article published on June 28, 1794, the day of his death, he delivered the *coup de grâce* by branding monarchy as morally bankrupt. The relationship between monarchs and subjects, Verri declared, is completely artificial. "Between the loving subjects and the *adored monarchs,*" as he expressed it, "there is no intercourse except on the basis of falsity and deception." Equality is the only thing which permits sociability. The only recourse left for monarchs, therefore, Verri concluded, was to abdicate peacefully before revolution swept them away. Their day was over.[112]

Verri thus hailed the steps taken to draft a constitution prior to the establishment of the Cisalpine Republic in the early part of 1797.[113] Bonaparte, he naïvely thought, could not hope to acquire any further military glory and thus turned "to found a republic in Italy, his country." He noted with satisfaction that the constitution would be modeled on that of France, and voiced no opposition to the provision that all officials would be chosen by Bonaparte for the first year. Assured that people of property would be appointed, he perceived a return to moderation and reason. The nobility, he felt sure, would be reconciled with the new republic. But in his buoyant state of mind, Verri, who had dedicated his life to his native province, now looked beyond the confines of Lombardy. He had always thought and spoken of Italy as a cultural unit. Now he began to envision it as a united nation. "Within a few years," he wrote, "Italy will probably be a single family." Sensing an end of fanaticism, a new altruism, and a great future for Italy, Verri accepted the revolution.

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[111] Pietro Verri, "Pensieri di un buon Vecchio che non e letterato." Found in Giulio Carcano, *Scritti Vari di Pietro Verri* (Firenze, 1854), II, 79-80, 81 ff.

[112] Pietro Verri, "Lettere del Filosofo N.N. al Monarca N.N." Found in Carcano, *Scritti Vari,* II, 104 f.

[113] For the following see Verri's letter to Alessandro of May 6, 1797, Cassati, *Lettere,* IV, 245-47.

Verri constitutes a perfect representative of the period of reform under Enlightened Absolutism. Given the control of Lombardy by the class dominated magistracies, he saw absolutism as the quickest way to reform. And he achieved much under its scepter, completing the task undertaken by Pompeo Neri to give Lombardy a more modern and efficient system of taxation.

The factor which turned Verri against Enlightened Despotism was the concentration of all power in Vienna. He could not accept the complete subjection of the province and thus defended the Senate in 1786, though at the same time condemning narrow class privilege. In addition, however, he gradually developed into a constitutionalist and could no longer accept the unlimited authority of absolute monarchy.

As long as the revolution in France remained in the stage of constitutional monarchy Verri was able to give it his complete sympathy. He lauded the destruction of privilege and the attempt to draft a constitution by the National Assembly, But with the execution of the king and the triumph of the Jacobins, he recoiled in shock and disgust. He had not yet recovered when Bonaparte entered Milan.

With the extension of the revolution to Lombardy, Jacobinism, which Verri had condemned in Paris, became the dominant force in Milan. The point of departure between Verri and the Lombard democrats was the attempt by the latter to level society. Nevertheless, the revolutionary furor of the Lombard Triennio served to crystallize Verri's thought which was in flux during the early 1790's. He finally rejected monarchy completely and called for a republic. He had hoped the revolution would not reach Lombardy, but accepted it as a means to this end when he thought it had returned to the ways of reason. Under both Enlightened Absolutism and the French Revolution, therefore, Verri remained a moderate liberal and used first one and then the other to achieve moderate ends.

In a real sense, then, Verri looms as one of the most important eighteenth century figures of the Italian Risorgimento. His hope for a united Italian republic is significant. But much more important are his efforts in the days of the *Caffè* group to foster the development of a public consciousness, his attempt to reform the Lombard administration and economy, and his conversion to constitutional principles. At the very basis of the movement of the following century were the concepts of national consciousness, modernization, and constitutional liberalism.

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THE MERGER ATTEMPTS OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, 1913-1914

by Hans Heilbronner

THE attempt on the part of Montenegrin and Serbian statesmen to accomplish a merger of their states before the outbreak of the First World War forms a fascinating mirror of the crosscurrents of Balkan power rivalries. This episode also represents an ideal laboratory example of the difficulties inherent in the solution of small power problems in the face of unresolved great power conflicts.*

The Bosnian Crisis had greatly exacerbated Austro-Serbian relationships. Serbia had been thwarted in her dreams of a Greater Serbia and came to regard the Dual Monarchy as the principal obstacle to future expansion. Austria-Hungary, in turn, feared the appeals of Russian sponsored Serbian nationalism upon her own Slav subjects and was therefore determined to prevent the realization of Serbian aspirations at all costs. The Balkan Wars only served to deepen these tensions and animosities. Serbia had emerged triumphant from these conflicts. Montenegro, while nominally a victor, could neither equal her neighbor's relative prosperity nor her glorious feats of arms.

Until 1912, King Nicholas of Montenegro had been considered the major focus of Serbian strivings for freedom. The less than brilliant performance of his troops before Scutari and the necessity of Serbian assistance during the First Balkan War had done much to tarnish the luster of his crown. The king's patriarchal rule, his financial speculations, the poor economic status of the country, the movement of students to Serbian schools, and the return of former emigrants from the United States, had all greatly contributed to the growth of discontent. The upshot of all these factors was the gradual transfer of the primacy of leadership from Montenegro to Serbia.[1]

The failure to capture Scutari had done even more than set in motion these stirrings of discontent; it made Nicholas fear for the safety of his dynasty.[2] Yet Austria had no desire to destroy the Petrović-Njegoš rule, only to have it replaced by a republican form or a fusion with Serbia. Giesl,

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*A short summary of the problem of Serbian-Montenegrin unification can be found in Roderich Gooss, "*Das österreichisch-serbische Problem bis zur Kriegserklärung Österreich-Ungarns an Serbien, 28. Juli, 1914,* in Deutscher Reichstag, Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses, 1919-1930, *Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges,* series 1, X, part 1, 158-162.

[1] Griesinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, March 11, 1914. Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Die grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914* (Berlin, 1922-27) XXXVIII, no. 15539. Hereafter cited as *G.P.* Giesl to Berchtold, Nov. 28, 1912. Austria-Hungary, *Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krisis bis zum Ausbruch des Krieges in 1914* (Vienna, 1930), IV, no. 4679. Hereafter cited as *O.U.A.* Von Merey to Berchtold, Jan. 30, 1913. *Ibid.,* V, no. 5613. Conrad to Berchtold, Feb. 21, 1913. Fieldmarshal Count Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918* (4 vols., Vienna, 1922), III, 134 f. Hereafter cited as Conrad, *Memoirs.*

[2] Giesl to Berchtold, Dec. 1, 1912. *O.U.A.,* V, no. 4733.

the Austrian minister at Cetinje, was therefore instructed to offer Scutari to Nicholas. In return, Montenegro was to gravitate into Austria's economic orbit and follow the foreign policy requirements of the Dual Monarchy.[3] In this manner Berchtold hoped to free Montenegro from the dominant influence of Russia. Nicholas received the Austrian offer sympathetically but the economic problems contained in the proposals proved insoluble.[4] When this unilateral approach failed, Austria, together with Italy, then suggested financial assistance to Montenegro by all the great powers. Such an approach was to safeguard the independence of Montenegro and prevent the danger of fusion with Serbia.[5]

These overtures also failed of their desired effect. In fact, members of the royal family, including the king, were not averse to threaten Austria with a voluntary union with Serbia if Austrian financial help was withheld.[6] Conrad therefore had little difficulty in persuading his colleagues that the extension of loans alone was an invitation to blackmail. Therefore Montenegro had to be bound to Austria by such tight economic and political means that escape from the embrace would be impossible even if Nicholas, in time, desired it.[7]

Internal pressures were not the only factors placing the continuance of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty in jeopardy. In September, 1912, Russia had abrogated the program of military assistance, owing to the Tsar's displeasure over Montenegro's unapproved attack upon Scutari. Nicholas of Montenegro then retaliated by the request to the Queen Mother of Russia to disband a girl's institute supported by the latter at Cetinje. If the king had hoped to frighten Russia into a renewal of the military assistance program, he had calculated falsely. Russia was perhaps quite content to see the end of a program which needlessly complicated relations with Austria and was, at the moment, opposed to her primary interest in Serbia.[8]

Austria's failure to win Nicholas with blandishments made her more than ever immovable in her determination to add the town of Scutari to Albania. Certainly she had no desire to cause the ruin of the Montenegrin royal house, but Vienna did not feel constrained to accept any unpleasant consequences flowing from such an eventuality. This was particularly true as long as Austria felt confident that Russia would not attempt to gain her objectives by an outrage against the sacred monarchical principle.[9] The creation in 1913 of an Austrophile Albania was, however, certain to weaken any earlier Russian insistence upon the unsullied maintainance of this ideal.

Serbia was content to follow Russian guidance at least on the official level, waiting for the ripe fruit to fall into her hands in due time.[10] Russia's disapproval of the débâcle before Scutari permitted the Serbian press to sound a grateful echo. Newspapers took up the chant for a merger, the *Skupchina* heard calls for the common administration of the armies, customs, and diplomatic services, while the Serbian government granted permission for the formation of a Montenegrin *Umladina* Club, whose goal was the unification of the two states.[11]

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[3] Berchtold to Giesl, Nov. 17, 1912. *Ibid,* IV, no 4467.

[4] Giesl to Berchtold, Nov. 23, 1912. *Ibid.,* nos. 4576-7.

[5] Berchtold to von Merey, April 12, 1913. *Ibid.,* VI, no. 6586.

[6] Weinzetl to Berchtold, Aug. 5, 1913. *Ibid.,* VII, no. 8228.

[7] Conrad to Berchtold, April 10, 1913. Conrad, *Memoirs,* III, 246-7.

[8] Weinzetl to Berchtold, Sept. 29, 1913. *O.U.A.,* VII, no. 8748.

[9] Berchtold to Thurn, Dec. 15, 1912. *Ibid.,* V, no. 4928. Thurn to Berchtold, Dec. 12, 1912. *Ibid.,* no. 4889.

[10] Griesinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, March 11, 1914. *G.P.,* XXXVIII, no. 15539. Ugron to Berchtold, April 30, 1913. *O.U.A.,* VI, no. 6667.

These forms of agitation were not without effect. In April, 1913, the Montenegrin Finance Minister, Drljević, went to Belgrade to discuss with Serbian officials a possible merger in various fields of administration and policy making. No agreement was reached in these conversations.[12] The Drljević Mission failed because the Serbian government had not yet decided in view of Russian hesitations, whether to pursue the merger movement actively. Negotiations in August, concerning the division of territories gained in the Second Balkan War, were crowned with greater success. This time Serbia was not lacking in magnanimity.[13] This generosity was perhaps due to the conviction that territories granted to Montenegro would, in time, become part of a Greater Serbia. In the meantime the assimilation and administration of the newly won areas were certain to place additional strain upon an already weakened state.

In October, 1913, Minister Giers returned to St. Petersburg on leave. Tension in Cetinje relaxed markedly and as optimism was kindled so fell the pressure for closer relations with Serbia.[14] Giers had long urged the complete abandonment of Nicholas, to be balanced by even greater support of Serbian aspirations. Obnorski, the chargé d'affaires, took the opposite course. He feared that the fall of the Montenegrin dynasty would entail certain Austrian intervention and the possibility of a general European conflagration.[15] Giers' absence from his post furnished Obnorski the opportunity to press for a renewal of the military subsidy and the dispatch of Russian instructors for the army. This approach would prevent any merger not sanctioned by Russia.[16]

In view of the Russian ambivalence it is not surprising that official Serbian comment was markedly reticent. This shyness and coyness was strengthened as the result of a visit paid by Pašić to St. Petersburg in February, 1914. He made no secret of his hope of eventual unification but also realized that the impetus for a union had to come from the weaker Montenegro; otherwise Austria was likely to intervene forcibly and King Nicholas could assume the role of the oppressed. Therefore Pašić proposed patience until Nicholas himself was compelled to make the first move. Then Serbia would be in a position to accept any workable proposal, including provisions to safeguard the interests of the Montenegrin royal house.[17] Pašić did not aspire to an immediate union. Instead he suggested the dispatch of Serbian military instructors to Montenegro. Such a step, he hoped, would establish the necessary foundations for future integration and would have better long term effects than official Serbian agitation for a merger.[18] Sazanov requested the views of Obnorski on so risky a course. As might well have been expected, the latter was strongly opposed to the adoption of so perilous a policy. He feared that it might well deal a fatal blow to the dynasty, arouse the implacable opposition of Vienna, and perhaps involve Russia in a war with Austria at a time not of her own choosing.[19] Neratov, Sazanov's deputy, and Danilov, the Quartermaster-General, agreed with Obnorski's objections.[20] Pašić was therefore advised that his plan was not feasible.[21] The latter had thus no choice but to accept the Russian point of view[22] and did not raise the subject again.

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[11] Popović to Pašić, April 1/14, 1913. Miloš Bogicević (ed.), *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens, 19031914* (3 vols., Berlin, 1929), I, no. 295. Hereafter cited as *A.S.* Griesinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, March 11, 1914. *G.P.*, XXXVIII, no. 15539.

[12] Giesl to Berchtold, April 18, 1913. *O.U.A.*, no. 6667. Ugron to Berchtold, May 8, 1913. *Ibid.*, no. 6590.

[13] Giesl to Berchtold, Sept. 1, 1913. *Ibid.*, VII, no. 8524.

[14] Gavrilović to Pašić, Oct. 19/Nov. 1, 1913. *A.S.*, I, no. 379.

[15] Giesl to Berchtold, Nov. 4, 1913. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 8952.

[16] Conversation of Giesl and Obnorski. Giesl to Berchtold, Nov. 17, 1913. *Ibid.*, no. 40006.

Certainly Russia and Austria-Hungary were the contrasting poles between which the Serbian-Montenegrin struggle was played out. Two other powers were, however, vitally concerned with this question. Italy, Austria's ally, was less fearful of the prospect of fusion of the two Balkan kingdoms than of the danger of Austrian expansion along the coastline of the Adriatic. Austrian diplomats therefore exerted themselves to allay Italian suspicions.

In November, 1913, Berchtold instructed von Merey, his ambassador in Rome, to raise the question of common action by Austria and Italy if the union of Serbia and Montenegro were suddenly proclaimed. To avoid even the possibility of such a threat to the balance of power in the Balkans and Adriatic, Berchtold urged the support of the Montenegrin dynasty through economic means, which would force Nicholas into a pro-Austrian political orientation. If Nicholas was nonetheless unable to stem the tide, Italy and Austria were then duty bound to insist upon the transfer of the Montenegrin coast to Albania.[23]

Although Berchtold spoke with seeming assurance and was ready to demand Italian cooperation, the Imperial government was itself not fully agreed upon any certain course of action. While Conrad urged the annexation of the coastline by Austria, Berchtold was somewhat more moderate.

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[17] Griesinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, March 11, 1914. *G.P.*, XXXVIII, no. 15539. *Ibid.*, note, p. 334. Pašić to King Peter, Jan. 20/Feb 2, 1914. *A.S.*, I, no. 399.

[18] Sazanov to Obnorski, Jan. 23/Feb. 5, 1914. Russia, Komissia po izdanii dokumentov epokhi imperializma, *Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus;* Dokumente aus den Archiven der zarischen und provisorischen Regierung (Berlin, 1931-6), series 1, I, no. 180. Hereafter cited as *I.B.Z.I.*

[19] Obnorski to Sazanov, Feb. 10/23, 1914. *Ibid.*, note, p. 169.

[20] Summary of Conference, Jan. 21/Feb. 3, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 165.

[21] Sazanov to Hartwig, March 16/29, 1914. Benno A. Siebert (ed.), *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel* (3 vols., Berlin, 1928), III, no. 1049. Hereafter cited as *B.D.S.*

[22] Hartwig to Sazanov, March 17/30, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 1050.

[23] Berchtold to von Merey, Nov. 10, 1913. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 8976.

He argued that unification would not come suddenly but by gradual action. For this reason Austria and Italy ought to agree in advance that the coastline must be ceded to Albania when the time came, particularly because Italy was as yet opposed to even so moderate a solution.[24] Count Tisza ranged himself alongside Berchtold.[25] Field Marshal Conrad was unable to accept such dangerous reasoning. If the government were reconciled to eventual unification, he remarked, it should do and say nothing. If, on the other hand, it planned to oppose it, then it must prepare for war, not on the basis of so subordinate an issue but in terms of a radical solution of the whole Serbian problem.[26]

It was Austria's misfortune that Italy was not to be convinced of the primacy of the Russian and Serbian danger. On the contrary, the Italian government was quite reconciled to the eventual fusion of Serbia and an anachronistic Montenegro. Italy did not fear a Serbian toehold on the Adriatic but considered Austrian domination of that sea a distinct threat to Italian security. San Giuliano only hoped that the union would evolve by slow stages. In this way the major European powers would not permit so minor a matter to unleash a new Balkan or even European conflict. Austria would thus stand alone, powerless to oppose the merger.[27] William II of Germany likewise could summon up little enthusiasm for the Austrian cause. He remarked that if Vienna attempted to prevent the inevitable and a war with Serbia and Russia ensued, Germany would have no interest in such a conflict.[28]

Germany, Italy, and Russia, all fearful of a war at the wrong time and for the wrong reasons, thus acted as brakes upon the ambitions of Austria and Serbia. Russian discouragement of Serbian aspiration should not be equated with opposition to the eventual realization of Serbian objectives. The Tsar's ministers merely wished to subordinate this inevitable process to the larger foreign policy aims of the Empire.[29] Russia was not blind to the fact that unification would bar, by a Slavic wall, any Austrian drive in the direction of Salonika and would therefore fit neatly into the framework of Russian objectives. But by the beginning of 1914, Austria had clearly expressed her intention to resort to war to prevent such a merger. It was made clear to Sazanov that Austria could not and would not accept any such reversal of the balance of power in the Balkans and the Adriatic. These areas were considered as vital to the security of the Dual Monarchy as the Black Sea was to Russia.[30] Fearful of war, Sazanov impressed the need for patience upon the Serbians, urging them to aim at an ultimate fruition slowly, by means of administrative cooperation in various fields.[31]

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[24] Conrad to Berchtold, March 11, 1914. Conrad, *Memoirs,* III, 616. Note, *G.P.,* XXXVIII, 332-3.

[25] Bethmann-Hollweg to von Tschirsky, German ambassador to Vienna, April 6, 1914. *Ibid.,* no. 15541.

[26] Note, *ibid.,* p. 345 f.

[27] Barrère, French ambassador to Italy, to Doumergue, Feb. 26, 1914. France, Ministère des affaires étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1871-1914* (Paris, 1926-), series 3, IX, no. 371. Hereafter cited as *D.D.F.* Griesinger to Bethmann-Hollweg, March 11, 1914. *G.P.,* XXXVIII, no. 15539.

[28] Marginal note of Kaiser, *Ibid.*

[29] Hartwig to Sazanov, March 17/30, 1914. Siebert (ed.), *B.D.S.,* III, no. 1050. Pašić to King Peter, Jan. 20/Feb. 2, 1914. *A.S.,* I, no. 399.

[30] Talk of Sazanov with Austrian Ambassador Szapary. Sazanov to Hartwig, Feb. 20/March 5, 1914. Siebert (ed.), *B.D.S.,* III, No. 1041.

Despite Russian counsels of patience to Serbia, King Nicholas of Montenegro was fully aware of the diverse pressures around him and of the precariousness of his position. On the heels of earlier financial scandals the dynasty suffered a further loss of prestige as the result of a divorce scandal involving Prince Mirko.[32] The odor of corruption was more widely spread by Montenegrin citizens, recently returned from Russia, who appeared before the *Skupchina* to complain about the disappearance of a large bequest left by a wealthy Russian to King Nicholas for the support of poor girls.[33] The domestic picture was further complicated by the close contact maintained by the *National Radical Party* with its Serbian counterpart. The members of this group advocated unification of the two states and propagandized in the newly annexed territories by making odious comparisons between local conditions and the status of the areas annexed by Serbia.[34] Inside Montenegro proper, the party constantly warned the population of impending economic ruin if fusion were long delayed.[35]

In view of these powerful forces in favor of a merger it is not surprising that members of Nicholas' retinue would themselves embrace the idea of unity, but on their own terms. To save themselves and the dynasty from ruin at the hands of a stronger Serbia, they hoped to realize their aim under the hegemony of the Petrović-Njegoš family, with the latter ruling under the aegis of Austrian protection. The prerequisites for success were the destruction of the *Radical Party* of Serbia and the end of the Karageorgević dynasty.[36]

Yet the immediate problem was not the fulfillment of vain dreams but one of bare survival. The king could not delay with some gesture calculated to appease his own subjects, oppose Serbian agitation, and reawaken Russian confidence. By early 1914, Russia certainly had become fearful that the steadily worsening condition of the Montenegrin economy and of the royal family might result in a premature merger. In line with the earlier conversations with Pasić, the Russian government thought the time ripe to dangle some bait before Nicholas. The Tsar wrote a friendly letter to his fellow sovereign on February 15, 1914, containing renewed assurances of financial support and the promise of Russian instructors for the army. At

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[31] Conversation of Paléologue and Sazanov. Paléologue to Doumergue, April 22, 1914. *D.D.F.*, series 3, X, no. 141.

[32] Giesl to Berchtold, March 6, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 9445.

[33] Hubka to Conrad, March 18, 1914. Conrad, *Memoirs*, III, 145.

[34] Otto to Berchtold, March 18, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 9486.

[35] Hubka to Conrad, March 18, 1914. Conrad, *Memoirs*, III, 134.

[36] Conversation of Otto, new Habsburg minister to Montenegro, with Jergović. Otto to Berchtold, March 18, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 9486. On the Serbian side this plan supposedly had the support of the former President and Foreign Minister Gjorgević, the former Minister of Justice Ribarac, and of Velković.

[37] Hubka, Austrian military attaché in Cetinje, to Conrad. Copy to Berchtold, Feb. 18, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 9386.

Cetinje this Russian move was happily interpreted as a resumption of friendly relations.[37] Nicholas, in return, promised to accept Russian conditions for the extension of this assistance.[38]

This new sign of Russian benevolence made an approach to Serbia fraught with less danger than heretofore. Nicholas now felt it possible to accede to the urgings of his minister in Belgrade and sent a personal letter to King Peter in which he spoke favorably of a merger of the two states on the basis of the preservation of their respective dynasties.[39] A discreet nudge from Sazanov had helped reinforce this reluctant decision.[40] Miushković had already been assured by the Serbian leaders that Serbia only desired integration in the fields of commerce, finance, and military affairs and had no wish either to end Montenegro's independence or to topple the king from his throne.[41] It might well be asked how much independence Montenegro could have retained under such a formula. At any rate, Nicholas was finally persuaded to dispatch his letter on March 30, 1914.[42]

King Nicholas had now grudgingly accepted the necessity of a letter to King Peter and had also spoken to the *Skupchina* in vague terms about ". . . continuing cooperation with our Serbian brothers."[43] These gestures could hardly have been heartfelt sentiments. He explained to von Eckhardt, the German minister, that his speech from the throne was merely intended to forestall similar statements from the opposition. In fact, he remained totally opposed to any merger.[44] Russian promises of financial and military support had not been translated into fact.[45] This was bound to reduce whatever element of sincerity had been contained in the latter to King Peter. Russia faced Nicholas with the qualms of Tantalus. She hoped to escape the unpleasant chore of giving true succor to the hard-pressed Petrović-Njegoš family yet, by pledges of help, keep alive a ray of hope in Nicholas and thus prevent him from drifting into the Austrian camp out of sheer desperation.

The arrival of the letter of Nicholas led Pašić to request the company of Miushković on a visit to the Russian Minister. Pašić did not wish to commence any negotiations without Russian approval. He certainly did not interpret the letter as call for a merger. Such an idea was not even seriously considered by the Serbian government.[46] It was well aware of the dangers of a precipitate step. Pašić did not hope to achieve the logical end by one fell blow but aimed, instead, at reconciliation and cooperation in administration and policy.[47] Miushković replied by the request for a concrete, formal plan from Pašić. The latter was in no haste to tie Serbian hands with written proposals. He transmitted oral suggestions for the establishment of a common general staff and a merger of the two armies, with each sovereign retaining command of the troops within its respective boundary. Pašić also revived earlier plans for a joint orientation of foreign policy, a unified system of justice, finance, and communications.[48] Miushković then left for Cetinje to acquaint the king with these purely oral recommendations Pašić, in the meantime, assured St. Petersburg that if a military accord resulted from the negotiations it would fit neatly into the framework of Russian foreign policy objectives.[49]

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[38] Obnorski to Sazanov, Feb. 10/23, 1914. *I.B.Z.I.*, series 1, II, note, p. 53.

[39] Obnorski to Sazanov, March 13/26, 1914. Siebert (ed.), *B.D.S.*, III, no. 1047. Paléologue to Doumergue, April 22, 1914. *D.D.F.*, series 3, X, no. 141.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] Obnorski to Sazanov, March 24/April 6, 1914. *I.B.Z.I.*, series 1, II, no. 159. Hartwig to Sazanov, March 25/April 7, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 170.

[42] *G.P.*, XXXVIII, note, p. 334.

[43] Von Eckhardt to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb. 25, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15537.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] Otto to Berchtold, March 18, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 9486.

[46] Hartwig to Sazanov, March 17/30, 1914. *I.B.Z.I.*, series 1, II, no. 119.

[47] Hartwig to Sazanov, March 25/April 7, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 170.

King Peter's reply to Nicholas was circumspect in tone and in line with the tentative probings of Pašić.[50] Nicholas was equally persuaded to play a waiting game and forced Miushković to absent himself from his post in Belgrade. Hartwig surmised that the king hoped to delay further talks until his position was strengthened by the arrival of the promised Russian subsidy. Hartwig therefore advised his superiors in St. Petersburg that Russian interests would best be served by the continued withholding of these funds for Nicholas would then be forced into a resumption of the interrupted negotiations.[51]

This strategy seemed to have its effect. By May, Nicholas finally realized the danger of continued vacillation and permitted Miushković to resume his duties.[52] After a second trip home he once more returned to Belgrade in June, this time armed with real authority to begin talks for a treaty draft.[53] In order to facilitate success, the plenipotentiaries aimed only at the achievement of minimum goals so as to parry the possibility of Austrian counteraction. To soothe the suspicions of Nicholas they agreed to include only such mutual obligations as would deprive him of the opportunity for opposition. Finally, the negotiators hoped to fashion a treaty which Russia could sanction and could thus serve as the guarantor of the eventual fusion of Serbia and Montenegro.[54] Serbia's great confidence in the ultimate fruition of this design was evidenced in April, 1914, by the announcement that henceforth Montenegrin citizens could attend Serbian non-commissioned officer schools and become members of the Frontier Guard on the same bases as Serbian subjects.[55]

Shortly before the resumption of the negotiations at Belgrade the foreign ministers of Austria-Hungary and Italy met at Abbazia from April 14-18. The problems posed by the quest for unity of the two Balkan states formed an important part of their agenda. Special urgency was given to this topic by the rumor of the impending sale of Montenegro to Serbia, to be financed by Russia.[56] Although the report had been proved to be false Austria was more than ever determined to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with Italy. Berchtold once again promised firm Austrian action if Serbia threatened to reach the Adriatic. Austria hoped to forestall such an eventuality, yet remain true to her policy of non-expansion, by awarding the Montenegrin coast to Albania. Berchtold expected Italian acquiescence since the sole aim of this purely defensive policy was the preservation of the Triple Alliance. San Giuliano replied that Austria, as the power most vitally concerned, should propose a definite course of action to Italy. Berchtold was unable to fulfill this request. His government was still unable to agree upon an irrevocable course of action.[57]

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[48] Hartwig to Sazanov, May 6/19, 1914. Siebert (ed.), *B.D.S.*, III, no. 26.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Hartwig to Sazanov, March 25/April 7, 1914. *I.B.Z.I.*, series 1, II, no. 170.

[51] Hartwig to Sazanov, June 17/30, 1914. *Ibid.*, series 1, IV, no. 35.

[52] Hartwig to Sazanov, May 6/19, 1914. Siebert (ed.), *B.D.S.*, III, no. 1056.

[53] Otto to Berchtold, May 20, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VIII, no. 9695. Hartwig to Sazanov, 17/30 June, 1914. *I.B.Z.I.*, series 1, IV, no. 36.

[54] Giers to Sazanov, April 29/May 12, 1914. *Ibid.*, series 1, II, no. 412.

[55] Gellinck, Austrian military attaché in Belgrade, to Conrad. Copy to Berchtold, April 5, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 9554.

The lack of a clearly marked goal was not the only factor in Austria's hesitation. Von Merey, the envoy to Italy, had advised Berchtold to circumvent any Italian demand for a written accord. He feared that any such attempt would be doomed beforehand because of Italy's adamant opposition to the transfer of the Montenegrin coastline either to Albania or Austria. If Austria was forced to choose one of these alternatives Italy would protest vehemently but would accept the *fait accompli* in time.[58] Certainly von Merey was correct in his judgment of Italy's refusal to acquiesce in any Austro-Albanian contiguity. In fact, the German ambassador in Rome was warned that any Austrian move in that direction would cause a crisis in the Triple Alliance and might even force Italy to seek Russian assistance.[59]

Even if these Italian threats were not altogether seriously meant, they were sufficiently grave to persuade Germany to work for an amicable settlement. Both the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg urged the ambassadors in Rome and Vienna to exert pressure to this end. Berlin entertained little hope that Austria might compromise her demands and therefore merely attempted to avoid the need for Austrian action.[60] Germany warned her partner to agree upon her minimum objectives lest a sudden *fait accompli* unleash an unwise, hurried response. Berchtold replied that the government was agreed on the absolute necessity of keeping Serbia from the Adriatic. On the goal there was unanimity; on the means to achieve it there was none.[61]

Although Austria had to bear the brunt of German criticism, Italy was also made aware of German displeasure. Bethmann-Hollweg reproached San Giuliano for regarding the merger question solely in the light of Austro-Italian relationships rather than as part and parcel of the general European power rivalries.[62] The Italian government was duty bound to destroy the popular myth of a Teutonic threat in the Adriatic and instead educate Italian public opinion to appreciate the real Russian threat in that area. After all, Italy had done much to bring Albania into being. If she was now to deny her own creation Germany would be forced to conclude that Italy reckoned on the early collapse of that state or perhaps desired to expand there herself.[63] By May, 1914, Germany's dread of forcible action by Austria and of a consequent rupture of her alliance system had come to dominate her policy.[64] So as to avoid any change of the *status quo* von Flotow proposed that Austria extend economic assistance to Montenegro. Bethmann-Hollweg, however, doubted the necessary pliability of Austrian diplomacy[65] and therefore pressed ever more firmly for an understanding between Italy and Austria on the basis of a territorial compromise.[66]

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[56] Bethmann-Hollweg to von Tschirsky, April 6, 1914. *G.P.*, XXXVIII, no. 15541.

[57] Summary of conversations between Berchtold and San Giuliano, April 18, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VII, no. 9592.

[58] Conversation of von Flotow, German ambassador to Italy, and von Merey. Von Flotow to Bethman-Hollweg, May 4, 1914. *G.P., XXXVIII,* no. 15548.

[59] Flotow to Bethmann-Hollweg, April 9, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15542.

[60] Bethmann-Hollweg to von Tschirsky, April 6, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15541.

[61] Von Tschirsky to Bethmann-Hollweg, April 9, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15546.

[62] Von Flotow to Bethmann-Hollweg, April 9, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15543.

In the meantime, agitation in Montenegro continued apace, Serbian propaganda increased in intensity, and rumors of a merger kept the contending powers in a constant state of alarm. In the latter part of May, King Nicholas departed for Munich. The *Klubaši* organization took advantage of his absence to plan a *coup d'état*. He was warned in time, hurried back to Cetinje, and mastered the situation. He was greatly helped in his task because the assassination at Sarajevo diverted the attention of Montenegrin opposition elements.[67]

On July 1, 1914, the French newspaper *Le Figaro* reported that the merger of Montenegro and Serbia was already an accomplished fact.[68] The Serbian government immediately and vigorously denied the story on the following day.[69] Such tales, even when proved wrong, could not help but inflame passion in a Europe already on edge and fearful of war.

In the face of the dangers unleashed at Sarajevo, Austria and Italy were as far apart as ever in the case of Montenegro and Serbia. No talks had been held regarding this subject since Abbazia. Italy would have been satisfied to keep the failure of the negotiations a secret and await a merger through a process of evolution. Then Austria, as often in the past, would miss the correct moment of intervention. Only the cession of a portion of the Tyrol would have assuaged Italian anger over the loss of Mount Lovcen to Austria. Rome was quite aware that Vienna would never agree to such a concession.[70]

The Austrian government, for its part, had also come to the firm conclusion that Italy could not be won over to its own point of view. Accordingly, as the war clouds were already gathering after Sarajevo, it finally accepted Germany's advice to approach Montenegro with offers of financial assistance in return for the latter's neutrality in the case of war with Serbia. On July 16, 1914, Minister Otto was instructed to inform King Nicholas that the evidence thus far unearthed did not implicate Montenegro in the attempt at Sarajevo. Austria was therefore prepared to give evidence of her special benevolence by attempting to obtain an advance on the international loan granted to Montenegro in 1913 and, when possible, to render future fiancial help.[71] Now that war loomed on the horizon Field Marshal Conrad was also in favor of all possible help for Montenegro.[72]

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[63] Von Jagow to von Flotow, April 28, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15547.

[64] Bethmann-Hollweg to von Tschirsky, May 8, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15550.

[65] *Ibid.* Von Flotow to Bethmann-Hollweg, May 4, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15548.

[66] Bethmann-Hollweg to von Tschirsky, May 8, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15550.

[67] Hupka to Conrad, July 15. 1914. Conrad, *Memoirs*, IV, 93-4.

[68] Szecsen, Austrian ambassador to France, to Berchtold, July 1, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VIII, no. 9969.

[69] *G.P.*, XXXVIII, note, p. 356.

[70] Conversation of von Flotow and San Giuliano. Flotow to Bethmann-Hollweg, July 10, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 15555.

[71] Berchtold to Otto, July 16, 1914. *O.U.A.*, VIII, no. 10300.

Of course King Nicholas was greatly elated at this turn of events, even if the sudden attention was somewhat belated.[73] He realized Austria's need and did not hesitate to take advantage of it by seeking the long-sought city of Scutari as the price of his friendship.[74] Once the city was his, he told the Austrian representative, Montenegro could live independently and the prospect of a merger, hated alike by him and Austria, would vanish into nothingness. Russia would then quickly lose her interest in Serbia once an outlet to the sea was firmly denied to the latter.[75] It was Nicholas' misfortune that other, even more vital, questions clamored for Austrian attention. The feelers were not to be pursued.

At the very time when the King was ready to accept Austrian offers of help with such alacrity his minister in Belgrade was still engaged in serious merger conversations with Serbian officials. Count Czernin, the Austrian envoy to Russia, drew Sazanov's attention to press reports which spoke of their imminent success. Sazanov hastened to deprecate these tales and assured Czernin that Serbia had no plans to merge with her neighbor.[76] He took the precaution, however, to cable Belgrade, "suggesting" a temporary cessation of the negotiations.[77] On July 26, Hartwig was able to reply that the talks had come to a close.[78] They were not reopened again.

Despite the lack of any preconceived plan, Austrian opposition to a merger had been adamant enough to convince Russia that war might ensue if the union were effectuated. The great powers, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, were not willing to permit a war merely to resolve this question. The junior partners of the contending alliance systems, Austria and Serbia, were given to wrangle over comparatively minor matters before the seniors, Germany and Russia, were ready or willing to fight over the major ones. Austria-Hungary, more powerful than Serbia, was therefore also more independent, while the latter was forced to cling more faithfully and tenaciously to her protector. The question of a merger was, in the end, swallowed up and integrated in the farmework of larger rivalries whose solution by force also carried a resolution of this problem in its wake.

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[72] Conrad to Berchtold, July 25, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 10702.

[73] Otto to Berchtold, July 21, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 10450.

[74] Otto to Berchtold, July 22, 1914. *Ibid.*, no. 10486.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] Note on decoded telegram from Czernin to Berchtold. *I.B.Z.I.*, series 1, IV, no. 117.

[77] Sazanov to Hartwig, July 7/24, 1914, *Ibid.*, no. 112. Siebert (ed.), *B.D.S.*, III, no. 1067.

[78] Hartwig to Sazanov, July 9/26, 1914, *I.B.Z.I.*, series 1, IV, no. 148.

STRESEMANN AND POLAND AFTER LOCARNO[1]

*by Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski**

IN contrast to the West, where Locarno was acclaimed rapturously as ushering in, at last, the longed-for era of real peace, its reception in Germany was cool, to say the least. Stresemann never succeeded in convincing his Nationalist critics that, far from entailing a recognition of the status quo, Locarno actually provided the basis for a realistic policy of revisionism. In a letter to a Nationalist leader von Keudell, dated November 27, 1925, he referred to Locarno as "an armistice," which offered "the possibility of recovering German territory in the East." Nobody, he wrote, had shown him "the slightest sign of any other way that might lead to this goal."[2] His was "the only practical policy" aiming at this goal and he spelled it out in a remarkable speech to the *"Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Landsmannschaften"* on December 14. When it would appear, he said, that "European peace or the economic consolidation of Europe was threatened by developments in the East, and when people would begin to ponder whether the cause of this whole non-consolidation was not to be found in impossible frontier-drawing in the East, then Germany might get a possibility of attaining her objectives, provided she had previously effected a political understanding and established an economic community of interests with all the world powers who would have to decide the matter." But this would take time, and Germany "must not adopt the attitude of a child that writes a list of what it would like to get for Christmas, containing everything the child will need for the next fifteen years. The parents would not be in a position to give it all this."[3] As it were, the foretoken of the things to come could already have been seen at Locarno where "Beneš and Skrzyński had to sit in a neighboring room until we let them in. Such was the situation of the States which had been so pampered until then, because they were the servants of the others, but were dropped the moment there seemed a prospect of coming to an understanding with Germany."[4]

Meanwhile Chicherin had paid a visit to Paris and on his way back stopped in Berlin on December 22. This afforded Stresemann another opportunity to assure him at length that the Locarno agreements were in no way directed against Russia; and the possibility of Germany being drawn into an armed conflict brought about by a Russian attack on a third power was "a purely theoretical possibility without any real political significance." Chicherin objected to this formulation if it implied the exclusion of the possibility of either Russia or Germany waging war, since in his view a war of Russia against Poland or Rumania was "by all means in the realm of possibility." After assuring him that that was not what he meant and also reassuring him on the question of an economic boycott, Stresemann had the feeling that "Chicherin was well satisfied with his Berlin impressions and that the nightmare of a Continent arrayed against Russia had been dispelled." "The deep distrust of German policy" had disappeared and there was "every indication that the tension had been eased."[5] To a great degree this improvement of relations had been facilitated by the conclusion, after long-drawn out negotiations, of a German-Soviet trade treaty on October 25, 1925. Now Stresemann could concentrate more on tightening the noose of isolation in which Poland had been caught.

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[1] "Stresemann and Poland before Locarno" appeared in the April 1958 issue of the *Journal.*

[2] Gustav Stresemann, *Vermächtnis. Der Nachlass in drei Bänden,* ed. by Henry Bernhard (Berlin, 1932-33) (hereafter cited as *Vermächtnis*), II, 246.

[3] *Ibid., 236-37.* Two weeks later Stresemann pointed out to the representatives of German eastern associations" the connection of German policy—Dawes plan, Locarno, the financial interest of America in Germany—with the eastern questions. A military move against Poland being out of question, there remains only the possibility of winning the world over to the idea that Poland in its present form, and especially the unjust frontier drawing in the German East, constituted a danger to European peace." Microfilm of the documents from the German *Auswärtiges Amt* (hereafter cited as *AA*) (the files of the Reichsminister and the Staatssekretär), National Archives, Washington, D. C., container 1426/serial 2945H/frames 571954-55.

[4] *Vermächtnis,* II, 243.

This task did not appear difficult and its execution not far off, as the ensnared victim was showing manifest signs of internal disintegration. The economic and political crisis in Poland was rapidly gaining momentum. The new currency, which had been introduced with so great an effort, broke down. The control of the situation was visibly slipping away from the paralyzed hands of the parliamentary government, whose very survival was now at stake. In the last resort, compelled by the impending catastrophe, all major political parties uneasily agreed to suspend political warfare for the time being, and the "great coalition" government of Skrzyński was formed at the end of November 1925.

The new government tried to stave off the catastrophe by a renewed endeavor to obtain foreign loans and to bring to an end the German-Polish tariff war. To pave the way for the reopening of negotiations, Poland had suspended the expulsion of German optants.[6] This was followed by indirect overtures and approaches. Skrzyński evinced an earnest desire for an understanding with Germany while discussing the question of trade negotiations with a German visitor to Warsaw, Baron Carl Soden, indicating that he was a man of *"vue large."* Soden found him wholly pro-English in his sympathies, and since he knew that the road to England led through the agreement with Germany, he sought it "sincerely."[7] To explore the possibilities of such an agreement, Herman Diamand, financial expert of the Polish Socialist Party—an important coalition party—had already gone to Berlin where he discussed this question with Professor Julius Hirsch, State Secretary at the Ministry of Economic Affairs.[8] But as could have been expected, the German conditions were totally unacceptable to the Poles. The President of the *Reichsbank* Schacht stated bluntly that no economic agreement was possible without a "political pacification," which, in turn, "was not possible without an outright return of the Corridor and Upper Silesia." However, once the political question had been positively settled, Germany "would have the greatest interest in helping Poland to stabilize her affairs." In his opinion, "such a state of peace" with Germany was "worth more for Poland's future welfare as well as for the maintenance of her independence from all other sides than the present *Gewaltzustand*."[9] A few weeks later, the British ambassador Lord D'Abernon noted in his diary that he had found in Schacht, and "in other German statesmen of late, an increased disposition to regard the settlement of difficulties with Poland as a matter of urgent moment to Germany." Schacht struck the Ambassador as being "so permeated with the conviction that the existing Corridor arrangement is unworkable and that the Upper Silesian award is iniquitous that he appears considerably to underrate the difficulty of inducing any Polish Government to abandon their present position." The attitude of Berlin left no doubt that "Now that Locarno has diminished danger on the German-French frontier, the Polish Corridor is the danger-spot in Europe."[10]

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[5] Microfilm of "Nachlass des Reichsministers Dr. Gustav Stresemann," (hereafter cited as "Nachlass"), National Archives, Washington, D. C., 3113/7129/148109ff., for an abbreviated version see *Vermächtnis,* II, 535f.

[6] *Ibid.*, 549.

[7] "Nachlass," 3144/7323/160843-44. A copy of Soden's letter to Papen, dated December 20, 1925.

However, there were doubts at the Wilhelmstrasse as to whether economic pressure alone would suffice to compel Poland to territorial concessions. *"The question of the Corridor,"* wrote Secretary of State Schubert at the end of 1925, *"is not to be solved otherwise than through force in conjunction with numerous favorable circumstances. Hence it is not actual today."* He thought that Germany ought to participate in an international action for a financial rehabilitation of Poland, even if political questions were to be excluded from its purview. For then Germany would be in a position to insist that, as a necessary condition of stabilizing Polish finances, cuts be made in the Polish budget; this would have very important political implications since a half of the budget was for military expenditures. Poland had the second largest army after France; its reduction would lessen Poland's significance as a power factor and in turn weaken France's interest in her. After being "reduced *politically* at Locarno," she would then be "reduced *militarily*." "The third step, the *territorial* reduction, for which the first two are essential preliminary conditions, must remain reserved for a more distant future."[11]

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[8] *Ibid.*, 3144/7323/160807-09. Hirsch's report to Schacht, December 14, 1925.

[9] *Ibid.*, 3144/7323/160810-11. Schacht to Hirsch, December 28, 1925.

[10] Viscount D'Abernon, *The Diary of an Ambassador*, III, *Dawes to Locarno, 1924-1926* (New York, 1931), 221. January 22, 1926. Schacht told Professor Hesnard who came to inquire about the possibility of German participation in the stabilization of the franc that Germany would be willing to participate, but observed that her cooperation would be facilitated if there were no Polish question between France and Germany. Questioned by Hesnard as to the German demands, Schacht replied: "The return of the Corridor and Upper Silesia. Whereupon Hesnard asked somewhat resignedly: *also* Upper Silesia?" Schacht thought that the Frenchman was to some extent resigned to the cession of the Corridor. When Schacht insisted on the necessity of the restitution of Upper Silesia, Hesnard asked "whether all of Upper Silesia had to be returned and could not some small parts remain with Poland?" Schacht replied that one could perhaps discuss this. He gained the impression that America pressed the participation of Germany in the financial stabilization of France. *AA*, 1426/2945H/571971.

Whether in view of internal political considerations Germany could ever join in an international program of economic assistance to Poland is a moot question. At any rate, the immediate reaction of the Germans was to prevent such a program from materializing, and they did their utmost to dissuade the British and American financial circles from attempting it.[12] At the same time, in their own trade negotiations with the Poles for ending the tariff war they resorted to such dilatory tactics that even their minister in Warsaw, Rauscher, felt constrained to protest to State Secretary Schubert; the notion, he warned, that "time works for the Germans" could be carried too far.[13]

In February and March 1926, the question of stabilizing Polish finances was pushed into the background by the crisis in the League of Nations occasioned by the impending election of Germany as a permanent member of the League Council. The special March meeting of the League adjourned in a deadlock over the question of creating additional permanent seats in the Council for Brazil, Spain and Poland. The Germans were resolved from the outset to thwart Polish aspirations for such a seat and spared no efforts to block even Poland's election to a non-permanent seat. They feared that the election of Poland to the Council would not only enhance her prestige but also would render more difficult carrying into effect their minority policy, which envisaged building in Poland an international control system over minorities with the intention of gradually bringing her completely under international control through the establishment of minority, economic and other international control commissions there, thus paving the way for the eventual realization of German objectives.[14] They paid no heed therefore to the French and British arguments that the presence of Poland on the Council would be of advantage to both France and Germany since

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[11] *AA*, 2339/4569H/E 168402-04. (Italics in the original). Schubert's undated memo, based to a certain extent on that of Dirksen, November 16, 1925. *Ibid.*, E 168406-15. However, Dirksen considered that it would be impossible for Germany to participate in the economic rehabilitation of Poland if the political objectives could not thus be realized. He thought that since England wanted to pacify Europe and stop bolshevism, her interest in the rehabilitation of Poland grew, the more catastrophic the economic situation of that country was becoming. But Germany should further, or at least not delay, the economic ruin of Poland, and consequently sabotage the English action. Dirksen mentioned in passing that he had discussed the Polish question with the leaders of the German minority in Poland.

On January 5, 1926, he conferred with Schacht, who agreed with him that "Eine Finanzsanierrung ohne politische Sanierung ist keine Sanierung." For the Polish budget had to be balanced, and it could not be balanced without a political settlement with Germany and without disarmament. *AA*, 1426/2945H/571973.

[12] *AA*, 1426/2945H/571957-58. Maltzan (Washington) to Stresemann, December 29, 1925; *ibid.*, 571959. Dufour (London) to Stresemann, January 2, 1926; *ibid.*, 571973; *ibid.*, 571961-62. Stresemann to Maltzan, January 16, 1926.

[13] *AA*, 2339/4569H/E 168365-72. December 29, 1925. Cf. Schubert's reply denying Rauscher's assertions, January 6, 1926. *ibid.*, E. 168375-9.

[14] *AA*, 2339/4569H/E 168512-18. Dirksen's memorandum of March 2, 1926. See also Zechlin's memorandum of March 26, *ibid.*, E. 168617.

[15] *AA*, 1426/2945H/572045-49. Hoesch (Paris) to Stresemann, February 13, 1926, on his

France would then be freed from the obligation of having to act as Poland's protector in the Council.[15]

The battle ground on which German and Polish diplomats measured swords was not confined to London, Paris, Geneva and New York, but extended to the Baltic capitals and Moscow. Together with the Russians, the Germans foiled the renewed Polish attempt to form a Polish-Baltic bloc.[16] But to their chagrin they found that Russian policy toward Poland again did not coincide with theirs. Contrary to the illusions entertained by some Germans, the interests of the two countries in the Polish question were far from identical. While for Germany the revision of the frontier with Poland was a paramount issue, it was only a secondary one for Russia. Therefore, Russian policy toward Poland could and did show a flexibility which time and again disturbed and vexed the Germans.

On March 4 Chicherin disclosed to Rantzau that the Soviet government, actuated by a desire to establish peace on its western frontier, and, above all, to prevent Poland from being used as a battering-ram (*Sturmbock*) by England," had renewed the offer of a non-aggression pact to Warsaw, which entailed recognition of the eastern frontier of Poland. Chicherin preceded this statement with the assurance that his government did not think for a moment "of guaranteeing the *western* frontiers of Poland."[17] Two days later Rantzau reported "extraordinary efforts" of Poland to bring about an "Eastern Locarno," and the presence of the head of the eastern department in the Polish foreign ministry in Moscow.[18] However, the Russo-Polish negotiations broke down again and the "grandiose" (*grosszügig*) Polish plan failed because the Russians insisted on a bilateral non-aggression pact, whereas the Poles were only interested in a multilateral agreement which would include all the western neighbors of Russia.[19]

The Russian overture to Poland made the Wilhelmstrasse very indignant indeed since it came at the time when the secret Russo-German negotiations for an agreement, that was to provide a basis for continued cooperation between the two countries in the new conditions of the post-Locarno Europe, were nearing successful conclusion. True, at Berlin's insistence, this agreement was being couched in general terms so as to avoid its contradicting the Locarno treaties; nevertheless, the Germans contended that Article I of the agreed draft barred any Russo-Polish agreement. During a long conversation on March 14, Chicherin told Rantzau that Moscow had only intended to conclude a short-term—three to five years—non-aggression pact with Poland, but this did not comfort Rantzau, who considered the pact "extraordinarily serious for our relations," depriving the proposed Russo-German agreement of its value. "One ought not to forget in Moscow," said he, "that the known negotiations of December 1924 were based

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conversation with Berthelot; *ibid.*, 2339/4569H/E168606. Dufour to Stresemann, March 18, on his conversation with Tyrrell.

[16] *AA*, 1426/2945H/572083-85. Stresemann to Rantzau, February 24.

[17] *Ibid.*, 572108-10.

[18] *Ibid.*, 572112. Rantzau to Stresemann, March 6. R. reported doing everything to thwart the Polish plans.

[19] *Ibid.*, 572114. Rantzau to Stresemann, March 7.

on the common German-Russian interest in pushing Poland back to her ethnographic frontiers." The recognition, "at least for the duration of the pact, of the unnatural [Russo-Polish] frontiers," would also "indirectly endanger the German eastern frontier, for he could foresee that the Poles . . . would become even more impudent toward Germany than they are now if they did not have to be apprehensive, be it only for three years, about their biggest eastern neighbor; thus, in the end, fully unbearable conditions would be created." To this Chicherin replied that in view of the Polish stand, it would be impossible to resume negotiations with Warsaw in the foreseeable future; meanwhile Russia and Germany must come to a sincere and friendly understanding about the way in which, "if it was at all possible, the peace, which Russia so urgently needed for her development, would for a certain time be secured for her from her sympathetic Polish neighbor." Yet at the same time *"the German-Russian relationship must suffer no injury in any respect,"* since *"politically and economically"* this relationship would be of *"cardinal importance for Russia, if it comes to the conclusion of the treaty now being negotiated between Berlin and Moscow."*[20]

Since the Russians were still willing to negotiate with Warsaw,[21] Stresemann instructed Rantzau, in a telegram dated March 27, to impress on them once again that "the conclusion of the German-Russian treaty was out of the question so long as Russia refused to give us an assurance that she would not meet in any form the necessity of Poland for security of her eastern frontier, be it through a treaty of guarantee, or through a non-aggression pact, or also through an arbitration treaty." He was "well aware of the Russians having the convenient pretext that they would be doing nothing else in relation to Poland than we on our part had done at Locarno. But this pretext does not hold good at all. Our arbitration treaty with Poland is nothing but an unavoidable consequence of the Rhine pact. From the political point of view the Locarno treaties, taken collectively, signify no guarantee or strengthening of Poland, rather the converse. If proof of this were needed, it was furnished by the latest Geneva proceedings, which in fact were nothing but a result of the weakening of the Polish position by the Locarno treaties. A Russo-Polish arbitration treaty or a similar Russo-Polish arrangement would have an entirely different character." The Russians could not contend that "they had a legitimate interest in securing peace for a certain time on the Russo-Polish frontier, for in view of our notorious (*notorisch*) attitude toward Poland and Russia's own defensive power, Russia does not need to fear any dangerous surprises from the Polish side." Stresemann did not want any written assurances from Russia or any secret exchange of notes, as he set great store on the new German-Russian treaty not being accompanied by any secret agreements. It would suffice, he wrote, to clear the question fully in oral conversations and "let the Russians know unequivocally that, should they conclude agreements of the indicated kind with Poland, we would consider it as incompatible with the fundamental idea of

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[20] *Ibid.*, 572116-21. Rantzau to Stresemann, March 15. (Italics in the original).
[21] *Ibid.*, 572135.
[22] *Ibid.*, 572135-36.

Article I of the treaty and consequently treat the whole treaty as broken and emasculated."[22]

However, knowing that Stresemann was hardly in a position to carry out his threat, the Russians would not be cowed into giving such a binding assurance. Stresemann did not insist, and on April 24, 1926, signed the Russo-German treaty.[23] For him the significance of the treaty lay in "preventing a dangerous Franco-Polish-Russian combination, as well as in pursuing generally, so far as possible, a common political line with Russia in the questions of the near East."[24] He was determined to make full use of Article I of the treaty, which envisaged constant contact and discussion between the two governments on matters of common interest, hoping that, in the new climate ushered in by the treaty, Russian desire for a pact with Poland would abate and then vanish.[25] On May 11 he asked Rantzau to call the attention of the Russians to the "mutual [Russo-German] interest in preventing premature political consolidation of Poland," using this as a "suitable pretext" to procure from them the promise that they would not guarantee the eastern frontier of Poland; the ambassador was instructed to press this issue whenever an appropriate opportunity presented itself.[26]

This telegram was sent on the very eve of a *coup d'état* in Poland, when it seemed that that country stood on the brink of disintegration rather than on the threshold of consolidation. Its financial situation became desperate; the party strife reached a new climax. Skrzyński's importuning the West for loans had been to no avail, since the leading British and American financiers swayed by Montagu Norman, Governor-General of the Bank of England, would not make a loan without the participation of Germany. Norman maintained close contact with the Germans, and on April 6 he boasted to the German ambassador Sthamer of having succeeded in preventing the British and American banks from extending any credits to Poland, even though actually she was in a position to give suitable securities. His influence, he said, extended over most of the financial institutions in London and New York, but not over such outsiders as Dillon, Read and Co., which at that time was negotiating with Poland. He insisted that Poland ought not to get any loans before she submitted herself to a Dawes Plan or turned to the League of Nations for assistance. The League could then say that her financial rehabilitation would be possible only if she made an all-out effort to remove all economic and political (i.e. the Corridor Question and Upper Silesia) differences with her neighbors. He was very anxious to learn the views of the German government on this question, for "the longer this business was protracted the greater was the danger of Poland's obtaining the urgently needed means from the lenders outside of his influence. . . ." He hoped to examine the whole matter with Schacht during the latter's forthcoming visit in London, and indicated that he was in contact on this with Tyrrell.[27]

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[23] Stresemann's public statement concerning this treaty, see *Vermächtnis,* II, 504-11.

[24] *AA,* 1426/2945H/572193. Stresemann to Rantzau, May 11, 1926. But to the American ambassador Stresemann said that in addition to the desire to be on friendly terms with both the West and the East and not to take sides against one or the other, "Germany's opportunity and mission" was "to mediate" between them. "This is in harmony with the metaphor of the bridge which has been used a good deal both by Dr. Stresemann and the newspapers in dealing with this subject." U. S. State Department documents, National Archives, 761.6211/20. Schurman to Kellogg, May 4, 1926.

[25] *AA,* 1426/2945H/572166. Stresemann to Rantzau, April 29, 1926, in answer to Rantzau's telegram of April 23, in which such a development had been foreseen. *Ibid.,* 572160.

[26] *Ibid.,* 572193-94. Stresemann did not want a formal obligation from the Soviet government in respect to its future policy toward Poland as that would lead to the conclusion of a secret agreement, and, moreover, the Russians might ask for a *quid pro quo* with regard to German relations with the Western powers. On May 1 Litvinov had again assured Rantzau that the Soviet Government would not guarantee the Polish possession of the former German territories. *Ibid.,* 572169-70.

In response to this inquiry, Stresemann redefined German policy toward Poland in a "strictly confidential" letter to Sthamer, dated April 19, 1926. He was gratified that influential English circles were taking an interest in the question of the German-Polish frontiers and seemed to be coming to the conclusion "that the solution to this question is not only the most important task of our policy, but perhaps the most important of European policy in general. The cooperation of England is an indispensable condition for a peaceful solution, and only as such comes into our consideration." A peaceful solution to this question that would really meet the German claims could not come before "the economic and financial catastrophe of Poland reached an extreme degree and the whole Polish organism was brought to a state of unconsciousness." For so long as Poland "possessed some strength, no Polish government would be in a position to venture on a peaceful settlement of the frontier question with us." Stresemann spelled out in detail German demands: only "the recovery of unlimited sovereignty" over "the Corridor, Danzig, Upper Silesia, and certain parts of Middle Silesia" could satisfy Germany. She had to be on guard against any hasty solution that would at the most produce an inadequate result, since that would dangerously prejudice a really satisfactory settlement. Consequently, German policy must aim at the postponing "Poland's financial recovery until that country becomes ripe for the settlement of the frontier question in accordance with our wishes, and until our power position is adequately strengthened." The English and American financial circles should therefore by no means be encouraged to help Poland, and any possible action by the League of Nations ought to be prevented for similar reasons. Since about half of her foreign trade had been with Germany, this placed Poland in a state of dependency on her western neighbor. Hence, Stresemann envisaged, Germany's participation in an action to stabilize Polish finances would eventually become inevitable, but it ought to take place at the time of her choosing when she would be able to realize her objectives.[28]

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[27] *AA,* 1426/2945H/572143-44. Sthamer to Stresemann, April 7. The counsellor of the German embassy, Dufour, had already on March 18 suggested to Tyrrell the possibility of using the League as an instrument with which to force Poland to a settlement with Germany in return for economic assistance. Tyrrell thought this was a very good idea. *AA,* 2339/4569H/E168612. Dufour also discussed this with Norman, and Sthamer asked Berlin for instructions on March 30. *Ibid.,* E168622. On April 6 Norman told Dufour that he had been appealing to "the financiers *in the interest of Europe* not to make any loans to Poland." *Ibid.,* E168643. (Italics in the original).

Stresemann's expectations that economic crisis in Poland would reach such proportions as to force her to accede to German terms proved premature. The strike of British coal miners was a boon for the depressed Polish coal industry, which had largely depended on the German market. Now the Scandinavian and other markets were opened to Polish coal and the increase in Polish exports exerted a salutary effect on the Polish economy, which also began to enjoy the benefits of world prosperity lasting until 1929. Moreover, in the middle of May 1926, Marshal Piłsudski seized power by carrying out a successful *coup d'état*. In contrast to the shaky, French-like parliamentary governments, the new military dictatorship gave an appearance of stability and strength. Yet this change of régime could not necessarily be viewed as unfavorable from the German standpoint.[29]

Considering Russia as the principal enemy of Poland, Piłsudski was a convinced partisan of some accommodation with Germany. In July, Diamand again paid a visit to Germany, this time as the Marshal's unofficial emissary, and after "repeated and urgent" solicitation, was granted an interview by Stresemann on July 28 at Bad Wildungen. He was charged to inquire "whether Germany would in due course be prepared to lend Poland her support in obtaining an alteration" of the rule governing re-election to the Council of the League, so that a simple majority instead of a two-thirds majority would be required for such a re-election. In return, he was authorized to state, "Poland would be disposed to offer Germany compensation." He laid stress on the fact that "Piłsudski attached great importance to establishing good relations with Germany, and that his whole attitude was anti-Russian," confiding significantly that Piłsudski "had once told him that in general it was true that more land meant more power. But Poland had far too many foreigners among her population, and in certain circumstances it was better to surrender land in order to strengthen national unity." Stresemann replied that he "could only welcome any efforts to achieve an understanding between Poland and Germany since, after all, it was our lot to live together side by side," and in this sense, he endorsed Secretary of State von Schubert's remarks "that it must be possible for

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[28] *AA.*, 2339/4569H/E168665-71; "Nachlass," 3165/7414/175393-99. Stresemann enjoined Sthamer to exercise extreme circumspection in discussing this subject, leaving rather to the British the initiative in broaching it.

On May 27 Schacht discussed at length the question of the financial stabilization of Poland with Norman. Norman told him that Strong of the New York Reserve Bank wanted "at all events to bring about a stabilization of Poland." Schacht retorted that he "would deplore that very much and believed personally that the responsibility for a restoration [of Polish currency] without the creation of a political *Ausgleich* must be left to those who began stabilization without such a condition." Ein "gesunder ökonomischer Aufschwung in Polen ohne freudige deutsche Mitwirkung nicht denkbar sei." In conclusion, he thought that first of all the Corridor question should be settled and "the Upper Silesian question could be deferred to a later moment." *AA,* 1426/2945H/572263-66.

[29] Baron Soden had already in December 1925 detected the signs that the just formed "great coalition" government of Skrzyński would not last long, as both the Right and the Left entertained desires for dictatorship. He envisioned that the Left's candidate for dictator, Piłsudski, with his strong pro-English sympathies and his hatred of Russia, would "seek to come to a modus vivendi with Germany as a cover (Rückendeckung), while the Right, equally as a cover, flirted with Moscow against us [Germany] naturally." "Nachlass," 3144/7323/160844.

Poland and Germany to stand in some relationship other than a hostile one. . . ." Yet he did not think fit to ask Dr. Diamand what sort of compensation Poland would be prepared to offer in the event of an agreement, and he would not commit himself then and there as to German support of Poland in the League of Nations, since Germany "did not belong to the League and must leave it to the leading Powers in the League to decide on the constitution of their organization."[30]

However, the territorial issue must have been raised at a subsequent meeting between the two. A clear indication of this is to be found in Hirsch's letter to Stresemann, dated October 21. Hirsch wrote that Diamand had spoken to him in detail about his conversations with Stresemann, and that the principal point of difference between them consisted in the Corridor question being regarded by Stresemann as only "the *basis* (*Fundament*) of an understanding," while Diamand viewed it as "the *crown* (*Krone*) with which, however, one cannot begin." As to Piłsudski's expression concerning a "stronger or greater Poland," Diamand interpreted it in the sense of an eastern and not a western expansion.[31]

The confidences of Diamand tended to support the rumors, which had gained wide currency, of an impending Polish invasion of Lithuania. Poland and Lithuania had from the very beginning of their independence been embroiled over Vilna. So long as her ancient capital was not returned to her, Lithuania refused to enter into any relations with Poland, with the result that a state of no-peace-no-war between them dragged on. All the efforts of the League to resolve the dispute invariably ended in failure, partly because Germany and Russia had an interest in fostering it, since both these powers were "concerned with maintaining the independence and integrity of Lithuania as a pawn that might be played out against Poland."[32] In London and Paris, on the other hand, one was beginning to give serious consideration to the idea of joining the Polish-Lithuanian question with that of the Corridor and settling the two simultaneously by providing Poland with an access to the sea through Lithuania in exchange for the Corridor. The possibility of such an arrangement alarmed Moscow, and prompted it to ask Berlin on July 21 (1) whether the rumors of a secret German-Polish agreement to that effect were true (Rantzau at once denied them most emphatically), and (2) what measures was Germany prepared to take in the event of a Polish attack on Lithuania.[33] In reply Schubert expressed his disbelief in the possibility of such a Polish action since it was certain to meet with the resistance of the League of Nations and could not be supported by Chamberlain, defender of the principles of the League.[34]

On August 5 Schubert, substituting for the absent Stresemann, had an opportunity to discuss this matter at length with Litvinov, who had stopped in Berlin on his way from France. The Russian stated "categorically" that in the event of a Polish attack on Lithuania Russia could under no circumstances remain still; and the position of Germany being the same, he asked whether a public Russo-German declaration to that effect would not serve the purpose. Schubert considered the idea "precarious" (*prekär*) since the rumor had already been emphatically denied by Poland, but Litvinov retorted that "we could head off any such maneuver by declaring at the bebeginning that we did not believe in such a possibility [of a Polish attack]." To Schubert's objection that then such a declaration would not serve any practical end, Litvinov replied "quite cynically that still one must do everything to isolate Poland in the eyes of public opinion and such a declaration suited very well this purpose." He also said, "again most cynically," that in the last analysis the purport of the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty then being negotiated was "to deter Lithuania from coming to an understanding with Poland."[35]

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[30] *Vermächtnis,* II, 550-552; see also III, 246. The German minister in Warsaw had already called this a "fantastic plan," and ridiculed Diamand's "private diplomacy." *AA,* 2339/4569H/E168809-12. Rauscher to Schubert, July 9, 1926.

[31] "Nachlass," 3147/7334/162775-76.

[32] Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies* (New York, 1953), 154.

[33] *AA,* 1426/2945H/572287-88. Rantzau to Stresemann, July 21, 1926.

[34] *Ibid.,* 572296-99. Schubert to Rantzau, July 24, 1926.

Several weeks later Moscow surprised Berlin with the disclosure that it had again renewed the offer of a non-aggression pact to Poland—a "pronouncedly demonstrative" move, first, to obviate the Moscow visit of the Polish foreign minister with its propaganda aspect, and, secondly, to "unmask Poland before the whole world," since Moscow was certain that she could not accept the proposal.[36] Schubert lodged a protest charging the Russians with violating the Berlin treaty, since they had not consulted Berlin prior to taking this step.[37] However, the anticipation of Moscow that Poland would again decline a bilateral agreement with Russia was borne out. The Polish deputy foreign minister told the German minister that he knew "the Russians sufficiently to know that they only wage 'defensive' wars. It was all bluff and an expression of Russian double-facedness."[38]

By then everybody's attention was again focused on Geneva. At the September meeting of the League's assembly the crisis occasioned by Germany's entry into the League was finally resolved. Germany obtained a permanent seat in the Council of the League, while Poland had to content herself with a semi-permanent seat, with the right of reelection. The Germans were deeply disappointed. "After all," a member of the German delegation to the League wrote later, "The German Government had not taken the initiative for the Locarno Pact to help Poland to the rank of a great power in the Geneva hierarchy."[39] Yet the Poles were not too elated, since they had hoped for a permanent Council membership.

On the morrow of Germany's entry into the League, the world was shaken by the secret meeting of Stresemann and Briand at Thoiry (September 17), which gave rise to the wildest speculations and caused much uneasiness in some places, particularly in Poland, but also in Germany. Stresemann at once sneeringly assured the press that Europe had not been "divided up" at Thoiry and pleaded with those who had a Franco-German understanding at heart—"the pivot of European understanding"—to desist from endangering it "by sensations and rumors that had no foundation in fact."[41] Speaking before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag on October 7, he denied emphatically that he had recognized the frontier in Upper Silesia, repeating that no German government, even a Communist one, would dare to do that. He had "refused to discuss Eastern or Colonial questions at Thoiry," since the time was not yet ripe for seizing the initiative. "These things can only be pressed onward step by step. But when the time comes when it will be possible to debate in any form the Eastern question, it must be clearly realized in Germany that this question can be settled only in conjunction with France; that the understanding with France is the first step that must be taken, and that henceforth, such an atmosphere must prevail in the relations between the two nations and Powers that it will become possible to deal with the more far-reaching matters at issue."[42]

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[35] *AA.*, 2317/4562H/E157794-98. Schubert's memorandum, August 5.

[36] *Ibid.*, E157810-13. Schubert's memorandum on his conversation with the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* Brodowski, August 24, 1926.

[37] *Ibid.*, E157818-22. August 28, 1926.

[38] *Ibid.*, E157836. Rauscher to Stresemann, September 1, 1926.

[39] Herbert von Dirksen, *Moscow-Tokyo-London:Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy* (Norman, Okla., 1952), 62.

This point was elaborated in a remarkable memorandum prepared by Zechlin, head of the Polish section at the Wilhelmstrasse. A revision of the German eastern frontier, wrote Zechlin, was possible only with support from the outside. Even though the conviction that the Corridor could not be maintained had permeated a large section of British and American public opinion, and even though the German-Polish conflict had inconvenienced England, still, he argued, England would not support "all our justified claims"; probably would not run the risk of an estrangement or even open hostility with France; and would not, in view of her antagonism toward Russia, pursue an anti-Polish policy. She would welcome a modification of the status quo only "in so far as it did not upset the balance of power and served the pacification of Europe." He admitted that German policy was inconceivable without or against England, yet he doubted that she was the power upon whose support Germany should rely above all, in the endeavor to realize her objectives. Nor could the Polish question be solved as a result of a Russo-German cooperation, since France would not allow Germany to take back the Corridor, even had that territory been offered to her by Russia following a victorious war with Poland. And Russia would certainly oppose an arrangement whereby the Corridor would be exchanged for Lithuania. There remained, therefore, only France, who held the key to the whole situation; through Paris led "the only sure way to the solution of the principal questions of German policy, not only in the west but also in the east." The idea of German-French cooperation would have been "fantastic" several years before, but now it was gaining support in "wide political circles," as there was no reason "why political cooperation should be less feasible than economic." However, it was essential to provide France with "an absolute and binding security against a German revenge," if she were to accede to

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[41] *Vermächtnis,* III, 31f.

[42] "Nachlass," 3147/7333/162672-73; an abbreviated version in *Vermächtnis,* III, 38.

German demands at the expense of Poland. From the German standpoint the best solution would be if Poland did not receive any territorial compensation for the loss of the Corridor, except the right of transit and free ports at Danzig, Stettin and Hamburg—and German "propaganda ought to be focused on this"—but Zechlin envisaged that it might be necessary, at French insistence, to compensate her with Lithuania. Moreover, France might also require that Germany guarantee the eastern frontiers of Poland, yet this was not certain since Paris had as much interest as Berlin in good relations with Moscow. However, "Germany could assume a guarantee of Polish independence without more ado."[43] Although all questions of the *grosse Politik* should be dealt with with an eye to the possible effects on German-French understanding, this did not mean that Germany should not cultivate good relations with London and Moscow.[44] There is little doubt that this memorandum reflected Stresemann's views, yet, apparently, it did not represent the consensus of opinion at the Wilhelmstrasse; the principal criticism leveled at it was that if Germany agreed to an exchange of Lithuania for the Corridor that would certainly result in the alienation and lasting hostility of Russia.[45]

As to this the Russians had already left no doubt. They took alarm at the rumors of the impending German-Polish deal at the expense of Lithuania (Chicherin asserted that this actually meant at the expense of Russia), suspecting that England was behind it.[46] On November 4 the Russian ambassador questioned Stresemann as to whether England had made such a proposal. Stresemann denied it, stating that in fact Chamberlain was set against raising the question prematurely. Actually it was the French journalist Jules Sauerwein who had broached to him the possibility of such a solution, but it had never been discussed seriously. Far from embracing any such idea, the French were in reality striving to induce Germany to recognize her Eastern frontiers which, he said, she was naturally refusing to do. He could not communicate right away to the ambassador the official stand of the German Government on this question, but indicated clearly that, first. he did not consider the Upper Silesian question as settled; and, secondly, in his opinion the question of Poland's access to the sea could very well be solved by Poland's using the Danzig port in the same way as, for instance, Czechoslovakia used the Hamburg port.[47] On December 2 Stresemann repeated this to Chicherin, adding that it was too early to open the quesion of the Corridor, as the Poles were not showing any readiness to discuss it.[48]

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[43] Here somebody (Schubert?—this being his file) put a large question mark in the margin.

[44] *AA,* 2339/4569H/E168868-77. November 19, 1826.

[45] *Ibid.,* E168879-82. Wallroth's comments, November 29. Wallroth also thought that an exchange of the Corridor for Lithuania was "in any case too small" for Germany and that then the danger would arise of having to guarantee the remaining eastern frontiers. E168879.

[46] *AA,* 2317/4562H/E157932, E157943. Rantzau's conversations with Chicherin (November 24, 1926) and Litvinov (November 26).

[47] "Nachlass," 3147/7335/162940-41.

[48] *AA.,* 2317/4562H/E157996. Chicherin was passing through Berlin on his way to Wiesbaden.

Yet eight days later Stresemann broached this question during a conversation which he held at Geneva with the Polish foreign minister August Zaleski, on the latter's initiative. Zaleski sought to explore the possibilities of a Polish-German trade agreement, complaining that the revisionist campaign of the German press rendered it difficult for the Polish government to make concessions. Stresemann replied that the German government did not control the German press, and proceeded to state "frankly" his position on the frontier question. The normalization of German-Polish relations desired by Zaleski was not possible "without a solution of the frontier problem," by which he meant "Danzig, the Corridor and Upper Silesia." In his opinion, he did not pursue "a chauvinistic German goal, but rather a goal which lay in the interest of both states." On the other hand, he could "see perfectly well that this problem was not yet acute and that it would be quite wrong (*ganz falsch*) to open it now in a practical way." Hence he "did not require any answer" from Zaleski. To this Zaleski replied that naturally it would be very difficult for him to give such an answer. But he could say that "this problem was a very delicate one for public opinion in Poland and to open it at that time would evoke the greatest agitation." During the war he had cooperated, even while living in London, with the Polish administration set up by the Central Powers in Poland. "He could say therefore that he was thoroughly acquainted with the frontier problem." He could not say anything more. Streseman answered that he understood perfectly well. In conclusion, Zaleski assured him that the rumors of Polish designs on Lithuania were "downright nonsense."[49]

Yet the mounting tension between Poland and Lithuania, especially since the establishment of the Waldemaras dictatorship in December, continued to give cause for uneasiness both in Berlin and in Moscow. Stresemann informed the Russians that at Geneva Chamberlain had stated "most categorically" to him that London had abandoned the idea of the Corridor-Lithuania exchange.[50] However, German suspicions of British policy in the Baltic area were not allayed, and the Germans were doing their utmost to dissuade London from working for a Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation. On January 12, 1927, Stresemann reiterated to the German ambassador in London that any settlement between Poland and Lithuania, which would "establish more or less pronounced Polish hegemony as far as Memel or at least would secure for Poland flank protection," was not in the interest of Germany.[51] He also notified Paris that an extension of Polish influence over Lithuania would create "an impossible situation for Germany"; and in view of Russia's attitude implied a danger of war. In consequence the question of the eastern frontiers would be opened, and Germany did not wish that at the time. However, he was not opposed to the normalization of Polish-

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[49] *AA*, 2339/4569H/E168905-09. Stresemann's minute.

[50] *AA.*, 1427/2945H/572502. Stresemann to Krestinsky, December 22.

[51] *Ibid.*, 572514; also *ibid.*, 572571-72. Stresemann to Lindsay, February 5, 1927; *ibid.*, 527573-74. Schubert to Sthamer, February 7.

[52] *Ibid.*, 572575-80. Hoesch to Stresemann on his conversation with Briand on February 9 in carrying out Stresemann's instruction of February 3. *Ibid.*, 572561-68.

Lithuanian relations. Briand welcomed this declaration and agreed to maintain contact with Berlin on this question, adding that English policy in this regard was "incoherent."[52]

Judging from the mounting revisionist campaign in Germany, one would hardly suspect that Stresemann was actually opposed then to opening the frontier issue. This campaign evoked a tide of agitation in Poland, forcing Zaleski to take a much stronger stand in public than he had taken in his Geneva conversation with Stresemann. Appearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Sejm on January 4, 1927, he warned that the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles—particularly those relating to Germany's disarmament—ought to be respected, and decried all tendencies to differentiate between the pacification in the West and the East as contrary to the spirit of peace, the problem of European security being indivisible.[53] In a speech delivered on January 9, he expressed Poland's fervent desire for an improvement in Polish-German relations, but not at the price of a revision of the frontiers, and denounced, at the same time, the violent German revisionist campaign as contrary to Article 10 of the Covenant of the League and a danger to peace.[54] Stresemann rejected at once these imputations, pointing out that the German stand on the question of the Polish frontiers had been well known and needed no propaganda, and that this "clear and unalterable item of German policy was in no sense a violation of the Covenant," since its Article 19 envisaged a modification of treaties.[55]

The prospect for a German-Polish understanding became remoter than ever when, at the end of January, a new German cabinet was formed which included, in spite of Stresemann's opposition,[56] two Nationalists. Two weeks later, Germany interrupted the economic negotiations with Poland: a clear indication of a more intransigent German attitude. The Stresemann-Zaleski conversation at Geneva on March 9[57] failed to break the deadlock. Adding fuel to the flame, the German Nationalists unleashed a vituperative anti-Polish campaign, culminating in an *Ostmark* meeting at Beuthen on the Polish border in Upper Silesia, on May 1, at which the Nationalist Vice-Chancellor Hergt, recalling the "broadly conceived Eastern border policy" of Frederick the Great, declared that the new Cabinet had embroidered the Eastern border policy on its banner, comprising some scheme of colonization and the transfer of peasants from West to East—"blood transfusion," as he called it. The meeting passed a resolution dismissing "an Eastern Locarno" as out of the question, and calling on the Government "to meet unjustified Polish demands with German pride and German dignity."[58] This provoked a storm of protest in Poland, prompting Stresemann to alleviate publicly the impression made by his colleague.[59]

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[53] August Zaleski, *Przemowy i deklaracje* (Warsaw, 1929), 46f.

[54] *Ibid.*, 61-62. Zaleski termed as "senseless" projects for providing Poland with an access to the sea through Lithuania in exchange for the Polish Corridor. *Ibid.*, 62. "At no price" would Poland cede "a bit of Pomeranian or Silesian soil." *Ibid.*, 61.

[55] *Vermächtnis*, III, 227-29.

[56] *Ibid.*, 90ff.

[57] *AA*, 1427/2945H/572699-702, 572752-53.

[58] *Vermächtnis*, III, 230; *The Times*, May 3, 1927.

At the September meeting of the League, Poland confronted Germany with an "unexpected" proposal that the League outlaw war in any form. Germany detected in this proposal a scheme to establish a so-called Eastern Locarno that would directly or indirectly guarantee the status quo in the East, and she would have none of it.[60] Nor would Great Britain and France do anything to spoil the spirit of Locarno. Chamberlain assured Stresemann "That he would not admit any proposal that placed him and [Stresemann] in opposing camps, and that to him the collaboration of the Locarno Powers was of more value than all the resolutions of the League."[61] Briand "also adopted the attitude that under no circumstances would he agree to an extension of the Locarno treaties to Eastern Europe. . . ."[62] At one press conference Stresemann approvingly quoted *Écho de Paris* to the effect that "the Poles, out of sheer clumsiness, have spoiled the delightful atmosphere prevailing at Geneva," and at another he asserted that the Polish proposal aimed at "stultifying the Locarno treaty;" by accepting it the foreign ministers of the Great Locarno Powers would "belie" their own attitude, for they had declared "repeatedly and recently, and independently of each other, that, in their conviction, every needed and possible security for peace had been provided for the East as well." They could not undertake any amplification of their agreements.[63]

The opposition of the Great Powers to the original version of the Polish proposal forced Poland to eliminate the clause, calling on the member states of the League to conclude nonaggression pacts that would in effect establish Eastern Locarno. The modified Polish resolution, adopted unanimously by the Assembly, prohibited all wars of aggression and stipulated that "every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes of every description which may arise between States."[64] The intention of Poland was in fact "nullified," and Stresemann thought that Germany might "be well content with the outcome of the dispute. The collaboration between the Great Locarno Powers has proved steady and secure. The rather too flamboyant Polish methods ended in a defeat greatly injuring Poland's prestige."[65]

With the termination of the contest at Geneva, some amelioration in German-Polish relations set in, rendering possible the resumption of the trade negotiations. Seeing that "the tariff war, and therewith the prospect of compelling Poland to make economic concessions, had been thwarted by

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[59] *Vermächtnis,* III, 231; also 170-80.

[60] Chicherin told Rantzau that he saw in the Polish plan a "further step to the formation of a united front against the Soviet Union . . . the whole Polish proposal was nothing but a maneuver to isolate the Soviet Union." *AA,* 1427/2945H/573045-46.

[61] *Vermächtnis,* III, 195. Stresemann to Chancellor Marx, September 21, 1927. Also *AA,* 1427/2945H/573028-29. Stresemann's minute. September 6.

[62] *Vermächtnis,* III, 195.

[63] *Ibid.,* 177. September 6; 179f. September 8.

[64] *Ibid.,* 187; League of Nations, *Official Journal, Special Supplement,* No. 54 (Geneva, 1927), 155.

[65] *Vermächtnis,* III, 195-196. Stresemann to Marx, September 21, 1927. On another occasion he wrote: "All these proceedings by Poland, so ill prepared, and merely intended to create an atmosphere, were not suited to succeed, revealing in a manner very disagreeable to Poland her dependence on the Greart Powers." *Ibid.,* 211.

the English coal strike and the ensuing economic boom in Poland,"[66] and that, as a result, "the position of Poland had grown somewhat stronger," and, in consequence, "an interest is taken" in her and "bets are no longer made, as they used to be, on how long the Polish State would endure,"[67] Stresemann, at one with the industrial interests he represented, reverted to his original position of 1925—that it was desirable to bring the tariff war to an end. After all, he wrote, Poland comprised "that part of the former Russia which had been one of Germany's best customers and which, in view of Germany's present economic position, still has a great absorptive capacity for our exports." Moreover, "the termination of the tariff war is likewise desirable from the standpoint of foreign policy, better than insisting that whatever the course of events we must see in the Poles the sworn enemies of Germany, waiting only until they are strengthened to proceed against us with all means at their disposal."[68]

But it was "not easy to get German-Polish trade negotiations started again." Berlin tied them up with the thorny domicile question, insisting that "there must be no more expulsions from Poland" until agreement had been reached on that question. Poland agreed to this, after having argued that "the right of domicile was not a matter to be dealt with in such a treaty." Stresemann felt that Poland very likely was constrained to yield in this matter because, while negotiating for further advances—the first loan for the Polish reconstruction not being sufficient—she "had been advised, and possibly even told, that she must get into reasonable relations with Germany, so that the impression does not arise abroad that she still find herself in a tariff war" with that country.[69]

Yet Poland's goodwill proved of no avail. What stood in the way of progress of the trade negotiations was "the conflict of interests prevailing in Germany:"[70] German agriculture "in its temporary but extreme distress"[71] feared "the competition of Polish agrarian products, while industry could not give up a market worth 500 million marks. The Government, itself, for reasons of reparations policy, was to a certain extent interested in the conclusion of a treaty. As a way out of this deadlock, the possibility had suggested itself of concluding a short-term commercial treaty which might serve as a *modus vivendi* until the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty."[72] Such a *modus vivendi* Stresemann negotiated in November with a special Polish plenipotentiary, Jackowski, who assured him over and over of Piłsudski's strong desire for an agreement with Germany.[73] Although the agreement they finally reached took into consideration the interests of German agriculture, it ran into strong opposition in Germany and the Cabinet was divided on the issue. Streseman threatened to resign if "the Cabinet preferred the dilatory to a prompt treatment" of this matter, and if the negotiations for the definitive trade treaty did not start at once and were not pressed forward; for he would consider it beneath him "to stultify the negotiations *de facto,* while pretending to be aiming at a result."[74] Yet the ensuing negotiations led nowhere, Stresemann "deploring" the fact that "the catastrophic economic situation in East Prussia" provided Germany with "such a poor basis for negotiations." At the same time, he acknowledged that "Herr Zaleski has, in all these negotiations, labored for a German-Polish understanding."[75]

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[66] *Ibid.*, 247.

[67] *Ibid.*, 244.

[68] *Ibid.* This was also the view of Reichswirtschaftsminister Curtius. *AA*, 1427/2945H/572806-36. Curtius' memorandum for Stresemann, May 5, 1927.

[69] *Vermächtnis*, III, 243f.

[70] *Ibid.*, 247.

[71] *Ibid.*, 236. Stresemann to Marx, November 24, 1927. The Minister of Agriculture Schiele led the opposition to a trade treaty with Poland. *AA*, 1427/2945H/572955-3001.

[72] *Vermächtnis*, III, 247-248.

[73] *Ibid.*, 231-234. Stresemann's notes on a conversation with Jackowski, November 17, 1927.

It is probable that Poland's resolute quest for an accommodation with Germany was to some extent actuated by the fact that the Polish-Lithuanian conflict was fast reaching a climax. Berlin and Moscow were in "constant consultation over the conflict,"[76] straining every nerve to prevent an explosion. At the instance of Chicherin, the German minister in Kaunas was instructed to join his Soviet colleague in urging Waldemaras to end the state of war with Poland.[77] But the stubborn Lithuanian dictator remained impervious to all persuasion and pressure. On the eve of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute being brought up before the Council of the League, Litvinov visited Berlin for the purpose of coordinating the policies of the two powers (November 25, 1927).[78] Stresemann also saw Waldemaras, strongly urging him to moderation.[79] It should be noted in digression that in the West, this conflict had given further impulse to schemes for resolving, at the same time, the Corridor problem, by way of compensating Poland with Memel for the loss of Danzig.[80] To bring matters to a head, Piłsudski made a dramatic appearance at the December League Council meeting. Finally,

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[74] *Ibid.,* 237-238. Stresemann to Marx, November 24.

[75] *Ibid.,* 243-244. December 19, 1927.

[76] Hilger, 154.

[77] *AA,* 1427/2945H/573281; also 573248-50, 573330-33. However, on November 3 Stresemann informed Hoesch (Paris): "It is clear that a final solution to the Vilna question in Poland's favor goes in a high degree against our interests. A solution in favor of Lithuania cannot be carried through under the present circumstances. In this situation the further suspension of a settlement is still the best for us." *Ibid.,* 573183.

[78] *Vermächtnis,* III, 239.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] Eg. A. François-Poncet confided to Pelet-Narbonne at the beginning of November 1927 that "the Polish Corridor was impossible in the long run" and that later there must be found an access to the sea for Poland "by way of Memel or north of it through Lithuania." "Nachlass," 3149/7348/165165. Among the Stresemann papers is also to be found a report by Carl A. René, consul of Guatemala in Stettin, on his interview with Poincaré on April 4, 1927, during which the latter allegedly said that the "Corridor" was an "absurdity," yet the Poles had to obtain a good harbor and that of Memel—the Poles had been stressing—was not ice-free; Paris would welcome with particular pleasure a concord between Germany and Poland. *Ibid.,* 7141/149843-44. Dufour-Feronce's report on his conversation with Selby at Geneva on September 17, 1928, attests to the fact that some Western diplomats still continued to entertain the idea of the exchange of the Polish Corridor for a corridor through Lithuania. *Ibid.,* 7349/165428-30.

[81] *AA,* 1428/2945H/573417-19; "Nachlass," 3173/7372/166829ff. Stresemann's notes on a secret Council meeting on December 10, 1927.

[82] *Ibid.,* 3173/7372/166916.

Waldemaras was constrained to agree to the resumption of direct negotiations with Poland,[81] but this proved to be a spurious gesture.

The Geneva visit afforded Stresemann the first and only opportunity of meeting the Polish dictator. Stresemann was struck by Piłsudski's "extraordinarily friendly and meet-half-way manner" in his conversations with the statesmen at Geneva. "One did not carry away at all the impression that he was a man who would bang the table with a saber."[82] At a lunch with Chamberlain, Briand, Scialoja and Stresemann, he "never ceased talking . . . behaving like an overgrown schoolboy, roaring with laughter at his own jokes and talking down everybody else."[83] He particularly tried to charm and win over Stresemann, reminiscing of the time when he had fought on the German side, praising the German armies—to the amazement of Chamberlain and Briand[84]—for having performed "heroic deeds such as the world had never yet seen," and assuring the German foreign minister that he entertained no animosity toward Germany for having been imprisoned at Magdeburg, since the Germans had been fully justified in taking that measure. His talk lost itself in inquiries about a certain Captain Pflugradt, whom he considered an excellent man, but of whom Stresemann had never heard before.[85]

When later the two statesmen were closeted together for an hour and a quarter, the conversation again "zigzagged, as the Marshal talked a great deal, strewing anecdotes and reminiscences . . ." "I have full understanding," said he, "of the difficult position in which Germany finds itself and I should like to live in good relations with Germany." He scoffed at Stresemann's question concerning Polish wishes to annex East Prussia: "there might be five or six fools who talked of such a thing, but for them the government could not be responsible." "What would we do with East Prussia?" he asked. "We do not need it."[86] Poland "could not stand any further expansion, being already oversatiated with minorities." She wished for good relations with Germany, "as she needed loans and economic assistance." He showed "an understanding for the German view that the Germans still living in the Corridor ought to remain there" so as not to contribute to a further overpopulation of Germany, and expressed readiness to negotiate a settlement of the right of domicile and similar political questions,[87] emphasizing that he strove to do away "with all disputes with Germany as quickly as possible and without strong bureaucratic influence."[88] "The *Geheimräte*" (privy councillors), he sneered, "would waste away many years with this." But "we can settle the whole thing in six months.

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[83] Sir Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain* (2 vols., London, 1939-40), II, 320. Yet Chamberlain added: "But he is a dangerous individual. Briand tells me that he had got his mobilization orders in his pocket and that he actually showed them to Briand."

[84] *AA,* 1428/294H/573408. Stresemann's note of December 9.

[85] *Ibid.;* "Nachlass," 3173/7372/166917; also Petrie, II, 320.

[86] *AA,* 1428/2945H/573408-09; Nachlass," 3173/7372/166868-69. Dirksen's minutes of a confidential meeting at Königsberg between Stresemann and East Prussian dignitaries on December 16, 1927.

[87] *Ibid.; AA,* 1428/2945H/573409-10.

[88] "Nachlass," 3173/7372/166916.

Let us begin in a given moment, and let us come to a result!"[89] Stresemann promised to lay the Marshal's proposal before the German government; for his part, he also "would greatly welcome it if we soon arrived at an understanding." All in all, Piłsudski impressed him as "a gifted soldier" with "a particularly friendly feeling toward Germany, who appeared to have an honest intention to come somehow to an understanding with us."[90] Three days later Zaleski called on Stresemann and, learning that the latter was to make a journey to East Prussia, remarked that if the East Prussians wished to establish better communications with Poland, he was ready to do everything in his power to bring this about. Also a *modus vivendi* in trade relations was most desirable, as it would facilitate the conclusion of a commercial treaty.[91]

The day before (December 11) Stresemann had had a long conversation with Briand, during which the latter brought up the question of "Eastern Locarno." Stresemann did not see any possibility of concluding a new treaty with Poland without the frontier issue having been settled. Thereupon Briand asked him whether he had talked with Piłsudski about this. To which Stresemann replied that he had not; "I saw Piłsudski," said he, "for the first time in my life yesterday and discussed some delicate questions with him, but I could not speak about a change of frontiers at our first meeting." Briand expressed a regret, since he was sure that Stresemann would have found Piłsudski more accommodating in all German-Polish questions than he had perhaps thought. However, Stresemann hoped to find an opportunity to discuss this question with the Marshal before March, and intimated that Germany would be willing to compensate Poland with a free port in Danzig, and perhaps in Memel. Briand "was very enthusiastic about the idea that eventually such a solution would be possible. He said that peace would then be secured in Europe and uttered not a word of criticism against the idea of a change of frontiers."[92]

Stresemann also discussed this subject "quite openly" with Chamberlain, who, however, in contrast to Briand, did not evince any "particular interest in these matters, but . . . if Poland and Germany came to an agreement he would welcome that."[93] He explained Briand's policy, saying that Briand expected a strong shift to the Left in the forthcoming French elections, and, as a result, "a demand for a significant reduction of the [French] army." For this, however, security treaties were necessary, and, that being the case, Briand was exploring the possibilities of a non-aggression pact which would include the Baltic states, Poland and Rumania.[94] It would be very desirable, said Chamberlain, if it were possible by the settlement of the frontier question, "to straigthen out the precarious relations between Germany and Poland." Only Piłsudski could solve these difficulties. Once the eastern questions were settled, peace would be really established in Europe, and "then Mussolini will do nothing serious."[95] "But England could not be taken into account, and he could give no further guarantee."[96]

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[89] *AA,* 1428/2945H/573410. According to Józef Beck, who accompanied Piłsudski to Geneva, the Polish statesman averred that nine years of bad relations between Germany and Poland and of German aggressive policy did not result in Poland's suffering any losses, while "Germany not only did not gain anything but actually greatly injured her interests before the tribunal of nations. Is it then worthwhile to continue?" he asked. Stresemann did not give a direct answer, quipping only that the *Geheimräte* were responsible." Joseph Beck, *Dernier rapport:politique polonaise, 1926-1939* (Neuchatel, 1051), 4f. No trace of this is to be found in Stresemann's minute of the conversation.

[90] *AA,* 1428/2945H/573410. Apparently Stresemann retained this opinion of Piłsudski to the end, for on May 10, 1929, he told Litvinov that Piłsudski had made a good impression on him in December 1927. *AA,* 2320/4562H/E160073.

[91] *AA,* 1428/2945H/573436-37. Stresemann's note, December 12, 1927.

[92] *Ibid* 573425-27. Stresemann's note, December 11. Stresemann also noted that when the German legal expert Gaus had told his French counterpart Fromageot, thinking "of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, that things in the East must be settled," the latter replied to the former's amazement that "the frontier question between Germany and Poland must be solved. But do not rush the matter: these things need time. Thereupon Herr Gaus said astonished and delighted: 'I had no intention at all to ask you about this, but it interests me very much to hear your opinion concerning this.'"

Fortune certainly smiled on Stresemann at this Geneva meeting. The success of the conversations, particularly with Briand,[97] surpassed his expectations. He left Geneva determined that "The whole problem will certainly have to be opened one day." He was convinced that "We can do this only in conjunction with the Western Powers," acknowledging "that contact with Russia is also essential for that." "We are," he wrote, "in the closest touch with her on the other problems of Eastern Europe, because it has been realized in Moscow and Berlin that our interests coincide. Our position in the League does not hinder us in this."[98]

From Geneva Stresemann hastened to Königsberg, where, on December 16, he addressed a closed meeting of twenty-seven responsible representatives of East Prussian opinion essaying to alleviate their grave apprehensions concerning his policy. In a remarkably frank talk he first reported on his conversations with Piłsudski and Zaleski at Geneva and on the state of trade negotiations with Poland. Then he reiterated that an Eastern Locarno implying a guarantee of the Polish frontiers "was not to be feared;" it was even "not expected" of Germany. "When at the last session of the League in September . . . the Poles made a proposal that aimed at this result, they had to give way very quickly to the extremely energetic pressure, especially from the English government." Yet people had to realize that "the removal of the Corridor by war was imposible," as Germany "had not the power" to wage such a war. "The question must therefore be considered whether it might be possible to recover the Corridor by peaceful means, and it was a question that concerned all Europe." The only such possibility was in continuing the policy of Locarno, of Berlin's close association with London and Paris. England was "possessed by an ardent need of peace, sustained by the difficult social and economic conditions of the country and the fear of a further undermining by Bolshevism. After the experiences with the shipping of English troops to China, it would be impossible for England to send troops abroad for a foreseeable period of time."

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[93] *Vermächtnis,* III, 245. It is probable that Chamberlain was quite tired of Stresemann's insistence for more and more concessions. Already in March 1926, at Geneva he "had lectured the Germans, saying 'Whenever we make a concession to you, instead of acknowledging it you ask for more.' Briand at once interjected, 'By no means a bad system.' " D'Abernon, 240.

[94] *AA,* 1428/2945H/573432-33. Stresemann's note, December 12.

[95] *Ibid.,* 573434-35; *Vermächtnis,* III, 245.

[96] *Ibid.*

[97] On December 22, 1927, Ambassador Hoesch told Briand how pleased Stresemann had been with the results of his conversation with Briand. *AA,* 1428/2945H/573452-53.

[98] *Vermächtnis,* III, 246.

He underlined therefore that there remained nothing else for Germany to do but to strengthen her relations with France. "France must first of all rid herself of the fear of the German threat, then recognize the untenability of the frontiers as drawn at present, and finally consent to their modification in return for certain financial equivalents from us. We had even now gotten so far that leading French politicians were raising no objections to a statement of the impossibility of the existing frontiers. The usual earlier objection of the sanctity of the existing treaties was raised no more. Nobody can say when this development would reach the point at which a modification of the frontiers would become possible. At any rate there were the preliminary conditions: the evacuation of the Rhineland, the removal of the fear of *Anschluss,* and the disappearance of the anxiety of a German attack on Poland. The German Locarno policy had also sprung from this train of thought. *Our Western policy rests upon and proceeds from our Eastern policy." "The cooperation with France* must begin in the intellectual field and then extend to the political field. The Lithuanian question provided an example of such a cooperation."

But if the German demands for the modification for the existing German-Polish frontier were to be maintained, it was necessary that the Germans living in Poland remain there. "A further flight of our countrymen from Poland would weaken our claims." This also applied to Upper Silesia, and the German standpoint with regard to Poland's desire to export fixed quantities of coal to Germany would be determined by this question. Thus it would be short-sighted for the press to attack the government for admitting "Polish" coal. Taking issue with an article in the *Ostpreussische Zeitung* which had demanded *greater energy* from the government in their negotiations with Poland, he retorted that "with energy not much would be achieved in such negotiations." In the same way he dealt with other critics: "There must be aim and method in any activity." "In 1813 Prussia staked everything on the one Russian card. But Versailles is worse than Tilsit. The present equivalent of the 42,000 man army which Prussia was permitted at that time would be 400,000. Furthermore, Russian armies in general have no offensive force. A Russian army that entered the Reich as an ally would at best try to Bolshevize Germany. And what other combination is conceivable? Surely not Italy!" So it remained only for Germany, he concluded, "to file off the fetters" of Versailles. "The others would be forced by their own interest to cooperate; we must buy eventual compensations from them. It is nonsense to speak of non-forthcoming Locarno results." The withdrawal of the Control Commission and the impending evacuation of the Rhineland attested to the contrary. "The further German demands must be wrested from the other Powers peacefully and step by step."[99]

When Stresemann was saying this he had already some reasons to believe that Warsaw was not as adamantly set against any territorial concessions as it sounded. The German Ambassador at Ankara, Nadolny, had reported on November 2 that his Polish colleague Kowalski had confided to him, after returning from Warsaw where he had had an audience with Piłsudski, that the Marshal had set his heart upon an understanding with Germany, and even though "the Corridor question was not easy to solve," still he believed that "surely one could also come to an agreement over it. Relata refero."[100] This tended to support Briand's intimation. And just before he had left for Königsberg, Stresemann had been informed that at a "recent" dinner party at the British Embassy, Countess Potocka had said "that Piłsudski was more interested in Memel than in Danzig."[101] To be sure these unequivocal hints did not necessarily imply that Piłsudski was prepared to return the whole Corridor to Germany, but that apparently he did not reject the idea of making certain territorial cessions if thereby a lasting agreement could be reached with Berlin and compensations obtained elsewhere. On December 22, 1927, Briand repeated to the German ambassador that he was convinced Germany could come to some terms with Piłsudski. He himself had been "surprised how far Piłsudski went in his desire for an understanding with Germany, which was the more interesting as Piłsudski also possessed the power to carry through far-reaching settlements."[102]

The Polish dictator followed up his Geneva meeting with Stresemann by sending, in March 1928, Prince Michał Radziwiłł to Cap Martin on the French Riviera, where the German Foreign Minister was convalescing. The emissary ran over the recital, fast becoming common, that Piłsudski desired an understanding with Germany. The difficulty in Poland's relations with France, he added, lay in the fact "that the French might place a greater value of their relations with a future Russia" than with Poland; "this fear would disappear if Germany and Poland could stand in equally good relationship with France." Then he asked Stresemann what "in his view, was

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[99] *AA*, 2339/4569H/E169061-69; "Nachlass," 3173/7372/166866-73. Dirksen's minutes; the most important excerpts omitted in the abbreviated version in *Vermächtnis*, III, 247-49.

[100] "Nachlass," 3172/7370/166562. Nadolny suggested in the same letter to Stresemann a solution to Germany's eastern problem by way of a German-Polish-Russian understanding which would "guarantee Poland its existence" and "reasonable frontiers:" the old German frontier would be reestablished and Poland would be compensated at the expense of the Baltic States, obtaining an access to the Gulf of Riga; this would bring Poland closer to Germany economically.

[101] *Vermächtnis*, III, 246.

[102] *AA*, 1428/2945H/573454. Hoesch to Stresemann (strictly confidential—for the Reichsminister only). On February 5, 1928, Hoesch discussed once more the eastern frontier question with Berthelot, who "again deplored most fervently the lamentable settlement in the peace treaty and thought that a solution must absolutely be found some time which would finally do away with the justified German dissatisfaction with the frontier settlement. At the same time he anew mentioned fleetingly Lithuania and the Memel region." In conclusion Berthelot remarked that he had "followed with satisfaction the skillful policy of the Reichsminister to establish tolerable relations with Poland. This appeared to him also the best way to the solution of the great unsettled questions between Germany and Poland. The perspectives for this were at present perhaps not wholly unfavorable." *Ibid.*, 573481-82. Hoesch to Stresemann.

still indispensable to pacify German public opinion, and what was to be done to make possible the settlement of all mutual territorial claims, as had been the case in the pre-war time between the former imperial Russia and the German Reich;" what he had in mind was a lasting settlement. Stresemann answered that "he could not come before his country with completely empty hands, and that now was the last and best moment to reach an integral agreement with Poland." He specified possible territorial modifications, but Radziwiłł "thought them premature." The Pole asked, however, "whether such concessions as might be made could eventually be compensated by great gains in the East, especially by newly created outlets for us to the sea." To this the attitude of the Minister, "from the standpoint of posible German objections, was not negative in principle. At the same time, he traced out broad horizons of a benevolent financial help of Germany for Poland." He also proposed a meeting with Piłsudski in a neutral place soon after the German elections.[103]

But the proposed meeting never took place. It is more than doubtful that Piłsudski could impose on his countrymen any cession of territory. At any rate, he could not possibly meet German demands. Consequently, in the summer of 1928 he made an attempt to get closer to the Italian-Hungarian constellation. And at the same time, as Rauscher reported, he spared no efforts to obtain new assurances from France in conection with the evacuation of the Rhineland.[104]

Having failed to set on foot direct negotiations with Piłsudski on the territorial issue, Stresemann decided to bring presure to bear on Poland through the League of Nations by exploiting the minority question. After all he had been actuated by this possibility in pressing for Germany's accession to the League in the first place. For while Poland was bound by the minority provisions of the treaties, Germany was not, and thus could easily turn to account this advantage. She could always regulate at will the flow of complaints from the German minority in Poland to the League. And now, in 1928, that body began to be veritably "inundated" by the ever increasing stream of German complaints and petitions.[105]

This prompted Zaleski to declare at the League Council session of December 15, 1928, that, in addressing "groundless or insignificant" complaints to the League, "the petitioners' object is not so much to satisfy the wishes of the minority as to persuade world opinion that the rights of the German minority are disregarded. . . . The conflict between the nationalities in Polish Upper Silesia would not exist if the *Volksbund* [a German organization in Silesia] were to abstain from constantly stirring up men's minds against the present status of the country, from creating political agitation and even engaging in subversive activities. . . . in flagrant contradiction to the spirit of the Geneva Convention." This activity was "absolutely intolerable," since it not only sought "to sap the authority of the Polish Government . . . but [was] calculated, if tolerated, to become a real danger to peace."[106]

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[103] "Nachlass," 3149/7348/165204-05. A copy of Radziwiłł's memorandum to Piłsudski on his conversations with Stresemann, sent the latter on March 12, 1928.

[104] "Nachlass," 3116/7150/151288-89. Rauscher to Stresemann, July 13, 1928. Rauscher laughed at the Polish "Operettenpläne" for new combinations in Central Europe. The Germans did their best to foil Zaleski's efforts in the West, *AA,* 1428/2945H/573639. Schubert to Sir Ronald Lindsay, June 18, 1928.

[105] F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (2 vols., London, 1952), I, 157-158, and esp. 406-408; Dirksen, 72-75; A., Thimme, "Gustav Stresemann: Legende und Wirklichkeit," *Historische Zeitschrift,* CLXXXI, 2 (April, 1956), 324ff.; Henry L. Bretton, *Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles* (Stanford, 1953), 126ff.

Stresemann became so agitated that he slammed his fist down on the Council table[107] and demanded to know since "when the minorities will no longer be allowed to exercise their right to form associations and to bring petitions before the Council . . ." He then observed that "sometimes high treason and love of the old country are very closely akin," making an obvious reference to the career of Piłsudski. Were the League to endorse Zaleski's opinion and "were it to cease dealing with the rights of minorities, it would be losing one of the reasons for its existence and would cease to represent for some states the ideal which induced them to join it."[108]

At the next session of the Council, on March 6, 1929, Stresemann pressed for the alteration of the procedural rules of the Committe of Three on Minority Questions so that no nation, because of its being ethnically related to a complaining minority group, would be excluded from the Committee's hearings. He insisted that "the interest taken by a country in the minorities of another country, an interest which may take the form of an appeal to the guaranty of the League of Nations, cannot be regarded as an inadmissible political interference with the domestic affairs of a foreign power.':' He contended that German sponsorship of minority rights would not be in contradiction to the League's principles, even if this sponsorship were to lead to irredentist movements. "Frankly," he avowed, "I do not think that we have in the present century established a state of affairs which is eternal, and that idea is very clearly expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations."[109] Observing that "finality was not human," he indicated only too clearly that irredentism was to lead to territorial revision. But this disclosure was his undoing. The Western imperial powers, even so sympathetic to German territorial claims in the East as England, could not possibly approve such a means to attain that end. Sir Austen Chamberlain warned at once that "to cite Article 19 [of the Covenant] in connection with the minority treaties can only make trouble. . . . The Council will . . . continue to do all that it can to protect the rights guaranteed to the minorities. . . . but it will expect [them] . . . to come to it with clean hands, able to show that they have behaved loyally to the country of which they are a part and have borne true allegiance to the government to which they are subject."[110]

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[106] League of Nations, *Official Journal, Council,* X (January 1929), 68f.

[107] This act brought forth a flood of congratulatory telegrams from Germany. 'Nachlass."

[108] League of Nations, *op. cit.,* 70.

[109] *Ibid.* (April 1929), 520-522.

[110] *Ibid.,* 526.

But Stresemann would not give up. A week later he wrote to his closest political friend Kahl: "I feel that I am obliged to remain in office . . . until the last phase of the minority question has been fought out. I would consider myself a deserter, if I were to drop the question, which I have introduced before the world, or if I were to leave it to my successor."[111] At the June meeting of the Council, he opposed the recommendations of the Committe of Three for the improvement of procedure in minority cases, especially the suggestion that the inclusion of a country like Germany in the committee "was contrary to the idea of equality, which should underlie all work performed by the League."[112] He also objected to the creation of a permanent committee on minorities, suspecting that it would tend to supervise them. In his last appearance before the League Assembly on September 9, he proposed that a special organization be set up to deal with minority questions, similar to those in charge of economic questions and colonial mandates.[113] It was clear, of course, that Germany would become a member of such an organization. But again the League was not ready to accept his proposal.

These were the last efforts of a dying man. But even had they not been cut short by his death, it is very doubtful whether he eventually would have contrived—had he lived longer—to turn the League into an instrument with which to strike at Poland. After all, in the last analysis, the League had been designed to preserve and not to destroy the order established by the same treaty to which it owed its life. It is not easy to pass judgment on Stresemann's policy. For all its ingenuity of conception and adroitness of execution, and granting its large measure of success in winning over Western public opinion to the view that the territorial status quo in the East was untenable and ought to be corrected in Germany's favor if a lasting peace were to be secured, the question still remains whether at the time of Stresemann's death Germany was nearer to attaining the paramount objective of his policy—the regaining of the lost Eastern territories—than she had been when he assumed office; whether that objective was in fact attainable by peaceful means. Admittedly, his was a long-range policy, not expected to bear fruit in five or perhaps even in ten years. Yet none the less, it is difficult to see how it could result—if pursued to its logical end—in a pacification of Europe rather than in an explosion shaking the old continent to its very foundations. For to assume that Poland would ever succumb to German demands without fighting, even if Germany had succeeded in winning the diplomatic backing of the West, was to fatally mistake the temper of the new Poland.

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[111] *Vermächtnis,* III, 438.

[112] League of Nations, *Official Journal, Council,* X, Special Supplement, No. 74 (June 11, 1929), 29; Bretton, 134f.

[113] League of Nations, *Official Journal, Assembly,* X, Special Supplement, No. 75 (September 9, 1929), 69f.

THE KÁDÁR-REGIME CHARGES YUGOSLAVIA
with
"CONSPIRACY" AND "INTERFERENCE IN HUNGARY'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS"

by János Mészáros

ON JUNE 17, 1958, Budapest and Moscow announced simultaneously the execution of former Hungarian premier Imre Nagy and his associates, and the other "sentences" of the alleged Nagy-"process."[1] It has generally been assumed that the publication of the judicial murder on the fifth anniversary of the popular upheaval in East Berlin was intended not only as an intimidation of the still resisting forces of the Hungarian people, but also as a warning for Poland's Gomulka and Yugoslavia's President Tito. This latter aspect of the Nagy case can be studied further in the exchange of notes between Belgrade and Budapest following the execution of Nagy.

In a sharply worded note delivered to the Hungarian government on June 24, 1958, the Yugoslav government referred both to the "exchange of letters between the governments of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Hungarian People's Republic of November 18 and 21, 1956," in which "agreement was reached on the solution of the question of asylum of Imre Nagy and other persons," and also to the exchange of notes of the two governments of November 24 and December 1, 1956. In this last mentioned note the Kádár regime re-affirmed its former position according to which "it was prepared to guarantee the personal security of the mentioned persons, and declared that it did not intend to apply any punishments for their past activities."

Hence, in the words of the Yugoslav note of June 23,

> it is obvious that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has on two occasions harshly offended the obligations it gave to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia: by not making possible the free return of Imre Nagy and other persons to their homes, but instead sending them to the Romanian People's Republic for a compulsory stay; and by the fact that, contrary to the given guarantees of personal security and impunity regarding their past actions, it brought some of these persons to a secret trial, and sentenced Nagy and some of his companions to death, which punishment was executed, whereby the fully valid agreement was broken beyond repair.[2]

After a delay of one month, the Kádár regime's reply was made public on July 23, 1958. To our knowledge, the note of Budapest, which is of about the same length as the original announcement of the executions on June 17, but goes considerably farther in its attack against Yugoslavia, has received no attention either in the English or in the American press;[3] neither was the note mentioned by *New Times,* Soviet weekly review of international events. On the other hand, the Red Chinese *Hsinhua* agency in its London Bulletin No. 223 of July 24, 1958, (p. 35) published a brief summary of the note. In reviewing the answer of the Kádár regime, it may also be recalled that with the exception of Poland, Hungary was the only country behind the Iron Curtain where the Pula-speech of Marshal Tito was published *in toto* in the fall of 1956. In this speech, delivered on November 11, 1956, (but published only four days later), Marshal Tito, although attacking the "Stalinist" clique in Moscow, nonetheless asserted that members of the Kádár regime "represent the most honest elements" in Hungary.[4] Claiming that the trial of Imre Nagy and his associates is

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[1] *Népszabadság* ("People's Freedom"—central organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), June 17, 1958, p. 3. For a complete English text, see: *New York Times,* June 18, 1958, p. 10.

[2] For a full English text of the Yugoslav note, see: *East Europe,* August 1958, pp. 55-56.

[3] *Le Monde* gave a short notice on July 24, 1958, p. 5.

> exclusively an internal affair of the Hungarian People's Republic in which the government of no foreign power including that of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia must interfere,

the Hungarian government, in its note of July 23, "vigorously rejects all such attempts as nonwarranted interference." Also, the Hungarian government "repudiates with deep indignation" the attempt of the Yugoslav note to connect the trial of Imre Nagy and his companions to the "tragic Rajk-case." In the words of the Hungarian note, this is a "gross calumniation of the Hungarian judicial authorities,' and

> the behavior of the Yugoslav government is the more scandalous, because it is generally known that in the case of Imre Nagy and his accomplices, the point of departure of the proceedings was based, before public opinion, on facts known to millions and millions of people; these proceedings revealed and the criminal procedure proved the deliberate conspiratory activity of this group.

After these introductory remarks, the Hungarian note deems it nonetheless necessary to state the following "facts":

1. With regard to the Yugoslav protest against the Hungarian statement that "certain groups of conspirators of the type of Imre Nagy sought asylum there whence they also earlier received support," the Hungarian note holds that

a. Milan Georgievic, former first secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest,

> who had been maintaining official ties with Miklós Vásárhelyi and Miklós Gimes[5] from spring 1955 on, asked the mentioned persons in the fall of the same year to transform their relationship into a secret connection of conspiracy.

Later on, Ferenc Jánosi[6] was also included in the plot. The Yugoslav secretary attended a series of secret meetings of the plotters, and received through the intermediacy of Gimes and Jánosi several articles written by Imre Nagy.

> These writings, concealed from the Hungarian authorities,[7] set forth in detail the political goal of Imre Nagy and his group: the overthrowing by violence of the regime, the alliance with the forces opposing the people's democracy, the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, and the passing of Hungary into the hands of the imperialists.

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[4] *New York Times,* November 16, 1956, pp. 1 and 14.

[5] The former sentenced to 5 years, the latter to death in the Nagy "process."

[6] Son-in-law of Imre Nagy, sentenced to 8 years.

[7] Imre Nagy sent most of his unpublished proposals and answers to the accusations of Rákosi, Gerö and Co. to the Central Committee of the party which, however, took care to conceal them from the public. See *Irodalmi Ujság* (organ of the Hungarian Writers' Association Abroad, published in London), August 15, 1958, pp. 2-3.

b. According to the Hungarian note, on five different occasions between October 23 and November 4, 1956, Géza Losonczy[8] negotiated at the Yugoslav Embassy with Dalibor Soldatic, then Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, and Osman Dikic, then councillor of the same Embassy. At these negotiations, Ambassador Soldatic asked for and received state secrets, thus interfering in Hungarian domestic affairs.

2. With regard to the sending of instructions by Imre Nagy, Géza Losonczy and others from the building of the Yugoslav Embassy in order to reorganize the illegal subversive activity, the Hungarian note cites:

a. the formation at the Embassy of an "Executive Committee" under the leadership of Imre Nagy on November 5, 1956. This Executive Committee

> held a series of negotiations with Ambassador Soldatic and other high ranking officials who had come for that purpose from Belgrade to Budapest. Through the intermediacy of members of the Yugoslav Embassy, this Committee sent instructions from the Embassy to the members of the group of conspirators in town [summoning them] to continue their counter-revolutionary attempts.

On behalf of Imre Nagy, documents smuggled out of the Yugoslav Embassy initiated the organization of the illegal "Hungarian Democratic Movement of Independence" aimed at the overthrowing of the régime, and the publication of the illegal paper *October Twenty-Third,* edited by Miklós Gimes, which summoned to strikes and further seditious activity.

b. On November 5, Géza Losonczy gave instructions by phone from the Embassy to Tivadar Pártay, former right-wing leader of the Independent Smallholders' Party to escape with other rightist politicians abroad, and to meet there the group of conspirators of Imre Nagy; they were to oppose jointly the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government.[9]

c. Through the intermediacy of Julius Djuca, correspondent of *Politika,* and Gavro Altmann, correspondent of *Borba* in Budapest, and with the help of the Embassy, the Nagy-group was in touch with "Radio Free Europe," and

d. with the counter-revolutionary workers' councils.

> e. Through the Yugoslav Embassy, Imre Nagy and his associates received informations concerning measures and plans of the lawful state organs aimed at the quelling of the counter-revolution, and, at the demand of the Embassy, elaborated a new political platform and tactical plan for the taking of power on November 14.

3. Even after Imre Nagy and his group had left the Embassy, subordinates of the Embassy, and the above mentioned two Yugoslav newspapermen continued to interfere in Hungarian domestic affairs, says the Hungarian note, quoting as an example of this interference the distribution of the Kardelj-speech of December 7, 1956, in the industrial plants

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[8] Member of the Nagy-cabinet during the October Revolution who "died" in prison according to the official statement of June 17.

[9] On November 5, 1956, the only legal and constitutional government was that of Imre Nagy which, naturally, had the right to conduct all kinds of negotiations, even if in asylum. The Soviet troops invaded Budapest without any previous warning; the night preceding the invasion both the Soviet High Command and the Soviet Embassy still were in negotiations with the Hungarian authorities, i.e. with the Nagy government. If there was a group of "conspirators," it was the Kádár-clique which did not even dare to show up in the Hungarian capital for several days after the Soviet troops had invaded Budapest.

Beloianis, MOM, April 4 Factory, Kelenföld Textile Enterprise, Steel Plant, and several plants in Csepel.

4. Refusing to admit the Yugoslav accusation of having violated "certain promises,"

a. the Hungarian note questions the right of the Embassy to give asylum to the Nagy group, saying:

> By the way, it is extremely characteristic how this group came to the Embassy. During the night of November 3 and 4, when responsible Yugoslav officials obtained knowledge on the basis of confidential informations [of the fact] that in the morning hours of November 4, the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government and the Soviet troops were going to launch a joint counter-offensive to crush the counter-revolution, Ambassador Soldatic called in person the leaders of the Imre Nagy group and, referring to the expressed wishes of Belgrade, summoned them to make immediate use of the right of asylum.

According to the Hungarian note, Ambassador Soldatic, Cultural Attaché Milovanov, and Assistant Military Attaché Jovo Vukmirovic took an active part in helping the associates of Imre Nagy to find an asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy. In the words of the note, this behavior has to be considered the more "grave," because on November 3,[10] the Yugoslav Embassy refused to give asylum "to progressive-minded, honest patriots whose life was in danger during the time of the white terror."

b. Also, in the opinion of the Hungarian note, "international law does not recognize the right of diplomatic missions to give asylum." Consequently,

> the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest was acting against international law, and was abusing its diplomatic privileges, obviously interfering in the domestic affairs of the receiving country, when it took under its protection the Imre Nagy group by granting it a so-called asylum.

c. With regard to the Worker-Peasant Government's promise of November 1956, the Hungarian note refers to the "Hungarian government's complete good faith," contrasting the latter with the Yugoslav attitude:

> However, the Yugoslav officials negotiating with the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, were already then completely aware of the real character of the activity of Imre Nagy and his group, but concealed it from the Hungarian government, thus trying to make believe that Imre Nagy and his associates were pushed into committing counter-revolutionary crimes by the events.

By "forcing" the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government to consent to the agreement, the Yugoslavs aimed at a twofold goal: they wanted,

> on the one hand, to prevent the facts of Yugoslav intervention from coming to light, and on the other hand, to exempt the Imre Nagy group from being called to account at a later date.

To develop further its *reservatio mentalis,* the note of the Kádár regime also claims that "the plotting organizing activity of Imre Nagy and his associates could have become only gradually known to the Hungarian penal and judicial organs," which

> could only step by step extend their investigation to the exploration of the antecedents and causes of the counter-revolution, and to the activity of the

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[10] There were no excesses or shooting at all in Budapest on that day.

> participants therein. During this process, however, it became necessary to expand the investigation as early as January 1957 also to certain persons, who, together with other persons not being called to account and not being held under criminal proceedings, had been at the Yugoslav Embassy between November 4 and 22. After a circumspect and careful investigation of the penal and judicial organs of the Hungarian People's Republic, the public prosecutor brought an accusation against Imre Nagy and his group on January 28, 1958. On the basis of the prosecutor's indictment, the first trial of the crime took place on February 6, 1958. On account of collecting supplemental evidence, the final session of the Supreme Court was held between June 9 and 15, and the known communiqué about the sentence delivered on June 15 was released by the Ministry of Justice of the Hungarian People's Republic on June 17. The real background of the public role of Imre Nagy and his associates before November 4, the seditious and conspiratory character of the antecedents thereof, and their attempts to continue their counter-revolutionary activities at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest had been revealed and proved in this trial by the court [*sic!*] which pronounced a just sentence.

5. Denying any connection between the Nagy case and the [then] present debate concerning the new party program of the Yugoslav communists, the Hungarian note also concludes that

> Hungaro-Yugoslav relations have been damaged not by the sentence of the Supreme Court, but by the behavior to be qualified as extraordinarily grave of those Yugoslav official personalities who, abusing the diplomatic privileges, repeatedly interfered in the internal affairs of the country.

Rejecting the idea of Yugoslav unselfishness in promoting the stabilization of the Hungarian situation as suggested by the Yugoslav note of June 23, the Hungarian note scorns the Yugoslav attitude, and ends with a reiterated "vigorous protest" against the interference in Hungary's domestic affairs, for:

> While namely the leaders of the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia openly manifested their friendship toward the Hungarian People's Republic and toward the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, at the same time persons endangering the public order of the Hungarian People's Republic received protection and assistance from Yugoslav officials. With this note [*i.e.* the Yugoslav note of June 23] they entered the service of the propaganda campaign led by the imperialists against the Hungarian People's Re public.

Conclusions:

Although the communist technique of the practical application of the theory of the "big lie" and the *a posteriori* introduction of mental reservations after an agreement had been broken can be comfortably studied in innumerable documents; nevertheless, the recent note of the Kádár-regime should not be simply dismissed as "propaganda for domestic consumption." Even the abbreviated summary of the note may be helpful in revealing the following trends and aspects of the policies of Moscow and its agents in Budapest:

1. In the Hungarian note of July 23, a belated effort has been made to reconstruct *a posteriori* the time-table of the "legal" procedure of the secret trial and execution of Imre Nagy and his associates. This may have

been motivated by the intention to counterbalance at least partially the shocking effect on public opinion caused by the communiqué of June 17.[11]

2. By tracing back the roots of the October Revolution of 1956 to an alleged conspiracy originated in 1955, a new effort has been made to prove the world that the Hungarian Revolution was not a spontaneous popular upheaval, nor was it prepared by the intellectual élite of the nation (after all, the latter sooner or later has to be regained for the construction of socialism): it was the devilish work of a handful of conspirators who succeeded in misleading part of the population.

3. The "misled" part of the population can be pardoned the more easily, for the present leaders of the "Worker and Peasant" government themselves had been misled and abused by the plotters for a long time. This effort to whitewash Kádár and consorts before public opinion is a very important aspect of the note, for the speeches of Kádár and Co. are well remembered both in Hungary and the Soviet Union: an even more thorough investigation could always expand the Nagy-conspiracy to the present rulers in Budapest, who are well aware of this potential threat increased by the behind-the-scene activity of the Rákosi-Gerö group sitting in Moscow.

4. The conspiracy against the Hungarian people and against socialism, of course, has been directed by the "Western imperialists." However, the note puts a far more emphatic stress on the role of Yugoslav diplomats and "other high ranking Yugoslav officials," who in all but name once more turned out to be the agents of the imperialists and the traitors to socialism. Under the surface of its almost ironically polite wording, the note *de facto* represents a complete reversal to the era of the Rajk and Kostov-trials.

5. From this point of view, the note may stimulate the Yugoslav government to reveal further details and documents concerning its role played before, during, and shortly after the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956. This role although extremely important seems to be far from unambiguous: publication of the documents of such secret negotiations, as with the Hungarian delegation led by Ernö Gerö in mid-October 1956 (both Kádár and Münnich were members of this delegation) as well as with Soviet and Hungarian officials during October-November 1956 would help to clarify the Yugoslav position which, in the opinion of Milovan Djilas, was pushed into impasse by Hungarian events.

6. Last but not least, the "interpretation" given by the Hungarian note to the relationship of international law and the right of political asylum, directly involves United States foreign policy, for Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty is still at the Legation in Budapest.

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[11] According to *Népszobadság,* August 16, 1958 (p. 2), in mid-August a new Hungarian "White Book" was published containing parts of the witnesses' testimonies on the trial and further "evidence of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy of Imre Nagy and his accomplices."

TWO DOCUMENTS
on the
IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN HUNGARY

1. *"Responsibility for the Teachers of Tomorrow."* On July 27, *Magyar Nemzet* ("Hungarian Nation"— organ of the "Patriotic People's Front") published (p. 3) under the title above an article dealing with "some of the experiences of the entrance examinations of the universities." The following excerpts are from this article.

> ". . . A considerable part of the students revealed a political ignorance which gives one cause to reflect. They were sixteen years old at the time of the outbreak of the counterrevolutionary revolt, they were eyewitnesses of the happenings, but there were only a few who could answer the questions concerning the character and causes of the events. It also became obvious that the youth held several erroneous views; one can even come across the effects of an alien ideology [*Weltanschauung*]. There were some who *"condemned"* the class struggle on the entrance examination and who were talking about a sort of universal *fraternity.*
>
> "The university does not expect political maturity, or a great degree of political orientation from young people of eighteen. But it expects that the high school shall lay adequate ideological foundations. The entrance examinations revealed *serious insufficiencies in ideological education.* During the instruction of history and Hungarian literature in the high schools—with a few exceptions—no adequate ideological conclusions are reached . . .
>
> ". . . The work of the instructors has always been determined by the thinking and polity of the ruling classes . . .
>
> ". . . The school of the workers' and peasants' state cannot be neutral in the struggle of ideologies either. It cannot send students to the universities who—according to the statement of the admission boards—"do not live in the present, and are not interested in the questions of the present." The university—and life—expect that the high school should train the students in addition to the transmission of factual knowledge, also a scientific way of thinking, and the ideology of socialism under construction.
>
> "The young people who will become teachers in five years, will be educating the builders of communism. They will be able to achieve this task only if *they herald the truths of the new society with heart and soul, and with full conviction . . ."*

* * *

2. *"To Promote Hungarian Politico-Economical Science."* This is the title of a highly critical editorial published by *Népszabadság* ("People's Freedom"—central organ of the Hngarian Socialist Workers' Party) on July 27, 1958 (p. 7.) The article, excerpts of which follow, deals with the work of the Institute of Politico-Economic Science (*Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet*) of the Hungarian Academy of Science. The Institute was founded in 1954.

> ". . . Despite the results [already] achieved *the Institute has not yet carried out its mission, it has not yet turned into a solid basis of Marxian politico-economical science.* This was in particular the case in the months preceding the counter-revolution, when the scientific views and political positions of the workers of the Institute were influenced by the views of Imre Nagy and Ferenc

Donáth (the latter was assistant-director of the Institute),[1] and by the positions of certain Yugoslav and Polish economists. Before the counter-revolution, the director of the Institute who held the position of Marxian-Leninism, and other communists could only partially counterbalance this influence. So it happened that in 1956, during the ideological preparation of the counter-revolution in addition to Donáth, also other leading and respected co-workers of the Institute, like Tamás Nagy, head of the department of general economics, and Ferenc Fekete, editor-in-chief of *Közgazdasági Szemle* ("Politico-Economical Review"), and others not only failed to oppose the demagogic criticism undermining the authority of the party at the debates of the Petöfi-Circle and other forums, but, through their attitude, they themselves gave support to the revisionist attacks directed against the party and against Marxism-Leninism . . .

". . . The impact of ideological confusion and of revisionist views was still to be felt in the Institute even in the months following the counter-revolution. In those months characterized by a sharp struggle against the remnants of the counter-revolution, and against the ideology of the counter-revolution, the great part of the co-workers of the Institute and of *Közgazdasági Szemle* supported with its passivity, vacillation or even active position the forces opposing the party, and the workers' power. E.g., the editorial of No. 11-12, 1956 of *Közgazdasági Szemle* (published in January 1957) essentially offered motives for the economic necessity of the counter-revolution. (By the way, it is characteristic that the article consistently talks about the "October-events" avoiding the word counter-revolution, thus beating about the bush.) The answer to the article criticizing the standpoint of the editorial board (Zsuzsa Esze: "The Essence of Socialist Relations of Production and the Economic Policy in Our Society." *Közgazdasági Szemle,* 1957, No. 4) tried to defend the previous position of the editorial board by lengthy "theoretical argumentation."

"The state of affairs within the Institute and the positions taken by its co-workers had, of course, an impact outside the Institute too, primarily upon the economists, but upon wider circles of the intelligentsia as well, and became an obstacle to consolidation.

"The clarification of ideas within the Institute was blocked for a long time by the fact that the communists loyal to the party and to Marxism were themselves not consistent enough, and, "defending the reputation of the Institute," stood on a common platform to the outside world with those wanting to disguise the faults of the Institute and of its co-workers. For a long time, some co-workers of the Institute arrived in their self-criticism at best at the point of admitting certain political errors of theirs, but denied the effort of the latter on their scientific activity. Obviously, this is an untenable position. The co-workers of the Institute comprised the Institute and the economists even if they did not represent revisionist and anti-Marxist views in their published works, but held revisionist positions or supported such views on various non-party forums. As is well-known, however, the point in question was not only this . . .

". . . for many months, the Institute and its co-workers tried to find all kinds of loopholes to evade the open and honest admission of their errors and the consequences of these errors . . .

". . . Recently—in particular since the party conference of June 1957—there has been a definite improvement in the work of the Institute . . .

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[1] Ferenc Donáth was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment during the recent Imre Nagy "process."

". . . The resolution, accepted not long ago by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which evaluated the work of the Institute and pointed out its tasks, gave a considerable help to the disclosure of the still existing mistakes of the Institute of Politico-Economic Science and of its further healthy development . . .

". . . The party-meeting and the general meeting of the Institute which discussed the resolution of the Central Committee's Secretariat were a good start on this road. On these meetings, several co-workers of the Institute and of *Közgazdasági Szemle* made significant steps forward, trying to reveal sincerely and openly the roots of their political mistakes. Tamás Nagy, for instance, related that he did not separate himself from the revisionist wing within the party before the counter-revolution, and, sympathizing with it, even supported its activity with his positions. Tamás Nagy sharply condemned the fact that, as a member of the revolutionary committee of the intelligentsia, he failed, making inadmissible compromises without principles, thus helping to mislead a part of the intelligentsia. The basic lesson to me is—Tamás Nagy said—that the struggle for the elimination of the mistakes within the party and of the deficiencies of the building of socialism has to be conducted only in such a way that the unity and leading role of the party, the concord of the socialist camp shall in the meantime be gaining strength.

"The party resolution dealing with the Institute, the party meeting and the general meeting of the Institute discussing the resolution are important landmarks in the development of the Institute of Politico-Economic Science. The meetings indicated that the overwhelming majority of the Institute's formerly erring workers have basically surmounted the ideological influence of revisionism and counter-revolution, and, ideologically and politically, found their way back to Marxism and to the party, and capable of defeating the remnants of the ideology alien to Marxism still present within and outside the Institute . . ."

(Selection and translation of the excerpts by János Mészáros)

NOTES

The accumulation of increased costs of printing and publication has finally obliged us to raise the annual subscription price of the JOURNAL from $5.00 to $6.00. The increase will take effect with the January 1959 issue. Subscriptions paid before January 15 will be accepted at the old rate.

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The annual session for this year of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde is to take place in Bad Pyrmont from the 23rd to the 25th of October. Methods of education and problems of youth in the Soviet Union will be treated as the principal theme. Professor Eugen Lemberg will give the public lecture on the evening of the 23rd of October. Discussions will accompany the consecutive sessions on "Youth and Economy," "Education," and "How Does Youth React?" An exposition of Soviet schoolbooks is connected with the meeting.

* * *

The Ford Foundation announced on June 21 a grant of one million dollars to the Free University of Berlin to strengthen and expand its academic program. The new grant supplements Foundation grants of $1,434,500, made largely in 1951, that provided the core of the university buildings—and auditorium, library, lecture halls, seminar rooms, and student recreation and eating halls.

The new Ford Foundation grant, to run over a five-year period, will provide the following: Exchange with foreign institutions of professors, instructors, graduate scholars and students; expansion of research and training at the University's East European Institute, Institute of Political Science, School of Politics, Institute for American Studies, and other centers; a tutorial system at a new student dormitory village to create closer relations between faculty and students; administration of expanded international programs and an emergency fund.

The new tutorial system is the result of a study by university faculty members of dormitory, house, college, and tutorial systems in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Approximately thirty scholars, assistants, and tutors will live in the new student village, comprising twenty or more dormitories and a student center. Each dormitory will have a tutor to counsel young students. The United States government recently contributed $2 million to help build the student village to house six hundred students.

In the past ten years, the student body has increased from 2100 to 11,000, with about 25 per cent women. About 3000 of the students, as well as a large proportion of the faculty, are from East Germany.

* * *

Mrs. Hildegard Boeninger, who reviewed for the *Journal* the memoirs of Fieldmarshal Mannerheim and of Max von Stockhausen (in vols. 14 and 15) and who also participated in the discussion of the relations between the NSDAP and the Army in the early years of Hitler's rule ("Hitler and the German Generals, 1934-1938," in the April issue, 1954, Vol. 14, No. 1), died after a long illness early in June in Stanford. Users of the German materials of the Hoover Library in the early 1950's will gratefully remember her boundless helpfulness; and her booklet, *The Hoover Library Collection on Germany* (Stanford University Press, 1956), will remain an eminently useful tool for scholars and keep her memory alive.

F.T.E.

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The Department of State has deposited in the National Archives a further collection of 166 containers of microfilm of documents from the archives of the former German Foreign Office. This collection consists mainly of material on the periods 1937-1940 and 1942-1945. Certain microfilms in addition to those previously released from the period 1914-1933 are also included.

* * *

The United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary issued the following communiqué on June 21, 1958:

"The Special Committee met this morning to consider the circumstances surrounding the recent reports from Moscow and Budapest that Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, and two of their companions have been executed.

To assist its study of these tragic events, the committee had before it the text of the statements issued by the Hungarian Government 16 June, when the trials were first announced, and a recent statement from Belgrade in which the Government of Yugoslavia recalled the undertakings which had been given to them by Janos Kádár when Imre Nagy left the asylum of the Yugoslav Embassy at Budapest on 22 November, 1956, namely,

". . . That it (the Hungarian Government) does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes."

The report of the committee, already presented to the General Assembly and endorsed by it, records the circumstances in which Imre Nagy, on leaving the Yugoslav Embassy, was arrested and taken to an unknown destination, subsequently indicated by the Hungarian authorities as being Rumania; it also recalls the unsuccessful efforts made by the committee later to arrange with the Rumanian Government an opportunity to meet Imre Nagy in the interest of the committee's inquiry.

The committee notes that no reply has ever been received to the letter addressed to the Hungarian Government on 20 December, 1957. That letter drew the attention of the Hungarian Government to the persistent concern displayed throughout the world regarding the fate of the men and women who played a part in the events in Hungary during October and November of 1956. It pointed out that anxiety would continue until the present regime of Hungary complied with the General Assembly resolution of 14 September, 1957, which called upon Hungary "to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people."

The committee notes that, since the uprising in Hungary in October, 1956, the United Nations has adopted a number of resolutions calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw her troops from Hungary so as to create an atmosphere in which free elections could be held. All these appeals have been ignored. The execution of Imre Nagy and of his companions demonstrates that the oppression of the Hungarian people has not abated, and that the reign of terror which began when Russian forces moved into Hungary early in November, 1956, continues.

The committee noted that the recent statement by the Government of Hungary in which the executions were announced was imprecise and vague in many particulars. Some unanswered questions are: What were the movements of the prisoners between the time of Nagy's abduction and the time of the trials In what country were they tried? Where did the executions take place? What was the precise form of the indictment? Under what laws and under what procedures were they tried and sentenced—laws and procedures in operation at the time of the uprising or laws promulgated subsequently? These are matters on which the United Nations has every right to be fully informed.

The committee accordingly issues an appeal to interested governments having at their disposal any information regarding the circumstances of the arrest, trial and execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter and their two companions, to make such information available to the committee.

The committee deplores this latest tragic event in which these men, symbols of the hope of a nation for freedom from foreign domination, were secretly sent to death in circumstances which call for exposure, in violation of solemn undertakings that their persons would not be harmed, and in defiance of the judgment and opinion of the United Nations. It expresses its grave concern lest the end of this repression and killing may not yet be in sight."

Herzfeld, Hans, *Die Modern Welt: 1789-1945.* 2 vols. Braunschweig: Georg Westermann Verlag, 1957. Pp. 260 and 376.

The first edition of this work appeared in 1951. This new, second edition is enlarged as well as brought up to date bibliographically. The first volume, *Die Epoche der buergerlichen Nationalstaaten,* covers the period from the French Revolution to Bismarck's dismissal; the second, *Weltmaechte und Weltkriege,* deals with "the history of our time," 1890-1945. (These are the last two of a four volumes series, *History of Modern Times,* edited by Gerhard Ritter. The first, *Das Werden der Neuzeit,* i.e. the late Middle Ages and the Sixteenth Century, by Erich Hassinger, is ready for publication; the second, *The Age of Absolutism,* 1610-1789, is far advanced in manuscript.) The volumes of this series are to fulfill a threefold purpose, as the editor states in his preface: They are to introduce the student into the academic study of modern history; to serve the teacher in all types of schools as a tool for further independent study; and to be useful to the general "educated" reader for quick orientation in the historical background of a given period, country or problem.

Professor Herzfeld, *Ordinarius* at the Free University of Berlin, had undoubtedly the most difficult assignment and has fulfilled it extremely well. The material is very well organized, the bibliography as far as German works are concerned, excellent. The selection of non-German works is also most satisfactory, even if here and there, unavoidably so, one misses an important title or would have made a different selection. *Die Moderne Welt* is not simply a textbook and it presupposes in various places some basic knowledge of the period; nor is it a compendium of facts, like, e.g., William L. Langer's *Encyclopedia of World History.* Wherever indicated, especially for the more recent period, Herzfeld tries to introduce the reader into the present status of research and controversy of a given problem. Therefore, certain pages read more like passages in a historiographical article than accounts of a series of events. Those pages seem to this reviewer the most valuable: e.g. the discussion of the negotiations between Germany and Great Britain, 1898-1901, the treatment of the crisis of July 1914. Herzfeld always tries to be fair and judiciuos. He is often restrained, but does not avoid clear-cut judgments wherever it seems to him indicated. He leaves no doubt as to where he stands on such issues as the stab-in-the-back legend, the fateful role of Tirpitz, the responsibility of Hitler for unleashing the Second World War.

There are a number of minor errors in the volumes. None is important enough to be singled out here. All can easily be corrected in the proof reading of the next edition.

Where one might take issue with the author is in the realm of periodization (1890-1945 as a historical unit) and concerning the relative space allotted to specific periods and the emphasis on certain aspects of modern history since 1789. That German history gets more extensive treatment is to be expected and seems quite justifiable. The outlook and the treatment are never parochial, however; the skill with which the essentials of the developments in other countries are selected and narrated is quite admirable. In general, diplomatic and military history gets the most extensive treatment; intellectual history and, occasionally, domestic events in non-German countries not enough. But probably no two historians will agree on such matters. It should be pointed out, however, that the First World War has more than twice the space allotted the Second (106 and 42 pp., respectively) while otherwise the treatment becomes more elaborate the closer we come to the present.

The merit of these volumes is at least twofold. For the American historian of German history they are a convenient introduction to the best historical thinking and historiographical evaluation of a leading and representative German historian. But their value is even greater as a guide for German teachers and students to regain a sound and positive relationship to their own past, and as a pedagogical tool to strengthen historical and political responsibility.

Cornell College Eric C. Kollman

Vergnaud, Pierre, *L'Idée de la Nationalité et de la libre disposition des peuples dans ses rapports avec l'idée de l'état.* (Études des doctrines politiques contemporaines 1870-1950). Volume X Études d'Histoire économique, politique, et sociale. Geneva: E. Droz, 1955. Pp. 258.

This book, as its somewhat lengthy title indicates, treats the history of certain European theories of nationalism and their impact on the evolution of the idea of the national state. Although the author announces in his introduction that his research covers primarily the late (1870-1950) period of European national ideologies, the scope of the work is considerably broader, and it includes very interesting materials on the earliest stages of national thought in Western Europe. Mr. Vergnaud's study begins with Machiavelli, Vico and the French sixteenth century thinkers, who developed the notion of fatherland, *la patrie.* Luther's sermons largely contributed to the growth of the national spirit in Germany, since this leader of Protestantism supported the notion of the German national church against the universal claims of Catholicism.

According to M. Vergnaud, the modern theories of nationalism and the theoretical foundation of the nation-state, however, were created by French political scientists only after the defeat of 1870, especially by Renan, Barrès, and Maurras. In Renan's mind nation should be divided into superior and inferior categories, the former "naturally" pushing the latter into the background of history. The "superior" race-nations predetermine the course of history, and, according to Renan, dominate the whole of human evolution. A nation, or as Renan prefers to call it, a nationality, is in his eyes an ethnic group based on race. Certainly in Renan's qualification the race is not the race (*die Rasse*) of German political writers, the latter describing it basically as a complex of biological and anthropologic features. It is still, however, as described by Renan, a "difference of courage, habit and education, transferred by *heredity,*" and thus the transition from Renan's definition to the most discriminatory *"Rasse"* of national socialists is easily made. The great French patriot, publicist and sociologist Barrès proposed a doctrine that was rather close to Renan's teaching about the nations and races, and especially to his division of the nations into superior and inferior. He considered the nationality as the result of the interaction of geographical ("territorial") and historical ("tradiitonal") forces. "The soil and the dead" determine the pattern of behaviour of a living generation of a land: "territory and tradition form common traits—a certain character of the spirit and heart, which are common to all representatives of the same race, the same country, the same soil."

Following Renan and Barrès, Charles Maurras rejected the Rousseauan theories concerning the inherited equality of men and voluntary association as the natural basis for the formation of a national state. This spiritual leader of the *Action Française* proclaimed that birth, the tradition of the past, the community of the language, the community of the soil and origin, are primarily responsible for the formation of the nation. Maurras refused with even more energy than Renan and Barrès to admit the equality of the nations and the languages. A more highly developed language with a richer heritage has a greater right to survive, and is predestined to absorb another, while the underdeveloped tongues will gradually disappear. The existence of a separate tongue does not justify the acquisition of the status of an independent nation-state by an ethnic group. Neither is an ethnic group of specific culture or particular tradition justified in creating a separate political organism if it does not give historical proof that it is able to create its own culture. To the romantic idea of national self-determination Maurras opposed "tradition and reason," and he considered that the division of an already existing national organism into a new ethnic political unit is simply harmful utopianism. "Tradition and reason," wrote Maurras, "indicate inequality among persons, nations, and languages." Only "well developed" nationalities deserve their independence, since they alone have demonstrated their ability to create a lasting sovereign organism and to develop rich and original cultures. The promotion of every dialect, or even tongue of small ethnic groups, to the status of a national language would contribute only to anarchy, wars, disintegration of the historically proven nation-states, to the "Balkanization" of Europe and other areas. In consequence of this conviction, Maurras came out against the introduction of Flemish as the second Belgian national language, against the regional movement in France (Provence, Brittany, Alsace-Lorraine) and against the dismembering of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The independence of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or the secession of Croats, Serbs and Rumanians from the Hapsburg Empire, constituted in his mind a backward step in European evolution, since the languages and cultures of these nationalities were, according to Maurras, of an inferior type.

The notion of nation and race merged into one in Maurras's mind. Contrary to his compatriot, Gobineau, who laid the foundation of a biological theory of race and of the superiority of the Aryan race, Maurras saw the latter as a product of social and historical forces. Membership in his race, however, can come only through birth and heredity.

Vergnaud contrasts the national theories and ideals of the French thinkers to those of German writers and politicians. The difference is not striking, however, and the reader rather acquires the impression that the French nationalist doctrines contributed in large measure to the theoretical formulaions of German racists.

Vergnaud's treatment of non-French ideologists of nationalism is considerably less interesting. Only Hitler and Stalin, among non-French writers on the national problems, attracted his attention. He completely disregarded Polish Messianism, the teachings of the great Czech humanist and thinker, Masaryk, and treats only superficially the treatment of the national problems by the Slavophils. In the teaching of the latter, the nationality is also a product of soil and tradition, but the people never merge completely with the state. Khomiakov, Aksakov and their followers opposed the notion of the state with its police, courts and machinery for imposition of political norms and practices, to the idea of the people. In the writings of the Slavophils the people are the bearer of the idea of spiritual freedom. while the intrinsic value of the state as the guardian of the national tradition is drastically reduced. In this respect the Slavophils' teaching was basically opposed to the doctrine of the French national ideologists, for whom concepts of the state, nation, race, and people merge into one, bearing the seeds of totalitarianism and of the sacrificing of the people to the neds of the abstract idea of state.

The impact of the French ideologies of nationalism and their effects on policies and destinies of the other nations cannot be underestimated, since both Barrès and Renan widely influenced a large number of Eastern European and Asian writers and politicians. Its study is especially timely today when nationalism continues to play a tremendous rôle in the life of many nations. The knowledge of French nationalist theories also contributes to the comprehension of the attitude of the French right wing parties and leaders toward the various states of Eastern Europe and Hitlerite Germany of the years 1933-1945.

Russian Research Center SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY
Harvard University

ALBERTINI, LUIGI, *The Origins of the War of 1914.* Transl. and ed. by Isabella M. Massey. Volume III: *The Epilogue of the Crisis of July 1914: The Declarations of War and of Neutrality.* London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp.: xv, 772, 70 s.

With this volume Dr. Massey has completed her translation of the monumental study by the late Senator Albertini, making it available to a considerably larger circle of readers than was the Italian original published in Milan in 1942—1943. (For a review of volumes I and II of the English translation which were issued in 1952 and 1953, see René Albrecht-Carrié, "Revisionism Revisited," *Journal of Central European Affairs* vol. XVI [October 1956] pp. 266-282.)

Volume III, which enjoyed the benefit of being read in manuscript by Bernadotte Schmitt, deals mainly with the chronological period July 29—August 6. In eleven chapters it carries the story of the actions of the Great Powers from the proclamation of the *Kriegsgefahrzustand* in Germany to the decision by the British Council of War to send the Expeditionary Force to the Continent. Five more chapters deal with the Balkan states other than Serbia. The concluding chapter treats of the policies of the remaining small powers of Europe and of Japan and the United States.

After methodically marshalling and sifting the evidence and thus establishing the facts, Albertini proceeds to pronounce judgment on the actions of Europe's major and minor statesmen. He tends to assess German responsibility for the outbreak of the war heavily. He goes to great pains in refuting certain of the explanations of German decisions which were given great currency by German and other revisionist writers. At the same time he brings out the mistakes, the shortcomings, the short-ranged calculations in every capital. Each of the foreign ministers is criticized from the point of view of the long-range interests of his state and the general European interest in the preservation of peace. In following Albertini's careful argument one cannot escape the feeling that none of the statesmen of the Great Powers was quite equal to his high office, and that each of the great nations might rightfully have expected something more in its principal diplomatic public servants.

Despite the enormous mass of material sifted by the author there still are phases of the story,—small sections of the whole picture,—on which more light can be shed. The *Documenti diplomatici italiani,* whose publication was decided only after Albertini's death, are likely to be a major source of such minor corrections and additions as scholars will consider necessary to his work. But it seems unlikely that any student of the period will wish to do the whole subject over again on the same scale, or hope to meet anything except greatly diminishing returns in reworking the materials covered by Albertini. His statements of fact and his historical and moral judgments are likely long to endure with the weight of authority .

The English edition is a fitting rendition of this masterly work. The text abounds in quotations from the sources, and with great accuracy the original language of English memoirs, documents, and monographs quoted by Albertini is reproduced. Wherever authorized English translations of foreign language books were available, their language has been used. The precise expression of shades of meaning of one language in a different one presents great difficulties and the translation does not run strictly word for word or clause by clause. For the sake of clarity English words have sometimes been added and in a very few cases the interpolations by the translator have been unfortunate. On page 467 "the V armoured division" is mentioned: the original reference is simply to the 5th division (p. 441). In a reference to the Peace Conference the Italian volume (p. 447) mentions the Americans, Lansing and Scott: in the English version this has become "the American delegates, Lansing and Scott" (p. 474). A pleasing Italian sentence has been rendered: "But it is obvious that Great Britain was redoubtable on account not so much of her army as of her navy" (p. 524). Such few slips, however, should not be taken as a measure of the translation which is a splendid performance. An excellent index makes the volume much more easily usable than the Italian original.

Washington, D. C. HOWARD McGAW SMYTH

Imre Nagy On Communism: In Defense of the New Course. Foreword by Hugh Seton-Watson and Epilogue by George Paloczi-Horvath. New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp. 306. $5.50.

This so-called "dissertation" of Hungary's New Course Premier in defense of his policy, although of considerable interest in its own right, would hardly have made the list of a New York publishing house had its author not made history as Hungary's Premier during the ill-fated October Revolution of 1956. But now that Imre Nagy has become a historical personality his book, smuggled out of Hungary, makes instructive reading on two accounts. First, the "dissertation" (written in the summer of 1955, with two chapters added in December 1955 and January 1956) reveals the intentions of an honest Communist who wanted to make Communism in Hungary a success. Second, it is a verdict against the bankrupt policy of the Soviets and their Communist stooges in Hungary; and as such it explains the ease with which Nagy could identify himself with the October insurrection.

Nagy's criticism and scorn is directed chiefly against the four notorious Muscovites, "the foursome," as he calls them—Mátyás Rákosi, Ernö Gerö, József Révai, Mihály Farkas—and in particular against Rákosi who was the boss and an autocrat in the Stalinist tradition more than any other Communist leader in the Soviet satellites. To be sure, Nagy also blames Stalin for forcing "identical forms and pace" of development upon the satellites and for suppressing their special characteristics in utter disregard of Lenin's teachings on "different roads to socialism." But to Nagy "the real criminals" are "the foursome," headed by Rákosi. They were responsible for the falsehood" and "inhumanity," the "atmosphere of suspicion and revenge," the "degeneration of political morality" in Hungary. They surrounded themselves with "careerists," "sycophants," "bootlickers"; they kept in positions of leadership the "economic saboteurs," the "squanderers of public property" and the criminals "responsible for the torture and killing of innocent people."

It was to remedy this situation, to avert the "approaching catastrophe," that

Nagy was called upon to head the New Course régime from July 1953 to March 1956. (And, incidentally, Nagy's selection "was made by the Soviet leaders themselves"—which is a telling illustration of the ways the Soviet leaders of the post-Stalin era practice their much publicized respect for the satellites' "sovereignty.") But Rákosi and his clique, after obstructing, sabotaging and finally overthrowing Nagy's New Course régime, continued their campaign against Nagy by accusing him of "right-wing, anti-Marxist, chauvinist deviations," and by branding him as an "enemy of socialism." It is against these charges that Nagy devotes the largest part of his "dissertation," expecting the widest possible public debate on his defense of the New Course.

The apology itself, however, makes less exciting reading than the indictment with which it is punctuated. Nagy stresses repeatedly that socialism can never be a success in Hungary as long as the leaders are "foreign" and "alien" to the Hungarian people, and as long as they oppose "the ideals of national independence, sovereignty, and equality, as well as Hungarian national feelings." For socialism, Nagy maintains, cannot be achieved by way of "denationalization" and "national nihilism." The party of the people "must be the embodiment of social ethics and morals, and must encompass within itself all the moral virtues and values that our people developed in the course of their history . . ." Socialism can be attained only under the leadership of those "who spring from the people and are of the people, and fight for them. . . ."

This is a most lucid analysis of the causes of Rákosi's failure in Hungary. Whether a return to the New Course, urged by Nagy in his "dissertation," would have been a success, as he thought it would be, is debatable. In any case, by identifying himself with the Revolution, Nagy proved himself a leader of the people and fighter for the people. Imre Nagy, one-time exile from Horthy's Hungary, for nearly twenty years found refuge in the U.S.S.R. The world has but recently learned the price he paid for loyalty to Hungarian nationalism.

Chatham College STEPHEN BORSODY

HAMMOND, THOMAS TAYLOR, *Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution: 1893-1917.* Studies of the Russian Institute. N. Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. x, 155. $3.50.

This book achieves its author's aim to review "the theories and principles underlying Communist tactics in the trade union movement today," as reflected in Lenin's pronouncements on capitalist trade unions. It gives a lucid account of the problem of leadership, the conflict between the trade unions and the Party, the Party 'cells' technique frequently applied in many Communist "front" organizations, and the perennial issue of politics versus economics in Marxist thought.

At the basis of Lenin's program for revolutionary action was his deep distrust of the masses and his thirst for power which he was willing to give only to the revolutionary party *élite*. Hence the clearly subservient rôle he assigned to trade unions. He saw them merely as a tool of the Party and a rather 'loose' movement designed to spread widely over the masses, whereas he wanted the Party to have a tight organization with limited and select membership, and carrying a lofty task of leadership. The theory of leadership was designed to deprive the labor movement —accused by Lenin of serving only the bourgeoisie—of its spontaneity and subordinate it to revolutionary socialist ideology, in practice of authority of power-seeking members of the highest Party echelons. While trade unions were to avoid carrying the Party label, they were to be at all times secretly directed by the Party, giving rise to the Party 'cells' technique. The basis was thus laid by Lenin—as it transpires from many quotations collected by Mr. Hammond—for an authoritarian chain of command in the Communist system and also for a divorce of theory and practice, dream and reality. It is on this basis, it may be added, that the present-day Communist leadership, to use the expression of Edward Crankshaw, "wraps itself away from reality," shielding its many false pretentions, the greatest peril for the system, as was dramatically demonstrated by Milovan Djilas in his recent book *The New Class*. The important issue of politics versus economics, reflecting the divergent dialectics of Marx and Lenin, is given attention in the chapter on Lenin's criticism of Economism. "Lenin," says the author, "while professing loyalty to Marx, acted directly contrary to Marx's formula" (p. 25). Lenin denied that the economic struggle should have precedence over the political struggle. It is the practical outcome of Lenin's policy, however, which is most revealing. One cannot simply speak of Communist theory without referring to Communist practice. What Lenin achieved for Marxism in Russia was, in terms of Marxist doctrine, an illogical success. By asserting that politics should take precedence over economics, he implied the falsity of the Marxian theorem which he had reversed; yet, in practice, by his victory he made it possible for Marxist doctrine to fructify.

This painstaking and well-documented book reads like a thesis and is unduly pedantic in its otherwise praiseworthy effort to exhaust all the references to capitalist trade unions which can be traced in Lenin's writings. The author's interest does not lie in many-sided discussion: he gives instead a formalistic and didactic treatise. The string of often long and unwieldy quotations is a burden in a short book, although it may be an asset in a thesis. The study follows the rules of traditional uniformity: the exposition is straight, most comments are appended to each section and there is no attempt to view Lenin's thoughts on trade unions in the oblique light of criticism by simultaneously describing and commenting on theory and events, doctrines and policies.

The author's concern is with Lenin's ideas on trade unions rather than his actions towards them. This was because Lenin considered the latter unimportant. And because he had little to say about trade unions under socialism, the subject of this book has definite limitations. Yet within these restricted limits (and because they are so narrow) more room should have been found to relate Lenin's thoughts on trade unions to the climate of social thought during his lifetime. The study inevitably tends to become a catalogue of items on a single issue. The author avoids the wider, related problems and disregards the cultural and historical background against which Lenin's ideas originated and developed. And mainly because Lenin often said the same thing over and over again, the book is occasionally repetitive and makes unexciting reading. For this reason some of the problems mention by Mr. Hammond should have been given more attention. Among these, the question of workers' control, the various view of the Economists, or Lenin's actual impact on the Soviet trade unions come to the fore. Altogether, the publication of this slim and specialized volume as a hard-cover book seems slightly hasty, although its content would make a good basis for some valuable articles.

University of British Columbia V. J. Stankiewicz

Durković-Jakšić, Ljubomir, *Srbijansko-Crnogorska Saradnja, 1830-1851,* (Serbo-Montenegrin Collaboration, 1830-1851), Beograd Inst. Hist.: 1957. Pp. IV; 4-251.

This monograph from the Historical Institute of the Serbian Academy of Science is an impressive contribution to scholarship, owing particularly to its wealth of documentation. The author has collected a mass of unpublished materials from archives in Serbia and Montenegro, as well as from the Czartoryski Archive in Cracow, which he supplements copiously with other sources. The book is divided into three sections, devoted to political, cultural and religious collaboration, of which the political section is by far the largest. The plan of this section invites criticism since it contains no introduction to the general political situation in the Balkans during the period under discussion (the dates comprise the reign of Bishop Petar II Petrović-Njegoš, Montenegro's poet-ruler), nor does the author relate affairs in Serbia and Montenegro to the larger context of the struggle between Britain, France and Russia for influence in the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the reader is confronted with a series of episodes in Serbo-Montenegrin relations rather than a coherent narrative.

Some of these episodes possess an intrinsic interest, such as the strange career of "Prince" Nikola Vasojević, who planned to create the new principality of "Holmija" between Serbia and Montenegro and permit it to be used as a concentration area for a Polish Army of Liberation, in accordance with a "treaty" signed by himself and Prince Czartoryski, only to be murdered under circumstances never clarified. The influence of Polish emigrés also led to the foundation of a secret Pan-Slav Club in Belgrade, which produced the first comprehensive plan for the establishment of a federated Yugoslav monarchy that should include Serbs, Croats and Bulgars. Admirers of Ivan Mažuranić's *Smrt Smail-Age Ćengića* will find in this book a documented account of how he actually perished. Njegoš reveals his nobility of character in a number of recorded conversations and letters. On one occasion he spoke of his desire to visit the United States and declared that free Montenegro ought to receive help only from free America, for Russia made him throw off the Russian yoke. This passage must read strangely in Yugoslavia today, and the author tries to soften it with a footnote explaining that Njegoš really didn't feel that way about Russia. During the revolutions of 1948-1849 Njegoš and Alexander of Serbia planned a campaign against the Magyars, but caution triumphed in Belgrade to the disappointment of the Montenegrin ruler.

The book is illustrated with seventy-nine reproductions of contemporary photographs, maps, lithographs, manuscripts and books, including portraits of Njegoš and many other prominent Serbs and Montenegrins. Here are the "falcons" of more than a century ago in full national costume, belts bristling with pistol butts, hands on sword hilts, photographed for posterity in the Vienna studio of Anastas Jovanović, a Balkan Matthew Brady.

Njegoš was a great admirer of Kara George, and his greatest work, *Gorski Vijenac,* is dedicated: "To the Dust of the Father of Serbia." In Tito's Yugoslavia last year Mr. Durković Jakšić was permitted to dedicate this book: "To the Karageorge Banner."

Dartmouth College JOHN CLINTON ADAMS

RAEFF, MARC, *Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772-1839.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957. Pp. 387. P. 7.75.

Speransky is generally recognized to have been one of the two or three most capable officials to serve the government of the Russian Empire, if not the most capable of all. A satisfactory biographical treatment of him was much needed, and the gap has been filled by an able book written by an American of Russian descent who is a professor at Clark University. It is a fine example of what American or other Western scholarship on Russian history can and should be. It is thorough, painstaking, and judicious; it takes into account all relevant documentation in Russian, French, and German; it illuminates the Russian scene by reference to other European countries and to the work of European social scientists; and it deals with the broader problems of Russia with which Speransky became involved in a manner which bespeaks deep knowledge.

There has been only one previous biography of Speransky; it was published in 1861 in Russian by Baron M. A. Korf, and it passed over in silence important episodes in Speransky's life. Professor Raeff has considered them all. Examining the early period when Speransky's influence was greatest, Raeff concludes that Speransky wished to introduce into Russia the rule of law and a division of governmental functions, but not to promulgate a "constitution" in the sense that absolutism would be replaced by some kind of representative government. He suggests that Speransky's abrupt exile in 1812 was mainly a concession by Alexander I to the conservative nobility whose support he needed against Napoleon, but it was not only that. The story of the dismissal is told especially well. At the end of his exile Speransky wished to return to the capital, but he bowed to Alexander I's request that he accept distant governmental appointments instead. As governor of Penza and especially as governor-general of Siberia (Raeff has treated the Siberian reforms in a previous monograph), Speransky made significant contributions. Nicholas I deliberately tested his loyalty by appointing him to the court which tried the Decembrist leaders, and thus placed him in a painful emotional dilemma; however, Raeff believes that his previous views required him to take the side of the judges rather than the defendants even if he had not been named to the court. His last significant state act was the codification—though this word is something of a misnomer—of Russian law, a fitting climax to the career of a man who wished above all to turn Russia into a *Rechtsstaat,* in the belief that thereby the maximum spiritual development of the people was possible.

Speransky the man is difficult to reach through the available sources, but occasionally Raeff succeeds in bringing him to life. The son of a village priest who was not much different from the peasants he served, Speransky was at home among neither the court nobility nor the classes of his forbears, and found real companionship only with the higher and educated clergy from St. Petersburg to Irkutsk. In the words of a contemporary, he was "respected by all but loved by none."

The form of the book could have been somewhat improved. Some chapters are analytical, some narrative. The reader may be annoyed by a frequent misuse of quotation marks; for example, "The ruthless arbitrariness of these persecutions was in the 'best' Siberian tradition" (,251). Sometimes there are casual references assuming a knowledge which may not be fresh in the minds of all readers. Speaking of the fad for political economy among Russian courtiers, the author says, "We need only to mention *Eugene Onegin* . . ." (85), but to quote the relevant lines would have taken little space. He mentions the "incident with Count Severin Potocki in the Senate" without explaining what it was (38). When he suggests that Speransky was the "first Russian statesman to have 'wagered on the strong peasant'" (295) it would do no harm to mention Stolypin's name. There are a number of stylistic imperfections: ". . . easily secured the reluctant consent." (15); ". . . had 'historical logic,' if there be such a thing, on its side . . ." (36). There are several typographical errors.

It is true, as the author says, that the problem of Speransky leads one into the whole problem of the bureaucratic regime. In a conflict between the nobility and the régime—the former seeking to curb arbitrariness and enfranchise one class, the latter attempting reform from above by fiat—which was forward-looking and which was not? Professor Raeff brushes against this problem without pursuing it, and yet his evaluation of Speransky, which properly attempts to circumvent the usual "liberal-conservative" dichotomy, suffers from an insufficiently explicit statement of his views. Speransky was an adherent of imperial absolutism, and yet wished far-reaching legal, political, and moral changes; this was not quite the ground of the early Slavophiles (with whom the author well but briefly contrasts Speransky), but some of them were drawn into a similar position later. The position of the reformer in a despotic state is a morally and practically difficult one, and not an easy one for the scholar to characterize; yet the author might have expounded his conclusions on such issues more fully. Nevertheless he has given us the basis for a thorough re-examination of the work of the ablest servant of the Russian state at a crucial period, and his book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of Russian history.

University of Washington DONALD W. TREADGOLD

KRIEGER, LEONARD, *The German Idea of Freedom, History of a Political Tradition.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Pp. xii, 450. $7.50.

This book is the product of a happy combination of sound scholarship and significant field experience. As an associate professor of history at Yale University, Professor Krieger has had the opportunity of delving for many years into the rich mine of German political history. During World War II he was a political analyst in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and subsequently served as a member of the State Department staff in Germany. His non-academic experience focused attention on the "German problem," raising such questions as why the Weimar Republic proved unequal to the task of governing Germany and how the Nazis managed to ensconce themselves so deeply in so many areas of German life. Returning to his university duties, he gave attention to a study of the forces and ideas that have contributed to producing a political record in Germany which is in many respects at variance with that to be found in such countries as Great Britain and France.

Krieger has organized his book primarily around the political ideas of various Germans beginning with 1650 and extending down to 1870. Fairly detailed expositions are given of the theories of such men as Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Arndt, Rotteck, Marx, Mevissen, Dahlmann, Hansemann, Gneist, Treitschke, Lassalle, and Liebknecht. In a sense therefore this book may be regarded as a history of German political thought during some two centuries. But the author does not content himself with presenting political theories only. He also considers the political attitudes of such men of affairs as Stein and Hardenberg, such events as the revolution of 1848, and the economic and social basis of German political development, noting the significance of the industrial revolution, pressure groups, and political parties. In a brief epilogue he comments on developments since 1870, particularly those during the years since 1918.

The book is divided into three main sections. The first starts with the Protestant Reformation and the rise of territorial states in Germany. The author concludes that "The impact of the Reformation, then, was to increase the powers of the prince and his government." A second section deals with the period of the French Revolution and it is remarked that "The Revolution in France did not take root in Germany. It inspired no contemporary organization of any permanence." The third subdivision devotes itself to the period 1830-70. The author traces the developments which eclipsed liberalism and the culmination of the struggle between liberalism and authoritarianism leading to the establishment of the conservative German Empire in 1870. Concluding that "the pattern of liberal politics for the half-century of the Empire's duration scarcely changed at all from its structure and posture in 1870," Krieger devotes little space to the years subsequent to 1870.

In a brief epilogue the author comments quite intriguingly on recent developments in Germany. He notes that "The Nazis smashed the age-old association of liberty with the authoritarian state," thus opening the way to a "new concept of freedom." As a political scientist this reviewer cannot refrain from regretting that Professor Krieger did not see fit to amplify his comments on the period since 1870 and particularly the recent years. Students of Germany can be very grateful for a study which combines high scholarly standards with excellent organization and penetrating analysis.

Ohio State University **Harold Zink**

Komarnicki, Tytus, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic. A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe,* London: William Heinemann, 1957. Pp. xiii 776. £3.3.0.

Komarnicki, a distinguished diplomat and international lawyer, former Polish delegate to the League of Nations, Minister Plenipotentiary in Switzerland, and clandestine delegate of the Polish Government in London for German-occupied France, has produced a pioneering scholarly work. His *Rebirth of the Polish Republic* is the first historical monograph of the re-emergence of his native country as an independent State after World War I. The book is based on impressive material; the selected bibliography gives nearly 300 entries. Professor Komarnicki quotes extensive extracts from innumerable documents and articles thus allowing his sources of information to speak for themselves. The author's purpose is to present the diplomatic side of the rebirth of Poland; he has been a faithful follower of Piłsudski, and his book reflects this leaning, although Professor Komarnicki is rather fair towards Dmowski and Paderewski, and their point of view.

The book contains the first full scale presentation of Piłsudski's federalist scheme so much misunderstood in the West largely owing to the skillful Soviet propaganda. In reality this was, according to Komarnicki, one of the most far-sighted schemes devised at the end of World War I, a scheme which could have assured European peace for another generation. Soon, after the Bolshevik Revolution, Piłsudski became convinced that independence of the newly organized national republics of Eastern and Central Europe was precarious as long as they were separated from each other by political and economic frontiers. Only a close cooperation, a federation, or at least a confederation, could assure their survival. Consequently, as Head of the Polish State he made several attempts at fostering the idea of national self-determination among the nations of Eastern Europe, and even Caucasus, and of establishing close links between Poland and the Baltic States, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine.

At the beginning of 1920 Piłsudski put forward a definite project of a confederation of free, democratic States situated between the Baltic and the Black Sea, as a regional block capable of withstanding both Bolshevik Russia and a future reborn and remilitarized Germany. One of the aims of Piłsudski's plan was to paralyze Bolshevism by splitting its territorial base, the former Tsarist Empire, by means of a strict, literal application of Wilson's and Lenin's principle of self-determination to all nationalites of the empire (including the Caucasus), but particularly to the Ukrainians.

Thus the plan aimed at nipping Communist expansion in the bud by splitting the Soviet State *in statu nascendi* along vertical or national lines. By this means a new balance of power would have been created in Europe which might possibly have prevented another world war.

This concept clashed with that of Lenin. Lenin's scheme aimed at paralyzing Russia's western neighbors by means of a social revolution which would split bourgeois States along horizontal or class lines. It would have created twenty-five years in advance of the facts, a belt of satellite states comprising practically the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. This block was meant to be a jumping-off ground for a further march of the Communist revolution toward Germany and Western Europe. Lenin's dream was shattered by the Polish victory at the battle of Warsaw and by the failure of his plans for a social revolution in Poland. But the war exhausted the young Polish State. Consequently, Piłsudski was unable to exploit his military victory and to pursue his "Great Design." The Baltic Confederation disintegrated; the Ukraine and Byelorussia were partitioned. The treaty of Riga of March 1921 sealed the fate of Piłsudski's federal plan.

This is an important book, a necessary reference for any student of contemporary history of Europe in general, and of Poland in particular.

Boston College M. K. Dziewanowski

Hiscocks, Richard, *Democracy in Western Germany*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. ix, 324. $7.50.

This is the first book since the achievement of West German sovereignty to deal with the overall political institutions as well as the operation of democracy in Western Germany. The author, who is thoroughly competent in the German field by virtue of careful study, residence, and experience in Germany during different periods, has made a genuine contribution. Confining himself "to the political problem" and dealing "scarcely at all" with the legal aspect, and treating the constitutional side "only so far as is required for an understanding of political institutions," Professor Hiscocks has given us a first rate treatment of West German government and politics in the recent period since the war. His purpose, as stated (p. 8), has been well carried out, namely "to examine the present state of the experiment that was started with the setting up of the democratic Federal Republic of Germany at Bonn in 1949; to assess the strength and weakness, the achievements and failures, of the system of government that was then established, and to make some estimate of future prospects."

After three helpful and reasonably adequate introductory chapters which provide a necessary background, the author treats successively the constitution, political parties, the federal, state, and local governments, the civil service, the trades unions, and then concludes with several brief chapters on the German people and politics, political education, the problem of reunion, recent developments, and the future.

The largest and perhaps the best chapter in the book deals with political parties. Here one finds an excellent critique of the S. P. D. and of Adenauer, but only one page on pressure groups and nothing on the new nominating provisions of the 1956 law. The author could also have emphasized more strongly that state and local politics are at least as important and basic as national politics. In another excellent chapter on political education a very useful summary and evaluation is given of the most important developments in Germany in this field.

It is very easy in a book which has as large a compass as this one to emphasize significant omissions. This could be done here—for instance, there is almost nothing on the administrative branch except a general treatment of the civil service, and there is no real discussion of federalism outside of several helpful comments on the rôle of the Bundesrat and how federalism safeguards democracy. But nothing is gained by detracting from what is essentially a very sound contribution to a most significant area of study. The book is replete with the judgments of the author, but most of them are well founded, and his last words are wise: "Western Germany is not yet a mature democracy. It takes time to build a democratic tradition, and there has not been sufficient time since 1945. Nor have conditions been very propitious . . . The struggle for democracy therefore lies largely in the future, with tradition, apathy, and self-satisfaction as the main obstacles to be overcome."

University of Michigan JAMES K. POLLOCK

STERN, CAROLA, *Porträt einer bolschewistischen Partei, Entwicklung, Funktion und Situation der SED*. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1957. Pp. 367. DM 12.80.

The Soviet zone of occupation in Germany—now called the German Democratic Republic—is ruled by the means of Stalin through Walter Ulbricht and his Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). Protected by the Red Army against the wrath of a proletariat it supposedly represents, the SED apparatus controls the lives of eighteen million Germans and attempts to squeeze their attitudes and actions into the periodically changing mold of party doctrine.

Carola Stern, who has previously written on various facets of the SED, provides in this work a survey of the origins, evolution, and structure of that party. An account of the first political organizations in the Soviet zone is followed by an illuminating description of the formation of the SED as a mass party increasingly dominated by Stalinists but operated as a united front movement. As the Communists within the party came to the fore, and the possibility of German reunification receded into the indefinite future, the SED was recast along lines copied from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This process required the purging of some of the elements originally welcomed so that the new party could direct the conversion of East Germany into an exact replica of the Soviet Union. The author shows how this led to the uprising of June, 1953 and then traces the tergiversations of party policy after the uprising, under the impact of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with its criticism of Stalin, and in the face of events in Hungary and Poland in October, 1956. The account is carried down to March, 1957. The occasional outbreaks of real or invented heresies are adequately covered; of these the fairy tales concerning that "American agent" Noel H. Field—though hardly the most important—should prove especially delightful to American readers.

The last two chapters describe the operations of the party in directing the state and various mass organizations and also the internal structure, mechanism, and composition of the SED. A series of annexes containing summaries of official party pronouncements, chronological lists of high officials, brief biographies of party leaders, and other information on the SED is especially useful.

Although the author provides a great quantity of information, the work is somewhat superficial. There is little discussion of the relationship of post-war events to Germany's past or useful comparison with other communist parties. As an example of the weaknesses resulting from this, one might mention that the book nowhere indicates that the SED is the only communist party ruling an area that contained a communist party of considerable size for any substantial period in its previous history, and that it is also the only one ruling people previously subjected to totalitarian controls. The limited perspective of the author is reflected in the bibliography—she either would not or could not use a single source in any language other than German.

On the whole, this book fulfills a valuable service. It will provide anyone concerned with the political structure of the East German state with a fine handbook on its ruling party.

University of Kentucky GERHARD L. WEINBERG

WRANGEL, GENERAL BARON PETER N., *Always with Honour.* Foreword by Herbert Hoover. New York, Speller, 1957. Pp. 356. $5.00.

This English edition of the memoirs of General Wrangel, the last commander-in-chief of the White Russian forces in the Crimea in 1920, is important in many ways. Naturally it is not an unbiased book, for it reflects very clearly the prejudices and the ideas of General Wrangel himself and also his attitude toward the other Russian leaders both under the Provisional Government and then in the earlier periods of the Civil War. It especially reflects his attitude toward General Denikin, who constantly fell lower and lower in his estimation.

Yet the ideas and the limitations of General Wrangel were not his alone. He reflected very clearly the opinions of the more conservative and broad-minded Russian officers of the Imperial Army. Unlike many of these he had been brought into close personal contact with the Emperior and he was fully aware of the intrigues in the court, both in the royal family itself and among the politicians of Petrograd who were jockeying for high posts with little regard to the success of the Russian arms in World War I. For that reason, he deplored the Revolution and he regarded the abdication of the Tsar and of his brother, Grand Duke Michael, as opening the door to anarchy. In this connection he does not spare the leaders of the Provisional Government, including Kerensky, and he states frankly that they "showed themselves to be far weaker, far more irresolute than he (Nicholas) had been, and much more foolish than the high officials of the régime they had overthrown" (p. 24).

The volume stresses also a striking feature of not only the Provisional Government, but of all the governments set up in 1917 within the Russian Empire: the distrust of the officers' corps not so much because it was aristocratic but because it was composed of officers who realized the need for military discipline if a Russian army or any army was to function. It was not so much the question of weeding out officers friendly to the old régime and replacing them, but it was a refusal to hold in regard any officers of any origin and any political faith at all.

General Wrangel was in a particularly favored situation, because though a Russian aristocrat, he had served mostly with Cossack troops not only from the Don and the Kuban but from the Asian Cossack areas as well, and he appreciated their insistence upon the preservation of their traditional rights and privileges. And we must remember that the Cossacks were the only groups in Russia that had been fully standardized on the Petersburg pattern. Wrangel's willingness to give the Cossacks some autonomy was the key to his relations with the Kuban; and it was quite different from the policy of Denikin, who ordered the leaders of the

Kuban Rada arrested for entering into a special understanding with the Medjilis, a North Caucasian Moslem people. One of them, Kalabukhov, was executed under conditions that did not improve the relations between the Russian Army and the Kuban population. Wrangel also stresses the fact that Denikin's policy alienated all the non-Russian peoples (p. 285).

On the other hand, it is very doubtful if Wrangel understood the significance of the Kuban Rada which tended to reflect the non-Cossack population of the Kuban and was usually in conflict with the Cossack Ataman of the Kuban Cossacks. As a result his version of events is very different from that given by Ivanys, the President of the Kuban Rada, in the Ukrainian version of the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine, p.* 540ff, written from the "separatist" point of view.

There is the same confusion in his references to events in Ukraine and his attitude to Hetman Skoropadsky, who had been his commanding officer before the Revolution, and his reception of the "delegation of the Ukrainian National Party under the influence of Petrushevitch." This pro-Union group "had no real strength but it was sympathetic to us, and had a few connections in the Ukraine and some in France. These could be used to counterbalance the Ukrainian Separatists" (p. 285.)

Wrangel's account of his experiences with the Allied Missions during his period of power and his comments on the efforts of Lloyd-George to make peace between him and the Bolsheviks often make sad reading. He realized, as few of the European statesmen of the day did the real significance of the Bolshevik movement and its danger to the world, and he continued his struggle against it until his troops were forced to evacuate the Crimea. He succeeded and kept his own honor untarnished in the difficult hours that he had to go through.

The general impression which he leaves in this book is on the whole good. Whether he understood the significance of the breaking up of the Russian Empire into separate national states may be doubted but he seems to have glimpsed and tried to develop some kind of autonomy for the different peoples within the old Empire (Eg. p. 224) and yet maintain the basic unity of the whole. Perhaps Wrangel was merely too late and if his later ideas had been developed by responsible persons in 1917, they would have found favor. As it is, he appears in retrospect as an earnest, hard working and severe general doing his duty to the best of his knowledge and capabilities and these qualities were not to be despised.

Columbia University CLARENCE A. MANNING

ČULINOVIĆ, FERDO, *Prestanak Kraljevine Jugoslavije i Postanak Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije,* Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti i Umjetnosti, *Rad,* Knj.311, Zagreb, 1957. Pp. 239-300.

This study was undertaken for the purpose of establishing the date on which Yugoslavia ceased to be a monarchy and became a republic. It is the author's thesis that this transition was effected at the second session of the AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) in November 1943, even though a Yugoslav Republic was not officially proclaimed until November 29, 1945.

Čulinović argues that the transition from monarchy to republic resulted from four simultaneous developments: (1) the creation of a federal and democratic state organization emerging from a dynamic revolutionary struggle; (2) its popular character as evidenced by the fact that the organs of (communist) state power evolved from below, that is, for the lowest echelons to the highest; (3) the *a* *priori* proclamation of a federal state structure and its immediate implementation, and; (4) the complete collapse of royal authority throughout Yugoslavia. (Mihajlović, even before his dismissal as royal Minister of Defense, is simply dismissed as a "collaborator.") In setting up a provisional government under Tito, the second AVNOJ session concurrently forbade the king and his government to return to Yugoslavia and called for the reorganization of the state on a federal basis. It therefore accomplished, according to Čulinović, not only the *de facto* but also the *de jure* abolition of the monarchy and thus marked the political watershed in the transformation of Yugoslavia. The fact that the monarchy was officially not abrogated until November 29, 1945 is explained as a matter of political convenience (or necessity) rather than historical reality. Čulinović rejects international recognition as having any connection with the birth of the 'new' state just as he rejects the theory (advanced by earlier Marxist writers) that this state came ino being with the formation of the first committees of national liberation in 1941. Instead, he asserts that the acts of the second AVNOJ session assumed the character of constituent public law and were so implemented by the Partisans throughout the territory under their control.

The Tito-Šubašić agreements of June and November 1944 which led to the establishment of the regency on March 2, 1945 are dealt with in summary fashion. The regency, writes Čulinović, "exercised its functions within the framework of the system of power of democratic and federative Yugoslavia . . . not by delegation of the ex-king, but by approval of the AVNOJ" (294).

While Marxist historians in Yugoslavia have struggled ever since the end of the war with the problem of general historical periodization, it is noteworthy that considerable energy has recently been devoted to the issue of the wartime transition. In keeping with current political doctrine, Čulinović maintains the tenuous position that the Nazi-Fascist occupation forces not only failed to overthrow the structural system of power of the Yugoslav Kingdom, but made full use of it to consolidate their régime (256). His treatment of the Tito-Šubašić agreements and the regency is even less convincing. No one can question the fact that by the end of 1943 the Partisans exercised effective power in large portions of Yugoslav territory; that Mihajlović's power had dwindled to secondary proportions; that the king and the government-in-exile had in fact no control over events at home. These cannot, however, detract from the fact that Tito gave repeated assurances (viz., to Churchill in Naples) that the fate of the monarchy could be settled only by popular vote after the war, not from his formal, albeit temporary, acceptance of the regency or earlier collaboration with the Šubašić government-in-exile to which he appointed two Partisan (non-communist) representatives in July 1944. For well over a year following the second AVNOJ session, in fact, Tito's actions scarcely suggested that the monarchy had ceased to exist *de jure*.

Yale University IVO J. LEDERER

EUDIN, XENIA JOUKOFF, and HAROLD H. FISHER, in collaboration with ROSEMARY BROWN JONES. *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. Pp. 450. $10.00.

This is one of a series of volumes prepared by the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace which present a documentary record of the course of Soviet foreign policy. An earlier volume by Olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher treated *The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International* (Stanford, 1940). Two volumes are in preparation by Merrill Spalding and Xenia

J. Eudin on the period 1918-20; and Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey* (Stanford, 1937) is a companion title to the volume under review.

The historical introduction surveys briefly the heritage of the Soviet régime in the field of foreign policy. Imperial expansionism had been restrained by "pressures for internal reforms, skepticism at home concerning the nature of Russia's civilizing mission, and the betrayal in practice of long-range messianic aims," (p. xxvii). Moreover, in many specific cases the expansionism of the tsars was successfully resisted by its intended victims. What had been the forces of restraint on Imperial expansion became the positive policies of the Provisional Government. It renounced territorial claims, offered a degree of autonomy to Russia's minorities, and welcomed foreign assistance in restoring the national economy. The Bolsheviks at the time they seized power, in the view of Eudin and Fisher, were bound neither by the restraints which deterred the Empire nor by the positive policies of the Liberals. Pressures for domestic reform did not inhibit a vigorous foreign policy; there were no longer any doubts as to Russia's civilizing mission, and long-range messianic aims were audaciously proclaimed.

Soon the traditional limitations on Russian expansionism reasserted themselves, however, although in new forms. Economic chaos at home, unwillingness to permit the self-determination of the minority peoples, the stubborn resistance of Europe to the "inevitable" world revolution—these developments brought Bolshevik foreign policy back to the realities of caution and compromise. Eudin and Fisher date the beginnings of "peaceful coexistence" to 1921, when the Bolsheviks set for themselves the dual objective of making their peace with the "capitalist" world, and at the same time furthering the ultimate goal of world revolution. The steps by which this dual policy was implemented in the post-revolutionary decade are set forth in considerable detail by Eudin and Fisher.

It is now forty years since the Bolshevik revolution, and there is still very little scholarship, American or foreign, in the field of Soviet foreign policy. The secretiveness of Moscow is one reason for this, but it is not a compelling reason. Foreign policy is by its very nature less crepuscular than is domestic, and Eudin and Fisher demonstrate clearly that there is adequate documentary material for a major treatise in this field. In the meantime their work will provide a valuable documentary guide supplemented by a useful chronology and bibliography.

Princeton University C. E. Black

Hertz, Frederic, *The Development of the German Mind: A Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas.* London, Allen & Unwin, 1957. Pp. 524. 35s.

In this volume Dr. Hertz adds a new dimension to his study of nationalism. *Nationalism in History and Politics* (1944) is a general work; *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States* (1944) examines nationalism in a special place and context. The new volume seeks "a real understanding of the mental structure" (jacket) of the German people: "The aim of this study is to show what the various sections of the Germans of every rank and class were thinking of the ruling men, how far they [*i.e.* the German people] supported or opposed them, what were their wishes, hopes and fears, prejudices, ideals and standards of right and wrong" (p. 4). Some of the articulate Germans whose thought is examined here never arrive at national consciousness; others do so in varying degrees of intensity. Since most of the writers deplore the social conditions they find among the Germans, the author takes pains to give some background in the social history of Germany, together with the political setting. He frequently compares Germany with England, France and Italy and indicates parallels between Western and German thought. Especially is he concerned with the tragic particularism which prevents the achievement in Germany of a national state and of needed social reform.

The key to the book is the "public mind." The author explains that he is not concerned with a "uniform and persistent force such as the alleged national character, or the public opinion much invoked by politicians" (p. 3); rather he is interested in a variety of "divergent trends." "in . . . the political and social feelings, opinions and aspirations of various groups forming the German people, with special reference to those which have determined politics" (p. 3). To find articulate reactions to the problems and conditions of the time he has brought forward all kinds of writers, poets and minstrels, chroniclers, teachers, theorists, commentators both lay and ecclesiastical, bureaucratic propagandists, and publicists. An increasing number of such writers appeared in Germany and in the German language as Germany was drawn into world affairs; hence interest in the materials of the book increases as discussion progresses from reactions predominantly to the issues of power and doctrine to those involving as well social, economic and intellectual aspects of German life.

The author provides a setting for the "public mind" in the form of background history. Thus, for example, two chapters, "Charlemagne's Political System" and "The Fall of the Frankish Empire," are followed by one chapter, "Political Thought and Sentiment in the Time of the Late Carolingians," in which a number of writers appear. Similarly general chapters on the late Middle Ages are followed by "Political Thought in the Fifteenth Century" (chapter 19) and "Social Criticism in the late Middle Ages" (chapter 20). In addition Dr. Hertz has made a great effort to bring in the territorial states, whose writers are even less well known than many of those whom he brings forward for the Empire as a whole. The analysis and synthesis of materials in the great number of monographs used, along with the bibliographies at the end of the chapters, make this volume useful to all students of early Germany. (A subsequent volume is planned, to bring the study to the present.) German history in terms of articulate reaction to public issues and social problems proves dramatic and moving. The publisher should have accorded the author better editing of the volume, and the author should have provided an index worthy of his unique material.

Santa Monica, California PAULINE R. ANDERSON

LEONTOVITSCH, VICTOR, *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland,* Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1957. Pp. xv, 426. DM 30.

Professor Leontovitsch's *History of Liberalism in Russia* deserves attention. Its twelve chapters and four hundred twenty-six pages, of larger than ordinary size and in rather small type, contain a wealth of facts, observations and interpretations. Following an introduction devoted to the nature and role of liberalism in European history, the first part of the book relates the history of Russian liberalism from 1762 to 1855; its seven chapters discuss Catherine II, Alexander I, Speranskii, Karamzin, specifically the codification of law, and, the last two, Nicholas I. The second part, entitled "The Development of Civil Freedom, 1856-1914" and composed of eight chapters, is primarily concerned with the emancipation of the serfs, the subsequent agrarian problem, and the attitudes of government and society to that problem. The third and final part switches to "The Development of Political

Freedom, 1856-1914." It contains twelve chapters and presents a general political survey of the period, but also concentrates on the crucial years 1904-1907. A name index completes the volume.

Professor Leontovitsch's entire work is animated by the author's special view of liberalism and by the application of this view to Russian history. Liberalism is declared to be an essentially negative concept, an attempt to abolish restrictions on man, rather than a positive, let alone political, program. Furthermore, liberalism means gradualism and a fundamental opposition to revolutions. More specifically, civil rights must precede political representation; imperial legal codes have priority over parliaments. It is on the basis of these assumptions that the generally oppressive and ultimately catastrophic rule of the Romanovs is made to yield abundant, if at times strange, liberal fruit, ranging from Catherine the Great's recognition and extension of the rights of the gentry to Stolypin's efforts to do a similar service for the peasants. Russian liberalism found its finest expression in the constitutional transformation of 1905 and 1906 and the constitutional régime in the years following, the luster of this liberalism remaining undimmed even by the change of the electoral law in 1907. During those years liberalism received support in Russia not only from the well-intentioned monarch and his forward-looking ministers, but also from at least a substantial part of the educated public, including such leaders as Maklakov and Guchkov and such parties as the Octobrists.

The author's unusual approach to his subject has enabled him to write an interesting, trenchant and provocative book. More specifically, it has led to numerous new evaluations of the personalities and events of the Russian past, to the illumination of some dim or forgotten pages of Russian history, to a certain redressing of the balance. The chapters on Nicholas I, for instance, should be read by all who still confuse his reign with oriental despotism. But these and other merits of Professor Leontovitsch's work fail to justify its thesis. Liberalism, after all, has had too long and honorable a history in Europe—a largely political history be it noted—to abdicate in favor of Catherine II, Stolypin and the peculiar concept of liberal absolutism. The author recognizes that the most illiberal and inhuman institution in Russia, serfdom, reached its height under Catherine the Great. Yet he considers the empress a true liberal, arguing that civil liberties had to come gradually, and that she took the first step by confirming them for the gentry, even though the gains of the gentry meant further misery for the masses. The explanation appears to have the flavor of Marxist casuistry rather than of liberalism. What purpose is served by calling conservatives "liberals" and calling liberals "radicals"? And are these "radicals" really so much to blame for Russia's misfortunes? Which was in effect the Russian tragedy: that the Decembrists rose against the policies of the imperial government, or that the government turned against the ideals of the Decembrists? Professor Leontovitsch selects his facts too carefully at times: he misrepresents Witte's relationship to Durnovo; fails to mention that Witte came to recognize the need to expropriate, with compenation, large gentry estates; presents Stolypin as a thoroughgoing liberal, minimizing the police character of his administration and his ineptness as a constitutional prime-minister which exentually antagonized not only "the radicals," but also Guchkov and even the State Council; and depicts Nicholas II as a devoted constitutionalist, omitting conveniently, for instance, the attitude of the tsar to the extreme Right. The entire narrative ends in 1914, not 1917; the war years proved to be very hard on Russian liberalism, even as conceived by Professor Leontovitsch.

Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland is a learned and useful book. Its contribution deserves particular welcome because Russian liberalism has been a generally neglected field of study. But most readers are not likely to agree with the author.

University of California, Berkeley NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

VILLARI, LUIGI, *Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini.* New York: Devin-Adair, 1956. Pp. xii, 396. $6.00.

The proposition that history is written by the victors certainly has no validity in the "decadent" democratic milieu, where the corrupt notion obtains that all sides have an equal right to a hearing and that it is the historian's duty to cultivate an objective approach. A flourishing literature has expounded the "guilt" of the democracies, the American not excluded, in bringing about, then enlarging, the conflict of 1939, preferably by deliberate intent, motivated by hatred of the Nazi-Fascist régimes. The housebreaker who, meeting resistance from his prospective victim, resorts to violence, is after all acting in self-defense.

One of the slogans current in Fascist Italy was that "Mussolini is always right," a proposition to the demonstration of which this book seems to be dedicated. The blindness and folly of the democracies has been amply documented and analyzed; the rise and consequent threat of the Communist danger is also a non-debatable fact. And it is also true that the Axis powers—at least until the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact—had long and loudly proclaimed the threat of Bolshevism. From this it might be inferred that it was a mistake for these western powers to have joined the Soviet Union in bringing about the defeat of those most staunchly dedicated to the defense of civilization.

That line of reasoning is old and Villari takes up its exposition and defense again. It is precisely the obduracy of the British and the French, especially the latter, controlled by the combination of democrati-masonic-Jewish-international financial forces, and their obstinate refusal to grant the have-nots and the defeated their rightful place and due which lies at the root of all current evil. The Italian record in these matters is particularly clean, for, had it not been for this Anglo-French stupidity, Italy would not have been driven into the German association. One error alone is allowed Mussolini, and one for which he could hardly be blamed, for how could he have known that Nazi Germany in turn would develop unreasonable ambitions?

Villari is entitled to his views and his book might still have been of use did it contain valuable revelations and serious documentation. These are unfortunately lacking. A quotation will serve to illustrate the tone and quality of his approach: "Whatever its [the Pact of Steel's] real nature may have been, the true authors of the Pact were Eden, Vansittart & Co. in Great Britain and Blum and the *Front Populaire* in France with their respective camp followers, third-rate politicians, shady financiers and the cheap journalists of the reptile press in those and other countries" (p. 231). Needless to say, the Pact was definitely defensive.

There seems little use in attempting to argue at this level; this book is a pamphlet, not a serious contribution to history. In view of this, minor factual errors do not assume great importance: it is interesting to be informed that the Anglo-German naval agreement was made in 1934 (p. 184); that the Vienna award caused Hungary to recover from Czechoslovakia 400,000 square kilometers of territory (p. 211—an area larger than the whole of Czechoslovakia); that the Rumanian foreign minister was Vasile (sic) Gafencu (p. 215). Also that the Italian declaration of war in June, 1940 was less an act of aggression than a means to moderate German demands; and that conditions in the Italian Social Republic were, despite German exactions, better and safer than in the South of Italy under allied, including negro, troops of occupation (p. 321).

The Publisher's preface contains this statement: "There is no pretense on the part of the publisher that Dr. Villari's book is completely objective history" (p. viii). Whether or not it was intended in humor, certainly no better description of the book could be given than this masterpiece of understatement.

Barnard College RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

SOJÁK, VLADIMÍR, ed., *O československé zahraniční politice v letech 1918-1939* [About Czechoslovak foreign policy in the years 1918-1939]. Prague: Státní nakladatelství politické literatury, 1956. Pp. 440. 23.70 Kčs.

This large symposium by an "authors' collective" of five members represents the first attempt to write a systematic and complete history of Czechoslovak foreign policy between the two World Wars. The subject is divided chronologically into six chapters: (1) "Czechoslovak foreign policy, 1918-1923;" (2) . . . in the period of the stabilization of capitalism, 1924-1929" (both chapters are by Dr. V. Soják); (3) . . . in the period of the World Depression, 1929-1933" (by Dr. Miroslav Houštecký); (4) "The attitude of Czechoslovakia towards the policy of collective security, 1933-1935" (by Dr. Alexander Ort); (5) "The growing danger to Czechoslovakia and the participation of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in the policy of supporting Fascist aggression, 1935-1937" (by Dr. Pavel Auersperg); and (6) "Czechoslovak foreign policy in the period of Munich and of the occupation of Czechoslovakia" (by Dr. Zdeněk Tomeš).

The authors have drawn on a wealth of documents, both published and unpublished. They have had access to the archives of the Czechoslovak Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and Justice, of the President's Chancellery, of the National Assembly, and of the Historical Institute of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, as well as to the Central Military Archives. The book has an index, a bibliography (conventionally divided into "Marxist" and "bourgeois" literatures), and appendices reproducing eight documents.

The individual contributions of the authors are carefully coordinated. No overlapping occurs; on the contrary, the authors attain remarkable evenness of treatment and homogeneity of point of view and style. The point of view of the authors is clearly set forth in the introduction: 'The foreign policy of every state grows organically out of its internal policy, is its continuation, and forms with it an integral whole. This derives from the class structure of the state, which has two basic functions: an *internal* (primary) one which expresses the relations between classes in the state, and an *external* (secondary) one which expresses the relations between the given state and other states. . . . In a state ruled by an exploiting class, that is, a bourgeois state such as the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic, the internal function of the state is to hold in check the exploited majority. The external function of the state is to extend . . . its territory in the interest of its ruling class, or to defend its territory against attacks by other states. . . . These fundamental principles apply also to the foreign policy of the Czechoslovak Republic in the years 1918-1938" (p. 9).

Guided by its class interest, the ruling bourgeoisie of Czechoslovakia oriented the country's foreign policy from 1918 to 1938 to the western imperialist-capitalist nations, principally France, and assiduously assisted in all imperialist plots against Soviet Russia. When Nazi Germany—an expression of the ultimate form of capitalist imperialism—launched on a program of territorial expansion, the western bourgeois democracies sacrificed Czechoslovakia to divert Germany's expansive energy eastward against Soviet Russia. The Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, placing its class interest above national interest, refused the proffered help of Soviet Russia against Germany and surrendered Czechoslovakia's independence at Munich.

This is, in a nutshell, the thesis of this book. The style is, in the Marxist tradition, undistinguished: a monotonous mumble, reminiscent of a report to a Party congress, punctuated by Marxist clichés. Except for the highest, personalities are ignored, history being in the Marxist view a result of broad social forces.

This book is open to argument on many grounds. Yet it would be an error to dismiss it as mere Communist propaganda. Czech Marxist historians have not yet sunk to the level of most of their Soviet colleagues. They were all formed before Communism had a monopoly of power in Czechoslovakia, that is, in a period when they had to defend their views in an open forum. They have not yet lost completely the habit of rational argument. Though the authors of this book pay full tribute to Marxist shibboleths, they are not generally content, unlike many Soviet historians, to clinch an argument with cant and quotations from Marxist scriptures, but endeavor to present it on rational grounds. Their conclusions will appear erroneous to non-Marxist historians, but the serious student of the history of Czechoslovakia and of East Central Europe will not ignore this fact-crammed book —at least not until Czechoslovak historians publish an integral collection of documents on Czechoslovak foreign policy in the 1918-1938 period, or until the Czechoslovak Government permits non-Marxist historians access to its archives.

Florida State University VICTOR S. MAMATEY

SCHNEE, HEINRICH, *Die Hoffinanz und der Moderne Staat,* vol. II. *Die Institutionen des Hoffaktorentums in Hannover und Braunschweig, Sachsen und Anhalt, Mecklenburg, Hessen-Kassel und Hanau.* Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, Pp. 367, *and* vol. III. *Die Institutionen des Hoffaktorentums in den geistlichen Staaten Norddeutschlands, an kleinen norddeutschen Fürstenhöfen, im System des absoluten Fürstenstaates;* Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1955. Pp. 359. DM 33 & 35.

This is a detailed study of the role of Jews as court bankers and financiers in the period of absolutism; but contrary to the indication of the main title, these researches are, as the subtitle of the volumes indicates, restricted to the investigation of a certain number of German courts. The general framework is provided by the well-known passages in the second Part of Sombart's classical *Der Moderne Kapitalismus,* esp. vol. I, pp. 334ff. and 720ff. Sombart also published a monograph, *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (1911). These views have been rejected by many Jewish scholars, more especially by B. Altmann (*Jewish Social Studies* V, 178ff.); Selma Stern of the American Jewish Archives treats them with complete silence in her *The Court Jew—A Contribution to the History of the Period of Absolutism in Central Europe* (1950). The author shows Sombart to have been in error, as far as the state is concerned, but is of the opinion that his researches vindicate Sombart's views concerning the Jews and capitalism (p. 253). He believes that "there are inner relations between the Jewish religion and ethics and the successful activity of the court Jews." Sombart's thesis was, to some extent, an extension and modification of Max Weber's celebrated theory about the relation between Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. It, too, has been subjected to withering critical analysis by Tawney, Robertson and Father Kraus, among others. I am inclined to favor Altmann's view that Jews recurrently adapted themselves to the times and their requirements. Arguments in terms of group characteristics are tenuous at best; they explain the known by the unknown, a favorite pastime of myth-makers, but hardly defensible as scientific.

The author cites Sombart's view according to which there are three qualities which make the Jew particularly suited to modern capitalism: the predominance of will, selfishness and the abstractness of their intellectual make-up. He quotes in this connection a bitter remark of Karl Marx who once wrote: "Which is the secular trait of Jewry? The practical need, selfishness (*Eigennutz*). Which is the secular cult of the Jews? Dickering (*Schacher*). Which is his secular God? Money." It seems rather regrettable that in a study that makes such an effort to build its findings on documentary evidence, such asides should be dragged out and given prominence as themes for discussing the role of the Jews in modern economic life. For there is much that is good and solid in these volumes. Nor is Schnee, as just mentioned, an unqualified supporter of Sombart's view. The more extravagant claims of Sombart, linking the Jews with the development of the modern state, he rejects in line with the sharp criticism they encountered at the hands of such renowned scholars as von Below, Felix Rachfahl and Hermann Wätjen. He, like they, rightly insists that Sombart lacked thorough knowledge of or interest in documentary evidence. But even here the "political" attitude intrudes itself. One cannot help gaining the impression that because of the high value placed upon the state, as contrasted with capitalism, the role of the Jews is reduced in importance. Characteristically, the author states that "Prussia's rise and greatness rested upon the army . . ." implemented by a bureaucracy (Beamtentum) and the sacrifices of "Gut and Blut" which all the subjects made in supporting the kings. The author is convinced that the role of court financiers of Jewish background can readily be exaggerated.

Schnee's general conclusions are as follows: (1) Before the Thirty Years' War, the Jewish businessman at the Court (Hoffaktor) is a rare exception; (2) the time from this war down to the Napoleonic wars is the heyday of the Jewish court businessmen, (3) the position of these financiers rested primarily upon the personal relations with the ruler, the court society and the leading officials; (4) payments to influential persons made the position of these financiers secure; (5) the princes and high nobility favored these Jews for personal as well as fiscal reasons; (6) an elaborate system of titles, salary and privileges separated these court Jews from their co-religionists and made them feel themselves to be a caste, an aristocracy; (7) the court Jew was favored by the many small states (Vielstaaterei); (8) the court Jews helped the other Jews; without them there would not have been any emancipation; (9) these court Jews and their descendants gradually infiltrated all branches of public life; (10) these court Jews became Christians and were absorbed into the German people; (11) they were especially readily taken into the élite of wealth and education; (12) the Jewish spirit and a particular aptitude of the Jews for capitalist enterprise promoted the activities of these Jews; (13) they constitute an important part of the organization of the modern state, but they were not decisive; (14) these financiers enabled princes and noblemen to adopt the style of life which expressed itself in the baroque; (15) for the development of Austria as a major power between 1663 and 1740 they were decisive; (15) after 1800 the court Jew gradually disappeared.

The extensive documentary material the author has marshalled in support of his conclusions is impressive. This source material is laid out in many pages of references to the documents (vol. III, pp. 275-322) and in an extensive bibliography (pp. 322-347). Among them P. Sundheimer (for Bavaria), K. O. Müller (for Württemberg) and M. Grunwald (for Austria) are considered especially important. No one who has not worked over at least part of this evidence would be in a position to evaluate the author's presentation in detail. On the whole, his conclusions are moderate, and appear in line with the data he himself offers. But for the general perspectives, it would have been better if the author had looked beyond the German theories readily at hand. Even Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* would have been a help.

Harvard University — Carl J. Friedrich

Tanner, Väinö, *Itsenäisen Suomen arkea. Valikoima puheita.* Helsinki: Tammi, 1956. Pp. 364. 920 Fmks.

The seventy-fifth birthday of Väinö Alfred Tanner, Finland's widely respected Social Democratic leader, was celebrated in many ways, not the least important being the publication of two books about him. One of these, *Kuin kallioon hakattu,* is a compilation of essays dealing with various phases of Tanner's career, written by a group of party associates and scholars, among them Professors L. A. Puntila, Arvi Korhonen, and Heikki Waris.

The second of the literary toasts, *Itsenäisen Suomen arkea* (Independent Finland's Everyday Tasks), is a selection of forty-five talks which Tanner made during the years 1918-1946, for the most part before the Finnish parliament and sundry Socialist party conferences. They have been arranged under seven headings: I. The revival of the working class movement following the disastrous civil war of 1918; II. The socialists in power, 1926-1927; III. The threat to Finnish democracy from fascist-minded movements on the right, 1930-1936; IV. The socialists and the north European orientation, 1932-1938; V. Building a united country, 1936-1938; VI. Finland in the storm of war, 1939-1943; and VII. Postwar Finland, 1944-1946.

Tanner's success as a speaker, this collection clearly reveals, was not based on finely turned figures of speech, emotionally charged words, or theatrical gestures. He sought rather to win his arguments by a straightforward, honest presentation of facts—a veritable mass of facts painstakingly accumulated, effectively organized, soberly delivered. "He does not want to win anything, not even the smallest affair by enticement," wrote a close associate. "Väinö Tanner has always desired to look truth straight in the face and to act accordingly, never seeking refuge in circumvention."

These talks also testify (if further evidence is needed) to Tanner's unswerving devotion to parliamentary democracy, law and order, the achievement of social reform through scrupulous adherence to the processes of peaceful persuasion and the ballot box.

There were, regrettably, a number of political developments in Finland during these years that compelled Tanner to warn and denounce: the reactionary rôle of the civic guards; laws violating freedom of speech and assembly; dangerous flirtations with fascism; chauvinistic tendencies represented by such movements as the IKL. On occasions, Tanner's forthright views were expressed with utter disregard for his own safety or welfare. Yrjö Soini's recent account of the ill-fated war trials, *Kuin Pietari hiilivalkealla: Sotasyyllisyysasian vaiheet, 1944-1949,* portrays the full dimensions of Tanner's honesty and courage.

No one can deny the considerable influence which Tanner exercised during the past quarter century, and it is, of course, impossible to deal with Finland's recent history without coming to grips with him. The task of the historian is greatly facilitated by the wealth of materials which Tanner himself has provided, the most recent, but one hopes not the last, being this very useful selection of his political speeches.

Heidelberg College John I. Kolemainen

Rein, Gustav Adolph, *Die Revolution in der Politik Bismarcks.* Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 360.

Gustav Adolph Rein is interested in eliminating certain stated gaps in our knowledge of the policies and ideas of Bismarck. He believes that the customary conclusion that the Chancellor, while distinctly successful in foreign affairs, was less fortunate in domestic matters is open to a reappraisal, as resting too exclusively on the testimony of contemporaries who opposed him. In *Die Revolution in der Politik Bismarcks* Dr. Rein examines Bismarck's reactions to the phenomena of revolution as experienced or foreshadowed in his age.

Revolution, as here portrayed, is construed in a broad sense. Bismarck generally regarded any consistent and organized hostility toward his policies and work, both internal and international, as being moved by some revolutionary force. Since the author makes no attempt to pass moral judgment or to assess the relative success of diverse policies, the text offers us a sympathetic, as Bismarck-saw-it, exposition of the Chancellor's actions and convictions. As such, it adds to our understanding of one aspect, with wide ramifications, of Bismarck's career.

The author relies mainly on Bismarck's own words as preserved in published speeches, letters, marginal notes, *et cetera,* as well as on the records left by direct witnesses. Here there is a wealth of primary sources since Bismarck prided himself on an outspokeness, often to the point of indiscretion, in an age when statesmen were inclined to permit silence to convey what thoughts it would. The Chancellor, however, was also a realist who tuned his words to the needs of the occasion. The hearer, and the historian, frequently was uncertain as to the meaning of such frankness in a statesman who used "open diplomacy" as an instrument of policy. Bismarck also had the Churchillian gift for apt and colorful phraseology where the artistry of expression can obscure or exaggerate the central thought. Controversy will not be eliminated through added knowledge though the area in which conflict is legitimate will be more clearly staked out.

In the absence of a formal bibliography, the reader must look to the text and footnotes (often rather incomplete) for information on the sources which Dr. Rein consulted. A list of abbreviations of works repeatedly cited is of some help. Even so, an *"an Johanna"* in a footnote gets no farther than *Fürst Bismarcks Briefe an seine Braut und Gattin* in the key to such abbreviations. The editor of published sources is seldom named. This may be enough for anyone familiar with the bibliography of Bismarck's period, but others will feel shortchanged. The volume has an adequate *Personenverzeichnis* but lacks the *Sach-Register* helpful in a work of this chraracter.

The volume traces Bismarck's reaction to different revolutionary threats, his calculated resort to revolutionary forces when needed, and his ability to make minimum compromises with such revolutionary movements as are invested with the legitimacy which hovers over irreparable trends. Bismarck remained a conservative, monarchist and Christian in sentiment, but his conservative friends often lamented his realistic excursions outside of recognized conservative bounds. His call for direct and universal manhood suffrage in 1866 appeared revolutionary even among those who upheld the sanctity of revolutions, although of a less democratic variety. That this move was not just a *ruse de guerre* against Austria and the small German states is demonstrated by the fact that Bismarck to the end believed that the masses, especially the peasants, were essentially monarchist and conservative in temperament. It was a lesson which the events of 1848 had proved to those sharp enough to interpret election results. Bismarck, convinced of the soundness of his policies, on various occasions was ready to appeal his case to popular instinct.

Dr. Rein's volume is an interesting and valuable addition to the literature on Bismarck. Similar studies directing light on neglected aspects will dispel other shadows which hide essential details of the age through which Bismarck strode. A better synthesis will then be possible.

Montana State University OSCAR J. HAMMEN

HANTSCH, HUGO and ALEXANDER NOVOTNY, edd., *Festschrift für Heinrich Benedikt.* Vienna: Verlag Notring d. wissenschaftlichen Verbände Österreichs, 1957. Pp. 244.

Few men will forsake an established career at the age of forty and submit to the academic discipline of the apprentice historian. Such a rare man is Heinrich Benedikt, the object of this tribute from his colleagues. Although his professional entry into historical studies was belated, he has served the profession well. He has enriched the literature and enhanced the dignity of the historians' fraternity. Under the editorial leadership of Hugo Hantsch, historians of five nations have contributed essays as tokens of esteem in which they hold Benedikt.

Even as the historical interests of the *Jubilar* range widely, so do the subjects of the essays in the *Festschrift.* They range in time from Hermann Aubin's review of the historiography and account of the battle of Lechfeld, "Rückblick auf das Jubiläum der Lechfeldschlacht 955-1955," to Arthur May's interesting outline of the development in attitude of Americans and their president toward Austria-Hungary during the first World War, "Woodrow Wilson and Austria-Hungary to the End of 1917." Paul Sweet also treats a twentieth century subject, "Germany, Austria-Hungary and Mitteleuropa, August 1915-April 1916."

For historians of the Enlightenment there is an article, "K. W. Leibniz as a Political Thinker," by Friedrich Hertz and one by Carlo di Vesme on "Il progresso dell' 'Esprit public' nella seconda metà dell' settecento e l'assolutismo illuminato," in which he states that Enlightened Absolutism lost vigor because it enforced measures of public welfare from above without convincing the public that they were intrinsically good. The "esprit public" then did not identify the good of the state with that of the "subjects," already on the way to becoming "citizens."

Hanns Mikoletzky's "Die 'Fräulein-Steuer' " is a most interesting exposition of Maria Theresa's public and private budgetary affairs, and her difficulty in disciplining herself and her government in fiscal problems. Further articles concerned with internal Austrian history are: Hans Kramer, "Die Reisen Franz Josefs I. nach Tirol;" W. M. Plöchl, "Die Propsteipfarre der Votivkirche in Wien;" Albert Hollaender, "Streiflichter auf die Kronprinzen-Tragödie in Mayerling;" and R. A. Kann, "Ein deutsch-böhmischer Bischof zur Sprachenfrage."

Friedrich Engel-Janosi's "Zwei Aspekte der Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und dem Vatikan im Jahre 1870," casts further light on that crucial year in nineteenth century diplomatic history.

Obviously, there is no central theme uniting this book, but in their areas the separate articles are the result of solid scholarship, most of them interestingly presented.

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THE NATIONAL MINORITY QUESTION IN AUSTRIA BEFORE AND AFTER 1918

by Kurt Schuschnigg

AMONG THE best-sellers which have shaped international public opinion on and about the Central-European sector, and have thus indirectly helped to make history, are Silvio Pellico's famous memoirs: *I miei Prigioni.* This authentic human account of ten years spent as political prisoner in the Piombi of Venice and especially at the Spielberg in Brno (Moravia) stands out rather as a verdict pronounced against the very existence of a multinational polity than an indictment against a given political system and the men who represented its authority.[1]

For a hundred years it was widely taken for granted, especially in the English speaking world, that the Spielberg was a Central-European political landmark symbolizing an outdated, oppressive rule of political serfdom. In the nineteenth century view it blocked man's way to freedom, such as in recent Greek perspective does Cyprus for whose liberation from a foreign yoke King Paul of Greece pleaded eloquently on the occasion of his recent State visit in Bonn.[2] In a seemingly endless chain of human tragedy, men with clean conscience, believing in the unwritten law of loyalty to their ethnic groups or nationality, plunged into open conflict with the written law of their political nations or historic states even though bound to face the risk and possible penalty of high treason. Learned and scholarly discussion about natural law as opposed to positivism thus reverberated in political trials.

Whereas even violent and deep-rooted political dissent within a homogeneous national community does not exclude settlement through democratic procedures, provided the opponents agree on commonly accepted standards of conduct and supraordinated basic values and acknowledge the existence of their political nation as a common denominator, national dissent within a given political society, such as a multinational state, renders the application of democratic methods rather difficult and of majority rule all but impossible, unless there exists a genuine federal structure which recognizes at least to some degree component ethnic groups as autonomous federal units.

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[1] Silvio Pellico, 1789-1854, born in Piedmont, poet of the Risorgimento, published "I Miei Prigioni" in 1832, two years after his release from political confinement.

[2] Cf. Keesing's *Archiv der Gegenwart,* XXVI, 37, p. 5979 A: King Paul of Greece to Federal President Th. Heuss on Sept. 17, 1956: "The Greeks of Cyprus claim a sacred right of civilized men . . . My nation is firmly decided to use all legitimate means, until we know our brethren on Cyprus to be free . . ."

Contrary to a widespread opinion it is not lack of democratic institutions, deliberate violations of basic human rights, denial of justice, or bureaucratic deficiencies which explain the undeniable fact that the former Danubian Monarchy fell short of finding a final satisfactory answer to its nationality problems; whereas Russia, survivor in the competitive struggle between organized Central, Central-Eastern, and Eastern Europe before 1918, within her own national borders, apparently did. Hardly anybody would seriously deny that the former Austrian administration compared in every respect favorably with its eastern neighbors.

The successor States, among them Czechoslovakia, which was generally considered as a paradigm of a progressive, humanitarian, parliamentary democracy, did not fare better than, and as to their structure did not differ substantially from, their multinational predecessor. None could do without its Spielberg. None has thus far found a better answer for its nationality problems than forced mass-transfer of population, a remedy unknown in Central Europe since the dark days of the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) and even then practiced in a less radical and more humane way compared with what we have experienced in our life-time.

On the other hand, Switzerland hardly knows national troubles. Apart from her unique position which does not allow analogies with other historic multinational States, it is her different constitutional structure, the organic federalism of a non-parliamentary democracy which has made her the model of a successful multinational federal union. Besides, Switzerland is favored by the compact local settlement of her four ethnic groups, by the particular relation of her numerical strength and by strong, common cultural, economic and political convictions and standards which have worked for peaceful symbiosis within the uncontested politics of a nation whose flag proved more attractive for all than did for some the nationalistic and ideological slogans from beyond the Swiss borders. Neither in Switzerland nor in former Austria did the nationality question ever concern international law, which after 1918 established rules related to minority rights and protection—not in Switzerland because none of her ethnic groups was ever defined or treated as a minority; not in former Austria because of the absence of any absolute national majority within her borders.[3] A comparative analysis of population statistics elucidates the situation:

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[3] Cf. R. A. Kann: *The Multinational Empire,* Vol. 1, 29ff.

Total Swiss population	(approximately) 5,000,000
German Language group	70.8%
French Language group	21.2%
Italian Language group	6.1%
Romansh (Rhaeto-Romans)	1.0%

Out of a total of twenty-five Swiss cantons, the German-Swiss are numerically in the lead with an absolute majority in nineteen cantons, a percentage of over 90% in seventeen; the French-Swiss are numerically superior in five cantons, with a majority ranging from 68% in Fribourg to 85% in Vaud and Neuchâtel. The Italian-Swiss are leading in one canton, Ticino, with a majority of 93%. Only three cantons—Bern, Fribourg, and Graubünden—have substantial linguistic minorities; in Graubünden, 51% belong to the German, 33% to the Romansh, and 15% to the Italian group. The Romansh were granted equal legal status.[4]

The last Austrian pre-war census of 1910 showed a different picture. It was based on the language actually spoken (*Umgangs-Sprache*), as registered in application of the personality principle, and therefore determined by the free decision of the people, irrespective of objective criteria such as the language spoken and ethnic allegiance professed by their parents. The census figures in percentages indicate for former Austria, without the Hungarian part of the Dual-Monarchy, out of a total population of 28,572,000:

German-Austrians	35.6%
Austro-Slavs	60.7%
Austro-Italians	2.7%
Austro-Rumanians	1.0%

In Austria, in marked contrast to Switzerland, no single ethnic group held an absolute majority. For the Slavic element found itself split into five different major groups and nationalities, some of them divided as to culture, historic traditions, and local economic interests; some in open conflict with each other, such as the Poles and the Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Poles and Czechs, Slovenes and Serbo-Croats. The nationality totals in percentages for the whole of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by 1910, with a population of 51,390,000 even more clearly indicate a lack of any national majority group. Thus, the strongest single groups were:

The combined Slavic nationalities with	47.2%
the Germans with	23.9%
the Magyars with	20.2%
the Rumanians with	6.4%
the Italians with	2.0%[5]

The population increase in Austria (without Hungary) was 29% from 1880 to 1910, a total of approximately 6,500,000; but the distribution of the linguistic groups during the same period remained virtually unchanged, with differences in numerical strength of less than 1% up or down in the over-all picture, the only exception being the Poles who increased by almost 3%.

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[4] Cf. *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1955.

[5] Cf. Kann, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, Population statistics, p. 300ff.

These figures allow the safe conclusion that, contrary to a sweeping accusation hurled against the administration of the multinational Austrian State, any large-scale policy of national assimilation or forced denationalization was conspicuously absent. Among the former seventeen Austrian Länder (historic administrative units), six had a German speaking majority of more than 70% (Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Vorarlberg), all of them forming part of the present Austrian Republic. The Czechs were clearly in the lead in two Länder (Bohemia and Moravia), with 63.2% and 71,8% respectively;[6] two Länder (Carniola, Gorizia and Gradisca) were Slovene as to the majority of their population (94.4% and 61.9%); Galicia had a Polish majority of 58.6%; Dalmatia was up to 96.2% Croat; and the Austrian Littoral, including Trieste, showed the dominant position oft he Italians with 63.3%.

The population of the Tyrol, in its historic borders from the Inn Valley to the Lago di Garda, was divided into 57,3% Germans and 42% Italians, including a small group of Rhaeto-Romans. Eventually, three Länder (Bukovina, Silesia, and Istria) formed a condominium of three or more linguistic groups, none of them in a numerical position to form a majority. It was in Bukovina that Ukrainians (Ruthenians) (38.4%), Germans (21.4%), Poles (4.6%) and Magyars (1.3%) found the nearest and most promising approach to their permanent, peaceful symbiosis.[7]

On the other hand, in the territories which once had formed the historic realm of the Bohemian crown (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia), out of a total population of 9,803,880 (census figures of 1910), about 64.2% adhered to the Czech and Slovak group, 35.8% to the German. It was here, more specifically in Bohemia, with a comparatively strong German minority (36.8%) that nationalism on both sides threatened with violent explosions the very existence of a multinational political society.

A retrospective view allows the conclusion that the chances of peaceful compromise decreased with the increased numerical strength and the compact settlement of a German minority; or, as in the case of Galicia (Poles, 58.6%), with the struggle of a privileged historic nation (Poles) against the substantial minority of an ethnic group without recent historic standing of their own (Ukrainians) whose pressure, political consciousness and cultural progress rapidly gained momentum.

On the important field of public education the statistics do not show any deliberate discrimination; e.g., the proportion of German and Slavic elementary schools reflects fairly accurately the numerical strength of the linguistic groups. 1,567,000 German-speaking pupils attended, by 1910, 7794 German grade schools, whereas 2,609,000 Slavic speaking pupils were enrolled in a total of 12,745 Slavic elementary schools. The ratio of schools,

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[6] *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 302; Hugo Hantsch: *Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Österreich* (Wien, 1953) 36ff.

[7] *Ibid.*

38:63, and of school population, 35:58, corresponds by and large to the proportions between the linguistic groups. It is true that the figures related to secondary and vocational schools favor the German group which differed, compared to the others, as to its socio-economic structure and the stronger element of city population.[8]

This paper does not venture an answer to the question whether or not Pre-World-War I Central Europe, with its multinational political organization, could have survived without its coresponsibility for recourse to force in 1914, and the resulting defeat in 1918, which inevitably invited and called for revolution. However, it seems quite possible that exaggerated nationalistic dreams had first to be led *ad absurdum,* before the true meaning, purpose, and, in the long run, necessity of an economic and political Danubian Cooperative had its historic chance to be rediscovered. After all, Central Europe has first served as shield and rampart of the West against potential eastern expansion which has been a historic reality as a permanent threat since the migrations at the beginning of modern times. Secondly, Central Europe with its multitude of national groups and civilizations was the given testing ground for a supranational economic and socio-political integration; and as such an early microcosmic version of modern, broader objectives. It should not primarily be regarded as the battlefield of conflicting national ambitions, but rather as a forerunner of federal conceptions, apt to guarantee liberty for those who would resent German control but at the same time do not want to be absorbed by their Russian neighbour. World War I and, as its result, the disintegration of Central Europe, was decided by the action of the U.S.A.[9] "National self-determination" marked the period between the wars, but the adjustment of this principle to Central European facts, and with this its necessary modification, kept the nationality problem alive and even recreated it after old Austria's disappearance as a matter of international concern in the new form of the national minority question.

Another world war ended with an American victory. The following interim-solution annulled for the time being national self-determination for two thirds of the former Danubian empire, now USSR dependencies. Forced mass-transfer of ethnic groups was tried to settle part of the minority problem, but the nationalities still exist. Neither their own champions of national freedom and independence, functioning as their élites, nor their national electorates, nor the U.S.A. and their western friends and allies had wanted them to become Russian protectorates. The pendulum had swung to the opposite extreme. Perhaps American interference and their own experience were needed to draft the blueprint for new constructive solutions which might even have made a future Central Europe, that had learned a lesson from past mistakes, one of the cornerstones of a long discussed confederation of free European nations.

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[8] The German percentage in secondary schools amounted to an average of over 40%; in vocational schools, over 47%; in business schools, 65%. Cf. Hantsch, *op. cit.,* p. 33.

[9] Cf. Hajo Hollborn: *The Political Collapse of Europe,* p. 85.

Obviously Old Austria is gone forever, and no one need be alarmed in remembering its mistakes and shortcomings, as has been frequently done, or its undeniable achievements and administrative virtues.[10] There is indeed a lot to be said in favor of the former Austrian way of handling delicate nationality questions. There was much shouting and shifting, but less shooting and jailing, fewer victims of insurrection and suppression, than in more recent European attempts to maintain the status quo against people wanting secession or national reunion with foreign kinsmen. Only the Republics of Austria and Hungary, among the successor states of the former Danubian Empire, were created as virtually uninational states, with more than 90% of their population respectively of German or Magyar-speaking extraction. And yet, although numerically insignificant in contradistinction to states like Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and with different accents, they found themselves confronted with a national minority problem within their new borders. We say with different accents because it was no more considered an exclusively domestic matter, for the linguistic minorities, following the former pattern of religious minority protection in Southeastern Europe, had by the Paris treaties, at least in principle, gained immediate and particular legal status under International Law.

For the Austrian Republic, the national minority question remained of a twofold practical relevance: actively, with regard to the Slovenes in Carinthia and the repercussion of their status on Austro-Yugoslav relations; in a passive way, with the assignment of the former Austrian South-Tyrol with its original 260,000 German speaking inhabitants to Italy by the peace treaties. They remained a permanent concern of Austrian public opinion and policy from 1918 to 1938, and from 1945 on.[11]

Any organized and self-conscious national minority fights for full equal rights and equal treatment. Both were solemnly promised to them by the fundamental laws of their former Austrian political nation.[12] Now, as in former times, the foremost objective of minority policy is not amendment, but application of the law as to its letter and spirit. Differently from pre-

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[10] Cf. Adolf Merkel: "Die Legende vom österreichischen Völkerkerker," in "Der Donauraum," *Zeitschrift des Forschungsinstitutes für Fragen des Donauraums* (1956), Vol. I, 41-47.

[11] The Viennese Parliament protested in 1927 against the policy of suppression and denationalization, applied by the Italian Fascist Régime against the ethnic minority in the South-Tyrol. The protest was sharply rebuked by the Italian government. In 1935 Mussolini promised, on intervention by the Austrian Federal Chancellor to permit private instruction in German, to stop Italianization of German family names and granting a political amnesty for German speaking South-Tyroleans. Since the minority rights remained practically ignored, a further Austrian intervention was answered by Mussolini with reference to the geographic settlement: "If the German speaking people would live somewhere in Toscana, they could freely enjoy all national rights they want. In neuralgic border areas national safety does not allow further concessions . . . If (the South-Tyroleans) were living in Austria, you would have to make them responsible for illegal Nazi activities." Cf. also *Enciclopedia Italiana,* App. II, Art. Alto-Adige: "Per un riguardo verso l'amica Austria la politica scolastica subi qualche attenuazione e furono riaperte scuole private tedesche, sotto il controllo delle autorità scholastiche Italiane . . ." However, private German language schools remained practically restricted to German speaking resident aliens.

[12] Austrian Constitutional Laws of 1867, Art. XIX.

World War I days, the controversy now directly affects international relations since violation of national minority, and therefore basic human, rights constitutes international delinquency. Minority complaints center on:

(a) the accuracy of official statistics,
(b) educational and linguistic matters, and on general economic discrimination.

With regard to (a), interested nations produce remarkably different figures as to numerical strength of their linguistic minorities. Thus the Slovene minority in (Austrian) Carinthia amounted, according to the Austrian census, to 29,580; whereas Yugoslavia insisted on a figure above 45,000.[13] Both sides refer to the exactness of their statistical methods. The discrepancy results obviously from a basic difference in semantics. The objective characteristics of a minority group are undisputed; they call for a relevant number of locally organized people who differ as to their ethnic background, language, or religious affiliation, from the majority of the political nation to whom they belong, and deliberately form a cultural community of their own, rejecting assimilation. Americans of Italian, Slavic or German descent may stick together in their own associations in order to cultivate traditions, folklore, and language; but at the same time they desire to be fully assimilated. As a matter of fact, it was for this purpose that they came to the New World, and on this condition that they were admitted. Therefore they do not form a national minority, only societies fully compatible with the norms of an over-all American community.

Whether or not within a given national body genuine national minorities come into existence depends first upon municipal law, and secondarily on the free will of the people concerned. It is the subjective criterion which is frequently contested. Does the fundamental freedom of man extend to his right to change not only his political nation, which is beyond question, but also his ethnic affiliation? The American answer would be "yes," as far as his merely linguistic or cultural community is concerned. The same position was taken by former and present Austria. Therefore, the Austrian census figures intend to reflect the free will and decision of the interrogated people.

The opposite opinion denies the individual right to change *ad libitum,* because a man's ethnic affiliation is considered part of his nature. According to this view only objective criteria count; the group interest, and hence the collective aspect, prevails; racial thinking decides the issue. Thus although an individual might never have spoken, e.g., a German word in his life, having been born and raised, let us assume, in the formerly autonomous Volga-Republic, where his German ancestors had settled down centuries ago in the midst of Slavic surroundings, the racial theory considered him still an "ethnic German" and as such he found himself one day as an expellee. The former Central European approach to nationality questions was dismetrically opposed to racism. Because political group-self-determination failed, because of its impracticability, and was bound to fail because of the Central European geographic and ethnographic conditions, and because of many historic servitudes, referred to as *"Historisches Staatsrecht,"* ethnic and cultural self-determination of individual men widely took its place. This was originally expressed in standards of contractual minority protection, and later in emphasis on individual liberty under international law.

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[13] Memorandum of the Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber in answer to the Deputy Foreign Minister Bebler of Yugoslavia, in discussion of the Austrian State Treaty, referring to the census figures of Carinthia. Cf. Keesing's *Archiv,* XIX, 1840 D.

Retrospectively and comparatively seen, it should be noticed that nationality treatment in old Austrian practice, fair or unfair in objective judgment, including the numerical preponderance of the German-speaking element in the central administration,[14] as well as the position of Jewish or any other religious minorities, showed at any rate complete absence of direct or indirect racist approaches and served, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, the conception of a supranational political society.

It is of course true that racist intolerance and thought sometimes embittered locally, in linguistic border regions and around national enclaves, the competitive struggle between ethnic groups, and assumed in certain cases even fake religious connotations. But this was without exception, definitely against the intentions and interests of the central administration whose failure was not caused by oppressive methods and an often condemned "divide and rule" concept, but rather by institutional weakness. The latter, unfortunately and against expectations, did not improve by the introduction of a general franchise (1907), and expressed itself in lack of control, absence of leadership and unpredictable vacillations.

Once more, retrospectively and comparatively seen, national minorities did not suffer because of a poor and unsufficient legal system, but rather because of a deficiency in law enforcement. On the other hand, under the racist aproach, with its superiority-inferiority relations, a wrong and rotten law was consistenly enforced to the detriment of the *"Volksgruppen,"* as national minorities were called in national-socialist translation. Denial of the right of individual self-determination smacks of racist trends and nationalistic intolerance. Statistics based on freely declared popular preferences and choices should in principle be considered authentic, and the burden to prove illegal pressure should be laid on the complainant, the more so if the latter happens to be a foreign power, acting on behalf of its ethnic relatives living beyond its national borders.

With regard to (b): The paramount right of the linguistic minority and the most frequent complaint about its violation centers nowadays invariably first around educational facilities and school laws.

The Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955, enumerates in Article 7 the rights of the Slovene and Croat minorities; it follows by and large the fundamental provisions of the famous Article XIX of the Fundamental Laws of 1867, which granted all nationalities legal equality and especially the right to their own public schools on the elementary and secondary levels. This Article XIX has been supplanted by the Peace Treaty of St. Germain which adapted its provisions to the needs of the small minority groups remaining within the borders of the newly established Austrian Republic whose constitution (Article 8) declared German as her official language (*Staatssprache*). In "districts" where in proportion to the total local population a "considerable number" of inhabitants belonged to a national minority group, elementary schools had to provide facilities for the use of the minority language as the language of instruction. Whether the term district, used in the original text, referred to a court-or any administrative district, such as a county, or to any compact settlement, such as a municipality, was not defined; nor did there exist an exact definition of the numerical strength required for a minority to be recognized in matters of public education. Following the general standards set by a Czechoslovak statute of 1920, a minimum of 20% of the total population in any given district was considered to constitute a relevant "considerable proportion."[15] With the Treaty of St. Germain and the State Treaty of 1955, Austria assumed an obligation under international law regarding the rights of her national minorities. Whereas the relations with the Croat minority group, living near to the Hungarian border in the Burgenland developed without any friction, certain difficulties arose regarding the Slovenes in Carinthia, caused and aggravated by originally maintained, and later on dropped, territorial claims of neighbouring Yugoslavia, based on the grounds of ethnic affinity.[16] The situation in Carinthia was complicated by the existence of a linguistic group between Germans and Slovenes which, undoubtedly of Slavic origin, speaks an idiom different from the literary Slovene language and whose allegiance is claimed by both ethnic groups: by the Slovenes for reasons of ethnic background, by the Germans by declared preference. The existence of the "Windish" people, as they are called, is easily explained by centuries of symbiosis of both ethnic groups in Carinthia, in separation from the former Austrian province Carniola, with its Slovene center Ljubljana and its more than 90% Slovene population.

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[14] Cf. Hantsch, *op cit.*, pp. 30, 32, as to the social structure of the nationalities in Austria. Cf. Kann, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, App. 5, as to the German share in Central Bureaucracy, p. 313.

The last Austrian language census for Carinthia (1951) indicates nine different linguistic shades, according to applied self-determination of the interrogated people: besides straight German and Slovenes, there are the "Windish," and bilingual combinations, such as German-Slovene, German-Windish, Slovene-German, Slovene-Windish, Windish-German and Windish-Slovene. All these groups except the straight Germans amounted to 45,970 out of a total population in Carinthia of 476,664. Only 7707 professed to be straight Slovenes and appear as such in the census figures, but all 45,970 are from a racist angle claimed as members of the Slovene minority with all the implications on the matter of minority schools.[17] The controversy eventually burns down to the point whether it should be up to the discretion of the parents in which language their children should be taught, or whether objective criteria, such as blood and ancestry, have to decide the issue; in other words, whether individual self-determination should be recognized.

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[15] Cf. L. Adamovich: *Grundriss des Österreichischen Verfassungsrechts* (1947), p. 367, n. 2.

[16] Yugoslavia claimed (Memorandum of Feb. 18, 1946) for historic, geographic and ethnic reasons Austrian territory with 130,000 people of Slavic nationality (in Carinthia and Styria); Tito's address to the Skupschtina on April 1, 1946; cf. Keesing's *Archiv* XVI, 701 E.

The Austrian administration provided thus far obligatory bilingual education in districts with mixed population; whereas in old Austria nobody could be forced against his will to learn a second language, bilingual training in mixed districts was now introduced as an expedient, not however, without serious local opposition.[18] By 1953, 843,842 pupils were enrolled in Austrian elementary schools; 5358 of them declared Slovene or Windish as their original language. A definite solution was not yet decided on. The draft of a new basic law regarding matters of school and education (1948) provided minority schools on the elementary and secondary level for districts with a minimum enrollment of thirty students. Enrollment depends upon the free choice of the parents, and the right of individual self-determination is expressly recognized. Whether or not this or any similar draft has a chance to become law remains to be seen, since according to the federal constitution a two-thirds majority of the parliament is required for its enactment.[19]

Entirely different as to its nature and main aspects is the problem of the German-speaking minority of Italian citizens in the former Austrian South-Tyrol, now the province of Bolzano (Bozen) in the Trentino-Alto-Adige region. There is no Italian ethnic minority living on Austrian territory, but by an international treaty, concluded between Italy and Austria (De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement) in Paris on Sept. 5, 1946, ratified by the Italian parliament in 1948, and incorporated into the Italian Peace Treaty, Austria became a recognized party to a formal accord on the protection of the South-Tyrolean minority in Italy.[20]

Austrian efforts after World War II were concentrated first on the demand for a plebiscite in the German-speaking South-Tyrol to whom the right of self-determination had been denied in 1918, when it was against the clear wishes of its population transferred to Italy. The total area in question covers 2851 square miles with a population of 342,000 (1953), 66% of them being German speaking Tyroleans. After all attempts to reach a solution either by a plebiscite or by way of a territorial compromise through frontier rectifications proved abortive the agreement concluded under the auspices of the powers except USSR was intended to guarantee the preservation of the ethnic character and the protection of the economic interests of the South-Tyrol by granting to its population the exercise of legislation and administrative rights on a regional basis. In particular the German-speaking people of the province of Bolzano were assured of their right.

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[17] Cf. Keesing's *Archiv*, XXII, 3353 C.

[18] Cf. Kann, *Op. cit.*, I, 196ff. as to the language problem in old Austria

[19] Cf. *Zahlenmaessige Darstellung des Schulwesens in Oesterreich*, Vol. 2, published by Bundesministerium fuer Unterricht, Schuljahr 1952/53, Tabelle 17: die Muttersprache und Unterichtssprache der Schuler, p. 32.

In 1958 the provincial government of Carinthia amended the law decree of 1945 which provided obligatory bilingual schools in mixed districts. The parents were given the right to decide whether they wanted bilingual training of their children to be continued. The parents of 83% or about 10,700 children voted against it. According to this vote only about 2,200 children remain enrolled in a bilingual curriculum. Yugoslavia filed a complaint in Vienna against what in her interpretation constitutes a violation of national minority rights by Austria.

Likewise in 1958 a Slovene high school (Gymnasium) was founded by the Austrian government as a minority school on the secondary level.

Cf. *Sued-Ost Tagespost*, Graz, edit. Oct. 24, 1958.

For the Slovene point of view, cf. Dr. Josef Tischler, *Die Sprachenfrage in Kaernten vor 100 Jahren und Heute*, Klagenfurt, verlegt vom "Rat der Kaerntner Slovenen," 1957.

[20] Cf. Keesing's *Archiv* XVI, 861 D, Austrian Information (New York) IX, 18, p. 8.

(1) to elementary and secondary schools of their own,
(2) to parification of the Italian and German languages in public offices and official documents, as well as in bilingual topographic naming,
(3) to reestablish German family names which had been subject to forced Italianization in recent years.
(4) to equality in competition for public office with a view to reaching an apropriate proportion of employment between both ethnic groups.[21]

The international agreement emphasized as its objective the guarantee of a "complete equality of rights" and the establishment of good neighborly relations between Austria and Italy. It was incorporated as Annex IV into the Italian Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947.[22] While this treaty, concluded in the post-war atmosphere of international understanding and reconciliation, appeared as a promising start headed toward continental integration, its performance soon fell short of the original plan. As a consequence new tensions and misgivings eventually developed, with public opinion boiling on both sides of the national border.

Italy accuses her German-speaking minority of irredentist trends and occasionally Austria of unwarranted interference in Italian domestic affairs. On the other hand the Austrian public remembers the classical methods of the "Irredenta," no doubt an original Italian political trade-mark; whereas the inhabitants of the South-Tyrol would be perfectly happy and satisfied if granted the rights their Italian brethren and co-nationals had enjoyed under the administrative practice of the Austrian *ancien régime.* As Robert Kann points out, "The Italian national position (within the Austrian empire) in due course became more favorable than that of almost any of the other smaller national groups."[23] E. Reutt-Nicolussi in his "Das altösterreichische Nationalitätenrecht in Welschtirol" (1929) arrives at the same conclusion.

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[21] *Austrian Information* (New York) IX, 18, p. 9; for population figures see also *Enciclopedia Italiana,* App. II, Art. Alto-Adige.

[22] Paris Agreement of Sept. 5, 1946, sec. 1, 3; Art. 10 of Italian Peace Treaty and Annex IV; cf. Keesing's *Archiv,* XVII, 1005 F; for background of Paris Agreement cf. Karl Gruber: *Between Liberation and Liberty,* 66-71.

[23] Cf. Kann, *Op. cit.,* Vol. 1, 265.

As a matter of fact, none of these groups was threatened in its essentially ethnic existence. The main gravamina brought forward by both sides are, first from the Italian view, that the German-speaking minority lacks loyalty to its political nation and, inspired by the motives and methods of the former Italian Irredenta, considers autonomy as a stepping-stone for secession. It is referred to the fact that in 1939,[24] out of a total of 253,953 South-Tyroleans, 179,503 exercised their right of option for Germany, and only 31,515 for Italy; 72,749 had actually been transferred to Germany by December 31, 1942.

From the Austrian view, in support of the minority complaints, it is maintained that the treaty was not fulfilled either as to its letter or to its spirit: first because the regional autonomy was vested with a regional council composed of the diets of the Bolzano and Trentino provinces, the latter being the larger and predominantly Italian-speaking area; as a result the outvoted German-speaking minority was deprived of its right of self-government,[25] second, contrary to the stipulations of the international agreement, German was admitted as a merely auxiliary language and civil positions were practically denied to the minority group; third, because forced industrialization and planned influx of Italian labor was bound to change the economic structure and to threaten the very existence of the German speaking group. According to Italian statistics the percentage of the Italian population in the province of Bolzano increased from 3% in 1910 to 8% by 1921, 24% by 1939, and 34% by 1953. The German speaking populations of the cities Bolzano, Merano, and Bressanone (Bozen, Meran and Brixen) amounted to 95% in 1910, 80% in 1921, 50% in 1937, and fell to about 30% in 1953.[26]

The practical conclusions indicate that, while in the period before 1918 the nationality struggle in Central European areas with mixed population or in territories near linguistic or political border lines centered on the fair application of national law which guaranteed legal equality, the main concern of present national minority policy in the same area is mere survival and the effectiveness of provisions under international contractual law to safeguard its ethnic character.

On the other hand, it should be easier now than ever before to find fair and satisfactory answers serving the ultimate interests of all parties involved. The argument of national security which insisted on the necessity for strict conformity, especially in border regions, obviously lost much of its former meaning. National boundaries hardly count any more in matters of national security, and the acceptance in principle of at least some kind of European integration calls clearly for abandoning of nineteenth-century style nationalistic clichés. Cultural and administrative autonomy for linguistic minorities, voluntarily granted and liberally interpreted by their political nation, in discharge of freely acknowledged international obligations, would constitute a constructive and inexpensive element in the organization of European peace and international cooperation. Moreover, it would be a convincing answer in the ideological struggle with the Soviet orbit as to its interpretation of self-determination and the status of nationalities in international law. Thus far, mutual distrust in Central Europe has delayed further progress. The lessons from past Central European history have taught that minority problems became insoluble only when, because of delayed action and neglected opportunities, emotional mass-appeal supersedes practical thinking. In more recent times it appeared too often that an aroused public opinion, which easily gets out of control, has its way only by threat of force or recourse to violent action. Indignant references by parties to a Central European minority conflict to the example set by Cyprus or North Africa, as repeatedly found in press comments, are objectively inconclusive because of a basically different situation. But, unfounded as they might be, they deserve to be registered as the reaction of public opinion.

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[24] Cf. Art. Alto-Adige in *Enciclopedia Italiana*, App. II.

[25] The province of Bolzano has an area of 2851 sq. m. with 333,934 pop.; the province of Trento has an area of 2395 sq. m. with 394,625 pop. (Census 1951). Since the province of Trento is solidly Italian and the regional council is composed of representatives of the provincial diets, the German speaking group is in all matters concerning autonomous legislation and administrative authority outvoted by a substantial Italian majority.

[26] As to population trends in towns and the open country, cf. *Austrian Information* (New York) IX, 18, p. 7; cf. Art. Bolzano in *Enciclopedia Italiana*, App. II: "Ten years before the war . . . because of industrial development and the influx of Italian labor, the Italian percentage of the population had increased to 33%.

"According to data disclosed in the official census report published from the office of the Italian Prime Minister, the South Tyrolean population increased by 38.2% from 1918 to 1953. The same source revealed that there was a concomitant decrease of 11.2% in German-speaking residents and an increase of no less than 1.720% in the Italian speaking population." (Quoted from *Austrian Information*, IX, 18, p. 15).

Free Europe can hardly afford a hostile climate in the international relations among its member States. National minority problems are the last remnants of a former historic antagonism between neighbors. It is quite possible that the national governments concerned, because of the pressure of public opinion in their respective countries, lost their freedom of action. Voluntary submission of the disputes to international arbitration remains the most promising approach to final settlement. The United Nations Charter and the International Court provide the necessary machinery.[27]

St. Louis, Missouri

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[27] For a selected bibliography to the nationality problem cf. Kann, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 377, and H. Hantsch, *op. cit.*, 112ff.

IMPERIAL GERMANY'S TRAGIC ERA, 1888-1918: THRESHOLD TO DEMOCRACY OR FOREGROUND OF NAZISM?

by John L. Snell

FOR THIRTY years—the human generation that separated the Europe of Bismarck from the Europe of Lenin—William II reigned over Imperial Germany's last hour in history. Two years after donning the Hohenzollern crown in 1888 the new King-Emperor ousted Bismarck and thus began the "Wilhelmian era" proper. In terms of *Zeitgeist* rather than of dynastic chronology, the era ended in 1914, for the outbreak of war brought sudden changes in the domestic values and institutions that the term "Wilhelmian" suggests. Defeat four years later marked the definitive end of the period: while a new silence on the western front closed the first campaign in modern Germany's struggle for hegemony in Europe, a new sound of shots in Germany's cities simultaneously signaled her enforced entry into the democratic era. They began a continuing revolution which, in radically changing forms, has lasted to the present and is not yet ended. Comparable to the year 1642 in the long history of England's Puritan revolution or to 1789 in France, 1918 closed a tragic era and exacted from the leaders of Imperial Germany the eternal penalty which awaits those who tragically grapple against evolutionary forces. Why they failed to transform these forces into orderly domestic progress should interest not only Germans but much of the human race, for the even greater tragedy of Germany's continuing revolution has been, by a cruel generosity, widely shared. This article will review the post-1945 historiography of the era and suggest some new approaches to it.

The Wilhelmian era has long been of interest to historical scholarship. Indeed, it was being subjected to historical analysis and critical interpretations long before its demise. A historian, *Ludwig Quidde,* as early as 1894 put into published words the misgivings many Germans felt for William II and *Erich Brandenburg* in 1917 handed down the following premature epitaph for the era of William II: "Compared with the fruitfulness and the successes of the Bismarckian period, it was a time of little men [*Epigonen*] and of unstable searchers for new goals."[1]

Collapse in 1918 was followed by an unprecedented opening of archives and early publication of memoirs. Political exigencies provided scholars with motivations as well as sources, and the years of the Weimar Republic saw a flourishing of contemporary history in Germany such as Europe seldom experiences. By 1933 a very large body of historical literature on the Wilhelmian era had been published.[2] *Conrad Bornhak* (conservative) and *Johannes Hohlfeld* (nationalist and liberal) by 1924 had published general histories which treated the Wilhelmian era in some detail. But the most important Weimar-era works of a general nature were the multi-volume histories of the Second Empire by *Adalbert Wahl* and *Johannes Ziekursch* and the one-volume history of the origins of the republic by *Arthur Rosenberg*.[3] Each in its own way was partisan, but all three remain indispensable works.

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[1] Erich Brandenburg, *Fünfzig Jahre nationalliberale Partei 1867-1917* (Berlin, 1917), 24.

[2] See, e.g., Mary E. Townsend, "Some Recent Publications Dealing with the Reign of William II, *Journal of Modern History,* III (1931), 474-481.

Adalbert Wahl devoted the last two of his four volumes on the Second Empire to the period 1888-1914. These cover years of his own impressionable maturity (Wahl was seventeen in 1888) and he wrote of them in a highly subjective manner. Wahl's long "chapter" on the cultural tendencies of the era (III, 1-149) reads more like a *Zeitkritik* than a history, for example. Yet, in it he more nearly did for the age what Franz Schnabel did for the early nineteenth century than any general historian who had yet approached this difficult period. Johannes Ziekursch devoted the last of his three volumes to the Wilhelmian era, emphasizing foreign relations and the rôle of personalities. His Caprivi emerges in a favorable light; he treats Hohenlohe with sympathy, but makes clear his weakness and unfitness for his job; Bülow is accurately revealed as an able but unprincipled performer, while his successor, Bethmann Hollweg, is found long in principles but short in ability. In all this William II does not appear as the dominant force who shaped his times but as a weak man, overly emotional in temperament, facing tasks that were much too large for him. Ziekursch's liberal account was and remains in outlook a valuable counterbalance to the conservatism of the Wahl history. Arthur Rosenberg found little space in his well-known volume for portraits of personalities, and dismissed the pre-1914 years with a few pages of sweepingly determinist generalizations. The Second Empire, in Rosenberg's view, was "mortally ill from the days of its birth." Presupposing in good Marxist fashion an "irreconcilable conflict between the middle class and Prussianism" even before 1871, Rosenberg was preoccupied with another class conflict which to him was even more significant, that of the socialist proletariat against the bourgeois-Junker empire. What made the Rosenberg volume valuable was its detailed account of the growing discontent of German socialists and the working class during World War I, culminating in the revolution of early November, 1918. Translated into English soon after publication, the Rosenberg volume has remained until now the standard account in English of Germany's sudden capitulation into the era of republican democracy.[4]

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[3] Conrad Bornhak, *Deutsche Geschichte unter Kaiser Wilhelm II,* 3rd and 4th rev. ed. (Leipzig and Erlangen, 1922); Johannes Hohlfeld, *Geschichte des deutschen Reiches 1871-1924* (Leipzig, 1924); Adalbert Wahl, *Deutsche Geschichte von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (1871 bis 1914),* 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1926-1936); Johannes Ziekursch, *Politische Geschichte des neuen deutschen Kaiserreiches,* 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1925-1930); Arthur Rosenberg, *The Birth of the German Republic, 1871-1918,* Ian F. D. Morrow, trans. (London, 1931). A new German edition of the Rosenberg volume has been issued along with his history of the Weimar Republic in one volume: *Entstehung und Geschichte der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt, 1955).

[4] Supplementary information and new interpretations may be found in John L. Snell, *Germany Enters the Democratic Era,* which should appear in 1959.

The Hitler era slowed and distorted but did not stop the output of books and articles about the last imperial generation. A two-volume Nazi interpretation of the era by *Hans Lohmeyer* illustrates an interesting historiographical phenomenon.[5] In externals the Loymeyer volumes strike one as a typical Nazi product: the jingoistic preface, the special chapter devoted to *Führerprobleme,* another on the *"grossdeutsche Frage,"* and special emphasis upon Germany's international relations, all these are in organization and dogma what one would expect. The really interesting feature of Lohmeyer's analysis, however, is its similarity to the left-liberal or socialist criticisms by Ziekursch, Rosenberg, and others. This points to one of the historically most significant features of the reign of the last Kaiser: in its moderation, indecisiveness, and zig-zag policies between authoritarianism and freedom, Junker-autocracy and egalitarianism, chauvinism and restraint in international affairs, in short, in its wavering between Right and Left, the régime left almost everyone unhappy. Lohmeyer's Nazi verdict is expressed in words which Arthur Rosenberg himself or other Marxists might well have written: "The Second Reich collapsed because it could not surmount its class antagonisms" (II, 548).

Interest in the Wilhelmian period was tremendously revived by a new collapse and new political and cultural experiments after 1945. For more than ten years, now, both West-German and East-German historians have diversely sought to discover heritages in the pre-Nazi years that befit the new Germanies of the post-Hitler era. A great many unpublished doctoral dissertations on specific aspects of the period have been written in Germany.[6] A new and very useful biographical dictionary for German history finds ninety-three personalities in this age of "Epigones" worthy of inclusion.[7] The appearance of popular biographies of William II and articles about his era for popular consumption attest to a widespread interest in the *Wilhelminische Epoche.*[8]

Several general accounts are among the post-World War II publications which merit the interest of students of the Wilhelmian period. *Carl Misch,* pre-1933 political editior of the *Vossische Zeitung,* has produced a conventional account, systematically organized, clearly written, usually accurate in facts and seldom original in interpretation.[9] *Koppel S. Pinson* has produced a different history altogether, except for its generally liberal point of view and clarity of expression. He devotes most of his space for the Wilhelmian period to economic, social, and cultural trends. A rather long and highly perceptive chapter on the growth of German socialism and one on the rise of political Catholicism provide excellent statements on two major trends in the domestic politics of the Imperial era.[10] Three other more general works on modern Germany, those by *Minna R. Falk,*[11] *Ralph Flenley,*[12] and *John A. Hawgood*[13] provide much briefer glimpses of the last thirty years of the *Kaiserreich.* Another general work that might be mentioned here is an old companion with a fresh make-up job, *Ludwig Bergsträsser's* survey history of the origins and growth of political parties in Germany, completely reworked for the first time since 1932.[14] The social history of the Wilhelmian era comes in for anthropological treatment in another general work by *Robert H. Lowie.*[15] For sources, Lowie has made extensive use of the old props of cultural history, contemporary works of fiction. In deciding which should be trusted as representative Lowie falls back upon the time-tried last resort of many a frustrated historian: "there is no substitute for sound judgments" (p. 21). His generalizations often sound more like theses for debate than like scientific conclusions. And yet Lowie is interested in facets of historical experience which historians of Germany should treat but seldom do. For this reason, and because it should provoke them to undertake research of their own, the Lowie volume is worth the serious attention of students of the Wilhelmian era.

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[5] Hans Lohmeyer, *Die Politik des zweiten Reiches 1870-1918,* 2 vols. (Berlin, 1939). See also the various items on the period that are listed in Walther Holtzmann and Gerhard Ritter, *Die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft im zweiten Weltkrieg,* Vol. II: *Mittelalter und Neuzeit* (Marburg-Lahn, 1951).

[6] An indication of the amount of work done at the student level is offered by Alfred Milatz and Thilo Vogelsang (eds.), *Hochschulschriften zur neueren deutschen Geschichte: Eine Bibliographie . . . 1945-1955* (Bonn, 1956).

[7] Hellmuth Rössler, Günther Franz, and Willy Hoppe (eds.), *Biographisches Wörterbuch zur deutschen Geschichte* (Munich, 1953).

[8] See, e.g., Walter Goetz, "Kaiser Wilhelm II. und die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung," *Historische Zeitschrift,* CLXXIX (1955), 265-278. See also: Andreas Dorpalen, "Wilhelmian Germany—A House Divided Against Itself," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XV (1955), 240-247.

[9] Carl Misch, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Massen: Von der französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart, 1952).

The veteran French historian, *Edmond Vermeil,* is another scholar who has shown a penchant for using German *belles-lettres* and philosophical literature as sources for sweeping generalizations about German national character. But Vermeil's conclusions differ radically from Lowie's, as when he writes about the vigorous anti-Semitism of Wilhelmian Germany. In 1952 he put in one volume his mature views on the Wilhelmian era, half of a two-volume work on "contemporary Germany."[16] He agrees with other critics that William II was a weak person and that he talked too much, but does not concede that he abused his powers through "personal government." Vermeil contends that the leaders of the state were inferior to their tasks, while the political parties were "incapable of uniting in order to exercise power" (p. 190). Vermeil sees the Wilhelmian era, therefore, as one of "permanent crisis," and devotes much space to its socio-economic conditions. He emphasizes the dangers of overpopulation, the disequilibrium between agriculture and industry, and the *"sinistre visage"* of misery in the great cities. And he seems to anticipate unduly the still distant Hitlerian tragedy in writing that this was the age in which Germany, preoccupied above all with material success, "sacrificed her liberties, perhaps her culture, to her dream of impossible grandeur" (84). There is much of Rosenberg's fatalism, economic determinism, and dogmatism in all this, a kind of "metahistory" which is pervaded by an anti-German *mystique.*

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[10] Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization* (New York, 1954).

[11] Minna R. Falk, *History of Germany from the Reformation to the Present Day* (New York, 1957).

[12] Ralph Flenley, *Modern German History* (New York, 1953).

[13] John A. Hawgood, *The Evolution of Germany* (London, 1955).

[14] Ludwig Bergsträsser, *Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland,* 8th and 9th ed. (Munich, 1955). This volume may be usefully supplemented by: Wilhelm Mommsen, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme: Eine Auswahl vom Vormärz bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 1952), and Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme, 1861-1956* (Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, 1956).

[15] Robert H. Lowie, *Toward Understanding Germany* (Chicago, 1954).

[16] Edmond Vermeil, *L'Allemagne contemporaine: sociale, politique et culturelle, 1890-1950,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1952-1953). An abridgement in English, which reduces the 301 pp. of the original on the Wilhelmian era to 31 pp., is: *Germany in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Cultural History of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich* (New York, 1956).

The impact of all these general works has been greatly exceeded by that of a stout volume which *Erich Eyck* published in 1948 on the Wilhelmian era.[17] This German-born historian-turned-business-man-turned-historian, writing in England in German and publishing in Switzerland, reawakened a great controversy in Germany with his portrayal of the era as one of "personal government." Himself a pre-1914 Naumannist-Progressive, Eyck devoted 785 pages of text to the Wilhelmian period, more than twice as much as Ziekursch gave. Even more than Ziekursch, Eyck emphasized diplomatic history. His book is less restrained than Ziekursch's, and indeed is marked throughout by a breezy sarcasm. Eyck is remorseless in his condemnation of William II, treating him as a vain and capricious man of morbid suspicions, a man who was "in the depths of his soul nothing but an applause-loving actor . . ." (p. 83). Accurately stated, Eyck's thesis is not that of "personal government" but that of "personal misgovernment." He argues that the Kaiser lacked courage as well as ability, chose men for top positions haphazardly, neglected to develop a consistent policy, and failed to support those who showed signs of vigor and determination. Instead, writes Eyck, only one motto held for all problems of state in the empire of William II: *"Quieta non movere . . ."* (p. 60).

Eyck finds much to blame besides the Kaiser himself. He deplores the schism of the Progressives in the 1890's. He deplores the power of the Center Party in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, viewing it as the dominant party of the era, one "with which every government had to reckon" in order to maintain itself (p. 108 and *passim*). He deplores the system of government, which put supreme power in the hands of a single individual. And he deplores the political immaturity and weakness of "the German people in its entirety" (p. 501), contending that the German people "never conceived the firm desire for . . . reform, not even after the warning bell of the Daily Telegraph interview . . ." (pp. 782-783). It is easy to see why German scholars have found it impossible to ignore the Eyck account, like it or not.

Ludwig Reiners in a popularized interpretation of the decline of the empire treats the last Kaiser as "an element of unrest," whereas a monarch should be an embodiment of stability.[18] Yet, the author acknowledges that the German Empire collapsed primarily because it was defeated in World War I. He is less convincing in pressing his thesis that the defeat grew out of the human failures of the men who led the German Empire after 1890, but sparks his presentation of this thesis with brilliant pen portraits of the major personalities.

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[17] Erich Eyck, *Das persönliche Regiment Wilhelms II.: Politische Geschichte des deutschen Kaiserreiches von 1890 bis 1914* (Erlenbach-Zürich, 1948).

The more specific post-1945 studies which are to be reviewed here may be grouped around five themes which seems to bring to focus the complex and refractory tendencies of Wilhelmian Germany. These five themes are: (1) attempts to preserve the Imperial régime and the society upon which it was based; (2) extreme contemporary intellectual criticisms—amounting to repudiations—of the political régime, social institutions, and moral values of Wilhelmian Germany; (3) movements for political and social democracy; (4) harbingers of what history would later define and condemn as National Socialism; and (5) the intensification of these contradictory forces and their interaction in World War I. These five themes suggest features of the Wilhelmian era which should continue to attract the attention of historical scholarship.

II

Forces of preservation in the prewar Wilhelmian Reich have been the subject of a number of studies since World War II. The lack of specific monographs on the domestic policies of the post-Bismarckian chancellors invited a sequence of dissertations at Kiel about 1950. Done under the direction of the late Otto Becker, these dissertations remain unpublished. The dissertations by *Gunther Blieffert* on Hohenlohe (1894-1900), *Wolfgang Neumann* on Bülow's first six years (1900-1906), *Hans-Georg Hartmann* on Bülow's last three years (1906-1909), and *Brigitte Haberland* on the peacetime policies of Bethmann Hollweg (1909-1914) will be treated here. Typical postwar German dissertations, they were done more hurriedly than scholarly work should ideally be done, under circumstances that were far from ideal. All the authors used the manuscript reports of several Bundesrat plenipotentiaries to supplement the minutes of the Reichstag and the Prussian Chamber of Deputies and large bodies of material from other standard secondary and published primary sources. All of them attempted to test Eyck's judgments, and the net result of them all is more a confirmation than a denial of Eyck's interpretation.

Gunther Blieffert made use of certain Hohenlohe manuscripts in his study, and more vigorously than convincingly seeks to rehabilitate the reputation of the third chancellor.[19] Wolfgang Neumann emphasizes the part that Philipp Eulenburg played in bringing Bülow to the Kaiser's attention and in pressing for his advancement, and the part which petty interests played in shaping Bülow's policies.[20] It is not a flattering likeness of Bülow that Neumann gives us, but that of an opportunistic *Streber,* willing to serve as a mouthpiece for the Kaiser. "Through his attitude toward the monarch, he advanced personal rule as no other Chancellor before or after him" (p. 189). Like Neumann, Hans-Georg Hartmann contends that a creative and energetic man of integrity might have shored up the foundations of monarchy with democratic reforms, but that Bülow lacked the qualifications.[21] In its details this study occasionally supplements not only Eyck but the more specific volumes by *Georg Vogel, George Dunlap Crothers,* and *Theodor Eschenburg.*[22] New material of real significance is not to be found here, however. The standard interpretation of Bethmann Hollweg is offered with greater detail in the dissertation by Brigitte Haberland. Haberland's objective and detailed account of the failure of Bethmann's suffrage reform efforts is followed by systematic surveys of the development of a tax on unearned increments, the new Imperial Insurance Law of 1911, the improvement of the status of the people of Alsace-Lorraine in 1911, and military reforms. In an even more significant monograph, *Hans-Günter Zmarzlik* argues persuasively that Bethmann's ability to carry through reforms was limited less by his personal failures than by his dependence upon the support of the Kaiser.[23]

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[18] Ludwig Reiners, *In Europa gehen die Lichter aus: Der Untergang des wilhelminischen Reiches* (Munich, 1954).

[19] Gunther Blieffert, "Die Innenpolitik des Reichskanzlers Fürst Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst 1894-1900," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kiel, 1949. The Historisches Seminar, Kiel, kindly made possible the loan of this and the other Kiel dissertations mentioned below.

All of these dissertations suggest new opportunities for study by their tendency to overlook or underevaluate important obstacles to reform in the Wilhelmian era. Among these are the failures of the "middle" parties to press vigorously for reform, their inability to agree upon basic policies, and their often irresponsible and generally negative attitudes toward the various governments. To these failures of the moderate parties must be added the resistance of anti-reform forces such as the particularism ("states rights") of the federal states, the influence of the army, the tenacious defense by the Conservatives of their political, economic, and social privileges, and the increasing identification of the National Liberals with the Conservative foes of the principles of political liberalism.

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[20] Wolfgang Neumann, "Die Innenpolitik des Fürsten Bülow 1900-1906," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kiel, 1949.

[21] Hans-Georg Hartmann, "Die Innenpolitik des Fürsten Bülow 1906-1909," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kiel, 1950. For a recent reconstruction of the *Daily Telegraph* affair see: Wilhelm Schüssler, *Die Daily-Telegraph-Affaire: Fürst Bülow, Kaiser Wilhelm und die Krise des zweiten Reiches 1908* (Göttingen, 1952). This volume is number nine in a series of general interest to students of recent German history: *Göttingen Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft,* edited by Professor Walter Hubatsch. The Schüssler volume tends to apologize for Bülow's part in the crisis of 1908, but agrees (pp. 47-49) with Neumann and Hartmann in condemning Bülow's flattery of the Kaiser. On Schüssler's own background, see: Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945* (The Hague, 1955).

[22] Georg Vogel, *Die Konservativen und die Blockpolitik Bülows* (Berlin, 1925); George Dunlap Crothers, *The German Elections of 1907* (New York, 1941); and Theodor Eschenburg, *Das Kaiserreich am Scheideweg: Bassermann, Bülow und der Block* (Berlin, 1929).

[23] Brigitte Haberland, "Die Innenpolitik des Reiches unter der Kanzlerschaft Bethmann Hollwegs 1909-1914," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kiel, 1950; Hans-Günter Zmarzlik, *Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler 1909-1914* (Düsseldorf, 1957). Zmarzlik provides a detailed account, based upon previously unused manuscript sources, of Bethmann's tax policy and his policy for Alsace-Lorraine.

One of these forces of preservation and obstruction to reform, particularism, has been strangely neglected as a field of study in its own right by students of the Wilhelmian era, notwithstanding Friedrich Meinecke's suggestive comments of 1908. A good bit of light is indirectly thrown on it by a recent study of the Bundesrat's little-known committee for Foreign Affairs by *Ernst Deuerlein.*[24] Deuerlein's account is not exciting, but it is substantial and reliable, having been derived from a vast array of published material and unpublished manuscripts in the Bavarian, Württemberg, and Baden Archives, and the private correspondence of Count Georg von Hertling and Count Hugo von Lerchenfeld, for many years Bavaria's minister to Berlin and plenipotentiary in the Bundesrat.

Created by Bismarck for tactical reasons, the committee did not meet from 1879 to 1900, and then only infrequently and innocuously until 1910. Revival in 1900 and the holding of annual meetings after 1910 testify not only to the durability of particularism but to the many misgivings which the governmental policies of William II caused in the federal states. (See, e.g., pp. 154, 160, 165-173.) None the less, the committee did not meet during the greatest foreign policy crisis the Second Empire faced, that of July, 1914. Deuerlein presents excellent material on the meetings of the committee during the war years, which demonstrate the solicitude of the national government for the rising particularism of the federal states under the crisis conditions imposed by the war. The rôle of federal-state relations in handicapping economic development (canal building, e.g.) and political evolution remains a large area which has yet to find its historians. A spate of monographs must be written before the major account itself can be synthesized.

In contrast to particularism, much has been written about the army as a prop of arbitrary government and out-worn social privileges in modern Germany. The second volume of a major work by *Gerhard Ritter* may be expected to broaden our understanding of Wilhelmian era militarism.[25] Meanwhile, *Gordon A. Craig* has presented new facts and judicious interpretations in a volume which is distinguished both in literary quality and in scholarship.[26] In his volume we see the Prussian army's training program breeding "aristocratic arrogance" into ever-increasing numbers of officers, transforming the modest lieutenant of previous decades into "the unbearable prig" of the Wilhelmian era (pp. 238,252-253). We also see the army leaders haggling with the parties in the Reichstag for financial support. The Craig thesis that the Prussian army was for centuries (until after January, 1933) "a law unto itself" (p. 468) and an enemy of constitutional government is not altogether supported by what he tells us of German domestic affairs in the Wilhelmian period. But the thesis is brilliantly and convincingly demonstrated in its application to Germany's foreign policy. Generally this volume stands as a model of lucid and sound historical writing on a broad and complex subject.

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[24] Ernst Deuerlein, *Der Bundesratsausschuss für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten 1870-1918* (Regensburg, 1955). Ideas Meinecke briefly suggested in *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (Munich and Berlin, 1908), 492-495, were treated in some detail by Hans Goldschmidt, *Das Reich und Preussen im Kampf um die Führung* (Berlin, 1931).

[25] See Gerhard Ritter's first volume: *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk* (Munich, 1954); his more recent work: *Der Schlieffenplan* (Munich, 1956); and a succinct statement of his viewpoint in his article in this journal, XVII (October, 1957), 259-271.

[26] Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (Oxford, 1955).

If the semi-absolutist rule of the last Hohenzollern Kaiser found its most reliable institutional prop in the Prussian army, it found its most constant political support—and frequent guidance—in the German Conservative Party (D.K.P.). This party is the subject of a most useful monograph by *Hans Booms,* and closely related studies by *Lysbeth W. Muncy* and *Sarah Rebecca Tirrell.*[27] Based largely upon research in the parliamentary records of Prussia and the Reich, the Booms study also made use of memoirs, monographs on related topics, and the Conservative press. The Conservative party had 80 Reichstag deputies in 1887 (61 from Prussian districts, and 49 of these from east-Elbian districts), whereas in the Reichstag of 1912-1918 it placed only 43 deputies (39 from Prussian districts). In the Reichstag the D.K.P. suffered from equal suffrage; profiting from the three-class system in Prussia, its share in the seats of the *Abgeordnetenhaus* (as the largest party there) rose from 30.7 percent in 1886 to 33.5 percent in 1914. (See pp. 6-7, 38.) This electoral experience goes far to explain the *après moi le déluge* attitude of the agrarian Conservative leaders in the face of reform proposals. In this and other matters, Booms presents convincing evidence to support his central thesis that the German Conservative Party of 1876-1918 differed very little in social composition, religious outlook, or particularist-Prussian political policies from its predecessor, the old Prussian Conservative Party. The D.K.P., with its "Prussia-first" politics, must occupy a central position in any reasonable account of particularism in the empire of William II.

Booms presents us with a workmanlike monograph on political conservatism, giving relatively little attention to the social history of the Prussian Conservatives. A newly published larger work by *Heinz Gollwitzer* of Münster, seeking to liberate the German concept of "social history" from its usual association with the *Sozialfrage,* treats the social history of eighty or so independent princely families who lost their full sovereignty in 1806 with the fall of the Holy Roman Empire.[28] The *Standesherren,* neglected by *Kohn-Bramstedt,*[29] largely remained a class which was defensively aware of its inevitable decline, and yet was unwilling to accept the inevitable. A few became "German Whigs." Some became super-nationalists.[30] The defensive psychoses of others were sometimes manifested in a particularism within particularism, as when sovereignty-conscious Prince Fugger-Babenhausen in 1880 rudely rejected an invitation to join other lords in a pledge of loyalty to the Bavarian throne (p. 60), outraged by the suggestion that he should be treated as any other mere *"hohen bayerischen Landesadel"!* Pettiness became a hallmark of many of these scions of proud families, and Gollwitzer's commentary on them suggests new approaches to many aspects of the Wilhelmian era: "The more their constitutional (*staatsrechtliche*) position was limited, the more sensitive many lords became in questions of rank and etiquette." (See pp. 67 and 268-276.) This was true of the leaders of the many other groups which, like this one, viewed the collapse of the *Kaisertum* in 1918 as "a catastrophe" (p. 157). It undoubtedly explains much of the otherwise incomprehensible behavior of the Kaiser himself.[31]

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[27] Hans Booms, *Die deutschkonservative Partei: Preussischer Charakter, Reichsauffassung, Nationalbegriff* (Düsseldorf, 1954); Lysbeth Walker Muncy, *The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II, 1888-1914* (Providence, R. I., 1944); and Sarah Rebecca Tirrell, *German Agrarian Politics after Bismarck's Fall: The Formation of the Farmers' League* (New York, 1951).

[28] Heinz Gollwitzer, *Die Standesherren: Die politischen und gesellschaftliche Stellung der Mediatisierten 1815-1918, ein Beitrag zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1957).

[29] Ernst Kohn-Bramstedt, *Aristocracy and the Middle-Classes in Germany: Social Types in German Literature, 1830-1900* (London, 1937).

[30] One of them, Prince Otto zu Salm-Horstmar, would bridge the gap from imperialistic movements of the Wilhelmian era to pro-Nazi activity in 1932. See George W. F.

Perhaps this also helps to clarify the politics of the National Liberal Party in the Wilhelmian era. The lack of a history of this party in both the war and prewar years remains a serious gap in the literature of the Wilhelmian era. Recently published studies by *Walter Gagel* and *Annelise Thimme* suggest that the party must be studied as an increasingly conservative force of preservation within the *Kaiserreich,* not as a party of democracy.[32] Democratic impulses still throbbed in the party's Reichstag *Fraktion,* as Gagel shows; but the national party leaders were unable to control their Prussian "subordinates." This schism of purpose between the Prussian party and the Reich party was especially intense in the question of Prussian suffrage reform, suggesting the possibility of a useful and stimulating case study in the rôle of particularism within a single German political party. The problems of leadership in the party were unenviable in the era of Ernst Bassermann, and no better for his 1917 successor, Gustav Stresemann. Thimme briefly illuminates the more challenging of Stresemann's Wilhelmian era problems in a recent short biography. Though she appropriately emphasizes Stresemann's Weimar era career, Thimme succinctly summarizes the large amount of data on the pre-1918 years which she gleaned from the microfilmed Stresemann *Nachlass.* In a letter of March 30, 1912, Stresemann (whose own election to the Reichstag in 1907 was financed by the small-industry *Bund der Industriellen*) bemoans the fact that the heavy-industry *Centralverband deutscher Industrieller* is more and more buying up the entire party and shaping its policies (pp. 15-18). This problem in aggra-

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Hallgarten, "Adolf Hitler and German Heavy Industry, 1931-1933," *Journal of Economic History,* XII (1952), 241.

[31] See, e.g., his statement to the Prussian *Staatsministerium,* December 9, 1895, bombastically refusing to dismiss a minister at the request of the other ministers, only subsequently to give in: Eyck, *Das persönliche Regiment Wilhelms II.,* 148. The survival into the Weimar era of sensitivities—on the Left and on the Right—about the symbols of Germany's monarchical-aristocratic past played an important part in the various crises of the Republic. See, e.g., Fritz Stern, "Adenauer and a Crisis in Weimar Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly,* LXXIII (1958), 1-27.

[32] Annelise Thimme, *Gustav Stresemann: Eine politische Biographie zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik* (Hanover and Frankfurt am Main, 1957); Walter Gagel, *Die Wahlrechtsfrage in der Geschichte der deutschen liberalen Parteien 1848-1918* (Düsseldorf, 1958), especially 103-105, 110, and 123-137.

vated form would face him later when (unchanged in basic motivations, in Thimme's view) he served as Germany's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1923-1929.

Thimme has given us a much fuller account of the Wilhelmian years—in this case the major years—of another personality whose constant goal was a strong but wise national policy through the collaboration of National Liberals and Conservatives. Her biography of Hans Delbrück is a study in the crossing and fusion of intellectual and political history.[33] Like the works by Vogelsang-Milatz, Booms, Koch, Varain, Zmarzlik, Gagel, Jansen, and Kruck mentioned elsewhere in this article, Thimme's monograph on Delbrück, historian-turned-political-commentator, is published by the very active Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, with headquarters at Bonn. Reichstag deputy and successor to Heinrich Treitschke (1889) as editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Delbrück reflected and influenced the views of a relatively small circle of influential German intellectuals, business men, bureaucrats, army officers, and politicians. Delbrück was a "convinced monarchist." Though his regard for the personal abilities of William II was not high, Delbrück saw in him "the embodiment of German Kaiserdom and Prussian monarchy" (p. 17), and, just for this reason, Delbrück never hesitated to criticize the Kaiser and his governmental policies. Priding himself upon being an "enlightened conservative" and favoring "organic-progressive" development (p. 23), Delbrück found even in Friedrich Naumann's views too much that was "radical democratic" (pp. 56-57). On the other hand, he criticized the Right as well as the Left, rebuking the *Bund der Landwirte* for trying to convert the Conservative Party into "a mere agricultural lobby" (p. 26). Delbrück dreamed of a fusion of interest of all Germans, transcending class and party differences, into an organic unity of purpose, but would experience it only briefly during the August days of 1914.

Karl Alexander von Müller was to live to see a transmogrified version of the dream come true under Hitler, and tried to serve both Nazism and historical scholarship as editor of the *Historische Zeitschrift* following the ouster of Friedrich Meinecke. Müller's full autobiography of the prewar years now takes its place along with Meinecke's own briefer recollections as an important source for students of Wilhelmian Germany's cultural forces of preservation.[34] The detailed view of young Müller's maturing impressions of Bavaria, the Reich, and the great world beyond is told in a style marked by classic simplicity. The result is a "growing up" book of importance to students of the Wilhelmian era, regardless of their opinion of Müller's academic politics in the Nazi era. It is a pleasant world which Müller describes, and his account helps explain why most members of the

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[33] Annelise Thimme, *Hans Delbrück als Kritiker der wilhelminischen Epoche* (Düsseldorf, 1955). Cf. Gagel, *Die Wahlrechtsfrage*, 137-142. Delbrück was also treated by Gertrud Gut in a Ph.D. dissertation, Free University, Berlin, 1951.

[34] Karl Alexander von Müller, *Aus Gärten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungen 1882-1914* (Stuttgart, 1957). See also: Friedrich Meinecke, *Strassburg, Freiburg Berlin 1901-1919: Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart, 1949).

"in-group" of Wilhelmian society so tenaciously sought to preserve its hierarchical structure.

III

Yet, even those who enjoyed privileged positions in the Wilhelmian social order occasionally raised their voices in scathing denunciations of its mores. More damning than any others were the judgments of Friedrich Nietzsche, who became insane in January, 1889, just a few months after William II ascended the Hohenzollern throne. Though most of Nietzsche's condemnations of the philistinism of German life were penned before William II began his reign, it was in the Wilhelmian era that Nietzsche first began to influence in any profound way a new generation of German intellectuals. A part-way parallel with Jacob Burckhardt may thus be established, for Burckhardt's work, like Nietzsche's, found a belated appreciation in Wilhelmian Germany. Burckhardt's lecture notes of 1868-1871 were, as *Erich Heller* has recently reminded us, published posthumously in 1905 as *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* and his *History of Greek Culture* appeared between 1898 and 1902.[35]

The character of Nietzsche's influence remains a subject of controversial interpretations after a thousand volumes of literature about him, so ambiguous were his utterances. As is well known, Nietzsche inspired extreme right-wing criticisms that German society was overly democratic and socialistic. What is not so well known is that he also inspired some democratic and socialistic rebels against the existing order. Victor Adler, founder and leader of the Austrian Social Democratic Party after 1889, was intrigued by Nietzsche in the 1870's; on at least one occasion he recommended Nietzsche's works to a friend, who wrote back that he found in Nietzsche "an aroused thinker against the spirit of the times."[36] As late as 1894 Adler's friend, Karl Kautsky, detected (and did not like) Nietzschean phrases in Adler's writings (p. 155); and on May 13, 1896, Adler, in a letter to Kautsky, describes Rosa Luxemburg's first article for *Die Neue Zeit* as *"die höchst unzeitgemässen Betrachtungen der Genossin Luxemburg,"* surely a play on Nietzsche's famous title, *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (p. 207). Non-socialist democrats of the era also felt Nietzsche's impact. Hugo Ball, born in 1886, wrote a dissertation in pre-1914 Munich on "Nietzsche and the Renewal of Germany"; during the war he co-founded the revolutionary Dada movement in the arts at the "Cabaret Voltaire" in Zürich, and briefly worked propagandistically for a democratic and republican revolution in Germany.[37] Rainer Marie Rilke can hardly be considered an authoritarian or reactionary poet, and yet Erich Heller has contended that Rilke's writings are Nietzschean ideas transformed into poetry. Indeed, writes Heller, the early Rilke simply "imitated and sometimes vulgarized" Nietzsche (p. 127). What does it matter, Heller asks, that one "whispered" his message while the other wrote with "the dramatic incisiveness of the thunderbolt"; for Heller, Rilke is "the St. Francis of the Will to Power" (pp. 130-131).

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[35] Erich Heller, *The Disinherited Mind: Essays in Modern German Literature and Thought,* rev. ed. (New York, 1957).

[36] V. Adler to K. Kautsky in Friedrich Adler (ed.), *Victor Adler: Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky* (Vienna, 1954), 5n.

[37] Hugo Ball, *Die Flucht aus der Zeit, new ed.* (Lucerne, 1946), x and *passim.* See also Eugen Egger, *Hugo Ball: Ein Weg aus dem Chaos* (Olten, 1951).

Certainly Nietzsche and Rilke shared a mood of much of modern German literature, a mood which is the central theme of Heller's book of provocatively interpretive essays, and the mood which Rilke expressed in the following words of resigned self-confession: "Each torpid turn of the world has . . . [its] disinherited children, to whom no longer what's been, and not yet what's coming, belongs" (frontispiece). Wilhelmian Germany had a generous share of intellectuals who found themselves in this unenviable position. They helped both democrats and proto-Nazis take the first step toward new socio-political systems: the step away from that which existed. It is hardly surprising that Heller finds Oswald Spengler among these intellectuals of the Wilhelmian era who were "concerned with lending Destiny a hand in the business of destruction" (p. 194).

Friedrich Glum, emphasizing Nietzsche's impact upon the pre-1914 youth movement, views Nietzsche as a *Bahnbrecher* for Nazism, and he aptly reminds us that "the false values which Nietzsche destroyed are also the values which National Socialism won fame in combatting."[38] Certainly liberal democracy was among the values which Nietzsche condemned, a fact that has enabled both Nazis and anti-Nazis to treat Nietzsche as a prophet of Hitlerism.[39] The identification was facilitated, *Walter A. Kaufmann* reminds us again, by the distorting editorial work of Nietzsche's anti-Semitic sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche.[40] But the distinctive feature of Kaufmann's carefully researched volume is its attempt to strip away the legends and to show the real Nietzsche as constructive artist, not as destructive social critic. To Crane Brinton's argument that Nietzsche was half Nazi and half anti-Nazi, Kaufmann counters that he was not in any way a Nazi. Kaufmann's apology is that Nietzsche was careless in his use of words: ". . . he speaks of 'war' even when he is evidently thinking of strife, of 'power' rather than 'self-perfection' . . ." (p. 362). *Albert Camus* in a perceptive essay has pointed to a more fundamental ambiguity in Nietzsche's thought: While he was first and foremost a great critic, a "diagnostician," he ended with "absolute affirmation," saying yes to everything. From this viewpoint, the logic of Nietzsche's own system would have prevented Nietzsche from disavowing Nazism, whether he liked it or not.[41]

Our concern, of course, is with the impact Nietzsche exercised before 1914, and it appears that the chief historical significance of this impact lies in its nihilistic character. He founded no system; condemnation is the important historical feature of his work. Glum sees the central meaning of Nietzsche's work in the following comment from the *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*: "Man must have the strength and from time to time use it to smash and dissolve a past, in order to be able to live. . . ." Nietzsche's own self-evaluation should be good enough for the historian of Wilhelmian Germany: *"Ich bin der Vernichter par excellence."* (Glum, p. 136.)

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[38] Friedrich Glum, *Philosophen im Speigel und Zerrspiegel: Deutschlands Weg in den Nationalismus und Nationalsozialismus* (Munich, 1954), 135.

[39] Wilhelm Grenzmann, "Nietzsche and National-Socialism" in Maurice Baumont, John H. E. Fried, and Edmond Vermeil (eds.), *The Third Reich* (New York, 1955), 203-242.

[40] Walter A. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton, 1950).

[41] Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York, 1954), 57-71.

The Nietzschean spirit of repudiation and yearning was curiously pervasive of German cultural life in the Wilhelmian era, despite its superficial brilliance. At the crossroads of culture and politics the Munich magazine *Simplicissimus* amplified part-Nietzschean, part-socialist, and part-liberal critiques of the old régime's bureaucratic and officer-corps virtues, its bourgeois morals and manners, and the philistinism of its art; and by 1904 the magazine had a circulation of 85,000. Not for nothing was the *Simplicissimus* symbol a ferocious bull dog, torn loose from its chains; Adalbert Wahl caught its significance when he stated that the magazine did "a job of destruction without parallel" (III, 94). Occasionally nationalistic even before 1914, the magazine became blatantly chauvinistic during the war. Its pre-1914 character emerges vividly from an attractive 1954 collection of some of the most famous and representative drawings of *Simplicissimus* and short essays about its history.[42]

At much the same juncture of culture and politics in Prussian Germany, Maximilian Harden, as *Harry F. Young* states in a newly-published biography, "committed practically all his thoughts on all the events and questions of his age" to his remarkable Berlin journal, *Die Zukunft*.[43] With perhaps 20,000 "educated readers" (II, 357) in the period 1900-1914, Harden's viewpoint was, like that of Nietzsche and *Simplicissimus,* difficult to summarize; Young's pithy verdict is that he was "a traditionalist with a radical flair" (I, 101), Himself a one-time actor and a master of sarcasm, Harden referred to "Wilhelm" as *"Filmhelm,"* and termed the unusually perambulatory emperor the *"Reisekaiser"* (I, 133). Harden did not oppose monarchy as an institution. But he prophetically warned against the Kaiser's pretensions, and in precipitating the Eulenburg scandal in 1907, Harden devastatingly lowered the prestige of dynastic government in Germany. The editors of the *Nachlass* of Fritz Holstein, captured with other Foreign Office documents in 1945, report that the Holstein papers show that close relations existed between Holstein and Harden, but offer "no positive evidence that it was Holstein who provided Harden with the inspiration or material to launch his journalistic campaign."[44]

Writers of the Wilhelmian era who were far less politicized than Harden scathingly criticized its institutions and shared the ill-defined yearning for something of a purer grandeur. One of the most genuinely "disinherited" cultural figures of the age was *Theodor Fontane,* as a recently published collection of his letters reveals.[45] In a letter of April 3, 1887, Fontane is already criticizing the pettiness that accompanies the power of Imperial Germany; he bemoans the vast influence and privilege of the military, whose status he compares to that of a spoiled son in the home of overdoting parents; he deplores the self-seeking, the "most ruthless *Streberthum*" of the age, and deprecates the growth of an unprecedented *Byzantinismus* on the one hand and "destructive ideas" on the other (p. 70). Fontane's early view of the young Kaiser's personal rule was favorable (p. 140). His letters of this period throw a piercing light on much of the negativism of the era's cultural critics, for Fontane's disillusion was caused by the failure of affairs to improve in desired tempo, not by a feeling that they were getting worse (pp. 146-147, 161-162). A more acute concern enters Fontane's letters by February, 1892: "Everything is wind in the sails of Social Democracy and the best circles are dominated by an attitude like that of 44 years ago in February 48. 'This cannot go on, something must give' " (p. 170). Approving the Kaiser's break with the recent past, Fontane was displeased, he wrote in 1897, by his seeming desire to restore the ancient past (p. 309).

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[42] Eugen Roth, *Simplicissimus: Ein Rückblick auf die satirische Zeitschrift* (Hanover, 1954).

[43] Harry F. Young, *Maximilian Harden: Censor Germaniae* (The Hague, 1958). Page citations in this article are to the version which Young did as an excellent doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins under the guidance of Hans Gatzke.

[44] Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher (eds.), *The Holstein Papers,* 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1955-1957), I, xvi.

In the same year, Stefan George was writing one of his best known works, *Das Jahr der Seele.* Perhaps he saw beyond the contemporary criticism and glimpsed its potential results; *E. K. Bennett*[46] shows how George wrote symbolically of his dissatisfaction with a flower he had grown by his window, until he "cut off the pale flower with the sick heart," only to become painfully aware of the void its destruction created:

Now again I lift my empty eyes
And in the empty night my empty hands.

Certainly no form of demagogic rule, whether democratic or Nazi, would improve upon the Wilhelmian status quo for George and his devoted circle of followers. Some of them, like *Ernst Morwitz,*[47] would go into exile after 1933; one, Klaus von Stauffenberg, planted the famous bomb at Hitler's feet on July 20, 1944; George himself, in whom there was no trace of anti-Semitism, chose to die in Switzerland in December, 1933, rather than in Nazi Germany. His rôle in preparing the way for Nazism was indirect and no greater than that of other severe critics of the status quo of 1888-1918.

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[45] Theodor Fontane (Kurt Schreinert, ed.), *Briefe an Georg Friedlaender* (Heidelberg, 1954). The publication of these letters makes Erich Behrend's analysis of *Der Stechlin* seem superficial. Cf. Erich Behrend, *Theodor Fontanes Roman "Der Stechlin"* (Marburg, 1929). For a review article based upon the Friedlaender letters see: Maximilian von Hagen, "Theodor Fontanes politische Wandlung," *Die Welt als Geschichte,* XVII (1957), 106-112.

[46] E. K. Bennett, *Stefan George* (New Haven, 1954), 43-44. Students of the Wilhelmian era will be interested in other studies in this most useful series, *Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought* (Erich Heller, ed.), especially those by Hans Egon Holthausen on Rilke, Hugh F. Garten on Gerhart Hauptmann, and Erich Heller on Nietzsche.

[47] See the following volumes, indispensable to any study of George: Carol North Valhope (pseud.) and Ernst Morwitz (eds. and trans.), *Poems* (New York, 1953); Olga Marx and Ernst Morwitz (eds. and trans.), *The Works of Stefan George* (Chapel Hill, 1949).

But this rôle, too, must be acknowledged. As *Jean Neurohr* writes, George "helped to prepare the atmosphere for a total revolution."[48] His verse was, as Bennett states, the voice of one "crying in the wilderness that the day of judgment is at hand" (p. 51). What happened after Judgment Day obviously lay beyond George's control. Here again we meet that ill-defined yearning of the Wilhelmian era, that desire for a transcendental *Verklärung* which Richard Strauss at twenty-five so brilliantly captured in 1889 in his symphonic poem, *Death and Transfiguration.* Something of the same sort was on the mind of Gerhart Hauptmann's Mother Wolffen (*Der rote Hahn,* 1901), when from her dying lips came the ambiguous cry: "One longs . . . one longs for something . . ."[49]

Some, like George, longed for an idealized authoritarianism and hierarchy of the past. Others reaffirmed their faith in the dream of liberal democracy or innocently staked new hopes in the idealized future of Social Democracy. The diverse possibilities for tomorrow were symbolized by the paranoiac posing of William II at the top and the surging masses from below. Exits from the present to both dictatorship and democracy were opened by the "disinherited children" of Wilhelmian Germany, "to whom no longer what's been, and not yet what's coming" could belong. They, too, contributed to the tragedy of imperial Germany's tragic era, for guidance to the future as ambiguous as theirs could inspire no confidence in change among those responsible for German policy.

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[48] Jean Neurohr, *Der Mythos vom dritten Reich: Zur Geistesgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus* (Stuttgart, 1957), 93. See also 231-233.

[49] Hugh F. Garten, *Gerhart Hauptmann* (New Haven, 1954), 22.

THE AMERICAN-LITHUANIAN PUBLICATIONS, 1875 to 1910

*by Vaclovas Biržiška**

THE FIRST Lithuanians reached the shores of the New World almost as early as the first colonists from England. By the time of the American Revolution some of them were taking active part in the fight. In 1795 Lithuania was occupied by Russia and from then on political unrest and insurrections caused many people to leave their home, great numbers of which came to the United States. In the 1860's there was a massive emigration from Lithuania brought about for several reasons. For one, a famine struck the homeland in the early 1860's. Soon after, the Russians imposed on Lithuanians compulsory service in the Russian Army. A final blow came with the suppression by the Russians of an attempted insurrection in 1863-64 after which followed a systematic prosecution of the Lithuanian language and culture. It was during the process of assimilation of this wave of immigrants that the American-Lithuanian press came into being.

The first Lithuanian immigrants were unorganized and very soon disappeared into the mass of people without leaving any significant sign of their activities. This was true of the great movement of the 1860's. These immigrants were for the most part young and physically strong, but their cultural level was very low. Thus, at first, they concentrated in the Pennsylvania coal mines. Not knowing English, they were unable to exploit the possibilities of the new world and were forced to accept the most difficult and the least profitable work. Nor was there any stimulus among themselves to organize cultural and social organizations. Most of them spent their free time in bars and saloons.

By the end of 1870's changes started taking place. Lithuanian priests and monks began to settle in America. Attempts to get their countrymen into Catholic parishes together with Poles gave poor results, sometimes ending in rioting. But by the end of 1880's the first Lithuanian parishes got their start and also some Lithuanian welfare societies were organized. These parishes together with Lithuanian economic, cultural, political and welfare organizations, which later began to grow and spread, helped to raise the cultural level of the immigrants. The results of these organizations were twofold. They helped Lithuanians to become more a part of the American life, but at the same time did not let them forget the country of their origin. They encouraged them to help their fellow Lithuanians in the homeland both morally and materially in their struggle for a better life.

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*The author of this article, the late Professor Biržiška (1884-1956), founder and former Director of the University Library in Kaunas (1923 to 1944) was an outstanding Lithuanian scholar and bibliographer. He was the author of the standard *Lithuanian Bibligraphy* (Kaunas, 1924-1939, 4 pts. in 5 v., covering the period 1547-1910) and of other scholarly publications on Lithuanian cultural history including *Senuju Lietuvišku Knygu Istorija* (History of the Old Lithuanian Books), 2 pts. Chicago, 1953-1957. He was also chief editor of *The Lithuanian Encyclopedia* in Kaunas and Boston. As an Honorary Consultant to the Library of Congress and an Associate of its Slavic and Central European Division (1951-1953), Dr. Biržiška compiled a 1366-entry bibliography of Lithuanian publications printed in the United States between 1875 and 1910. The unpublished text of this bibliography was deposited at the Library's Manuscript Division. The present article written by Dr. Biržiška as an introduction to this bibliography is in its original form, except for a few explanatory notes which were added by Dr. John P. Balys of the Library's Slavic and Central European Division to bring the article up-to-date.

American-Lithuanians played a very important part in laying out plans for the future of Lithuania. Living in America and enjoying the rights and privileges of American citizens made the American-Lithuanians feel more keenly the plight of Lithuania. Long before the American nation began to help the oppressed nations in the struggle for freedom and human rights, the American-Lithuanians were helping their compatriots in their fight against the oppression. In this fight a very important part was played by the American-Lithuanian press.

While the majority of the European immigrants were able to use the American press as well as the press of the countries of their origin, the Lithuanian immigrants were left without anything. They could not use the American press, as the majority of them did not read English; and there was no printed word available from their homeland. At the time when massive emigration started from Lithuania, the Russian government in an unsuccessful attempt to introduce the Cyrillic alphabet into Lithuanian writing, prohibited the printing of Lithuanian books in the Latin alphabet. This prohibition lasted exactly forty years, from 1865 until 1904.

The prohibition of the Lithuanian press in the homeland was the main factor which prevented the American-Lithuanians from getting the necessary literature from Lithuania, but at the same time it directly stimulated the birth and growth of an independent Lithuanian press in America. Among the immigrants coming to America after the prohibition of 1865, many left Lithuania for fear of being punished by the Russian government for use of prohibited Lithuanian books smuggled into Lithuania from East Prussia, which had now become the center of publication of the Lithuanian books. These immigrants were of a more educated type than those who had come earlier. They brought with them the desire to start a new book printing center in the United States.

The first steps towards the American-Lithuanian press were difficult. Except for a few priests and monks, there were few who could contribute material. Moreover, few of the American-Lithuanians could read. Under the Russian occupation Russian authorities had closed all the private parochial schools (there were no state schools) and replaced them by the Russian primary schools. For many years these schools were boycotted by the Lithuanians because these schools were antagonistic to the Catholic religion and because Russian language was used in them.

For these reasons the pioneers of the American-Lithuanian press had to adjust the form and the contents of their publications to the educational level of the readers. This explains the low standard of the early American-Lithuanian periodicals and books. However, as literacy increased, this was directly reflected in the quality of the publications.

Mykolas Tvarauskis can be called the pioneer of the American-Lithuanian press. He was an ordinary immigrant from the old world. A teacher before his departure from Lithuania, he was forced to leave his homeland because of his active part in the 1863-64 insurrection. In the new world he quickly acquired command of English; he recognized immediately the advantages which it offered. In order to be of help to his compatriots, Tvarauskis decided further to compile an English-Lithuanian dictionary. He based his work on a small English-Polish dictionary which came into his possession, and proceeded by merely translating the Polish words into Lithuanian. Though the translation was often poor and spelling of the words was frequently wrong, he finally produced the Tvarauskis' English-Lithuanian dictionary. In order to get his work printed, Tvarauskis acquired a small printing shop in 1874 in Shamokine, Pennsylvania. He advertised for subscriptions in the local newspapers. The wording of the advertisement has misled many Lithuanian historians to believe that Tvarauskis had plans not for publication of a book but of a periodical. After a year of hard labor, the printing of the dictionary was finished in 1875. However, while the new book was still in his printing shop, the whole building was destroyed by fire and the whole edition, save a few copies, perished. This explains why so many Lithuanian historians who were not able to see the book arrived at false conclusions. But there is documentary evidence that Tvarauskis' publication was a book and not a periodical. About twenty years ago, the only known copy of this work was acquired by the Library of the University of Vytautas the Great in Kaunas. This copy had been preserved in the attic of a primary school in Lithuania. Probably sometime before the fire Tvarauskis mailed a copy to a friend in his native land.

This small hundred-sixty-five-page dictionary was the first American-Lithuanian book. After the failure of the first attempt, Tvarauskis left Shamokine, Pennsylvania, and moved to New York City. He carried with him a small part of his printing press which he was able to save from the fire. In 1879 in New York he started the publication of the first Lithuanian newspaper in the United States. Tvarauskis called his paper *Lietuwiszka Gazieta* (Lithuanian newspaper). It lasted, however, only a half year and was closed for lack of subscriptions. The paper was not a total failure, however. A number of the older immigrants became interested in writing. Among the contributors to the *Lietuwiszka Gazieta* there was a monk by the name of Augustinas Zeytzas who most likely was called "Zuikis" in Lithuania. Zeytzas later contributed a great deal to the American-Lithuanian press. He wrote stories, mostly of a moral and religious content, which were to a large extent the imitation of Polish publications. His first Lithuanian stories were published in 1884 in a Polish printing shop in Chicago, Illinois. But later the publication of his works was taken over by the Lithuanian press. Zeytzas' works did not enrich either the Lithuanian literature or the Lithuanian language, but they did no harm either. They succeeded in keeping some Lithuanians out of bars and saloons if nothing else can be said about them.

Even before Zeytzas there were some other attempts to start a Lithuanian literature, which must be mentioned here. Mykolas Tvarauskis, who was mentioned above, printed *Praractwos Michaldos* (Prophecies of Michhalda), New York, 1880, and in 1883 *Istorije Ali Babos ir kiaturesdiaszimczio razbainiku* (The History of Ali Baba and Forty Robbers). Another man, Dominikas Tamošius Bačkauskas (1846-1904) was a great promoter of light literature. In 1888 he established in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, a Lithuanian newspaper *Saulė* (Sun). This newspaper was continued by Bačkauskas' successors and is still being printed today with comparatively little change in style. Bačkauskas published further some "literary" supplements to *Saulė*. In them as in *Saulė* itself Bačkauskas printed a great number of poorly written stories, without any regard to spelling or grammatical rules.[1] Very often these stories were imitations or translations of cheap Polish books. *Saulė's* literature was obviously directed to the large group of less educated Lithuanian immigrants. Nevertheless, it performed an important function: it encouraged reading among a group of the lowest level of education. It is sad to admit that even today some of the descendants of these immigrants still demand a similar type of "literature." And now they read it not from necessity as their ancestors did, but out of habit.

Bačkauskas himself wrote and printed about a hundred of these cheap stories, being thus one of the most productive writers among the American-Lithuanians. He was not without literary abilities. However, lack of education prevented him from being a good writer.

In 1884 a new period began for the American-Lithuanian press. Jonas Šliūpas (1861-1944), a young and very active man, arrived in the United States from East Prussia where he had been an editor of *Aušra* (Dawn), an illegally published Lithuanian newspaper. Jonas Šliūpas was the first intellectual among the Lithuanian non-clerical immigrants. Soon after his arrival in the U.S.A., he entered medical school and eventually received his doctorate in medicine. During the years 1884-85, Jonas Šliūpas collaborated with Mykolas Tvarauskis in publishing the periodical *Unija* (Union) in New York. In 1885 Šliūpas started a newspaper *Lietuviszkasis Balsas* (Lithuanian Voice). He published this paper single-handed until 1889, first in New York until 1887, and afterwards in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania. Despite the fact that many Lithuanians disliked the newspaper for its anti-religious tendencies, it was of a much higher literary quality than anything which had been published before. *Lietuviszkasis Balsas* gathered many contributors from among the intellectuals in Lithuania and even from those who had contributed to *Aušra*. Šliūpas was successful in organizing a net of contributors in the United States. For a long time *Lietuviszkasis Balsas* performed a twofold duty. It was intended to be smuggled into Lithuania and therefore discussed problems which were of interest to the inhabitants of that country ruled by Russia. On the other hand it was trying to become an organ of the American-Lithuanians and thus attempted to devote its attention to questions important to American-Lithuanian life. Through his publication Šliūpas endeavored to encourage the American-Lithuanians to organize cultural and economic associations independent of the Polish church. At the same time his paper was among the first to encourage the Lithuanians in the United States to keep in touch with their homeland and to support it in its bitter fight for freedom, just at the time when the Russian government prohibited not only the Lithuanian press and schools and restricted the religious freedom, but even prohibited the public use of the Lithuanian language. Taking the same course, other new American-Lithuanian newspapers assumed the same attitude, though, as the result of differentiation of political opinions, these papers struggled sometimes one with another, fighting for their principles. But this variety of opinions raised the activity of the press; the number of books and periodicals increased, especially in the period of the Russian revolution of 1905-1906, which brought to America a new wave of the political emigrants.

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[1] E.g. in 1893 Bačkauskas' translation of Arabian stories *Tukstantis Naktu ir Wiena* (Thousand and One Nights) was published in Mahanoy City, 813 pp., 2000 copies.

The new periodicals were, in most cases, weeklies. From 1897 *Saulė* was issued semiweekly. In 1914 the first American-Lithuanian dailies were organized.

As time passed the American-Lithuanian press became the real mirror of life in Lithuania. Lithuanian periodicals published in East Prussia were for several reasons unable to keep up with developments both at home and abroad. First they were published at long intervals. Secondly, their material came from contributors from all over Lithuania and Russia and to obtain it was a difficult and time consuming undertaking. Finally, these periodicals had to be illegally distributed among their readers and it was again a difficult task. Contrarily the Lithuanian press in America had certain advantages which facilitated their tasks. There was more money in America to support such periodicals. They were therefore able to devote a certain amount of money to the support of special agents in Lithuania. To this source of information must be added personal letters from people in Lithuania to friends and relatives in America. In this way the American-Lithuanian press gave wide coverage of life in the United States as well as in Lithuania, and its publications very often reached the homeland and encouraged Lithuanians in their resistance against Russian oppression.

The newspapers in the United States started to apply new methods of publication of Lithuanian books, which, again, could not be applied in East Prussia. While the Lithuanians in East Prussia, in order to keep cost to the minimum, and to make books suitable for smuggling through the frontier, were compelled to print small books, all American-Lithuanian newspapers began to produce larger books dividing them into parts and publishing gradually in succeeding issues of their papers and then later reprinting them as separate books. In this way new books, covering the fields of literature, science and politics, were published. Many manuscripts which had reached America many years earlier were now printed for the first time. Thus were published the works of Simanas Daukantas, who had died in 1864, Bishop Motiejus Valančius who had died in 1875, Antanas Tatarė, Leonas Ivinskis, Pabrėža and others. It was very probable that without the help of the American-Lithuanian press these important works would never have seen the light. *Vienybė Lietuvininku* (Lithuanians' Unity) led in this way of publication by reprint from its columns.[2] Since 1901, *Žvaigzde* (The Star), published and edited by Rev. Antanas Milukas (1871-1944), printed many books.[3] In 1905 *Kaleivis* (The Traveller) and others adopted similar practices. The most important part, however, was played by the newspaper *Lietuva* (Lithuania) after it was taken over by Antanas Olšauskas (Olševskis, 1863-1942) in Chicago, Ill., in 1893. This newspaper lived for over a quarter of century.[4] From 1895 to 1912 the paper was edited by Jouzas Adomaitis (1859-1922), the former editor of *Varpas* (The Bell), an illegal Lithuanian newspaper published in East Prussia. Jouzas Adomaitis wrote under the pseudonym of Šernas. He was not only a good newspaper editor, but himself an author who wrote articles on popular science, especially natural sciences. During the twenty years of his editorial work, *Lietuva* published many of his own works later printed as monographs.[5] The works of Jouzas Adomaitis were eagerly read and they accomplished a great deal in elevating the low cultural level of the Lithuanian immigrants. Adomaitis' works were also smuggled to Lithuania.[6]

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[2] This journal, established in 1886 in Plymouth, Pa., as a weekly, was published by Juozas Paukštis (1871-1906) and edited by D. B. Tamašauskas. Editors and publishers changed, but the paper has survived until today. Its name was shortened to *Vienybė* (Unity) and as the oldest existing Lithuanian newspaper is now edited and published by Juozas Tysliava in Brooklyn (192 Highland Blvd., Brooklyn 7, N. Y.) Juozas Paukštis was the most prolific publisher of Lithuanian books between 1886-1905: for instance, in 1886 he published five, in 1887—seven and in 1888—six books. The first textbook of English for Lithuanians was compiled and published by J. Paukštis: *Spasabas Grejto Izsimokinimo Angelskos Kalbos del Lietuwninku Amerikoje* (Method of Quick Learning of the English Language for Lithuanians in America), 1886, 272 pp., 3000 copies. Other important publications by Paukštis were: *Dainos Lietuwiszkos isz Wisur Surinktos* (Lithuanian Songs Collected from Everywhere), 1887, 232 pp.; 2nd ed. 1893, 496 pp.; *Lietuvos Istorija* (History of Lithuania) by Simonas Daukantas, 1893-1897, 2 vols.; *Eglé* by Aleksandras Gužutis, 1893, 101 pp. (one of the first original dramas in Lithuanian); *Dainos* (Songs), poetry by Antanas Vienožinskis, 1894, viii, 50 pp.; short stories by the well known woman writer Žemaitė (pseud.), and other books, all published in Plymouth, Pa. J. Paukštis & Co. also published the *Catalogue of the Lithuanian Literature,* 1906, 29 pp., which included not only their own publications, but also all other Lithuanian books available on the market at this time (nearly 500 titles).

[3] As early as 1898, the Rev. Antanas Milukas started publishing in Shenandoah, Pa., a quarterly *Dirva* (The Field) which can be regarded as the first Lithuanian scientific and literary periodical. Each issue had about 160 pages and consisted of one or more monographic studies such as collections of folksongs by J. Šimtakojis (=Rev. Juozas Čaplikas) in 1899, and Dr. Jonas Basanavičius, 2 pts. in 1902, further *Botanika arba Taislius Auguminis,* a Lithuanian botany book, compiled in 1843 by Rev. Ambroziejus Pabrėža, 1900, 166 pp. Altogether 25 issues appeared before the periodical was discontinued in August, 1902.

[4] Founded as a weekly in 1892, *Lietuva* became a daily in November 1918 under the chief editorship of B. K. Balutis. The last issue came out on May 7, 1920.

[5] Šernas translated and compiled 15 voluminous books including *Earth and Other Worlds* (1896), *Geography* (1899), *Biology* (1901), *Ethnology* (1903), *Hygiene* (1905), etc.

[6] In sum Olšauskas published 131 books including the best seller *Naujausias Lietuviszkas Sapninykas* (A New Lithuanian Interpreter of Dreams) which he compiled himself, reprinted many times and sold over 20,000 copies (1st ed. Chicago, 1895, 205 pp., 310 illus.) For more details about this very active and able man see monograph *Antanas Olšauskas,* ed. by Petras Jurgėla, Sodus, Mich., J. J. Bachunas [1934] 55 pp.

The smuggling of Lithuanian books from the United States has defeated the attempts of the Russian government to compel the Lithuanians to accept the Cyrillic alphabet and Cyrillic types. While the Lithuanian people were able to get only prayer-books and small pamphlets printed in East Prussia, the Russian government hoped to force the Lithuanians to accept the hated alphabet. The American-Lithuanian press destroyed all such hopes, because it supplied books to meet all needs both of older and younger generations.

Gradually the quality and quantity of the American-Lithuanian press increased tremendously. From 1875 until 1904 American-Lithuanians supplied one seventh of all the Lithuanian books known for the period from 1547 to 1904.

For a long time the American-Lithuanian periodical and non-periodical press did not have any established center. The editors and publishers traveled from place to place looking for better jobs and opportunities, and printing presses followed them. Of course, the editors of the Lithuanian papers tried to keep close to the large Lithuanian settlements. Because the majority of the first Lithuanian immigrants were centered around the coal mines, the first Lithuanian book in America was published in Shamokine, Pennsylvania. By 1886, Plymouth, Pennsylvania, had become the center of the Lithuanian book trade and by 1888 Mahanoy City. Then followed: in 1890, Scranton, Pennsylvania; in 1894, Mt. Carmel, Pennsylvania; in 1898, Minersville, Pennsylvania; in 1899, Philadelphia; in 1900, Pittsburgh; in 1910, Wilkes Barre. Later on the publishing centers were organized, for a shorter or longer period, in many other places. For example, Chicago played, and plays, a very important part in the history of the American-Lithuanian press. Here *Lietuva* was started and a number of the other Lithuanian newspapers. At the present time Chicago, a large center for the printing of Lithuanian books, possesses two Lithuanian dailies, *Draugas* (Friend), founded in 1909, and *Naujienos* (News), founded in 1914. Several other centers have published Lithuanian literature sporadically: New York City where the first Lithuanian book was printed in 1884; Brooklyn, New York, Baltimore, Maryland, and Waterbury, Connecticut, beginning in 1896; Detroit, Michigan, in 1893; Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1900; Elizabeth, New Jersey, in 1897; Brockton, Massachusetts, in 1905; Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1907; Kensington, Illinois, in 1907. In 1894 a Lithuanian press center was established in South Boston on a more permanent basis and on a wider scale. At a much later date Cleveland, Ohio, and Detroit, Michigan, became important centers.

Not all of the printing of the American-Lithuanian literature was done in the United States, however. To save money the practice was adopted of sending American manuscripts to East Prussia for printing. The East Prussian printers were paid with American money but on the East Prussian wage scale. This was practiced by the society which was organized by Jonas Šliūpas in Plymouth, Pennsylvania, under the name Lietuviu Mokslo Draugystė Amerikoje (Lithuanian Learned Society in America), which in

1892-93 published its organ *Apšvieta* (Enlightenment) in Tilsit. Also in Tilsit were published several books written in the United States by Jonas Šliūpas and Petras Mikolainis. Despite the fact that these works, written and prepared in the United States, were published abroad, they must be considered as part of the American-Lithuanian publications and should be included in the bibliography of the works of American-Lithuanians. The majority of these books were not only prepared in the United States but also were distributed and sold here.

Sometimes, in order to get their books into Lithuania, publishers used falsifications. The main method was to use a false imprint. For example a prayer-book prepared and published in 1903 in Chicago by the newspaper *Lietuva* has the imprint "Vilnius, 1862." After the prohibition was lifted the incorrect imprint was still used but this time for a different reason. In 1905 we find two translations of Posteri books printed in Chicago but carrying the imprint of Odessa, Russia. A catalog printed in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1907 has the imprint Vilnius. In 1908 Mykolas Alyta issued his book *Anatemos knygelė;* the book was printed in Brooklyn, New York, but Paris appeared in the imprint.

Between 1890-1904 and even during the first world war the majority of authors of Lithuanian books printed in America were residents of Lithuania. However, as time passed the number of able Lithuanian writers living in the United States became larger, and there was an ever increasing number who had completed their education in America.

This article is concerned only with the early days of the American-Lithuanian press. But even in those days there were a number of able journalists and authors. Among the latter must be mentioned Jonas Sliburis and Anatolis Tulys. The former wrote short stories on American life. Then there was Bronius Laucevičius who wrote dramas under the pseudonym of Br. Vargšas. There were a number of minor poets. Most of them ended their poetry careers in their youth, as writing poetry is a common disease of all Lithuanian teen-agers. These young writers brought up in America added to the press a new color and at the same time brought the American-Lithuanian press closer to the American press in general.

For raising the cultural level of the Lithuanians in America, the greatest credit must be given to Tévynés Mylétoju Draugysté (The Society of the Lovers of the Native Country) which was organized in 1896 and has survived until the present day. The goal of this society was the distribution among its members of popular-scientific works. Tévynés Mylétoju Draugysté has published a great many popular books on science. Finally, in 1908-1909, the Society decided to publish the collected works of Vincas Kudirka (1858-1899), a notable Lithuanian poet and politician. Vincas Kudirka's works (*Raštai,* ed. by J. Gabrys, Tilsit, 1909) which were issued in six volumes and filled about two thousand pages, still remain the largest publication of the American-Lithuanian press. The publication of this work was accepted with great joy by the Lithuanians not only in the United States but also in Lithuania. However, the publishers were pressed by financial problems as they were unable to enlist enough subscribers. Hence Vincas Kudirka's works were printed in Tilsit, East Prussia, in 1909, and the Tévynés Mylétoju Draugysté distributed its copies among the members of the society. Some copies of Kudirka's works were sent to Lithuania. Despite the fact that the prohibition of the Lithuanian press has been lifted long since, the works of Vincas Kudirka were prohibited by the Russian officials and they had to be smuggled into Lithuania.

Other very important Lithuanian works published in the United States were collections of Lithuanian folklore. Dr. Jonas Basanavičius (1851-1927) and his collaborators for many years collected Lithuanian folklore. Later, living abroad, he prepared them for publication. Several volumes were published: *Lietuviszkos Pasakos* (Lithuanian tales), 2 vols., Shenandoah, Pa., 1898-1902; *Ožkabaliu Dainos* (Songs of Ožkabaliai), 2 vols., Shenandoah, Pa., 1902 (reprinted from *Dirva*). Five vols. of folk tales were issued by Antanas Olšauskas, publisher of *Lietuva,* under the titles: *Lietuviškos Pasakos Yvairios* (Various Lithuanian Tales), 4 vols., Chicago, 1903-1905, and *Iš Gyvenimo Lietuvišku Véliu bei Velniu* (From the Life of Lithuanian Ghosts and Evil Spirits), Chicago, 1903. Even today these collections of folklore are very important and not only for the study of Lithuanian folklore, but also for international studies as material of first rate. Tale books were very much in demand; therefore, the publishers stereotyped the composition, and Basanavičius' folk tales, originally published by *Lietuva,* has been reissued four times (latest in Kaunas, 1928).

During the time of the prohibition of press in Lithuania, the American-Lithuanians began to think about grammatical rules for Lithuanian writing. Despite the fact that the number of publications in Lithuanian was large, there was no uniformity in orthography. Everyone wrote the way it looked prettier, more convenient or better to him. In order to eliminate such "colorfulness," in 1900 one of the greatest Lithuanian fraternal organizations *Susivienijimas Lietuviu Amerikoje* (Lithuanian Alliance of America), announced a contest for a Lithuanian grammar. In announcing the contest the society was looking for a simple handbook of grammatical rules which could be used by the writers and readers of the American-Lithuanian periodicals. Jonas Jablonskis (1860-1930) won the contest. Thus, he acquired the title of the father of the Lithuanian language and in independent Lithuania he became the first professor of Lithuanian language in the newly formed University at Kaunas. Jablonskis' grammar was financed by the Susivienijimas Lietuviu Amerikoje and was published in Tilsit in 1901. In order to avoid all possible difficulties with the Russian officials Jablonskis used the pseudonym of Petras Kriaušaitis.[7]

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[7] Many Lithuanian books and articles were published in the United States under pseudonyms. This habit was inherited from the times of the prohibition of the Lithuanian press by Russians when the disclosure of the real name might have entailed for the author loss of job, prison and possibly deportation to Siberia. V. Biržiška compiled a directory *Lietuviškieji Slapyvardžiai ir Slapyraidés* (Lithuanian Pseudonyms and Kryptonyms), 2 pts., Kaunas, 1942-1943.

After the prohibition against Latin types for Lithuanian publications was lifted in 1904, the press began to grow in Lithuania. This development had a great influence on the activities of the American-Lithuanian press, especially felt in book publication. From 1905 on the American-Lithuanian newspapers were able to discuss Lithuanian affairs more freely. Also their sources of information considerably improved. They could depend not only on their special agents but also on Lithuanian newspapers which were now being printed at home. With the growth of newspapers in Lithuania, however, Lithuanian newspapers in America were forced more and more into the field of publication of news about Lithuanian affairs in the United States.

Meanwhile, Lithuania was going through a period of trials and new troubles, which required solution of new problems. New tasks needed moral and economic support, and the American-Lithuanian press took this burden upon its shoulders. In 1905-1906, in the period of the first Russian revolution, the revolutionary movement in Lithuania together with similar movements of other nations raised the problems of the national autonomy and this struggle required large funds. During World War I, Lithuania became a battlefield and was devastated by Russian and German armies and bitterly needed help from abroad. In 1918-1940, when Lithuania succeeded in reestablishing its independence, the American-Lithuanian press, regardless of its differences, enthusiastically supported all political, economic and cultural needs of the free mother-country. And, since 1940, when Lithuania has been occupied and ruined by the Soviets, the tasks of the American-Lithuanians and of their press have grown immensely, because today this press is the only free Lithuanian press which can continue the fight for the Lithuanian freedom. All these tasks needed enthusiasm, stubborn work and large funds; and all that was liberally contributed by the American-Lithuanian press.

A similar situation arose in the field of Lithuanian books. During the period 1905-14, as it was mentioned above, a great number of works written in Lithuania were published in the columns of the Lithuanian newspapers in the United States and only later were reprinted as separate volumes. But since the vast majority of the books after 1918 could be easily obtained from Lithuania proper, the American-Lithuanian publishers limited themselves to works which were still not printed in Lithuania. There was also another trend in American-Lithuanian publications. In the early days people who themselves were unable to produce new works, were making translations of Polish and Russian books. At the turn of the century the majority of the Lithuanian intellectuals in America had learned English and began to make translations from English. In this way both the Lithuanians in the United States and those in Lithuania became acquainted with the literature of the English-speaking world. The translations were not limited to popular works. Many famous literary and scholarly works were also translated. Among the early translators V. K. Račkauskas may be mentioned, who translated Longfellow's *Hiawatha* (publ. in 1929) ; this translation appeared first in parts in local papers. In 1908 Vincas Daukšys translated Upton Sinclair's *Jungle*. The translation of Lithuanian works into English started much later when shortly before World War II Nadas Rastenis translated the poem *Anykščiu Šilelis* (The Forest of Anykščiai) by Antanas Baranauskas (1831-1902).[8] Rastenis also translated the famous Lithuanian epic *Metai* (Year's seasons), the famous classical poem by Kristijonas Donelaitis (1714-1780). The last translation was not published as separate book yet, but appeared only in parts in periodical publications.

Publications on political theory were especially numerous during the first world war when Lithuanians were definitely working for their political independence, and the Lithuanian books printed in America acquired once more importance for all Lithuanians.

But after the war, when free Lithuania had raised tremendously the output of Lithuanian books in all fields of science and literature, the American-Lithuanians had no reason to enlarge their production of the Lithuanian books, which could be easily and inexpensively received from Lithuania. In the course of this period, even some books prepared for press in America (for instance, the publications of the above mentioned Tévynés Mylétoju Draugija) were, to a great extent, printed in Lithuania, because of the relative cheapness of its printing costs while paying in dollar currency. Thus, in the period of 1918-1940, Lithuania, as the only center of publication of Lithuanian books, had practically no competition.

The outbreak of World War II brought a new upset of the whole situation. In 1940, Lithuania was occupied, first by the Soviets, later, with the outbreak of German-Soviet war, by the Germans, and in 1944 again by the Soviets. Today the country is forced into the Soviet Union and it has lost its independence and all its freedoms, among them the freedom of the press. The Lithuanian publications in Lithuania of today are mostly the tool of Communist propaganda. Thus today again the American-Lithuanian press assumes the responsibility of representing free Lithuania and supplying Lithuanians, scattered throughout the whole world, with publications in their own language.

In this period of national disaster, the American-Lithuanian press got a new impetus and a new vigor. The generous hospitality of America opened the doors for numerous Lithuanian refugees. These refugees differ considerably from early immigrants, because they represent all aspects of the Lithuanian intellectual life. The American-Lithuanian press received in them a rich source of contributors and of readers. Therefore, at the present time, the Lithuanian books in America cover not only the fields of politics and social science, but they represent Lithuanian literature as well.[9] Nevertheless, the situation lacks stability and is rather difficult. In the old days, the Lithuanian books published in the United States of America, did not depend entirely on the demand of the American market, because a great number were sold in Lithuania. Even in the darkest days of prohibition of the Lithuanian press, books could be smuggled into Lithuania. Today the situation is different, and the Lithuanian books, published in America can be sold, practically, only in the U. S., Canada and Australia.

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[8] *The Forest of Anykščiai* by Antanas Baranauskas, translated from Lithuanian by Nadas Rastenis, Los Angeles, Lithuanian Days Pub., 1956, 41 pp. Five legends by an outstanding recent Lithuanian author, Vincas Krévé Mickevičius (1882-1954) were translated into English and published by Vytautas F. Beliajus in his *The Evening Song*, Los Angeles, Bonnie Press, 1954. The first Lithuanian novel translated into English was *Crosses* by Vincas Ramonas, tr. by Milton Stark, Los Angeles, Lithuanian Days Pub., 1954, 329 pp.

Silvestras Baltramaitis (1831-1919?) was the first person to take important steps towards the preparation of Lithuanian bibliography. In 1892 he published in St. Petersburg a list of publications covering materials from the beginning of the Lithuanian press in 1547 until 1891. He included both books and periodical publications which he found in the Public Library of St. Petersburg. It must be noted that the collection of Lithuanian materials in that library consisted mostly of those confiscated by the police either from people smuggling them into the country or from people who possessed them. Twelve years later, in 1904, Baltramaitis revised his list, added new publications up to 1903, and issued a second edition of 218 pages under the title *Spisok litovskikh i drevne-prusskikh knig s 1553 po 1903 g.* (A List of Lithuanian and Old Prussian books from 1553 until 1903).[10] This bibliography included also American-Lithuanian publications. For the latter publications he used an American-Lithuanian bibliography which had appeared in 1900 on the occasion of the world exhibition in Paris. The Lithuanian section of this exhibition was financed by American-Lithuanian funds. The organization of this section was an attempt to draw attention to the disastrous situation of the Lithuanian printing in Lithuania occupied by the Russians. In order to make the propaganda among the visitors of the exhibition more effective, two bibliographies were prepared: a bibliography of Lithuanian books published in East Prussia in 1864-1896, and a bibliography of American-Lithuanian publications. The latter—the American-Lithuanian bibliography—was prepared by Jonas Žilinskas Žilius, who covered himself under the pseudonym of Jr. Jonas; the bibliography was published under the title: *Suskaita arba Statistika visu Lietuviszku Knygu Atspaustu Amerikoj nuo Pradžios Lietuviszkos Amerikon Emigracijos ligi 1900 metu* (List or Statistics of the Lithuanian books printed in America from the beginning of the Lithuanian emigration until 1900), Plymouth, Pa., 1900, 35 pp. This bibliography of the American-Lithuanian press was based primarily on the collections of Rev. A. Burba and Žilinskas, and included practically all the older American-Lithuanian publications. No bibliographical description was included, but the publication is of great value because the list contains the titles of many books which today are absolutely unavailable.

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[9] Most active in current Lithuanian publishing in the U. S. are: Lithuanian Book Club (4545 West 63rd St., Chicago 20, Ill.); Terra Pub. (3333 So. Halsted St., Chicago 8, Ill.); Lithuanian Encyclopedia Pub. (265 -C-St, So. Boston 27, Mass); Lithuanian Days Pub. (9204 So. Broadway, Los Angeles 2, Calif.); Gabija Pub. in Brooklyn, N. Y. (activities discontinued in March 1955; however, many of its publications are still on the book market).

[10] The first Lithuanian book, *Catechism* by Martin Mosvidius, was published in 1547 in Königsberg, and the first Old Prussian *Catechism* was published in 1545, therefore the date 1553 is misleading.

In independent Lithuania a publication called *Lietuviu Bibliografija* was started in 1924 by Vaclovas Biržiška. This bibliography was an attempt to register all Lithuanian works from "the beginning to the present day." In the third volume of this bibliography, issued in 1929 and devoted to the period of press prohibition, 1865-1904, publications of American-Lithuanian press were also included. Vaclovas Biržiška based his work on the library of Rev. A. Burba and Žilinskas which had been donated to the University in Kaunas. In 1935 the fourth volume of the *Lietuviu Bibliografija* came off the press and covered the years 1905-09. Supplements to the earlier parts were included. Much attention was also paid in this volume to the development of the American-Lithuanian press. A volume covering the year 1910 was published in 1939, just before the outbreak of the Second World War. The supplements to earlier parts were added as well. The war and then the occupation of Lithuania stopped further publication of this Lithuanian bibliography. In 1940, the completed manuscript for 1911-1914 was destroyed by fire.

In the United States there is no place where all the American-Lithuanian publications have been preserved. Therefore, the author has stopped his bibliography of these publications at 1910. The materials on the years from 1911 onwards are very incomplete and a bibliography based on such sources would fail to give an exact picture. Valuable information on the American-Lithuanian press may be found in *Bibliografijos Žinios* (Bibliographical News) which was edited by Vaclovas Biržiška and Aleksandras Ružancovas and published since 1928 in Kaunas. *Bibliografijos Žinios* was published until 1944, but since 1940 (Soviet occupation) no American-Lithuanian publications could be included. In 1946 Aleksandras Ružancovas started to publish in Germany, later transferring to the United States, *Knygu Lentyna* (Bookshelf) in which the greater part of the current American-Lithuanian press publications are included. Thus, the weakest period of the American-Lithuanian bibliography is that between 1911 and 1928.[11]

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[11] Two following articles on the same subject were recently published in a collective work entitled *Lithuania's Fight for a Free Press* (ed. by Vytautas Bagdanavičius et al., Chicago, Lithuanian Community of Chicago Area, 1957, 365 pp.): "Amerikos Lietuviu Knygos" (American Lithuanian Books) by Vytautas Širvydas, p. 239-296 (the author used V. Biržiška's unpublished survey, manuscript in The Library of Congress), and "Amerikiniai Lietuviu Laikraščiai" (American Lithuanian Newspapers) by Juozas Prunskis, p. 297-314. A more extensive survey of the American Lithuanian press was compiled and published by Frank Lavinskas: *Amerikos Lietuviu Laikraščiai 1879-1955* (English title supplied: The Lithuanian Press in U. S. A. from 1879 to 1955, Newspapers, Magazines), Long Island City, N. Y., 1956, 191 pp., illus.

PLANNING IN THE UPPER SILESIAN INDUSTRIAL REGION

by Norman J. G. Pounds

A MILE below the Upper Silesian town of Mysłowice the dark waters of the Czarna Przemsza river are joined by those of the Biała Przemsza. The combined rivers flow on to join the Vistula. At one time they carried small barges laden with coal to Kraków and to other cities farther downriver. But until 1918 their chief function was to separate the three empires of Prussia, Austria and Russia. The confluence of the two rivers was the *Dreikaisereck,* "Three Emperors' Corner," where their respective jurisdictions met at a point.

The Przemsza river, with its western or Czarna branch, had formed part of the boundary of the Prussian province of Silesia, annexed from Austria in 1742. The land lying between the Czarna and Biała Przemsza went to Prussia at the Third Partition (1795), but the territory lying east of the rivers remained part of the Polish kingdom until it passed, also at the Third Partition, into the hands of the Hapsburgs. The territory on this side of the river was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which Napoleon had created in 1807, but in 1815 the Przemsza river and its tributaries assumed the boundary functions which they retained until 1918.

The fact that the boundaries thus established dissected an important coalfield may have been dimly recognized by those who traced them. That the negotiators could have been influenced by this knowledge was inconceivable. As events were to show, the coalfield was divided unequally among the three empires. The coal basin as a whole forms a triangular area of about 2500 square miles (figure 1), but over most of this the coal measures are too deeply buried beneath later geological deposits for even their presence to have been recognized thus early. The coalfield was divided between the three empires in the proportions of approximately:[1]

Germany	2800 square kilometers:	48.7 per cent
Austria	2517 square kilometers:	43.7 per cent
Russia	440 square kilometers:	7.6 per cent

These figures are misleading in so far as in much of the Austrian sector the coal was, and still is, incapable of economic development. The coal measures come to the surface over less than a sixth of this area, but here the coal can be recognized in the surface rocks and extracted from shallow pits. These outcrops of the coal measures cover an extensive area in the north of the coal basin and several small areas in the west and southwest. We are not concerned with the latter in this paper. The northern outcrop is in all respects the most important, and supports the larger part of the mining and industrial development of this region.

The extent of this northern outcrop of the coal measures is shown in figure I in relation to the political boundaries existing throughout most of

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[1] Stefan Czarnocki, *Polskie Zagłębie Węglowe,* Warsaw, 1935, 2.


ZONE A
ZONE B
EXPOSED COALFIELD
COAL BASIN
Tarnowskie Gory
Radzionkow
Bytom
Gliwice
Zabrze
Chorzow
Dabrowa Gornicza
Sosnowiec
Katowice
Myslowice
Tychy
PRZEMSZA
VISTULA
ODRA
POLAND
Goczalkowice
0
5
10
15

the nineteenth century. The largest share went to Germany, and appreciably smaller areas to Russia and Austria. Some form of industrial development was promoted during the nineteenth century in each of these sectors.

(a) *German Upper Silesia*: Mining and industrial growth was most vigorous in the Prussian sector. Here coal mining was developed in the later years of the eighteenth century, and mineral fuel was used in the iron furnaces established by the Prussian officials at Gliwice and Chorzów (Königshütte). By the middle of the nineteenth century industrial growth in this region had made great progress. It was one of the leading industrial regions of Europe, though within Germany itself the Ruhr was drawing ahead both in its mining and its metallurgical development. Growth in Upper Silesia was severely restricted by the location of the area on the south-eastern confines of the German Empire. It was difficult to market coal and iron goods in the rest of Germany, and, in so far as Upper Silesia can be said to have had a natural market, this lay eastward within the empire of the Tsars or south-eastward in that of the Hapsburgs. Nevertheless, in spite of these handicaps, the coal output of Upper Silesia reached almost 40 million tons in 1913, and the pig-iron production amounted to over one million tons.

(b) *Russian Dąbrowa*: In the angle formed by the Czarna and Biała Przemsza lay the district of Dąbrowa, which passed to Russia in 1815. Coal mining was probably carried on at an earlier date here than in Upper Silesia, but the mining industry grew much less rapidly. Little came of the attempts made during the short-lived "Congress" Kingdom, to develop manufacturing industry. Soon afterwards the Huta Bankowa works were established by the Bank of Poland, but they did not prosper, and were closed down in 1870. Indeed, success did not come to the metallurgical industry in Dąbrowa until it was more closely associated with the industry in Upper Silesia.[2]

The slowness of the industrial development of the Dąbrowa sector is not easy to explain. Undoubtedly, Polish and Russian investment capital was inadequate. There was no pool of industrial skills such as existed in Upper Silesia. But the Polish and Russian market was opening up for iron goods and there was a potential demand sufficient, as was soon demonstrated, for a metallurgical industry of modest size.

A high tariff barrier excluded from the Polish Kingdom the products of the Upper Silesian works, whose smoking chimneys could be seen from the Russian bank of the Czarna Przemsza. In 1868 the import duty on pig-iron was reduced from 15 kopecs per pud to 5 kopecs. Within a few years some of the Upper Silesian metallurgical concerns had established subsidiaries in Dąbrowa.[3] The Königs- und Laurahütte established the Huta Katarzyna in 1881. A year later the Obenschlesischer Eisenbahnbedarfs A.G. founded the Huta Aleksandra, and Henckel von Donnersmarck, the Puszkin. Other works were founded at Sosnowiec, Poręba and Sielce.[4]

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[2] Franciszek Popiołek, *Dzieje Hutnictwa żelaznego na Ziemiach Polskich*, Katowice, 1947, 32-41; Jan Rutkowski, *Historia Gospodarcza Polski* (do 1864), Warsaw, 1953, 351-361.

These were all puddling and refining works. Pig-iron was brought in by each company from its respective works in Upper Silesia to be refined and marketed in Poland. Between 1884 and 1891 the Russian government progressively raised the duty on pig-iron to 35 kopecs. It ceased to be profitable to import it, and blast furnaces were built at some of the Dąbrowa works. In this way they became smelting, puddling, and steelmaking works. They were small, even by Upper Silesian standards, and they faced more serious technical problems than those in Upper Silesia. In the first place, the scanty Upper Silesian deposits of coking coal lay entirely in the German sector. Blast-furnaces situated in the Russian area had either to import iron and pay the duty or make do with coal of less than coking quality. Secondly, ore was more scarce in Dąbrowa than in Upper Silesia. Local deposits were scanty, and had to be supplemented from Częstochowa, Kielce and even the Ukraine, which even before the First World War was becoming a significant source of ore-supply for this area.

(c) *Austrian West Galicia*: South of the Biała Przemsza lay the Austrian territory, which in 1846 had incorporated the free territory of Kraków. Resources in coal and iron ore in this sector were not inconsiderable, and there were in addition deposits of lead and zinc ores. But the iron industry was small, and based on charcoal, and coal-mining was less developed here than in any other part of the coalfield. It was never the policy of the Austrians to develop industrially this overcrowded region. They looked upon it as a market for the factory products of Bohemia, and strove to maintain their authority here by promoting the differences between the *szlachta,* the townspeople and the peasantry.[5]

Such were the political and economic divisions of the Upper Silesia-Dąbrowa-Kraków coalfield when the First World War broke out. It requires little imagination to see how the economic growth of the region as a whole had been distorted by its political fragmentation. In 1918, the Dąbrowa and Galician sectors were taken into the newly revived Polish state, and four years later Upper Silesia was itself partitioned between Germany and Poland.

UPPER SILESIA DIVIDED: At the end of the First World War, the Polish Republic was established and from the first embraced both the former Russian and Austrian areas of the coalfield. The only question at issue was whether the new State should also have all or only part of the German industrial sector. Both parties claimed the whole, urging that it was, in the words of one of the many German publicists, a *"gewaltige Wirtschafts-Organismus."* His mistake lay in limiting this claim to the former German

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[3] V. Wittschewsky, *Russlands Handels-, Zoll- und Industriepolitik,* Berlin, 1905; J. Kuczynski and G. Wittkowski, *Die deutschen-russischen Handelsbeziehungen in den letzten 150 Jabren,* Berlin, 1947.

[4] For details see F. Popiołek, *op. cit.; Handbuch von Polen,* ed. I. Wunderlich, Berlin, 1918, Chapter XII, *"Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb;* Die Montanindustrie im Königreich Polen," *Zeitschrift des Oberschlesischer Berg und Huttenmannescher Vereins,* LV, 1916, 9-29.

[5] *Cambridge History of Poland,* volume II, Cambridge, 1951, 432-460.

territory and in not extending it to the whole industrial area. Negotiations, marred by sporadic fighting, culminated in the plebiscite and partition.[6] By the Geneva Award of 1922 the new political boundary was made to run to the east and south of Bytom (Beuthen), between Zabrze (Hindenburg) and Chorzów (Königshütte), and then to the south of Gliwice (Gleiwitz) (figure 2). It did what both parties to the dispute had claimed that it should not do: it broke up functional units. Eleven out of the twenty-two major industrial concerns found their assets divided: zinc mine from smelter, and coal mine from coke-oven.[7] Two of the largest iron and steel concerns found the several parts of their integrated plants divided by a political boundary.[8] The transport services, the supply of fuel and industrial raw materials and reservoirs and water pipe-lines had been created and organized for German Upper Silesia as a whole. If the partition were made too drastically, economic life would have been paralyzed. In the event, the Geneva Convention provided for the gradual severence of the two parts and established a Mixed Commission to supervise the task.[9]

Thus, while the Polish Republic was trying to knit together those sectors of the industrial area which had been separated for a century by the fork of the Przemsza river, an international committee was working a few miles to the west to create a political and economic division in what had hitherto been a unit.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the consequences for the economy of the area of this fresh partition, nor is there space to examine the ways in which some of the industrial concerns attempted to avoid the consequences of partition. The concrete German blockhouses of the inter-war period still stand between Chorzów and Bytom as reminders of one of the least realistic boundaries established after the First World War. Now that the whole region is again under a single political rule, one can only marvel at the patience and tolerance of the local people who made the Geneva Award function as smoothly as it did in this crowded, industrial area.

The Achievement of Unity: The maintenance of this division of Upper Silesia after the Second World War was never in question. It was decided at Teheran that the whole region was to go to Poland, and at Yalta (1945) the present western boundary of Poland was agreed to by her allies. For the first time the whole of the Upper Silesian industrial region was under the control of a single political administration, and for the first time an opportunity offered of handling the manifold problems of the area as a whole. It was pointed out that the Upper Silesian industrial region was part only of a greater whole—the Upper Silesian-Moravian coal basin—in which were other industrial centers in Moravska Ostrava and Karvinná. It is true that rather vague proposals were made for the planned development of the whole coalfield basin,[10] but the problem here was somewhat academic. The industrially developed areas are separated by almost 40 miles of forest and poor agricultural land. Coal mining is spreading into this area, but the time is not near when it would be desirable to plan the development of the whole coalfield area as a single unit. On the other hand, within the Upper Silesian industrial area, with the adjoining district of Dąbrowa and the formerly Austrian West Galicia, there were serious and urgent problems.

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[6] Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War*, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1933, Volume I, 206-270; Adam Benisz, *Górny Śląsk w Walce o Polskość*, Katowice, 1930.

[7] Gerhard Wende, "Die Auswirkungen der Grenzziehung auf die oberschlesische Montanindustrie," *Schriften des Deutschen Ausland-Instituts*, Stuttgart, Reihe E, Band 7, 1932; also Konrad Rasch, *Die Teilung Oberschlesinens und ihre Bedeutung für die Kohlen-, Eisen- und Zinkindustrie, Dissertation*, Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität, 1926.

[8] *Oberschlesischer Eisenbahnbedarfs A. G.* and *Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie A. G., Gleiwitz.*

[9] Georges Kaeckenbeeck, *The International Experiment of Upper Silesia*, Oxford, 1942.

The combined industrial area was now about 30 miles from west to east and at most 12 miles from north to south. The former German industrial area had constituted a triangle with its apices at Gliwice, Bytom and Katowice, but to this was now added the former Russian and Austrian sectors. Outside this industrial region lay a more lightly industrialized area. To the north was the former lead and zinc mining district around Tarnowskie Góry; to the west, some works, including the Labędy steel and rolling works, had grown up along the old Kłodnicki Canal. To the south and east coal mines had been opened up deep in the surrounding forest and farmland.

As is often the case, the industrial region was hard to define, because it did not end abruptly. It contained six industrial cities: Gliwice, Zabrze, Bytom, Chorzów, Katowice and Sosnowiec; but between these lay a multitude of villages (*gminy*), whose function was nevertheless almost exclusively industrial. In October 1939 the German administration changed the governmental structure of the area, establishing the *Regencja Katowicka* to embrace the whole industrial area.[11] No significant changes were made, however, at the level of cities (*miasta wydzielone*) and rural districts (*powiaty*). In 1945, the Polish system of local administration was extended to the territories newly recovered from Germany, but for a time no attempt was made to bring the administrative structure into line with the needs of a region as highly urbanized and industrialized as this. Indeed, it was not until May, 1950 that Bolesław Bierut, in his address to the Fourth Plenum of the Party Central Committee mentioned the need for a revision of the administrative areas of the country. In the next month the major administrative unit, *Województwo Katowickie,* was created, covering the whole industrial area and reaching southward to the Czechoslovak border. In the spring of the following year, administrative order was brought to the industrial area. Some of the existing cities were enlarged by the incorporation of *gminy,* and from the remaining *gminy* six new cities were created: Mysłowice, Nowy Bytom, Ruda, Siemianowice, Szopienice and Swiętochłowice. In the eastern part of the industrial area three separate cities (*miasta wydzielone*) were established at Czeladź, Będzin and Dąbrowa Górnicza.[12]

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[10] Wacław Jastrzebowski, "Polsko-czechosłowacka współpraca gospodarcza," *Myśl Współczesna,* I, 1948, 48-76.

[11] *Górny Śląsk: Prace i Materiały Geograficzne,* Kraków, 1955, 564-589.

GORNO-ŚLASKI OKREG PRZEMYSLOWY (GOP): A number of minor modifications and changes of boundary were subsequently introduced. These administrative changes had introduced some order and had reduced drastically the number of administrative units. It did not however solve the problems of the area. This could only be done by a planning authority which embraced the *miasta wydzielone*. In June 1953, by decree of the *Prezydium Rządu* the Upper Silesian Industrial Region (*Górno-Śląski Okręg Przemysłowy*) was defined and a planning authority established.[13] The region itself was divided into Zone A, comprising the highly industrialized area from Gliwice to Dąbrowa Górnicza, and a surrounding, less thickly settled and industrialized area, known as Zone B.

Zone A consists of the fifteen cities (*miasta wydzielone*) already mentioned, together with five *miasta niewydzielone* and three *gminy*.[14] It has an area of 154 square miles,[15] and a population in 1955 of 1,485,000.[16] Most of this area is closely built up, and the open spaces which remain between the cities are rendered unfit for housing or industrial development by the danger of subsidence above mined-out areas. Only around the periphery of the GOP is the terrain sufficiently free of this danger for extensive building—domestic or industrial—to be practicable. It is an overcrowded area, as its average population density of nearly 10,000 per square mile indicates. Its average population density is more than three times that of the Ruhr industrial area[17] and more than twice that of Greater London.[18]

The problems faced by the planning authority of the GOP were not limited to overcrowding and the competing claims for space for housing and industry. Water-supply, transportation and the supply of materials for the local industries each presented difficulties.

The basic assumptions of the Upper Silesian Plan were that industry, more particularly coal-mining, had to be intensified, and that the population of the central industrial area had, both for its own sake and in the interests of industrial expansion, to be reduced. These objectives could be achieved only by building satellite or dormitory towns around the periphery of the GOP and, for the future, by allowing only those industries to be

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[12] Alfred Hornig, "Rozwój górno-śląskiego zespołu miejskiego," *Czasopismo Geograficzne,* 1954, 126-146.

[13] K. Szwabowiz, "Teoria i praktyka deglomeracji Śląska," *Gospodarka Planowa,* XI, 1956, Marzec, 64-6; Janusz Ziołkowski, "Z problematyki przestrzennej i gospodarczej górnośląskiego okręgu przemysłowego," *Przegląd Zachodni,* XIII, 1957, 254-279.

[14] Leszek Kosiński, *Specyfika struktury demograficznej miast Górnośląskiego Okręgu Przemysłowego,* Instytut Urbanistyki i Architektury, (mimeographed), Warsaw, 1955.

[15] Computed from *Rocznik Statysticzne,* 1956, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warsaw, 1956.

[16] Computed from "Liczba ludności miast i osiedli w Polsce w latach 1810-1955," *Documentacja Geograficzna,* zeszyt 5, P. A. N., 1956.

[17] As defined by the *Ruhrsiedlungsverband,* see *Ordnung und Plannung im Ruhr-Raum,* Dortmund, 1951, 22.

[18] As defined by the Metropolitan Police District.


● Coal Mines
✪ Iron and Steel Works
☆ Steel and Rolling Works
KOZŁOVA GÓRA
Przemsza
Pustynia Błędowska
PRZEMSZA
Biała
Czarna Przemsza
SOSNOWIEC
KATOWICE
CHORZOW
BYTOM
ZABRZE
GLIWICE
KLODNICA
TO THE ODRA
0 1 2 3 4 5

Fig. II

established there that were heavily dependent on coal and zinc ore, the chief natural products of the area itself.

DEGLOMERATION: The need to reduce the population of the industrial area had been widely recognized and officially accepted several years before the mechanism for affecting it was established.[19] Living conditions were unpleasant and unhealthy, with no real possibility of improvement. Indeed, with increasing demands for labor in mines and factories, the congested conditions could only deteriorate yet more.

The plan, foreshadowed as early as 1948, was to prohibit in the GOP all new domestic building, especially apartment blocks, and also new factories that were not intimately connected with the local deposits of coal and zinc. The increment of population was to be housed in satellite cities, and every opportunity was to be taken of rehousing industrial workers in Zone B.

A number of sites have been chosen for satellite towns, mostly on the edge of or just beyond the limits of the GOP. Construction is most advanced at Nowy Tychy, some 8½ miles south of Katowice. Here, as in other satellite towns, the new building takes the shape of large five- or six-floored apartment blocks, uniform in style and too closely spaced to be artistic. A main railway, as well as buses, link Nowy Tychy with Katowice and the cities of the central part of the GOP.

In the summer of 1957 considerable progress had also been made in building the "new" Radzionków and the "new" Piekary. Other satellite towns are being built at Pyskowice, Halemba, Grodziec, Dąbrowa Gornicze and Mysłowice. Some of these are within—though only just inside—the Zone A. The pressure of circumstances has obliged the planners to abate the rigidity of their schemes. The acute housing problem in the cities, combined with the urgent need for labor, has led, for instance, to the erection of large apartment blocks at Koszutka, on the northern outskirts of Katowice. Anyone who has travelled out of Katowice in the late afternoon by public transport would probably be glad to continue to live amid the smoke of the city rather than make for the open country by this means. It would appear that the inadequacy of the transport services constitutes one of the major obstacles to the further "deglomeration" of the industrial area.[20]

Nor has the prohibition of new industrial works in the central area been enforced as strictly as was hoped. It had been expected that all new plants, not heavily dependent on the local coal and ores, would be located on the Odra river, the Kłodnicki Canal or along the upper Vistula.[21] To some extent this has been done. A large new chemical plant has been built at Kędzierzyn, where the Kłodnicki Canal joins the Odra;[22] thermal electric stations have been erected on the coalfield but outside the central area, and one large iron and steel plant, the Nowa Huta, was located on the Vistula below Kraków[23] and another near Częstochowa. But the attractions of the older industrial area proved strong, and the planning authorities have again compromised. The journal *Życie Gospodarcze* in 1956 named some industrial works that had been established in the central industrial area without being closely tied to the local resources. These included[24] a factory for railroad signalling equipment, a ball-bearing factory near Katowice, a plant for making mining tools and equipment at Niwka, near Sosnowiec, and other engineering works at Mikołowie, Piotrowice (Katowice) and Swiętochłowice.

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[19] M. J. Ziomek, "Problem deglomeracji Górno-śląskiego Zagłębia Węglowego," *Życie Gospodarcze,* III, 1958, 494-7.

[20] Tadeusz Mrzygłód, "Potrzebna jest śmiała koncepcja deglomeracji GOP," *Życie Gospodarcze,* 24 Listopada 1957.

[21] *Życie Gospodarcze,* III, 1948, 494-7.

[22] "Kędzierzyn i ambitne plany chemii," *Życie Gospodarcze,* 22-29 December, 1957.

This was excused by the facts that the skilled labor was available here, that old and derelict buildings could be renovated more cheaply than new buildings could be erected elsewhere,[25] and that it was impossible to put up workers' housing quickly on the virgin industrial sites.

This criticism of the planning authority was followed in 1957 by an even more vigorous attack. An alarming picture was drawn of the destruction of the land surface by industry. Of the total area, 5.7 per cent had been rendered useless by mining operations, and spoil and slag heaps alone covered 1404 hectares (over 5 square miles). The extraction of sand for the *podsadzka* process of filling in worked-out coal seams was said to destroy 450 hectares (nearly 2 square miles) anually in or near the GOP. Hitherto some 10 square miles have been made useless for both agriculture and building by the extraction of sand. Spoil heaps alone are spreading at the rate of 62 hectares (about ¼ square mile) per year.

It is urged, on the one hand, that every effort should be made to reconstitute the land surface and, on the other, that a firmer line should be taken in excluding new industrial works from the area. The modernization of the iron and steel plant already in the area would, it is claimed, require an increase of its total area from 1700 hectares (about 6½ square miles) to 6000 (about 23 square miles); as the journal indicates, such an area fit for industrial use is not to be found.

WATER SUPPLY: The planning of industrial development may have been less bold than some of its critics would have desired. This cannot, however, be said of the plans for water supply to the industrial area. The supply of water to the cities of the area has always been difficult. The industrial area lies on the divide between the drainage basin of the Odra and the Vistula, and its rivers are not only extremely small but also too polluted to be used as a source of supply. At first wells were used. Then in the late 19th century resort was had to abandoned lead and zinc mines—coal mines did not yield a sufficiently pure water—and a network of pipes was laid down linking the chief mines that were so used with the cities. The division of the industrial area in 1922 played havoc with the water supply and Part

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[23] *Życie Gospodarcze*, XI, 1956, Marzee, 64-6.

[25] J. M. Montias points out that in general it nas been cheaper to modernize old plants than to build new: "The Polish Iron and Steel Industry," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, XVI, 1957, 318.

5 of the German-Polish Convention was concerned with regulating the division of the available water and its circulation through the complex pipeline system.[26] Though there were no serious disputes regarding the sharing of the water-supply, the amount was restricted and was a factor inhibiting industrial development.

The industrial and population growth that is taking place in the GOP as a whole necessitates a large and assured supply of water.[27] The sources formerly important, such as Szyb Staszic (Adolf-Schacht) and the Zawada mine, continue to be used, but they are now being supplemented from other and more distant sources.[28] A dam has been built across the Vistula at Goczałkowice and another on the smaller river Brynica at Kozłowa Góra. It is planned to build other dams on the Biała Przemsza and in the Beskid mountains. The plan, now only in its early stages of implementation, is to build a double pipeline completely surrounding the industrial area, consisting of one pipe for clean water for domestic consumption and the other for non-purified water for industrial use. Mines and dams used for water supply will feed into this "water ring," from which water will be taken by pipes leading inward to the industrial cities. Work has not yet been begun on the "water ring," and its completion must inevitably lie in the distant future. On it, however, depends the growth of industry and population in this area, and its completion is wholly dependent on a unified control of the whole industrial region.

The supply of electric power, a further factor in industrial growth, is similarly conditioned by the unity of the area. The German-Polish Convention of 1922 made elaborate provision for the supply of power across the newly established boundary.[29] Though there are large generating stations at Zabrze and Chorzów, the demand for power is increasing sharply.[30] Three large thermal generating stations have been built, Miechowice and Jaworzno I and II, on the worked coalfield, but outside the central industrial area. From these current is fed *into* the industrial area itself.

Extension of Coal Mining: The further increase of coal production is a condition both of the maintenance of exports and of continued industrial growth. The whole of the industrial area is underlain by coal, and toward the west of the area much of it is of coking quality.[31] Coal seams in the Upper Silesian basin are thick and at a comparatively shallow depth below the surface. This makes for easy mining, but it also leads to severe damage to the land surface. Subsidence is probably more extensive and more serious here than in any other major coalfield. There is no precise estimate of the area that has been made valueless,[32] but a map showing its extent is in course of preparation at the Jagielloński Uniwersytet at Kraków. The fields which separate the cities and villages are dotted with shallow lakes, resulting from subsidence, and it is no uncommon sight to see a cottage standing in a foot or two of water. The danger of subsidence not only restricts the spread of building; it checks the extension of mining beneath areas already built up. Today, cities and factories often appear to stand on low hills, which have been left by the subsidence of surrounding areas.

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[26] Clauses 336 to 369; The text is printed in G. Kaeckenbeeck, *op. cit.*, 567-822.

[27] K. Nowakowski, *Zaopatrzenie w wode górnośląskiego okręgu przemysłowego*, Katowice, 1938.

[28] W. Żukowski, "Zaopatrzenie Zagłębia Węglowego w Wodę," *Życie Gospodarcze*, III, 1948, 515-516.

[29] Clauses 370 to 380, Kaeckenbeeck, *op. cit.*, 719-724.

[30] In 1955, demand was about 2.5 times that of 1949. Józef Kokot, in *Górny Śląsk, Prace i Materiały Geograficzne*, Kraków 1955, 484; *Rocznik Statystyczny*, Warsaw, 1956, 98. 1956, 98.

[31] The best account of the Upper Silesian coalfield is still S. Czarnocki, *op. cit.*

It has become necessary to extend mining beneath such areas, and the problem of roof-support in the mines has long exercised the mining engineers. Even before the First World War, experiments were made in washing sand and gravel into the worked out areas. The water was allowed to drain away and was pumped back to the surface, while the sand became compacted and reduced the extent of the roof collapse to small proportions.[33] The employment of this *podsadzka* process was very limited until after the Second World War, owing in part to the localized nature of the sand-deposits and the difficulty of moving the sand in large quantities through a politically divided area. The latter obstacle has, of course, been removed. Sand is obtained primarily from the Kłodnicki valley to the west and from the Przemsza valley to the east, where there is an extensive area of diluvial sand, the Pustynia Błędowska.[34] The use of the *podsadzka* process has necessitated the construction of large concrete sand-bunkers at most of the mines, and facilities for the transport of the sand. The latter is obviously similar in scale to the movement of the coal itself, without the possibility of using the coal cars themselves for this purpose. A separate network of narrow-gauge railroads is under construction, joining the sand-pits with the mines. At present this is near completion, and when finished will consist of about 310 miles of track reserved exclusively for this purpose, and extending from the sand deposits of the Przemsa valley to all parts not only of the central industrial area but also of the worked area of the coal-field.

The construction and operation of this sanding mechanism is clearly dependent on the unified control of the area. Its results are apparent in the areal extension of mining. The writer saw, for instance, a 20 feet seam being worked *under* the city of Będzin. Again, the Katowice mine, which had been regarded as almost worked out, has been given a new lease of life by being enabled thus to mine coal from beneath the Huta "Ferrum" and other industrial works.[35]

TRANSPORTATION: The policy of the Communist masters of East-Central

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[32] See A. Hornig, "Formy powierzchni ziemi stworzone przez człowieka," *Górny Śląsk,* 125-149.

[33] The process was fully described and illustrated in a special issue of *Wiadomości Górnicze,* V, 1953, no 10; see also Tadeusz Paszta, "Centralne zaopatrzenie w piasek podsadzkowy kapalń Śląskiego Zagłębia Węglowego," *Wiadomości Górnicze,* V, 1954, 207-210.

[34] *Przewodnik po Zagłębiu Dąbrowskim,* Sosnowiec, 1939, 179.

[35] Noted in *Życie Gospodarcze,* December 8, 1957.

Europe is to integrate the whole area economically, with locally specialized industries serving the needs of the whole. In such a scheme of things, Upper Silesia would inevitably become a major source of coal as well as of metals and metal products. Greatly improved means of transport are needed if Upper Silesia is thus to serve the needs of Communist Eastern Europe. The Germans foresaw a basically similar rôle for the area in their concept of an East European empire, and in their plans, the extension of the transportation net was to play an important rôle[36] In the world as a whole waterborne transportation plays a big part in the growth and the prosperity of heavy industry, and the development of canals was seen by both Germans and Communists as an essential part of their greater plan.

Lying, as we have seen, between the Odra and Vistula basins, the industrial area has in consequence, no navigable rivers. The Gliwicki Canal, replacing the old Klodnitz (Kłodnicki) Canal, links the western extremity of the industrial area with the Odra, which is navigable for barges of medium size. But in no instance can coal be loaded onto a barge at the mine, and nowhere can iron-ore be brought by barge to the smelting works. The German plans had envisaged a canal from the Odra through the Moravian Gate to the valley of the Morava and thus to the Danube with a branch through the industrial region. The present plans call for a canal from the Odra to the Vistula and a second from the Odra to the Danube. Maps in the planning office in Katowice show the possible routes which these canals might take through the GOP, but the very high cost and the technical difficulties are likely to cause the indefinite postponement of their execution.

SUMMARY: This paper has been concerned with the partition of the industrial region of Upper Silesia between at least two separate States up to the time of the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and with the problems and the consequences of the inclusion of the whole within the limits of a single political entity. No boundaries are "natural," but over a period of time human organizations and institutions adapt themselves to arbitrary boundaries to such a degree that these have come to be thought of as in the nature of things. Such was the boundary along the Przemsza, which antedated the industrial development. Industry adapted itself to the boundary, but industrial development would have been less restricted and more rational if this boundary had not been there. The area west of the Przemsza grew up to be a *Wirtschaftsorganismus,* as Volz claimed. The boundary of 1922 was created after the full development of the industrial area, and its division, whatever may have been the political justification, was an economic tragedy.[37] The technical problems of water supply, transport and land-use, which arise in any densely settled, highly industrialized region cannot be settled piecemeal; the region has to be looked at as a whole. The return to Poland of the *Ziemia Odzyskanie* gave her the opportunity for a more rational organization of the area than had been possible hitherto. The creation of the *Górno-Śląski Okręg Przemysłowy,* with a planning authority charged with control over land-use and industrial location, is the means whereby the planned development of this area is being achieved. That the plans have not worked smoothly is only too apparent. The poverty of postwar Poland, faulty estimates of the order of priorities, and plain mistakes in planning which are now being revealed in the pages of the Polish press, have made it necessary to compromise with the plan. The Upper Silesian industrial area has never been, as some German writers have claimed, *das Ruhrgebiet des Ostens.*[38] The GOP plan may, however, enable it to become such an area.

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[36] Hans F. Zeck, *Die deutsche Wirtschaft und Sudosteuropa,* Leipzig-Berlin, 1939, 81.

[37] See: Richard Hartshorne, "Geographic and Political Boundaries in Upper Silesia," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* XXIII, 1933, 195-228; Pierre Dumas, "Le Partage de la Haute Silésie," *Annales de Géographie,* XXXI, 1922, 1-14.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

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[38] P. H. Seraphim, *Industrie-Kombinat Oberschlesien: das Ruhrgebiet des Ostens,* Koln-Braunsfeld, 1953.

NOTES

The mass of German publication in the area of German-Polish relations, and the question of the lost territories in the East which have appeared in the past few years, is prodigious. It would, perhaps, be an overstatement to assert that there is good ground for believing that there is a carefully guided campaign under way to acquaint the German and Western public with the sad deterioration that has taken place in this area since Polish occupation in 1945. Graphic pictures of the ruins which have not been cleaned up or rebuilt, or of dilapidation of formerly intact and prosperous installations which the Polish administration has allowed to take place, have been published, along with accounts of how the Polish population in these regions has been declining and of how the cities are empty and are not showing signs of effective rebuilding.

The Polish government in Warsaw has recently issued a *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny* (1958) which gives census figures for cities and towns in the "regained lands." Of 28 cities of more than 20,000 population, 13 had a greater population in 1957 than in 1939. 23 of the 28, furthermore, had suffered wartime damage to a greater or lesser extent. The figures, as given below, are illuminating. They are also difficult to reconcile with the conclusions one is asked to accept from German sources.

TOWNS	POPULATION, 1939	WARTIME HOUSING DESTRUCTION	POPULATION, 1957
Wrocław	630,000	65%	389,700
Szczecin	383,000	50%	241,200
Zabrze	126,200	5%	184,500
Bytom	101,100	15%	178,000
Bliwice	117,300	20%	129,500
Wałbrzych	64,100	0	111,500
Elbląg	86,000	60%	69,900
Olsztyn	50,400	45%	60,500
Legnica	83,700	60%	55,900
Opole	53,000	25%	55,600
Słupsk	50,400	35%	49,900
Jelenie Góra	35,300	0	46,800
Gozrów	48,100	50%	46,600
Zeilona Góra	26,100	10%	44,600
Koszalin	35,500	40%	38,100
Piła	45,800	75%	29,800
Dzierzoniów	11,000	0	24,100
Malbork	27,300	45%	23,100
Zary	25,900	60%	21,200

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The Studies Center on Polish-German Affairs, 20 Princes Gate, London, S.W. 7, has begun to issue a quarterly review entitled *Poland and Germany.* No. 1 was issued in the spring of 1957. As of the time of going to press, five numbers have appeared. The issues average 48 to 52 pages, and contain articles on current problems of German politics or economics, as seen by Polish emigrés, and studies of similar problems in the life of the Polish homeland. There are also some reviews of current publications which concern Polish or German affairs. The reader will not get the idea that the publication is pro-German. On the other hand, the documentation is in general quite full.

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At the Seventy-Third Annual meeting of the American Historical Association, held at Washington, D. C., December 28-30, 1958, there were more sessions of direct interest to readers of the *JOURNAL* than has heretofore been the case. On Sunday morning, December 27, at a joint session with the Conference on Slavic and East European History, Robert F. Byrnes of Indiana University presided over a section on Russian History in undergraduate education, John M. Thompson, of the Social Science Research Council, presented a paper on "Teaching Russian History"; George Barr Carson, of the Service Center for Teachers of History on "Interpreting Russian History"; Ralph T. Fisher Jr. of the University of Illinois commented on both papers. There was lively discussion from the floor. The Conference on Slavic and East European History held a luncheon session, presided over by S. H. Thomson. The Chairman of the Conference, Geroid T. Robinson of Columbia University, spoke on "The Communist, the individualist and the Machine," based on observations from his recent trips to Soviet Russia. On Sunday afternoon, Richard Pipes of Harvard University presided at a session on Western culture in Eastern lands. Firuz Kazamzadek of Yale University spoke on "The Civilizing Influence of Russia"; R. Bayly Winder of Princeton University on "The Civilizing Influence of England." John C. Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations commented.

On Tuesday afternoon there was an unfortunate conflict. Two sessions on Central Europe were set for the same hour. A joint session with the Conference Group for Central European History, Documenting Central European History, was presided over by Oron J. Hale, of the University of Virginia. Paul R. Sweet, United States Editor-in-chief, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, spoke on "Documents on German Foreign Policy"; G. Weinberg, University of Kentucky, "Nazi Party and Military Records," F. Engel-Janosi, Catholic University, "Habsburg Archives."

At the same hour a session on the Habsburg Monarchy was presided over by Robert A. Kann of Rutgers University. Herman Freudenberger of Rutgers University spoke on "Industrialization in Bohemia and Moravia in the Eighteenth Century"; R. John Rath of the University of Texas on "Habsburg Government in Lombardy-Venetia, 1814-1821." Arthur J. May of the University of Rochester commented.

There were other papers in several sessions of peripheral interest to Slavic and Central European scholars on Byzantine, Italian, Prussian, and German history. This crucial area is beginning to get the attention it merits.

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The American Division of the Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano held its Third Annual meeting in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, D. C. on December 28. In addition to an academic meeting as a part of the program of the American Historical Association on the morning of the 28th, there was a business meeting in the afternoon, at which it was decided to adopt the name: Society for Italian Historical Studies for the American group. The members of the Division were guests of the Italian Ambassador to the United States at the Embassy on Monday evening.

BOOK REVIEWS

Luciani, George, transl., ed., *Le Livre de la Genèse du Peuple Ukrainien* (Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People). Transl. from Ukrainian. Paris: Institut d'Études Slaves, 1956. Pp. 149.

Luciani's work is a presentation to the western world of an historical source reflecting the early Pan-Slavic ideals among Ukrainians in the time of Romanticism. It is obvious that Romanticism, basically a cultural trend, was credited in its consequences with the national rebirth of several European peoples at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, up to this time deprived of their national independence. Therefore *The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People* is a fundamental source for the study of the beginnings of rebirth of the Ukrainian nation, as well as of national aspirations of the Ukrainians.

The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People was composed by the first prominent Ukrainian historian of the nineteenth century Mykola Kostomariv, the initiator of the first modern Ukrainian political association—the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius—established in Kiev in 1846. The Brotherhood as a secret organization attracted several prominent young Ukrainians of this time; for them the *Book of Genesis* became the ideological guide.

Luciani's work is composed of two parts. The first brings us an author's scholarly treatise about the background of the *Book of Genesis*. The second part is a critical edition of the same text in the original Ukrainian, as well as in a French translation, with critical comments.

The treatise is a skillful review of Slavic research on this topic. Luciani also contributes his own suggestions and conclusions. The Brotherhood transplanted the ideology of the Ukrainian national movement from the Kharkiv circle of the younger generation to the wider scene of the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. Kostomariv and Bilozersky were the founders of this secret political organization, but the main inspiration for the Brotherhood was given by Taras Shevchenko, the great poet of Ukraine. The Ukrainian brothers were fully dominated by the ideals of liberty, equality and brotherhood, with a desire to spread them not only among Ukrainians but also among other Slav peoples, including Poles and Muscovites, the historical enemies of free Ukraine.

The statute of the Society as well as its proclamations issued to these peoples, expresses deeply religious sentiments of brotherly love and forgiveness for the past. The Brotherhood's political plans proposed creation of a free federation of Slavic republics, in which personal liberties and religious tolerance were to be practiced. Serfdom was to be abolished. Kiev was planned as the capital of the Pan-Slav federation as moral satisfaction for the Ukrainian people, who had been persecuted for centuries but had never oppressed other peoples. But this holy city of Slavdom had to be dedicated by Ukrainians to all Slav republics as a kind of District of Columbia.

In the Brotherhood's ideology were blended the ideals of the French Revolution, the concepts of some American institutions, and the ideal of Slav solidarity. After one year of existence the Society was denounced to the tsarist police by a Russian student Petrov, living in the building of its headquarters. The members were imprisoned and severely punished by the government of Tsar Nicholas I, who personally intervened in the judgment.

The second part of Luciani's work brings a new edition of the *Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People* in Ukrainian and in French translation. This is an historiosophical book in 104 paragraphs, dealing with the past of all the important European nations, including Ukraine, and with the future rôle and the destination of the Ukrainian people. The book reflects the Messianic ideas known at this time in other Slav literatures as well, e.g., in Adam Mickiewicz's *Księgi Pielgrzymstwa Narodu Polskiego.*

The leading idea of the *Book of Genesis* is the following: God alone is the true guarantor of liberty among men. Institutions such as serfdom, lordship, and tyranny are a digression from the will of God. The Ukrainian people always practiced the ideals of liberty, equality and brotherhood. For that reason they were enslaved by their neighbors. This was done against the will of God and must come to an end with the full triumph of God's will.

The destination of Ukraine is pictured in paragraph 95 and the following in these words: "Ukraine lies in a tomb, but she did not die. Her voice calling the whole Slav world to liberty and brotherhood spreads over the Slav world," (also over Poland and Muscovy) " . . . because Ukraine's voice was not silenced. And Ukraine will rise from her tomb and will again appeal to all her Slav brothers and they will hear her call. And Slavdom will arise, and there will be no tsar, no tsarevich, no tsarevna; no prince, no count, no duke, no excellency, no highness; no lord, no boyar, no serf, no slave— neither in Muscovy, nor in Poland, Ukraine, Czechia, Khorutania, Serbia, nor in Bulgaria. Ukraine will be an independent republic in the Slav Union.

"And at this time all peoples will say, pointing out the place where Ukraine will be designated: 'This is the stone which was rejected by the builders, but which became the cornerstone of the structure'."

Luciani's French translation is exact in words and in meaning. The author quotes the names of places and persons very correctly as they are pronounced in the Ukrainian literary language. It is obvious that he has a complete mastery of Ukrainian. His new work is a valuable contribution to the study of the Ukrainian liberation movement in its historical development.

Mahwah, New Jersey NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

DELLIN, L. A. D., ed., *Bulgaria.* (*East-Central Europe Under the Communists*). New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp. xvii, 457. $8.50.

Anyone who has tried his hand at compiling a comprehensive, up-to-date guide to a foreign country knows the difficulties and frustrations involved in attempting adequate coverage of all the important aspects. These are vastly compounded when the country in question and the sources are Communist-controlled. In connection with World War I (in England) and especially World War II in England and this country, there have been many series of handbooks. In Washington almost every agency dealing with foreign countries has felt obliged to produce them. The advances of Communism and the cold war obviously have not lessened the need or in some cases the duplication. Among public ventures may be noted the series issued (with limited circulation) by the Human Relations Area Files, Inc., some volumes of which cover Communist countries; and particularlly the Mid-European Studies Center's seven-volume series on "East-Central Europe under the Communists."

The volume on Bulgaria, compiled by Dr. Lubomir Dellin (University of Vermont), illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of the project, with the former easily outweighing the latter. Most of the authors of chapters are European émigrés and more than half of these are of Bulgarian origin. Several chapters, however, are anonymous. Chapter headings and arrangement differ somewhat from those in the first volume in the series, on Albania. Foreign affairs are treated incidentally in the excellent and broadly conceived historical introduction. The chapter on the land is very complete and there is a good demographic section. Among the best portions are the political, among the poorest the economic. Here the problem lies of course in the spotty and unreliable nature of Communist economic data which makes for difficulty in correlating the pre-Communist situation. There is a further dilemma: we encounter, on the one hand, an unnecessary (because obvious) criticism of Communist policies and practices; and on the other, an acceptance of Communist claims of economic successes (for lack of other information). Possibly it was too soon to attempt to give such a comprehensive picture of the country's economy under Communism. In particular, two short chapters, "Planned Economy" and "National Income and Product" seem much too technical and argumentative, and are thus out of keeping with the rest of the volume.

From a long-range point of view, Part III, "The Society," which includes somewhat unrelated chapters on religion, education, literature and the arts, labor and public health, and social security, might be considered the most important and enduring. Here, however, the reader will not find much on such imponderable but vital aspects as family and group relationships, popular customs and attitudes, and national characteristics and reactions; nor on the impact of Communism on the lives and thoughts of the people. Perhaps this was too much to hope for. The net effect of the work, therefore, is that of a more or less encyclopedic and most informative handbook, rather than a penetrating analysis of underlying elements in the problem of Bulgaria under Communism.

In any work with so many collaborators one may expect discrepancies in terminology, spelling, dates, and facts, but not within individual chapters. Most such inconsistencies are minor, but they could have been avoided with more careful editing. The biographies of 14 top Communists, brief chronology, and list of treaties and agreements make a useful chronological appendix up to October, 1956. The bibliography might have been better classified and could have given more complete coverage to items in English ("Bulgaria . . . among the least explored subjects in American scholarly literature," p: ix).

Without question, Dellin's *Bulgaria* is the most complete, up-to-date, and authoritative work on Bulgaria in any language. Regardless of the inevitable changes which time will bring about, it will remain an essential record of the first decade of Communism in Bulgaria.

University of Pittsburgh JAMES F. CLARKE

FISCHER-GALATI, STEPHEN, ed., *Romania* (*East-Central Europe Under the Communists*). New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp xv, 399. $8.50.

It would assuredly be in the interests of the Soviet government's propaganda to lift the Iron Curtain, if, by so doing, it had the slightest chance of demonstrating to impartial observers the alleged progress realized by the Communist régimes in the various captive countries. Hence the fact that Rumania, for instance, continues to be a virtual Tibet for the free world may be taken to a backhanded admission of failure.

In order to gain a picture of the results achieved in more than a decade of rule by a so-called Marxist-Leninist system, Western investigators must resort to the laborious compilation and evaluation of such data as are parsimoniously furnished by the local Communist authorities. The current volume on Rumania, published under the auspices of the Mid-European Studies Center, is a work of this kind. It comprises a series of studies, of unequal value, grouped under the headings of "Background," "Government and Party," "Culture," and "Economy."

The task of the authors of the economic studies was of course the most arduous, since it is the custom of all Communist régimes to publish only statistics expressed in percentages or else in currency units whose purchasing power is difficult to appraise. Of this group of studies, the chapter on National Income and Product is outstanding, although the author was unable to establish the share of private consumption in the country's national income (he remarks that no data are available in this regard). Now, this deliberate Communist blackout is of itself revealing: such data would allow a comparison of the current living standards with those obtaining prior to 1945.

Under the heading "Government and Party" will be found useful information concerning today's political organization of Rumania; the study titled "National Security" is of special interest as an analysis of police organization in a typical police state.

On the other hand, the chapter on religion is disappointing. In it, for instance, we find the astonishing assertion that "religious persecution as such has generally been unnecessary," side by side with references to the "virtual destruction" of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, it is false to say that the "leaders of the Uniate Church" agreed, under government pressure, to join the Orthodox Church. The truth is that the Uniate Bishops preferred imprisonment—most of them, indeed, death—to abjuring their faith.

The "Historical Background" and the historical introduction to certain chapters likewise contain a number of errors and half-truths. For instance, the assertion (on page 85) that the electoral system "guaranteed automatic control of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies to the party in power" is negated by that (on page 103) to the effect that "the National-Liberal governmen failed to win re-election" in 1937. Then again it is gratuitously misleading to state (page 103) that "the destruction of the political and economic position of the landed aristocracy was not desired by the rulers of post-war Romania." For the fact is that (as is stated on page 60) the landowners were "the mainstay of the powerful Conservative Party," and that this party had virtually disappeared in 1919, following the electoral and agrarian reforms. We might note in this connection that the agrarian reform is itself described (on page 196) as "the most sweeping and equitable land reform in southeastern Europe."

Another glaring misstatement: the allegation that between 1893 and 1938 the Social Democratic Party "was the strongest party so far as working-class support was concerned." And it is hard to reconcile the assertion (on page 101) that the "Allied Powers virtually made the recognition of the newly established Greater Romania contingent on the adoption of a democratic constitution" with the fact that four years elapsed between the signature of the peace treaties of 1919 and the adoption of the 1923 constitution.

Finally, in another order of ideas, one cannot help deploring the choice of the spelling: *Romania* instead of Rumania, as that country is commonly referred to in the United States. *Rumania* is invariably used by the Department of State in official documents, as well as by such authoritative newspapers as the *New York Times*. The use of *Romania* by some Rumanian exiles, as well as, more recently, by the Communists, serves only to create confusion.

Washington, D. C. ALEXANDRE CRETZIANU

LAMPERT, E., *Studies in Rebellion.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. Pp. 95. 30s.

The 1840's in Russia were a "remarkable decade" (Annenkov's phrase) during which the intelligentsia sought and to some extent found philosophical footing for its subsequent revolutionary endeavors. Those searchings are the topic of the work by Dr. Lampert, working privately in Oxford. It is designed as the first of three volumes on nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary thought, but the author's claim that this work can stand alone is justified. After an introduction whose length is about one-fifth of the whole, Dr. Lampert devotes his three chapters to the three most prominent "Westerners," Vissarion Belinsky, Mikhail Bakunin, and Alexander Herzen. All three men came to intellectual maturity during the 1830's and made their mark on Russian thought in the 40's. Belinsky died in 1848, while Herzen and Bakunin lived (largely in emigration) until 1870 and 1876. The author deals with the three chiefly as individuals rather than as members of the Westerner faction of the Moscow "circles"—but then scholars have always found the term "Westerner" more difficult than "Slavophile" to attach to individuals of the period; and the faction, insofar as there was one, quickly melted into the currents of populism, anarchism, and others scarcely less nebulous than their progenitor.

Dr. Lampert has a generally lively style, and the kind of erudition which serves to enlighten rather than dazzle the reader who would examine the sources for himself. He writes with open sympathy for, though not idolatry of, his subjects. The Moscow "circles," in his opinion, made a "remarkable and two fold contribution to the history of the Russian mind" by embodying "the revolutionary as a kind of permanent form of human existence" and also by creating "the spiritual conditions for the birth and development of the Russian novel" by changing the relationship between literature and life. He is seeking, as he says, to examine the "revolutionary quality" rather than the specific political expressions" of the individuals in question. That is appropriate, for Belinsky did not enter the realm of political action, and yet as a literary critic contributed importantly, despite his own fiery and sensitive temperament, to the ethos of the revolutionary movement and in fact to that barrenness of spirit and insurrectionary asceticism which Herzen remarked in Chernyshevsky and the latter's contemporaries.

Dr. Lampert is not a partisan of his subjects in the sense that he feels compelled to denigrate their antagonists in life. He is, however, impelled to do battle for them in the lists of scholarship. He praises the Soviet scholars and attacks the *émigrés*—in particular Father George Florovsky, who has criticized the whole Westernizing Russian intelligentsia including both Westerners and Slavophiles (and their successors), and Dmitry Chizhevsky, who has laid severe strictures on Belinsky. Florovsky is assailed as a "romantic" (his own ground of criticism, in part, of the intelligentsia) because he admires the Byzantine past and so goes "like many another disappointed intellectual, to the Greeks, arid heart in hand, begging a transfusion of ancient blood" (p. 33). Before this personal attack, Lampert has already dismissed the problem of Western influence on Russian thought by pointing out that certain Germans attacked France and certain Frenchmen disliked England, and concluding that therefore there is "no such thing as the unity of 'Western culture'" (p. 4). This is comparable to saying that mama nags papa, therefore there is no family.

In general, however, the author makes his contribution not by philosophy of history in the style of his subjects, but by painstaking effort to combine an account of their thought with an evocation of their personalities. Perhaps his work would have been easier to write if E. H. Carr, Richard Hare, and others had not recently trodden some of the same ground; but he still manages to add a good deal to the discussion without losing touch with the exciting atmosphere of that period when young Russians thundered at each other, as did Belinsky to Turgenev, "We have not yet solved the question of the existence of God, and you want to eat!" The book contains interesting pairs of photographs of Belinsky, Bakunin, and Herzen, in youth and old age.

University of Washington DONALD W. TREADGOLD

LUNT, HORACE G., Ed., *Harvard Slavic Studies, III.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. 327. $5.75.

This interesting volume opens with the article "Marko Marulić" by M. A. Usmiani. The article gives a detailed biography of the "father of Croatian literature." Little was known before about the youth of Marulić, but now the gap is filled by the painstakingly collected information incorporated in this article. The author describes the conditions under which Marulić wrote the poem *Judita* (1501), the first long poem written in Croatian. Marulić also wrote a few mystery plays, which were the first dramatic compositions in Croatian. Marulić's Latin work *De Institutione Bene Vivendi,* which went through at least thirty-eight editions and was translated into several languages, was widely known during the Counter-Reformation period. His principal Latin epic *Davidias* remains unpublished. The date of Marulić's death in the table of contents (1525) is incorrect; it should be 1524.

"The Ideological World of the Denisov Brothers" by Serge A. Zenkovsky is a valuable contribution to Russian historical scholarship, as the author reveals the link between the Old Believers' ideas (the Denisov brothers were leaders of the Old Believers in the early eighteenth century) and the later Russian thinkers of the Slavophiles, Poćveniki and Populists of the nineteenth century. Some chronological discrepancies about the beginning of the persecutions of Old Believers by the Russian government in note 4 (p. 51) are probably due to an oversight.

The article "The Russian Bible Society and the Bulgarians" by James F. Clarke treats the history of the Society from its organization in 1813 to the middle of the nineteenth century. The members of the British and Foreign Bible Society, John Paterson and Robert Pinkerton, especially the latter, were most active in promotion of the Russian Bible Society, which was backed by Emperor Alexander I and prominent members of Russian officialdom and nobility. As a result of the work of the Society the whole Bulgarian Bible was published in 1871, and its publication left a marked imprint on the Bulgarian literary language.

Anica Savić-Rebac's excellent translation of Petar Njegoš's poem *The Ray of the Microcosm* is preceded by her introduction, in which she reveals to the reader a set of mystical ideas and symbolism, which, in her opinion, influenced Njegoš in the creation of his outstanding poem.

"Recurrent Imagery on Dostoevskij" by Ralph E. Matlaw is an interesting attempt to find some new clues to the personality of the writer end to his creativity. The author treats a concept of Dostoevskij's "insectology" and illustrates this concept by quotations from Dostoevskij's works as well as from the works of Dostoevskij's commentators.

"The Battle for Literature in the Soviet Ukraine," a documentary study of *Vaplite* (1925-1928) by S. N. Luckyj, covers the tragic period when the Ukrainian writers were struggling against Communist oppression. This period was marked by pro-Western orientation of writers both in Russia and the Ukraine. This orientation was finally completely suppressed by the Communist Party.

The article "Prague and the Purple Sage" by Svatava Pírková- Jakobson, is a detailed study of the peculiar Czech youth movement called "Tramps." This colorful movement was the result of American popularity after World War I and was intrinsically pro-American. "Tramps" created their own songs and ballads which they believed to be genuinely American. The members of this movement and romantic rebels against the unharmonious relationship "between an individual and the outer world."

"The Sad Armchair" by Vera Sandomirsky is an analysis of the relationship between a poet and the régime. The author finds this relationship far from happy. She covers in detail the Soviet period of poetry from the twenties to the end of the forties, and her outlook on Soviet poetry is pessimistic: "To lay bare the poetic sterility of Soviet society is a sorry task, for it is only too obvious." However, the samples of the Soviet lyric (in Russian) quoted in her article do not quite substantiate this pessimism.

University of Colorado TATIANA NENNSBERG

WENTZCKE, PAUL, ed., *Darstellungen und Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbewegung im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert,* volume I, Gesellschaft fuer burschenschaftliche Geschichtsforschung. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1957. Pp. 256. DM 18.

The present volume continues a line of research conducted in the past under the auspices of the *Burschenschaftliche historische Kommission.* Of the four essays included, two are concerned directly with the history of the Burschenschaft, one approaches the history of the youth organiaztion through a study of the young Heinrich von Gagern, and one treats the relatively little known liberal Johann von Itzstein. The volume's real unity and interest lie in the authors' common preoccupation with the history of pre-1848 German liberalism. Concerned less with broad generalizations than with detailed factual accounts based on new materials, this is probably a specialist's book, but one with implications of interest to any student of the period.

The longest and most ambitious essay is Paul Wentzcke's on the youth of Heinrich von Gagern. Wentzcke uses unpublished materials to build a somewhat pedestrian but admirably straightforward and careful narrative of Gagern's life to 1836. The essay's interest lies fully as much in the picture drawn of Heinrich's father, Hans von Gagern, and the relations between father and son, as in the story of the younger liberal leader himself. Few subjects could demonstrate so well the complexity of early German liberalism, its mixture of motives and themes which make it impossible to fit either father or son into neatly drawn categories of liberal or conservative. Hans von Gagern was a noble landowner, a scholar of repute, a government official in Nassau, representative of the Prince of Orange at the Congress of Vienna, and later a member of the Second Chamber of Hesse-Darmstadt. A good friend of both Stein and Metternich, he displayed at once a keen awareness of his noble status, the mentality of an enlightened eighteenth century official, and a sincere commitment to constitutionalism and the cause of German unity. He stood between two periods, disapproving equally of the reaction of post-Vienna governments and of the impracticality and revolutionary theorizing he thought he detected in his son. His own words, written shortly after a visit to Metternich at Johannesberg, made the point neatly: "Up there frivolity, superficiality, lack of plan, arrogance, and inconsequence . . . , down here too much seriousness and planning, an opposite kind of arrogance, a related (*unteilbare*) search for equality, and unfortunately only too much consequence!" (p. 47) Heinrich represented a younger and less moderate generation of liberals, one which found the life of a government official narrow and unsatisfying, and accordingly aimed to arouse public opinion through the Diets and to force governments into concessions. Certain features of his development were typical of his South German liberal contemporaries: the perhaps excessive emphasis on theoretical study as a preparation for political life; the rejection of radicalism; the growing awareness of the necessity for Prussian leadership. Yet much of Hans von Gagern's thinking remained alive in the son; one notes that Heinrich justified his parliamentary activity by the argument that it was his duty as an aristocrat to provide his kind of leadership.

Wolfgang Kloetzer has edited forty hitherto unknown letters of Johann von Itzstein with a brief introductory essay, the whole a model of precise scholarship and analysis. Dr. Kloetzer makes clear that Itzstein, whose career has received little study, was a leader of real importance. Not primarily interested in theoretical or parliamentary work, Itzstein devoted himself to building up personal connections among the South German liberal leaders, thus creating what was in effect a skeletal party machine. The letters provide information about the meetings which took place periodically at Itzstein's Hallgarten estate from about 1832 on, meetings that Dr. Kloetzer argues can properly be regarded as unofficial preliminaries to the Frankfurt Assembly.

Ernst Duerlein's study of the history of the Erlangen Burschenschaft in the first half of the nineteenth century, and Horst Bernhardi's study of the Goettingen Burschenschaft from 1933 to 1945 are conscientious, detailed accounts, explicitly intended to provide necessary materials for a later synthesis. One is struck by the accumulated evidence of the non-political character and consistent moderation of the students' organizations; if there were revolutionaries here, they were few indeed. Of interest for the modern period is Bernhardi's analysis of student resistance to Nazi student organizations. Political motives were not decisive. Rather students disliked the all-inclusive character of the new groups, preferring the sense of security and community provided by the smaller, more cohesive Burschenschaften. The chief function of the Burschenschaften in modern as in earlier times then, has clearly been social, not political.

Smith College LENORE O'BOYLE

MORSEY, RUDOLF, *Die Oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck 1867-1890.* Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1957. Pp. 351. DM 24.80.

The time has long since passed when one could think of the German Empire as springing full blown from the brow of Bismarck. More and more the achievement of German unity appears as a gradual process extending from well before 1866 to many years after 1871, a process in which the Austro-Prussian war was significant mainly in breaking a legislative log jam and thus permitting a steady institutional development. The book considered here is a major contribution to the picture in the post-1866 period. The Bismarck who strides through these pages is a mighty figure, his personality perhaps the greatest single force in the development of Germany; but he is by no means a calculating plotter whether in the interests of German nationalism, of Prussian particularism, of revolutionary Caesarism, or of a sham constitutionalism deliberately concocted to frustrate liberalism. Rather he appears as an improvisor, a man reacting to rather than commanding events, yet staying abreast of them, his major objective being always to preserve the cumbersome—in many ways, absurd—union that he had brought about.

Bismarck seems to have thought of the North German Confederation as little more than a continuation of the old Bund. He envisaged the Bundesrat, successor to the former federal diet, as the core of the new system, with executive-administrative as well as legislative functions. The chancellor was to be merely the presidial envoy receiving instructions from the Prussian foreign office. Pressure of the liberals for ministerial responsibility, however, forced a compromise: the chancellor would be "responsible," but to whom was never stated. It was from this almost unintentionally inflated office that the supreme administration of the Reich proliferated, at first only in the form of the *Reichskanzlersamt,* later with many other agencies, each headed by a state secretary. Thereafter, Bismarck's struggle was for the independence of the apparatus from (1) the Prussian government, where there was much sentiment for a "personal union" between the imperial offices and their ministerial counterparts in Prussia, and (2) the Reichstag, which desired to convert the chancellor and state secretaries into ministers and the ministers into a cabinet with collective responsibility. By 1878 Bismarck had tempered his resistance to Prussia. His experience with various imperial enterprises, particularly the imperial railroad bureau, convinced him that, for better or worse, an imperial course apart from and above Prussia was impossible. To the Reichstag, however, he never gave way—some will insist only because he was conservative and autocratic, but Morsey shows (though without the emphasis the point deserves) that fear of the centralism inherent in a collegial ministry was Bismarck's immediate motive. Obsessed with the fragility of the Reich, still thinking of the Bundesrat as the proper administrative authority, he did not want to arouse the sleeping—or at least drowsy—dogs of particularism. At this and many another turn the author rightly makes this consideration, more than doctrinaire conservatism, the reason for Bismarck's actions.

Most of the book is devoted to detailed descriptions of the origins and operations of the various imperial agencies. One chapter analyzes the background of imperial officials and Bismarck's recruitment policies, but tends to be rather prolix on minor points (e.g. postage expenses and vacation arrangements), and all too superficial on connections between the bureaucracy and big business. Bismarck, the author convincingly concludes, sought men of high education, but increasingly insisted on political "reliability," too. Both the Kaiser and the state governments, except Prussia, are treated scantily. On the other hand, that able man, Rudolf van Delbrück, is quite justly brought out from his customary obscurity in the shadow of Bismarck. Perhaps most important is the treatment of the Bundesrat. Too often regarded merely as the reactionary, Prussian- manipulated upper house of a parliament, it emerges here in its intended function as the organ of federalism in the Reich, at least in Bismarck's time.

Considering the administrative detail that had to be included, Morsey has written clearly and interestingly. He utilizes a wide range of sources, documentary, archival, and monographic, (including half a dozen American studies), and parades them before the reader in heavy concentrations of notes. Altogether this is an excellent work, one that opens up new fields in a period long dominated by foreign affairs.

University of Kentucky **Enno E. Kraehe**

Treadgold, Donald W., *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Pp. xiii, 278. $5.00.

Professor Donald W. Treadgold's new book, *The Great Siberian Migration,* is devoted, as its title indicates, to the eastward movement of the Russian peasants into Siberia during the decades preceding the revolutions of 1917. Its five parts, each containing two or three chapters, deal successively with "The Colony and the Homeland," "The Frontier Crosses the Urals, 1861-1892," "The Trans-Siberian Railway, 1892-1906," "Stolypin and the Duma, 1906-1914," and "The Fate of Siberian Migration." The text is supplemented by three maps, a number of striking illustrations, eighteen useful statistical tables and four appendices which include, in addition to some of the tables, lists of Russian rulers and ministers and the administrative divisions of Asiatic Russia in 1914. The volume also has a rich, although unfortunately not annotated, bibliography and an index. It is attractive in appearance and relatively free of misprints.

Professor Treadgold's work is primarily concerned with the origins, nature and results of the Siberian migration, concentrating on such topics as transportation, the settlement on new land, the legal position of the settlers, their adjustment to new life, and the emergence of a novel, frontier society in Siberia. While not a definitive study of its subject—a point emphasized by the insufficiency of information on many vital matters and the heavy reliance on a few basic Russian sources—it is an able and useful summary and synthesis of the available materil. And it represents the first thorough treatment of "the great Siberian migration" to appear in the English language. Factual errors are few and usually insignificant: the Russians reached the Pacific in 1639, not in the sixteen-forties (p. 19); the term *zemskii* on page 216 seems to be a misnomer for *zemelnyi,* because there were no zemstvos in Siberia.

But Professor Treadgold's book possesses still broader aspects and more far-reaching ramifications, along two lines. One stems from the author's adherence to at least a qualified version of Frederick Jackson Turner's celebrated frontier hypothesis. Professor Treadgold states his allegiance explicitly in the "Foreword: Russian and American Frontiers," and this allegiance finds further reflection throughout the entire work, especially in the general evaluations and interpretations of the Siberian development. The author's other major interest is even more pertinent to his study: it is the evolution and policies of the Russian empire on the eve of 1917. Siberian migration is, therefore, treated not in isolation, but as an integral and significant part of the final phase and imperial Russia. In a sense, Professor Treadgold continues to be engrossed in the topic of his first book: *Lenin and His Rivals: the Struggle for Russia's Future.*

This broad and fundamental approach to the problem of Siberian migration marks, however, the weakness as well as the strength of the volume, or at least it is a weakness if the reader refuses to accept Professor Treadgold's designated would-be savior of Russia—Stolypin. The controversial issue of Stolypin's legislation and its rôle in Russian history is much too complex to be analyzed in a review. Indeed, it proved rather too complex for Professor Treadgold's book. Still, a reviewer should emphasize that the author supports completely Stolypin's policies, both in Siberia and, more importantly, in European Russia. Professor Treadgold's figures on the extent and success of Stolypin's land reforms differ sharply from the figures of such specialists as Professors G. Robinson and M. Florinsky. As to Siberia, to cite one example, the author apparently accept the fantastically low figure of 3.8

per cent returnees from Stolypin's report to Nicholas II (p. 173), although it contradicts other material in the study. In general, Professor Treadgold relies too heavily on this report without allowing for the fact that it represented the minister's defense of his own policies to the monarch. People whose views disagreed with Stolypin's receive short shrift: A. Ermolov, dismissed as "bumbling" (p. 155), was in fact the only minister of agriculture during the period who had an expert theoretical and practical knowledge of his subject and who had won general respect for his high competence. The author rejects plans to expropriate gentry land, the main issue on which the government opposed the comprehensive land reform programs of the first two Dumas, on the ground that they could offer only very partial relief at best for the peasant land hunger. Yet his own favorite measure, migration to Siberia, could do little more, as he himself readily admits. And, to use one of Professor Treadgold's favorite yardsticks, the peasants themselves certainly wanted gentry land. While the author emphasizes the alleged superiority of Stolypin's approach in economics to those of his opponents, he fails to discuss the sad political rôle of the prime-minister, notably his arbitrary and wholly illegal change of the electoral law. This last point is irrelevant as far as economic theory is concerned, but it must be taken into account in assessing the situation and the possibilities in Russia on the eve of 1917.

Fortunately, one does not have to share Professor Treadgold's overwhelming admiration for Stolypin to enjoy *The Great Siberian Migration* and to thank its author for his timely contribution tot his neglected area of learning.

University of California, Berkeley NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

MEYER, KARL, *Karl Liebknecht: Man Without a Country.* Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Pp. viii, 180. $3.25.

This first political biography of Karl Liebknecht fills a hiatus in the mushrooming literature of German socialism in the early twentieth century. Here is a study of a revolutionary leader who played an important part in the turbulent political warfare of the decaying imperial era and the initial weeks of the Weimar Republic. It is a dispassionate, scholarly and reasonably comprehensive biography, based upon a wealth of sources. It does suffer, however, from a lack of adequate footnote documentation.

Attacking the subject in chronological order, the author traces Liebknecht's initial grounding in political philosophy, especially his hatred of capitalism and the ever present militarism, to his father, Wilhelm, a chief architect of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the nineteenth century. Always a rebel in the SPD and in the Reichstag, Karl Liebknecht attempted prior to World War I to commit the party and the government to an anti-militarist and anti-nationalist policy, but met defeat.

The outbreak of the war thrust Liebknecht more than ever into the limelight. That he was a man of courage and unwavering convictions despite repeated political reversals and disappointments is vividly demonstrated. Liebknecht's solo vote against war credits in December 1914; his break with the SPD and subsequent ouster; his assumption of leadership of the Spartacists, a left wing splinter group; and his incitement of the dissatisfied masses and the army against the government—all these actions were characteristic expressions of his contempt for the policies of the SPD and the nation's ruling élite. They not unexpectedly led in 1916 to his imprisonment for the remainder of the war.

What significant factors does the author stress concerning Liebknecht's rôle during the chaotic weeks following the collapse of the old régime? Although the years spent in prison made Liebknecht a martyr and precipitated isolated revolutionary activities throughout Germany, he was neither responsible for instigating the naval revolt in late October 1918, nor was he ready to proclaim a soviet republic on German soil on November 9, the day of the military and political collapse. Because he believed that the masses first must be "ripened" to revolutionary action, Liebknecht merely urged them to strike and protest against the newly-constituted Social Democratic government, committee as it was to legalism and moderation. His lack of incisive leadership made the workers turn instead to the left wing Independent Social Democrats and the revolutionary shop stewards. The Spartacists, isolated, formed the Communist Party in December, and Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, chief Spartacist theoretician, became members of its central committee.

Significantly, the Russian Bolsheviks supported the new party, and pinned some hope on Liebknecht, as one of its major leaders. He, in turn, perhaps visualized himself as the Lenin of Germany, and Ebert, the head of the new government, as Kerensky. Be that as it may, his political acumen could not match that of Lenin for he made far too many tactical mistakes. The most serious blunder was to lead an unplanned and weak uprising of workers in January, 1919, in an unsuccessful effort to topple the SPD-led government. Military forces brutally murdered Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in the aftermath. Thus, there was a revival of militarism, the very evil which Liebknecht had so valiantly fought, but for which he was partially responsible by doggedly promoting civil strife in the immediate post-war years.

The book, descriptive in nature, does not purport to set up a conceptual framework in which one could, for instance, compare the performance of a revolutionary leader with the theory of revolution. Rather, the author wishes to let the record speak for itself. It is a pity that he has not woven into the fabric of the book more of Liebknecht's personality and private life in order to complete an otherwise sensitive and not unsympathetic portrayal of the "man without a country." The study merits serious attention in this ever revolutionary age.

University of Massachusetts GERARD BRAUNTHAL

MAMATEY, VICTOR S., *The United States and East Central Europe. A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Pp. xii, 431. $7.50.

Let it be said from the outset that this is a superb book on an area of history needing much clarification and public understanding. Professor Mamatey is clear in his presentation, calm and dispassionate in his analysis of men and events, logical in his deductions about the meaning of the events he describes, and eminently fair to the public figures who appear in it. Nor can one discern any pet thesis, for he lets words and deeds speak for themselves. Only in his last summary chapter does he demonstrate a faith regarding the possibility of resolving some of the complex problems that have streamed through his book.

The necessary task of any historian is bound up with the five P's of history, namely, People, Places, Principles, Perspectives, and finally Processes. The task of the diplomatic historian is complicated by the very nature of his discipline, concerning itself as it does, so much with the deeds and especially *words* of a particular statesman, or politician. What criteria, what test of truth may he bring to bear to reveal the very essence of a situation? Does the man or men under scrutiny say what he means, and more important, mean what he says? Is there a reserve of Machiavellianism in his judgments, or must open statements be openly believed? Many of the answers here depend on the nature of the equipment of the historian, who must be a profound student of human nature, as well as possess a unique capacity for weighing the value of things in an intricate pattern of men, events, and words. Here and there Professor Mamatey reveals a gift for irony; but on the whole little humor is present, for the subject is deadly serious. Keeping in mind the catastrophic events and the great public agitation of the time, 1914-1918, it is a thorough study into the nooks and crannies of diplomacy, policy, and scheming concerning especially what might be called "Greater Danubia."

He opens his subject with a rapid, clinical study of the defects and weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and then goes on to reveal the course of Allied and Wilsonian teetering on the brink of making a choice: to destroy or not to destroy this ancient (but in Professor Mamatey's opinion) decrepit state. He shows by a mass of convincing evidence that the "mission of Austria" versus the simple application of "Wilsonian principles" in the name of ethnic or historic justice is no easy task or choice. He demonstrates with great clarity how the course of events: the collapse of the Monarchy, the Russian Revolution, the nationalistic intransigence of the peoples involved, and finally the American entry into the war all combined to resolve events, establish courses, and "to settle things." Whatever may have been the exact moment when Allied thought determined on the destruction of the Monarchy may not be specifically ascertainable; but once taken, it created a force in Danubia which is still at work today.

The pathologist tells us that as soon as we are born we begin to die a little each day. So too the nations that emerged carried even then the seeds of their own post-war travail. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Question, and its multi-national character; in Yugoslavia, the dissidence of the Croats; in Poland, the Ukrainian Question; in Hungary, revisionism; in Austria, Anschluss. Of all this Professor Mamatey is keenly aware, for it appears directly and implicitly in his book. He is led, therefore, to examine in his last chapter the possible bases of an East Central European Federation (or Confederation).

While pointing out the insuperable difficulties in the way, he nevertheless appears to lament the failure, after 1918, to create an East Central European Federation. One can agree heartily, looking backward, with its desirability, and yet point out in pragmatic terms the extraordinary difficulties in architecturing a structure which might or could work. A scholar of his astuteness must be profoundly aware of the constitutional, legal, social, economic, and political obstacles besetting the path of even the most agreeable of men. In view of the present character of the Soviet position in East Central Europe this concept appears to be slightly nostalgic, or perhaps over-idealistic, a regret for things that might have been. However, one must concede that neither the Western World nor the captive nations under the Soviet power are entirely happy, and cannot mistake the Russian type of ideological *Gleichschaltung* for the postulated benefits of a voluntary association. A fervent desire for the political consummation of an Eastern-Central European Federation ought not to mislead us into believing that, but for the unfortunate circumstances of World War II, it would be at hand. Nor on the other hand would the retreat of the Soviets from this area *ipso facto* produce it. This reviewer admires Professor Mamatey's idealism, and envies his optimism, and accordingly finds it difficult to share his faith.

Hunter College of the City of New York. GEORGE WASKOVICH

Neurohr, Jean, *Der Mythos vom Dritten Reich. Zur Geistesgeschichte des National-sozialismus.* Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachf., 1957. Pp. 288. DM 18:50.

Jean Neurohr of the *Institut Français* in Berlin, has the bilingual heritage of many Alsatians. A continuous study through several decades of German intellectual developments makes him fully qualified to analyze the Myth of the Third Reich. Executed with a rare degree of objectivity and comprehension, this work should command the attention of all serious scholars interested in the intellectual and emotional trends which, while frequently not identical to the catch-all Nazi slogans, ran parallel to or leaned toward the torrent which carried the Germans into National Socialism.

Der Mythos was written in London in the summer and fall of 1933. For diverse and incomprehensible reasons no publisher was interested in the manuscript. Its appearance now through the medium of a German publisher is a hopeful sign indicating that the German public is receptive to a reasoned examination of the over-all circumstances which caused many Germans to turn to Hitler and his emotionally-packed but vaguely defined program.

Neurohr avoids that peculiar species of inverted "racism" which in an exaggerated form has expressed itself through a delineation of the Germans as specifically and inherently predisposed to a policy of brutality, arrogance, irrationality, and a lust to play the rôle of the superman. He dismisses Vansittart and others as worthy of no more than a passing reference reserved for those who also ran.

Neurohr is ready to concede to the Germans that National Socialism as such, with its capacity for mass intoxication, might possibly have been an ephemeral, superficial phase of German history. He agrees with Armin Mohler's statement that the philosophy of a "conservative revolution" need not of necessity end up in National Socialism. But he insists that the "national movement" which brought Hitler to power in the setting of a "1000-year old empire" was the result of myths, illusions, and programs which openly or covertly accompanied the evolution of the German nation in the 19th and 20th centuries. In a sense, it was the synthesis of all German dreams (*Wunschträume*), dreams that were all the more compelling though hardly in most cases exclusively the product of the frustrations which followed defeat and Versailles. Germany, he feels, is ripe for a thorough examination of the history of the last thirty years—as a catharsis as well as a warning.

The organization of the work is along topical lines. In successive chapters, Neurohr examines various myths and cultural trends, tracing their evolution as they took on exaggerated proportions in the years after 1918. A number of chapters are devoted to the subject of national feeling which operates as a sort of *Leitmotif*. Other major themes center about the myth of a Third Reich, of a specific German revolution, a unique German socialism as distinct from the international variety, the concept of race, the belief in the destiny of "young peoples," as well as the romantic idea of a separate German art.

The author does not belabor the subject or illustrate the obvious by constantly pointing out the similarity of certain Nazi tenets of the above trends of thought. He allows the facts to suggest their own conclusions. Nor does he insist that the sum of all the various movements analyzed spelled out National Socialism. He does bring out, however, the fact that diverse German groups were blinded to the total Nazi philosophy because they were attracted by the part thereof which reflected their own most ardent wishes. Many discovered later, too late, that concrete Nazi policy belied their expectations and distorted their fondest hopes.

Der Mythos vom Dritten Reich, with an excellent index and a short bibliography of major works consulted (mostly published before 1933), is the best brief and comprehensive introduction to the intellectual developments which helped to create an environment favorable for a triumph of National Socialism. No serious student of the Weimar Republic and the advent of Hitler can ignore it.

Montana State University OSCAR J. HAMMEN

ČELOVSKÝ, BORIS, *Das Münchener Abkommen von 1938.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958. Pp. 518.

After twenty years, a long and eventful period, there has appeared in Germany a scholarly study of the events which led to the meeting of four European leaders in the Bavarian capital, which was to result in the temporary dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The tenth anniversary of that conference was marked by the publication of a monograph, *Munich. Prologue to Tragedy* by John W. Wheeler-Bennett.

Presented originally as a doctoral dissertation at the Heidelberg University, Čelovský's book was accepted for publication in the series of *Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte* and ably edited by Paul Kluke. The appearance of a detailed study of the Czechoslovak crisis is to be greeted as an important event both by scholars and intelligent laymen.

Dr. Čelovský, a Czech by birth and a Canadian by adoption, presents the story in a competent way, supporting his theses by primary and secondary sources, as well as some interviews. He has made full use of collections of documents, not available to authors who were writing either immediately after the events or early in the post-war era. He writes well and has the gift of combination without which the narrative would be spotty and incomplete. It is doubtful whether some of the basic documents, to which other materials point clearly, will ever be found in their original version. Thus far, Rome, Paris, Prague, Warsaw, and Moscow have contributed far less than Berlin, London, and Washington. French, Czechoslovak, and Polish official files suffered badly during the war, and nobody has broken even one of the seven seals by which the Soviet files are protected from prying eyes.

The new analysis of the causes of Munich from Dr. Čelovský's pen is again primarily a contribution to modern diplomatic history. It compares favorably with Wheeler-Bennett's book and other contributions because it is more concise and penetrates more deeply into the intricate game of international politics in which Czechoslovakia was destined to play the rôles of passive partner, defendant, and scapegoat. One of the leading ideas to which the author's research points unmistakably is a sober finding that liberation of the German-speaking inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, presented to the world public by Hitler and his henchmen as the chief objective of his campaignt figured in his schemes of expansion merely as a mask to disguise his lust for conquest. Territories inhabited by the Sudeten Germans had a limited value for Germany, but beyond them lay the areas which could add enormously to German economic and war potential. As Čelovský says (p. 124), the Czech-Sudeten German antagonism lost in Hitler's designs its local color and grew more and more distinctly into a problem of world politics.

The author has given a good deal of attention to a highly important and controversial question which the contemporaries, deprived of access to confidential files, failed to unravel: At what point did Konrad Henlein and his lieutenants subordinate the interests and aims of their electorate to Hitler's drive for world domination? Guided not only by documents but also by interviews with some personalities once prominent among the Sudeten Germans, Čelovský is inclined to believe that the Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront (SHF), renamed in 1935 to Sudetendeutsche Partei (SDP), in 1933 sprang out of discontent with meagre results of the activist policy, practiced since 1926 in the Czechoslovak Parliament by three old style parties—the Christian Socialists, Agrarians, and Social Democrats. According to this interpretation, which despite the author's careful search for solid corroboration is still open for discussion, closer contacts between the SDP headquarters and Berlin were promoted by anti-Czech radicals within the party ranks, pressing for conformity with the NSAPD. When we dismiss rumors and exaggerated stories by which some earlier accounts had been tinged, we reach a safe point: Konrad Henlein met the Führer publicly in August 1936 and at about the same time the SDP accepted financial aid from Germany. In the spring of 1938 Berlin took the SDP in tow, using it without any opposition from within as a tool in bringing about the destruction of Czechoslovakia. This alignment was kept secret for quite a long time so that Henlein was able to masquerade in London as a free spokesman of the German speaking inhabitants of Czechoslovakia; and the German official circles, when requested by the Western capitals to exercise moderating influence on the SDP, could wash their hands and deny any connection.

Reflecting mostly the language of the sources, Čelovský's story gives prominence to the Sudeten Germans, to their aspirations as well as their grievances. There is in his book not much evidence of interest in the worsening situation of the Czech people or of those Slovaks who, represented by the Prime Minister Milan Hodža, supported the republic loyally. Such facets of the problem as the strategic importance of Czechoslovakia, its record in practicing democracy, and its sound economy ceased to exist for the champions of appeasement, both in the official circles and among the defeatist groups. The author's concentration on the diplomatic game accounts apparently for the emphasis placed on the Sudeten German problem, although its maximalist settlement, demanded by Hitler at Berchtesgaden and Godesberg, could not be brought about without serious damage to other nationalities of Czechoslovakia.

In his discussion of the causes of Munich, the author pays attention to both the major and minor Powers. It is quite natural that France and Great Britain have asked for most of this time and critical acumen. Avoiding harsh judgments or quick generalizations, Čelovský has endeavored to determine which of the two countries pressed more energetically for concessions to the Germans to avoid an armed conflict between Czechoslovakia and the Third Reich. The answer to such complex questions can never be simple and conclusive. Dr. Čelovský is inclined to believe that the British statesmen, Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, were the more active partners; but that ideas and directives emanating from London were seldom modified by the French leaders. If official correspondences, public speeches, interviews with foreign journalists and other testimonies are soberly analyzed, as the author has done both in his text and in copious footnotes, it becomes clear that the speech delivered by Chamberlain on March 24, 1938, had set the limit to which the British government was ready to go. The British statesmen were aware that if the war broke out they would not be able to dissociate themselves from France. Hence, they believed it was their chief occupation to create by relentless pressure on Prague conditions in which France would not be forced to take to arms.

With the help of British diplomatic documents Čelovský has reconstructed the conferences of the French and British statesmen held in London on three occasions (April 28-29, September 18, and September 25, 1938) and has shown how the rôles were usually distributed. Through contacts and regular channels the British Foreign Secretary worked for diplomatic isolation of Prague with no less determination than did Neville Chamberlain. As early as the beginning of June 1938, Lord Halifax suggested that France denounce its pact, or at least threaten to do so, to make Prague more pliable. His initiative usually met with faint opposition from the Quai d'Orsay, but in this instance even Georges Bonnet was reluctant to fall in with his illustrious colleague, fearing the collapse of the system of French alliances. The French side of the story is rather obscure, as the evidence is fragmentary; but Čelovský is probably right in assuming that apart from the fear of internal complications the firm stand of the General Secretary determined the Minister's stand.

Čelovský's opinion on the British orientation will have to be confronted with other considerations to the same problem. Quite recently, Karel Lisický, who served at the Czechoslovak legation during the critical period, published the first installment of his study of the British policy in relation to Czechoslovakia. Using his own notes as well as copies of documents, hitherto unpublished, Lisický dispelled some widespread misconceptions. As his contribution is unfinished it would be rather premature to speculate how it will compare with Čelovský's chapters on Great Britain.

In a book of over five hundred pages covering, as Čelovský has done, a period of intensified diplomatic activities, describing honest efforts to mediate as well as sordid intrigues, reproducing justified claims and fabricated stories, and steering the middle course between the conflicting testimonies, it would not be difficult to find passages which raise questions or call for re-examination. Some angles simply could not be explored because documentary evidence has been forever lost.

Apart from concrete problems there are questions of general importance in which the conventional approach gives little satisfaction. Answers to such questions cannot be found in single documents but must be prepared by analytical studies of various factors by whose interplay there had been created an atmosphere in which traditional concepts had been abandoned and the Führer was accepted into partnership on his own terms. Reflecting on facts presented by Čelovský, the critical reader will hardly be able to suppress questions of wider range. What forces widened the gap between Prague and the western capitals and caused the estrangement in which no friendly exchange seemed to be fruitful, or indeed, possible? How could Hitler's assurances be taken seriously into consideration? How could anyone believe that a truncated and humiliated country could exist in the shadow of the hooked cross? A wide field is open for research as the Munich conference, at which Čelovský's book ends, was only one step toward a world conflagration.

University of Pennsylvania OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

TANNER, VÄINÖ, *The Winter War: Finland Against Russia 1939-1940.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. Pp. x, 274. $5.00.

The late summer of 1914 proved that for most European Socialists national consciousness was far more powerful than Marxist ideology in the event of conflict between them. Not until the late autumn of 1939 did Finnish Socialists demonstrate that nationality was for them, as well, the stronger motivation. Until the demands made on Finland by the Soviet Union in the Moscow negotiations of September-October, 1939, and the beginning of the Winter War (which included the proclamation of a Soviet-sponsored Finnish Democratic Government), there was some uncertainty about the response of Finnish Socialists to any serious Soviet challenge to continued Finnish independence. In view of the tragic civil war of

1918, this uncertainty was perhaps not entirely ill-founded. As the largest single political group in Finland (about forty per cent of the electorate in 1939), their attitude would prove decisive in determining the strength of Finnish resistance to Soviet diplomatic and military pressure. These memoirs of the Socialist who was Foreign Minister of Finland during the Winter War are essentially an apology for Finnish foreign policy during late 1939 and early 1940. Whether this policy was sound is for the Finns to decide. The striking fact is that there is little in this volume that could not have been written by a Finnish Conservative. Indeed, even Mannerheim's memoirs are somewhat more critical of the daring Finnish policy of this period. The key to Tanner's thinking—and the attitude of his party during 1939-1940—is his characterization of himself (pages 139-140) as neither Red nor White, but Blue and White (the colors of the Finnish flag).

The strengths of this book are many. From the detailed account of the Moscow negotiations it is apparent that Soviet demands on Finland were motivated by traditional conceptions of national interest rather than by the desire for world revolution. The Finnish refusal to request British and French aid during the closing stages of the Winter War is defended on the grounds that this refusal prevented a lasting Soviet-German alliance. The relative independence of Madame Kollontai as Soviet Minister in Stockholm provides an interesting case study in the rôle of diplomacy in the interwar Soviet system, in which her record as an old Bolshevik seems to have permitted certain undiplomatic indiscretions. Repeated German reluctance to support Finland against its temporary ally proved disappointing to many Finns, although not to Tanner himself. Perhaps the most surprising change which the events of 1939-1940 introduced into Finnish politics was the fundamental alteration in the decision-making process. The President, constitutionally responsible for the conduct of foreign relations, was unaccustomed to deceisive action, and was not in good health. During the course of the Moscow negotiations, the Parliament, including its Foreign Relations Committee, was virtually ignored; after the actual war began, it was shunted off to the remote countryside. The press and the public at large were unaware of even the most basic decisions and problems. The net result was that a small group of men (Ryti, Paasikivi, Walden, and Tanner) acted on their own initiative, deciding fundamental questions of war and peace. Tanner's power, even while he was still Minister of Finance, was so extensive that he was able to decide, after the beginning of hostilities, that a new Cabinet would be formed, in which the then Foreign Ministers would not be included, and to inform the Prime Minister at the begining of a Cabinet meeting that he must resign during the course of the meeting.

In some respects this English version of Tanner's memoirs leaves much to be desired. There are no adequate maps of the crucial border areas involved in the Moscow negotiations, military action, and peace settlement. Explanatory notes are largely missing, as are three important appendices from the Finnish edition. The translation is rather free and at times approaches condensation, and the identity of the translator (if someone other than Tanner himself) is not revealed. Even with these limitations, it represents a major addition to the English-language literature dealing with the early months of World War II. Like all *ex parte* accounts, it must be used with caution; unlike most, it is remarkably free of emotionalism.

Fletcher School of Diplomacy MARVIN RINTOLA

DALLIN, ALEXANDER, *German Rule in Russia 1941-1945. A Study of Occupation Policies.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957. Pp. 695. $10.00.

The subject of this volume is German policy in the invasion, occupation and retreat from the Soviet Union. It is based largely on official records. These are supplemented by interviews and correspondence with several participants in the events described, and by various studies pertinent to the problem. There are thirty chapters grouped into four well-balanced parts. In Part I Dallin unfolds for the reader the historical setting and motivations behind the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941. He also reveals, but perhaps somewhat overemphasizes, the existence of bitter "feuds and fissures" within the Nazi elite regarding methods of implementing the *Ostpolitik*. A brief description of the organization of German administration of occupied areas rounds out Part I.

Part II of the study examines briefly the national problem—one of the most fundamental and perplexing problems of Eastern Europe. The author carefully documents German immediate and long-range interests and goals *vis-à-vis* the Ukraine, the Baltic States, Belorussia, Caucasus, and Great Russia, pointing out in each case a different set of German premises and practices. While this examination basically succeeds in revealing German ignorance of the national problem in Eastern Europe and the utter disregard of the Germans for the aspirations of the native peoples, additional information on German schemes in those regions before the outbreak of World War II would have strengthened many of the arguments.

In Part III the author centers his attention on Nazi economic aims and their approaches to such problems as mining, transport, finance, and, above all, agriculture. He likewise evaluates Nazi views toward, and their treatment of Soviet war prisoners, their policy of utilizing a conscripted labor force, and their overall attitude toward culture, religion, education, and intelligentsia. In dealing with these issues, as well as throughout the entire study, Dr. Dallin stresses again and again the fact that Nazi disregard of the basic needs and interest of the native population conributed greatly to German defeat.

The last part, subtitled "Political Warfare," analyzes the political side of *Ostpolitik*. It examines the working of Nazi propaganda with its half-hearted and belated attempts to utilize some Russian defectors (such as Vlasov) and those of various other nationalities to offset Germany's military losses. In this part, as well as throughout the entire work, the author underlines the shortsightedness and inflexibility of the Nazi policy and propaganda and the inability of the personnel to take advantage of great opportunities which presented themselves. This in fact seems to be one of the main themes as well as one of the basic conclusions of the study.

Another major theme, though somewhat overemphasized, is the conflict between Berlin and its agencies in the occupied areas, as well as the differences among Party, Army, SS, diplomatic, economic and numerous other experts over tactics to implement the *Ostpolitik*. It is true that in some cases these differences contributed substantially to military, administrative, economic and political failure of the *Ostpolitik*. In the final analysis, however, the seeds for that failure must be sought not in personal feuds, important though they may have been, but in the Nazi philosophy itself. It seems reasonable to suggest that the Nazis would have had more chance of success, not through laying aside personal animosities, but through drastically altering their objectives, abandoning their policy of conquest, reducing their intolerance, surrendering their assertion of racial superiority, appreciating the existence of other peoples and systems, etc. Since the Nazi leadership was neither willing nor able to make such fundamental changes, it had to perish.

In spite of the undue accentuation of personal feuds within the Nazi elite, this is a comprehensive and a carefully evaluated study. It deals with complex materials and problems in a scholarly manner. It would, however, have been in a scholarly manner. It would, however, have been desirable to provide this amply footnoted work with a bibliography. It seems regrettable also that the price of this volume may discourage many interested persons.

Portland State College, Oregon BASIL DMYTRYSHYN

SPULBER, NICHOLAS, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe.* New York: Technology Press of MIT and John Wiley, 1957. Pp. xxiii, 525. $12.50.

This important book is one of the studies undertaken by the Center for International Studies at MIT, revised to cover developments up to the spring of 1957. It represents an ambitious attempt to gather in one volume all significant aspects of economic change which have occurred in the European satellites of the Soviet Union, including Yugoslavia but excluding Albania. This areal limitation may distort at least the historical profile of Eastern Europe: inclusion of Austria alone would materially alter some of the statistical series presented. After tracing the economic structure before and after the war, the study analyzes the nationalization of the economy chronologically and sectorally for each of the countries covered, the special case of Soviet assets, companies and "joint partnerships" in the former enemy states and the two cycles of changes in agriculture, namely land reform and partial collectivization. The second major part of the book deals with planning and industrialization, in terms of model, scope and techniques of plans; results achieved in each country; some of the fundamental managerial problems; and the resultant pattern of trade with the Soviet Union. A concluding chapter on investment and national income is in many ways the most significant contribution of the study, more especially since it may correct possible misinterpretation of data in the main part of the book.

At their face value, results of planning and industrialization were impressive. Computed in current dollars the author gives the following figures for the prewar and 1954 per capita incomes for the various countries: Czechoslovakia 244 and 519; Poland 116 and 468; Hungary 224 and 387; Romania 139 and 314-329; Yugoslavia 133 and 167; Bulgaria 163 and 285 dollars. These figures are, however, meaningless as indicators of living standards because of levels of investment and of public consumption having little relevance for the reference to private consumption. The reader has to read the last chapter to be made fully aware of this fact, partly because data on investment are scattered among analysis of the various economic sectors, partly because no data at all are given for spending by consumption units. This is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the study. It is easy to be impressed by the fact that Hungary reached a level of industrialization (measured by per capita steel consumption) of prewar Czechoslovakia and the latter that of prewar Sweden; but it is only on page 480 that one reads that economic growth "is paid for by the sharply reduced share of private consumption in the net material product, a factor which creates enormous imbalances and pent-up pressures and generates deep processes of dislocation which can ultimately lead to the complete disintegration of the system itself. "Indeed, the final conclusion is, somewhat divergent from the previous chapters, that the orbit conflicts are deepening and are bound to initiate new and powerful centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet bloc.

Occasional errors necessitate a somewhat limited reliance on the statistical data, quite apart from the caution one has to exercise in using figures published by authoritarian régimes. For instance, on page 15 and subsequently, it is indicated that the total share of agricultural holdings of more than 100 hectars in Czechoslovakia was 41.2% of total farm acreage, and on page 225 Czechoslovakia ranks with Hungary and Poland as an example of feudalism. Reliable figures by Brdlík, reprinted in the monograph on Czechoslovakia published by Human Relations Area Files, give the corresponding figure for the same prewar period as 10%, certainly much more in consonance with known facts. On page 19, foreign capital is credited with having owned 80% of the capital and reserves and held 80% of the deposits of the local banks, but the reader looks in vain for a statement that this only applied to the Balkan states and not the other countries in the area. In general, the virtues and the shortcomings of the study are those of many group and institutional research projects, presenting a vast array of data and covering vast areas of investigation, but somewhat uneven in reliability and depth. None the less, no serious student of the economies of Eastern Europe could henceforth do without this most valuable and knowledgeable volume.

Reed College FRANK MUNK

MACLEAN, FITZROY, *Disputed Barricade, The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito.* London: Jonathan Cape, 1957. Pp. 480. 25s.[1]

The French Revolution, in its initial stages, was strongly imbued with the universalistic outlook of eighteenth -century social and political thinkers; not French man, or French society, alone, but Man and Society were to be reformed and reconstructed. We know the unexpected sequel: from the French Revolution modern nationalism received its greatest single impulse. Similarly, the Bolsheviks were initially more concerned with the reform of human society than with the Russian state, accidental first base for world wide operations. Within this context Trotsky's statement that "patriotism to the Soviet State is revolutionary duty, whereas patriotism to a bourgeois state is treachery" is wholly understandable and consistent.

But the question of what the leaders of the Soviet state stand for is precisely what bedevils the politics of our day. In so far as they can claim adherence to their initial revolutionary purpose they can also claim, and do in fact receive, the first allegiance of individuals over the entire planet. It is this condition that lends especial interest and significance to the present book, a survey of the Yugoslav scene centering around the personality of Tito.

The triune kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia, was born of the first World War. Whether or not Yugoslavia was a nation might indeed be debated, and the accidents of history could give the question one answer or another. Tito himself may be regarded as such an accident and the humor of the possibility of a staunch Communist being eventually enshrined as a national hero should not be overlooked.

Tito himself did not emerge into clear and notable focus until the later stages of the second World War, prior to which time it was not even certain whether the name concealed an actual person. His earlier career, following his first-hand acquaintance with the Russian Revolution (he had been wounded and captured by the Russians in 1915), was, between the two wars, that of an obscure underground organizer. Yugoslav communism was a poor thing which, for that reason, commanded a minimum of respect in Moscow; it is worthy of note, however, that Tito was mainly in Yugoslavia during this interval and that he gave evidence of personal courage, determination, organizing skill and blind obedience to the Kremlin. The war gave him his opportunity which his strength, moral and physical, and his ability enabled him to exploit where lesser men would have either yielded or been captured. The record of his survival during those dark years has truly epic dimensions.

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[1] An American edition of this book has also been published under the title, *The Heretic* (New York, Harper, 1957).

With patience and forbearance he bore Russian highhandedness, but the war experience left an indelible mark.

> The orthodox Communist must be immune to ordinary human feelings: he must be without pride, without love or hatred, without pity or resentment, without patriotism or loyalty, save to Moscow. During the war. under the terrific stresses and strains to which they had been subjected, Tito and the men around him had to some extent lost this immunity. Fighting side by side, they had come to feel pride in their achievements and in those of their countrymen. They had allowed feelings of comradeship, of loyalty and affection to grow up between them. They had at times even felt pity for the sufferings of the civilian population. They had felt anger and resentment at the lack of understanding they so often encountered. In short, they had acquired a point of view of their own, a national point of view, very nearly, for which in the ultimate resort they would have been prepared to die. They had experienced the stirrings of something which, if not oldfashioned patriotism, was certainly very like it. And they had experienced it with the violence, the intensity of feelings, which is one of the characteristics of their race (p. 368).

It was obtuseness and insensitiveness of colossal dimensions on the part of Moscow, more specifically of Stalin, to remain blind to these things. Yet Tito's loyalty was such that it took three years before he found he must resist Russian *prepotenza.* It was a courageous decision, rash in many ways, the consequences of which will be long in unfolding; it was also one that gives Yugoslavia interest and significance far beyond what her intrinsic power could command. There is weakness, not to say cause for amusement, in many of the things Tito said after 1948, things which had long been there for all to see; and there is the strength of consistency at least in Moscow's insistence on absolute obedience. For the seed of heresy once planted, the course of its growth cannot be guided into specified channels; to this the current case of Djilas bears witness and lends added fascination to the Yugoslav scene.

This tale is told in highly attractive fashion by Sir Fitzroy Maclean than whom few could be better placed to unravel it. He has gone to considerable pains to document it and has succeeded in giving an account that is characterized by a rare combination of sympathetic understanding and dispassionate fairness. The result is a dramatic story and an important contribution, of the sort that one can only wish more samples were available.

Barnard College RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ
Columbia University

MCVICKER, CHARLES P., *Titoism. Pattern for International Communism.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957; Pp. 332. $6.00.

The organization of Mr. McVicker's book, as unusual as one finds it, is indicative both of the Titoist pattern and of its evaluation by the author. Only the last part of the book is concerned with the organization of the Communist Party—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as it has called itself since 1952—and with its ideological development. The new Titoist system in the economy and administration of the country forms the crux of McVicker's work and within such a framework appears to be the most informative study to date.

The Workers' Council Law, passed in 1950, "turned the management and control of all economic organizations over to the workers of each individual enterprise," (p. 33) and thus established a foundation for a neo-Marxist theory and practice, which not only interprets Marx in a new light, not only enriches Lenin, not only rejects Stalin, but also, according to McVicker, opens a new road to socialism with the potentialities of reconciling the demands of a socialist economy with those of political democracy. The system of workers' self-management "will remain the touchstone of Titoism," states the author (p. 56).

Once the Yugoslav Communists took the paramount step of turning over the factories to workers' management other important measures had to follow suit. Decentralization in the factories' administration was accompanied by drastic reforms in the planning of production policy—from a strictly central plan to a widely decentralized, local planning. The policy of budgets had to be decentralized accordingly. Wages were more individualized and prices were opened to individual considerations and open market conditions. A similar trend, away from dictation by central governmental offices, took place in the credit system, banking, and foreign trade. De-collectivization of land, abolition of dictated prices of agricultural products, and free marketing appear to have been the most radical departure from any type of communism, whether Marxist, Leninist, or Stalinist. Tito's policy in agriculture can hardly be called Titoism if the term still implies a form of socialism; and Mr. McVicker rightly points to the stubbornness of the Yugoslav peasant and to his being still Tito's greatest challenge.

Equally informative is Mr. McVicker's treatment of the political reforms in Yugoslavia, the social reforms, the education, and the legal system. They all tend to give to the Yugoslav citizen some measure of political, social, and legal security.

There is little doubt that the general climate of politics in Yugoslavia has progressively changed since about 1950. The Stalinist totality of control in the period between 1945 and 1950 gave way to some political and economic concessions which cannot but be welcomed by liberals. No wonder that even after the formal reconciliation between Moscow and Belgrade Khrushchev felt compelled to point to serious ideological differences existing between the two centers, each claiming the purity of Marxism in their respective countries. The distinct clarity with which Mr McVicker acquaints us with the Yugoslav system makes these differences clear even though he refrains from comparisons.

However, as McVicker stresses on various occasions, most of the Yugoslav innovations are obviously of an experimental, perhaps even an opportunistic nature, and their frequent amendments would rather discourage the conclusion that Titoism does represent a new political and economic theory, a "social democracy," possibly even "a pattern for international communism."

The limited space which the author devotes to the position and activities of the Yugoslav Communist Party is indicative of the tendency to underestimate its decisive rôle in every sector of life in the country. But he points to the fact that even in that hub of new Yugoslav system, in the management of factories, the chairman of the Workers' Council, the director, and the officials of the Trade Unions in each enterprise are "in almost every instance" Party members (p. 71). He emphasizes information over analysis. He is on guard against accepting it at face value; yet his criticism stops, it seems, half-way, often inclined as he is to seek a really new theoretical twist in the Yugoslav Communists' writings and practices.

With all good will to accord them the benefit of the doubt, it is most difficult to accept that "Titoist social democracy stresses, both in theory and practice, the importance of the individual as the essential component of the socialist community" (p. 296). For a democrat and a liberal there is no ambiguity about the place of the individual in society. This will remain the sole measurement of Titoist "social democracy."

This remark should not, however, detract from the highly illuminating value of the work of Mr. McVicker which is a must for any student not only of Yugoslavia but also of communist theories and practices in other countries.

University of Denver JOSEF KORBEL

ALEXANDROV, VICTOR, *Khrushchev of the Ukraine: A Bibliography,* New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. 216. $4.75.

It it regrettable that a book such as Alexandrov's *Khrushchev of the Ukraine* must be reviewed in a scholarly journal. Yet in the inevitable scavenger hunt of contemporary researchers every "source," however spurious or fictitious, is likely to be consulted, and it is therefore in order to enter one's comments and caveats. The book under review is a chatty and grossly misleading product of journalism at its worst, mitigated by sporadic soundness of judgment. It is unreliable as a source and less than honest in the use of quotations.

The biography as here presented is a Russian Horatio Alger story. "Nikita" (the author hardly ever refers to him by his last name), by his "simple, unassuming, cheerful and affable" manner, by his clear vision and energy, makes his way up the ladder of Soviet power. In a peculiar "cult of personality," Khrushchev and others (it is always a matter of intriguing personalities—or their wives—but not underlying political or socio-economic problems) make history in a fashion all too simple, dramatic, heroic, and untrue. There is always a *deus ex machina* who arrives at the proper time to solve every crisis, always a comic-strip type resolution that "explains" whatever eventuates. (The author could not, it is true, have predicted the latest rounds of purges and is therefore caught flatfooted when he depicts Zhukov as the kingpin and bosom friend of Nikita).

"Being of Ukrainian origin, [Khrushchev] is completely devoid of the byzantinism which is so prevalent among the Russians." The hagiography spans Khrushchev's career from the "unforgettable impression" which Lenin made on him, over Kaganovich's and Stalin's immediate discovery of Nikita's unique talents, to Khrushchev's single-handed slaughtering of miscellaneous monsters and Berias.

The author does not mince words in condemning the cruelties of the Big Purge or even exaggerating the number of exiles. Yet he neutralizes much of this by a Deutscheresque propensity to consider Stalin and Stalinism inevitable and progressive "at a juncture when Russia vitally needed someone" like the late dictator. More important, there is (one charitably assumes, out of naïveté) a tendency to soft-pedal the "excesses" of Bolshevism." The end-product of Khrushchev's forcible conversion of collectives into *agrogoroda* is blandly referred to as "garden cities." In speaking of an "extraordinary commission" to fight crime, Alexandrov nowhere suggests that this was the Cheka. The Main Political Administration of the army is reduced to an organ of wartime censorship. In speaking of Khrushchev's alleged (though utterly unsubstantiated) paternity of the Nazi-Soviet pact, the secret clauses allowing for mutual expansion remain concealed. As for the present, Nikita is the architect of "irreversible democratization."

Some of this may be due to plain ignorance. Under the Treaty of Riga, we are told, Bessarabia and Bukovina were ceded to Poland. Kursk and Briansk wind up in the Ukraine. Lenin, we are told, in 1918 "summoned Kerensky's Constituent Assembly." Stolypin, we learn, was a *boyar;* and Ukrainian is much like Slovene. The Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee are confused, as is Piatakov and Platonov, and as are the S-R's and S-D's. Sixty per cent of Soviet heavy industry is near the Chinese border; Miliukov was "simple-minded," and the MVD, we gather, had some "connections with the secret political police." Space does not permit listing more significant errors of dates, quotations, and, above all, interpretation. A number of specific citations seem to have been fabricated for the occasion. Passage after passage is based on gossip or imagination. Indeed, were it not for the risks of libel, one could fruitfully explore the similarities in approach between this volume (translated from the French) and others on Soviet affairs which, under various names, have emanated from Paris in recent years.

Columbia University ALEXANDER DALLIN

MARKERT, WERNER, ed., *Der Mensch im kommunistischen System.* Tübinger Vorträge über Marxismus und Sowjetstaat. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957. Pp. 118.

This volume contains seven lectures that were delivered in the summer of 1956 by historians, economists, political scientists, and philosophers of Tübingen University in a common effort to shed light on the origin, development, and present significance of Marxism and the Soviet system. The book is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Erwin Metzke, professor of philosophy, who died at the age of fifty a few weeks after lecturing on "Man and history in the original conception of Marx's thought." Judging by the quality of this speech, the loss caused by his decease is great indeed.

The publication of speeches or lectures in their original form generally tends to create awkward problems, not only because of the difference between the spoken and the written word to which a well known German saying refers, but also because of the more concentrated and critical attitude of the reading public compared to an audience. This difficulty has not been quite overcome in the case at hand; certainly the reader would often like interesting points more fully elaborated than was possible within the limits of an academic lecture; and he would desire more references to the sources. But there can be no doubt about the high level of nearly all these lectures nor about the soundness of the idea that such complex phenomena as Marxism and the Soviet system cannot be adequately dealt with in any one department, but call for the coöperation of experts from various disciplines. Finally, nothing but good can come from the decision to make such a pool of knowledge available to the general student body.

To the American reader, it is true, some of these lectures, notwithstanding their excellence *per se,* are likely to be of minor interest. Thus, Theodor Eschenburg's penetrating, yet lucid study of "The rights of the individual in the Soviet democracy" does a very able job in showing up the hollowness of recent Soviet claims to have effectively safeguarded the rights of the citizen; but in view of the work done in this country, especially at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, the lecture is not likely to contain anything startlingly new to American readers; and the same probably goes for Woldemar Koch's study of the relation between historical law and strategy in Lenin's thinking.

However, Hans Rothfels' speech on "Social order and co-existence" is a very different matter; This brilliant piece of historical analysis and interpretation is of special interest to all Americans who care to understand the present political thinking of German intellectuals—who are torn between their desire for German unification and their awareess of the prohibitive price to be paid for it. Professor Rothfels shows that under present conditions the price the Russians would exact would not be mere co-existence, but active coöperation with Russia, and ultimately the loss of German freedom! If this sounds pleasing to American ears, Rothfels makes several remarks that should be heeded in this country, especially his warning against the smug assumption that the social order of capitalism is sacrosanct and not fully subject to the dynamics of history. But within the framework of this review only a hint at the scope and significance of this speech can be given.

The remaining four lectures deal chiefly with Marx's works. Apart from Metzke's above-mentioned study, there is Hans Peter's lecture on "The political economy in Marx's work," Werner Markert's analysis of "Marxism and Russian heritage in the Soviet system," and Iring Fetscher's study "From Marx to the Soviet ideology." In this field German scholars, owing to their easier access to the original of Marx's works and letters—only part of which is available in English—and to their closeness to the philosophical background against which Marx's development must be viewed, enjoy considerable advantages over their American opposite numbers. However, not all of the authors under discussion make good use of such advantages. Thus, Peter's speech is, on the whole, disappointing; more particularly, it contains some strangely naïve remarks concerning Marx's character and intentions which a closer study of his correspondence with Engels, Lassalle, and others would probably have prevented. And although Markert's lecture which effectively complements that by Eschenburg, is remarkably level-headed and unbiased, I would take issue with several points if space permitted.

Finally, Metzke's and Fetscher's lectures (which in some ways also complement each other) are both outstanding for their scholarly qualities and of special interest for Americans; for Metzke deals entirely, and Fetscher to some extent, with the humanistic thinking of the early Marx whose works are not easily available and little known to the American public. However, at least Fetscher does not seem fully aware of the tremendous and fateful transformation of Marx's personality that took place in the late forties and fifties—a transformation that changed the idealistic philosopher into a hard-bitten, cynical, and unscrupulous power-seeker. The most startling contrast is not that between Marx's thinking on the one hand and the Soviet ideology on the other, but that between Marx's original concepions and the ideas and actions of the revolutionary politician in London.

Dickinson College ARTHUR M. PRINZ

STARLINGER, WILHELM, *Russland und die atlantische Gemeinschaft.* Würzburg: Marienburg Verlag, 1957. Pp. 163. DM 8.80.

In 1955, Wilhelm Starlinger published a book, *Grenzen der Sowjetmacht* (reviewed in the *Journal,* XVI, 1956, pp. 201-203), which not only expressed his thoughts about Soviet power, but which was adopted in Germany (like Kennan's article signed 'X' in the United States) as a concrete program of action toward the Soviet Union. Starlinger has since died, and posthumously, various manuscripts of his elaborating the same theme are being published. The one to be reviewed here concerns the future relations of Russia and Germany—the latter seen as a member of the Atlantic community. Starlinger follows (or is it that he has shaped?) the views of Chancellor Adenauer, whose political wisdom is extolled to the point that the whole book may appear as election propaganda as well as an analysis of the situation in 1956, and an appeal to persist in the course followed by Germany under her present chancellor.

Starlinger starts from the premise that in the past years of Stalin's life, and at the time of the Geneva conference, the Western powers—especially the United States—underestimated the difficulties facing Russia (pp. 7, 12) and, deluded by Soviet smiles, missed the opportunity for a settlement in central Europe—key to future peace (p. 29). Since then, the balance of power has changed in favor of the Soviet Union and above all else extreme patience is necessary, especially for Germany. For the moment will come when Russia will realize that her own safety can be secured only by a settlement mutually satisfactory to herself and to a free Germany which is part of the Atlantic community. Such a settlement, by serving Russia and Germany, will serve the whole West. Its coming will be speeded if the West remains strong, alert to Soviet trickery, and patient. The Kremlin must understand that a split within the Atlantic community cannot be expected and that Germany will act only in concert with the United Staes. Indeed, the moment for an understanding may not be far off; for Starlinger expects (as already emphasized in his *Grenzen der Sowjetmacht*) that two major problems of Russia will convince her of her need for a settlement: (1) continued internal difficulties (obviously proved by events since the writing of the book), and (2) the rise of China and China's leading rôle in large parts of the former colonial world of East and South Asia. In Starlinger's view, this latter factor in particular may be a propitious one since it will make Russia realize that safety for her lies in an alignment with the Western world.

Most of Starlinger's points are today well known and generally accepted, and in this sense, his book offers little to the reader of today. The book may serve, though, as a reassurance of the sense of balance with which the future is viewed by responsible Germans. No doubt, Starlinger would regret the advantage that, in the meantime, lack of wisdom on the part of England and France in Cyprus, Egypt, Algeria, etc., has secured for a Russia which otherwise would have been forced into an entirely defensive position. But it is clear that even recent events would not have shaken Starlinger's thesis that Germany must remain steadfast in its Western alliance and that the Western powers must remain faithful to Germany; that it is necessary to preserve united strength and to give nothing without receiving a due equivalent; and that it is in Russia's interest to seek security by befriending the West before eastern problems become too pressing.

University of Delaware WALTER KIRCHNER

BUĆ, STJEPAN, *Značajke i sudbina "Dušanovih Carstva."* Munich: Published by author, 1957. Pp. 62.

The tragedy of the Yugoslav refugees is that they, like their Russian predecessors, are in disagreement over a variety of basic political, religious and national issues. Some of them, including the author of this book, are racists and bigots who have dedicated themselves to dissemination of historical errors and distortions. Dr. Buć is associated with the Ustashi, who during World War II murdered untold numbers of Serbs to justify the Drina as the ethnic frontier of the Croat nation. For a long time Dr. Buć has been waging war against the Croat "official historians" with whom he disagrees over the interpretation of many important historical problems, including those concerning the origin of the Croats. He rejects the generally accepted thesis that the Croats are Slavs, and contends that the Croats must be of Gothic origin; he bases his interpretation on the work of T. Peisker, who considers the Slavs the scum of humanity. (See Buć's *Naši službeni povjesničari i pitanje podrijetla Hrvata.* Zagreb, 1941. Pp. 24)

With this background of the author's writings and convictions, one can well imagine what he has to say about "The Significances and Fate of 'Dushan's Empires." The title of this work implies that the author has an axe to grind. Buć explains how in 1918 the Croats were forced into a single state with the Serbs with whom they had nothing in common, and how he had dedicated himself to undoing the Yugoslav state by initiating no less than eleven different anti-Yugoslav periodicals during the interwar period. The author shows nothing but disdain for everything Serbian and for all who helped to establish the Serbs in history with their writings (Orbini, Jireček, Niederle). He tells us that the Croats have a much longer and richer history than the Serbs, that the Croat homeland stretches to the Drina river and that the Croats are heirs to the territories and culture of the Western Roman Empire. The Serbs live on the other side of the Drina, that is, in territory which is the "Asiatic" or "Asiatic-Byzantine" cultural orbit. Thus, in Buć's opinion, the Serbs have no valid claim on Bosnia and Herzegovina, or any other territories West of the Drina.

The author rejects all well-established theories regarding the origin of the first Serbian state and the rôle of Nemanja and his dynasty in Serbian history. Instead, he accepts the ideas of the Magyar writer F. Kaszony who speculates among other things that the ethnic composition of the Serbs is a result of fusion of Pechenegs, Cumans and Magyars (22-23). As for Nemanja, his rôle in history—according to Buć—was to "legitimize" the people of Raška as the Serbian nation. Because of a need for "amoral force," Nemanja's son Sava manipulated his way into being recognized by the Patriarch of Nicaea as Archbishop of Serbia, without the approval of the Archbishop of Ohrid whose jurisdiction extended over Raška.

The Serbian Church, we are told, was "no religious institution," but "an imperialistic instrument" used to conquer foreign lands (30-31). To prove this the author notes the anti-Orthodox policy of the Roman Church. Since its origin, Buć writes, the Church of St. Sava carried within itself all the "characteristics of its founders."

The author blames Vuk Stefanović Karadžić—who he thinks was of Osmanli origin—for founding "Serbian nationalism," and accuses him of supplying the ideology for today's "Dušan Empire." In conclusion the author points out that Serbia would have been better off had she remained within her 1914 borders, because she would have been in her own ethnic element, and therefore would have been a stable state. From Buć's standpoint, there is no difference between pre-World War II Yugoslavia and Tito's Yugoslavia; the difference between them is only one of nomenclature That Tito is a Croat and a Communist dictator is of no consequence. The state he heads is only a latest version of "Dušan's Empire." What nonsense!

Stanford University WAYNE S. VUCINICH

MACARTNEY, C. A., *A History of Hungary 1929-1945.* New York: Praeger, 1957, 2 vols. Pp. xvi, 493 + 519. $20.00.

The historians of Hungary, so articulate in describing past epochs, have been rather silent on the affairs of the last forty years. Lacking the freedom which is necessary for the evaluation of current events, scholars of the older generation finished their narrative with the end of the First World War; and the younger generation, working under the official control of the Communist Party, have not contributed essentially to an objective comprehension of history in our generation. The conspicuous hiatus of our knowledge has now been greatly filled by the competent authority of Professor Macartney. His new book, monumental in its research and length, is obviously the work of a scholar who is dedicated to his subject and not afraid of an arduous task. Hungary in the time of the Regency had more than her fair share of controversial problems. Although many of those problems belong now to the past, they are still surrounded by the emotional involvement of the interested parties. The author shows praiseworthy courage in taking up this controversial period.

He begins his history with the year 1920 when Horthy as Regent emerged, and gives a relatively short but clear summary of the country's social, political, and economic situation in the 1920's. The narrative expands into more details with the year 1932 when the appointment of Gyula Gömbös launched Hungary on her pro-Nazi political course. The description of the following twelve years makes up almost nine-tenths of the book. Unfortunately, this main part of the study restricts its interest to what was regarded as "political life" in Hungary and neglects the social, economic, and cultural aspects, so important for the future. The chapters on domestic policy record those never-ceasing intrigues and counter-intrigues which constituted the struggle for power in a country where the existence of the government did not depend on the approval of the masses. The chapters on foreign policy describe, with great restraint, the country's ill-fated association with the Axis Powers and, with apparent over-emphasis, the rather irrelevant and unrealistic attempts to establish connections with the Allied Powers.

Within this framework the author displays a rare mastery of that Hungarian background which is so strange to Western eyes. Having collected a vast amount of material, he records almost every important event and arranges them in a digestible form. He valiantly faces the difficulties of historical controversies, and in many passages he offers a well-balanced summary of complex questions. It is not his fault that the topic hides too many challenges, and where a short history could keep the balance, the detailed account of the author becomes a stumbling block to historical objectivity.

The author collected a great part of his source material from the reminiscences of people active in Hungarian politics and administration. The list of his informants (p. xvi) begins with "H. R. N. the Archduke Otto Habsburg, S. H. S. the Regent," and reminds one of the opening pages of the old Hungarian Book of Dignitaries, the *Tiszti Cimtár.* All but one of the informants belong to the former Hungarian ruling class. Representatives of other classes or political parties were evidently not asked to furnish information.

Personal connections, especially if one-sided, may be prejudicial for the historian. Indeed, many passages indicate that the sentiments of the author are with the Right wing of Hungarian politics, and against that sector which advocated democratic reforms. The characterization of Horthy (I, 51-3) sounds like the eulogy of an official newspaper, and is strangely contradicted in some later parts of the work (II, 30, 246, 253, 291). Even Szálasi appears as a statesman of governmental abilities (I, 161); and the frequent references to his unpublished diary (showing him as an exceptionally keen observer of his time) necessitate the question whether the author used an authentic copy of the diary. Professor Macartney finds some words of praise for the rightist politicians; but censures repeatedly all parties and politicians of the opposition—the Small Holders, Liberals, Social Democrats, and particularly the "nasty and jealous" émigrés (I, 52). He tries to connect the organizations of the opposition with Communism and accuses, for example, the strictly bourgeois newspaper *Magyar Nemzet,* of having been the handmaid of Communism (II, 48).

The hardly repressed partisanship leads to certain practices and statements which do not conform to the general academic usage. The author identifies some people as "Jews," or "Swabians"; but others, especially business leaders and supporters of the government, are not similarly identified. The invective used against Vilmos Böhm (II, 121, 164) and the pun made on the name of a journalist (II, 56, 65), are rather tasteless. The omission of the first names, initials, official titles of the Social Democratic leaders is in line with the practice of the pro-Regency press, but not with academic impartiality. As some further unevenness in composition, the author includes many anecdotic details, but overlooks those more important items which would contradict his evaluation of the Regency. The book, although a thorough work, contains a number of errors and misprints.

Macartney's work is an important, but somewhat uneven summary of an Hungarian epoch. It will undoubtedly be widely used by scholars, but very likely with criticism.

Le Moyne College JOHN KOSA

SHORTER NOTICES

WANDRUSZKA, ADAM, *Das Haus Habsburg.* Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk, 1956. Pp. 226.

This book is a brief and laudatory account of the fortunes of the Habsburg family from its first recorded history to the World War. It is not a political history, but rather a study of the character of the individual rulers and their conception of their duties and their position. The traditions and myths associated with each reign as well as the evolution of the concept of the empire itself are discussed. The international, or supranational, aspects of the monarchy and its "mission" in Europe are emphasized throughout. As to the final downfall of the dynasty, the reader is left with the impression that it simply faded out. With Franz Joseph the burden of office became too heavy for the individual members of the family to bear; it was a "crown of thorns," destructive of personal happiness and satisfaction, as was witnessed in the tragic lives of Empress Elizabeth, Rudolf, Franz Ferdinand and even in the fate of Maximilian in Mexico.

This book is recommended as an interesting and popular account of the dynasty; it is not, nor is it meant to be, a critical study of the Danubian Monarchy.

University of California, Berkeley BARBARA JELAVICH

RHODE, GOTTHOLD, and W. WAGNER, edd., *Quellen zur Entstehung der Oder-Neisse Linie.* Stuttgart: Brentano, 1956. Pp. 292. 1 map.

KRAUS, HERBERT, ed., *Deutschlands Ostproblem.* Würzburg: Holzner, 1957. Pp. 220.

KRAUS, HERBERT, ed., *German Eastern Territories.* Würzburg: Holzner, 1957. Pp. 196. 1 map.

KURT, KARL O., ed., *Die deutschen Ostgebiete im Spiegel der polnischen Presse.* Würzburg: Holzner, 1958. Pp. 102.

WIEWÓRA, BOLESŁAW, *Granica Polsko-Niemiecka w świetle prawa międzynarodowego.* Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1957. Pp. 230. 2 maps.

There is no likelihood that the stream of books and articles focused on the present borderline between Poland and the German Democratic Republic will diminish. Indeed, with each new publication, the heat enerated seems to increase and the light to decrease. The present group, selected from a much larger list, clearly illustrates this generalization.

The first book on the list is a collection of extracts from published diplomatic papers, joint declarations, memoirs of participants and public pronouncements by chiefs of state, secretaries of state, foreign ministries and statements made in the several legislative bodies from 1939 to 1950. There is nothing in the collection strange to anyone who has kept abreast of these publications as they have appeared. The collection was doubtless intended for the German public who may not have had the whole suite of the original publications available. The German interest in Allied concern for an Eastern border settlement can be easily understood, and the present selection is weighted in that direction.

The next three titles are the product of the Göttinger Arbeitskreis, which has made a specialty of gathering and presenting data on the past, present and future of the areas of pre-1939 Germany that have been, since 1945, in Polish and Soviet hands. In *Deutschlands Ostproblem* a broad approach is made to the Slavs and their impact on *Germanentum.* The relationship is pictured as, at times in the past, one of friendly dependence by the Slavs on the German benevolent protectors against Russian aggression. The burden of the second of the Göttinger Arbeitskreis books, the *German Eastern Territories,* is a summary of statistics of these areas from pre-1939 censuses and a fairly complete chronology of events in this area from 1200 B. C. to 1956 A. D. There follows another *catena* of brief selections from important persons. Professor Kurt quotes statements from Polish newspapers which depreciate the failure of Poles to achieve in the Western territories in ten years what the Germans were able to do in six centuries.

Professor Wiewóra examines the establishment of the present frontier from the point of view of international law. It is carefully and thoroughly done, but the realistic reader, I fear, will have to remark that the sanction of the "laws" concerning frontiers between nations are still what they have always been: the power of a state to maintain those frontiers. Poland, of all states, has the best reason to be aware of this reality.

University of Colorado S. H. THOMSON

WŁODARSKI, BRONTISŁAW, *Chronologia polska. Praca zespołowa.* Warsaw: Instytut Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk. Pod red. Tadeusza Manteuffla, 1957. Pp. 492, 11 tables.

To the traditional elements of a chronology the authors of this book have annexed some data which is of value to scholars interested in the history of Eastern Europe. The "Theoretic Part" by K. Jasiński, the pupil of Professor Włodarski, includes information on the medieval system of dating used in Poland. The "Practical Part" by Włodarski contains calendars used in various bishoprics and by some religious orders and three of the oldest Polish calendars of the eleventh century. The edition is based on rare publications and on twenty manuscripts, among them, four Cistercian calendars and four calendars used by the Teutonic Order in Prussia. Also in this section are lists of saints of the Western and Eastern Church, the former taken from old Russian calendars of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. The list was already published in the rare works of Sreznievsky (1864) and Makrios (1868) and has now been reprinted. Scholars studying not only Polish, but also Russian history, would be interested in consulting these lists. Third, following the chronological tables, modelled on those of Grotefend, the section contains the Polish Cisioianus, a table of Slavonic numbers used in Russia and Poland, a table of solar eclipses by the astronomer Wł. Dziewulski, on which only those observable in Poland are mentioned.

A supplement includes lists of the rulers of Poland, Pomerania, Prussia, Livonia, Curlandia, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Lithuania, Hungary, and the Rumanian principalities, excepting the nineteenth century Turkey, the

Tartarian States and the list of Popes. It occurred to us that in the supplement there are more mistakes in the dates than in the rest of the book (e.g., the day of the death of Hitler is given as June 30 instead of April 30). Students in Polish history will find next the successive order of seats in the Senate, the lists of primates, of diets—including those of Polish provinces during the partition of the land in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—and a bibliography of works dealing with the lists of dignitaries and official personages of Poland. I think the book will be useful to scholars interested in the history of Eastern Europe.[1]

Toruń, Poland KAROL GÓRSKI

VON SCHMERTZING, WOLFGANG P., ed. and transl., *Outlawing the Communist Party, A Case History: The Decision of the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany.* New York: Bookmailer, 1957. Pp. xviii, 227. $5.00.

This is the English translation (in an abridged version) of a historical document: the decision which, in the summer of 1956, declared the Communist Party of Western Germany unconstitutional and dissolved the party in accordance with the famed Article 21 of the Bonn Fundamental Law. The hotly debated provision had been inserted in the constitution in order to forestall the recurrence of events that had led to the suicide of the Weimar Republic. In 1952 the Constitutional Court (in an untranslated decision) outlawed and obviously thereby destroyed a totalitarian party of the Right. Four years later the Communist Party was found to be among the organizations which "by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany."

The evidence which the Court gathered and discussed comprehensively is impressive and gives indeed a closely reasoned account of the rapport between revolutionary theory and action of communism everywhere. At every point the Court is most careful not to base its findings on the condemnation of unorthodox beliefs and therefore to avoid the reproach of engaging in a witch trial. In their conclusions the judges delve into profound problems connected with the relationship between law, justice, and politics. They do not deny under all circumstances the right to resistance but believe that important distinctions must be drawn between the mere formal legality and the true legitimacy of an existing order. By reasoning in this way the Court is able to leave undecided the question whether the CP actually intended to overthrow the unconstitutional order by violent means; it remains therefore, in my opinion, on a far safer ground than the U. S. Supreme Court when it tried to apply the Holmes-Brandeis formula of "clear and present danger" to the activities of an internationally-based modern totalitarian party.

While students of communism and of political jurisprudence will still have to turn to the original German judgment, this edition will prove useful to many others. It is preceded by a most unfortunate preface, authored by Robert Morris, Chief Counsel of U. S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. That Mr. Morris feels antagonistic to the point of hysteria towards certain recent Supreme Court decisions, such as the Watkins case, is his right. That he tries to attack the Supreme Court Justices vitriolically by contrasting their views with those of their German brethren is tactless to say the least. A comparison between the tone of his preface and the painstaking efforts of the German Court makes this reviewer wonder whether Mr. Morris has even understood the legal and political implications of the discerning and searching decision he praises.

University of Colorado HENRY W. EHRMANN

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[1] A book on the diplomatic, paleographic, chronologic and other auxiliary sciences of Turkey and of the Tartarian States was published in 1955 by Professor Ananias Zajackowski and Jan Reychman (*Zarys dyplomatyki osmanskotureckiej*. Warsaw: 1955. Pp. 168, 1 table). It includes also a short bibliography of the auxiliary sciences of the history of Turkey.

RÖSSLER, HELMUTH, *Reichsfreiherr vom Stein.* Berlin: Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 119.

This small paper-back volume is the second in the series *Persönlichkeit und Geschichte,* the purpose of which is to present great men in relation to their times. In this respect Rössler has written a model book, a marvel of compression, up-to-date scholarship, and lucid writing. The five chapters neatly correspond to the major phrases of Stein's life. The first stresses the importance of his *reichsritterliche* origins and his Göttingen education. The second tells how his administrative talents brought rapid advancement in the Prussian civil service. The third treats his reforms in Prussia. Modern in his desire to abolish serfdom. Stein nevertheless appears as essentially conservative; an admirer of the medieval Reich and a champion of reform based on the ancient diets, estates, and imperial cities. Parliamentary England, not bureaucratic France was his model. In Chapter Four the author analyzes sympathetically but not approvingly Stein's rôle in the wars of liberation. He regards Stein as unrealistic about the German problem, naïve in his trust of Russia, and less adroit than either Metternich or Hardenberg. Stadion, the subject of an earlier study by Rössler, is still the author's favorite of this period. Chapter Five is the concise, sometimes moving dénouement of Stein's life after 1815.

I find the admiration for Stadion far-fetched and do not share Rössler's belief (p. 105) that without Stein's urging Alexander would never have continued the war outside of Russia. One factual error is the statement (p. 100) that Stein did not collaborate with Gagern and Plessen at the Congress of Vienna. Otherwise I have no complaints and can only concur in Rössler's conclusion that character, not success, entitles Stein to a place in this series.

University of Kentucky ENNO E. KRAEHE

VOLLMER, BERNARD, *Volksopposition im Polizeistaat. Gestapo- und Regierungsberichte 1934-1936.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1957. Pp. 399.

Portions of the files of the NSDAP and the Gestapo have only very gradually been made available to German scholars. The documents which Vollmer here reproduces in part, with an introduction and some cursory annotations, are therefore of considerable interest, affording as they do a wealth of information about the character of public opinion in the Aachen district during the period between March 1934 and March 1936. They are monthly reports addressed to the Headquarters of the Prussian Secret Police and written (with one exception by functionaries who often manifest a remarkable candor. It is perhaps to be regretted that Vollmer reproduces only the first two in full. For the rest, he has restricted the text to "the chapters which are of interest in so far as opposition to National Socialism is concerned." Nevertheless what is reprinted in the initial two reports outside this rubric is of minor value to the historian.

The reporting officials were, as faithful National Socialists, fully aware that excesses of which the Party was guilty increased silent opposition. This in turn was centered in the Churches, though to be sure underground Communist activity did not cease in scattered mining districts. Since the population was overwhelmingly Catholic, the firm stand taken by the Luthern Confessional Church made less of an impact than it did, for example, in Berlin. The manner in which the well organized Catholic clergy, sure of the silent allegiance of the faithful, carried on the struggle against the "ideology of neo-Paganism," of which Alfred Rosenberg was the principal apostle, was thus the chief object of Gestapo concern. That concern is manifested frankly and fully in these pages, which their authors never suspected would sometime be cited as evidence that the public they cowed with force was spiritually immunized against the Party. It was finally the occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler in 1936, without even a threat of recourse to sanctions by the French, which ended the possibility that the repudiation of Nazism on spiritual grounds could develop into more overt political opposition. Regrettably, despite the register of persons and places which Vollmer apends to his book, readers without some previous familiarity with the scene and the men who struggled on it can hardly sense the deep human quality of the narrative.

Hunter College GEORGE N. SHUSTER

EULER, HEINRICH, *Die Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republik 1919-1923. (Vom Waffenstilland bis zum Ruhrkonflikt)*. Aschaffenburg: Paul Pattloch-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 471. DM 18.50.

This is a curious book. Published, apparently, at the author's expense, it lacks the customary introduction and conclusion in which historians usually state the purpose and summarize the findings of their research. Instead, Mr. Euler plunges right into a detailed narration of political events, domestic and foreign, during the first five years of the Weimar Republic. Writing as a chronicler rather than a historian, he makes little attempt at selection, interpretation, and generalization. After reading this massive volume with its close to 500 large pages of small print, the historian of the period will have learned little that he did not know before, while the general reader will be hopelessly confused, his head swimming with data and his ears ringing with the innumerable speeches of leading statesmen, often quoted in full.

The writing of a factual narrative, setting forth the salient facts of a period on which source materials are still scarce, can be an important contribution. But there is hardly any longer a shortage of sources on the period discussed here. With all of Germany's, most of America's, and many of Britain's documents now available, research into the crucial subject of the Weimar Republic's foreign policy can now be fairly definitive. Even a mere survey, such as the author may have intended to write, can now draw on the numerous secondary studies produced during the last ten or fifteen years, most of which penetrate below the surface of official policies and pronouncements. Mr. Euler's impressive bibliography, probably the best part of his book, shows that he is aware of the existence of most of these recent studies. But a look at his voluminous footnotes (more than a thousand in one single chapter) shows that he made little use of them. Most of the materials to which the notes refer, especially Wippermann's excellent *Deutscher Geschichtskalender* (of which much of the present book is a mere paraphrase), were available at least 25 years ago, and the bulk of Euler's book could have been written then. As for later sources, the author leans heavily on secondary works by little-known writers of the Nazi period. Their accounts, needless to say, often tend to be more colorful than correct.

This does not mean, however, that Euler's book is biased. His approach is on the whole neutral, and his treatment of controversial figures like Wilson, Erzberger, or Rathenau, tries to be balanced and fair. The main shortcoming of the book is its lack of depth. Its great length, furthermore, is deceptive, since so much consists of quotations, and since some of the rest has no direct bearing on the subject. Still, Mr. Euler has done an immense amount of work, and as a general introduction to the early years of the Weimar Republic his book has some use. It might also serve as a factual reference work, though the absence of an index makes this quite difficult. About the author's knowledge of his subject and his ability as a writer there can be no doubt. One only wishes he had put his talents to better use.

The Johns Hopkins University HANS W. GATZKE

VON BOETTICHER, FRIEDRICH, *Schlieffen*, Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1957. Pp. 106.

The brief biography, number seven in a series of such sketches, under the publisher's general title, "Personality and History," is an almost entirely uncritical apologia, both of Schlieffen the man, and of his military planning, which had such a disastrous influence on German politics. The author's thesis, that Schlieffen scrupulously subordinated war and war planning to its proper place as an instrument of politics rather than an end in itself, rests on the argument that Schlieffen himself *planned* for a twelve-day grace period before the actual World War I invasion of Belgium was supposed to begin, a period which Moltke dispensed with in his haste to seize Liége. In view of Schlieffen's espousal of a preventive war against France during the 1905 Moroccan crisis, which the author discusses on pp. 64ff., his principal thesis falls apart rather badly.

Although of little substantive interest to the military historian, Boetticher's essay provides some insight into the narrow world of the professional military planner of the period, a world isolated from, but ultimately shaping, the fate of the society from which it was almost entirely cut off. The notes make no mention of Gerhard Ritter's authoritative *Der Schlieffen Plan,* published in 1956 with the complete texts of the 1905 plan itself, earlier drafts, and later studies.

Washington, D. C. PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

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